Peace and Conflict Transformation in Southeast Asia

Edited by Kamarulzaman Askandar

SHAPE SEA

ASEAN University Network
Human Rights Education (AUN-HRE)

SEACSN

Supported by

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University of Oslo

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Strengthening Human Rights and Peace Research and Education in ASEAN/Southeast Asia (SHAPE-SEA)

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Foreword

The publication of this sourcebook signifies a very welcome addition to the literature of peace and conflict studies at a time when the field urgently needs to be re-energised with the creativity, coherence and unity of theory and practice presented here.

When we published the fourth edition of our book *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* in 2016, we pointed out how swiftly and indeed how dramatically the global conflict environment can change. Five years on, as we write the foreword to this sourcebook, it is clear that the challenges for peace and conflict research have intensified and the need for fresh perspectives and constant adaption to complexity and change is more important than ever. In the conclusion, we wrote that the main task for the peace and conflict field was "to push forward decisively with the central mission of ensuring that conflict resolution is seen to be a truly cosmopolitan venture derived from and owned by all civilisations and all parts of the world."

We also expressed the hope that as we move into the third decade of the twenty first century, new ways of knowing, developed though multidisciplinary and cross cultural sharing of knowledge, would produce the creativity and renewal necessary to enrich both theory and practice in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

It is immensely satisfying to see the contributors to this sourcebook rising to the challenge. *Peace and Conflict Transformation in Southeast Asia* presents the work and experiences of researchers, educators and practitioners from a region which has experienced some of the most destructive and intensive conflicts, yet which has surmounted and transformed many of them and along the way provided a distinctive and authentic understanding of how to grow cultures of peace. Across eight chapters, the contributors to the sourcebook, all from the region or writing from embedded knowledge and experience in Southeast Asia, have provided an inspiring narrative, rich in case studies and robust in theory. It also projects an awareness of shared humanity that underpins the global enterprise of peace and conflict transformation. A remarkable achievement and a notable milestone in the progression of peace and conflict studies.

Professor Tom Woodhouse
Emeritus Professor
University of Bradford, UK

Professor Oliver Ramsbotham
Emeritus Professor
University of Bradford, UK

Co-Authors with Hugh Miall of *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Fourth Edition, London: Polity Press, 2016

Foreword

Since the first human rights textbook was published by the Southeast Asian Human Rights Studies Network (SEAHRN) in 2015, there has been increasing momentum behind the idea of developing teaching materials, including a 'Human Rights Textbook' in Southeast Asia. With a strong belief that reading materials can have an important impact on student learning, we began to pay attention to not only the improvement of instructional handbooks but also to the possibility for such textbooks to become a 'reform lever' for furthering the promotion of human rights education in the region.

As the field of human rights education grows gradually in the Southeast Asian region, likewise, we deemed it crucial to promote peace and conflict education among students. Following publication of the first three series of *An Introduction to Human Rights in Southeast Asia: A Textbook for Undergraduates*, we came to realise there was a real need for the development of a textbook pertaining to peace and conflict studies. As convener of the ASEAN University Network-Human Rights Education (AUN-HRE), I discussed with a few colleagues, especially Prof Dr Kamarulzaman Askandar (founder of the Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN) and one of a few experts in peace and conflict studies in the region), the possibility of developing a textbook focusing on peace and conflict education for Southeast Asia-based university lecturers to use as teaching materials. The idea was first concretized in a meeting held in Hanoi in December 2019 when Prof Askandar kindly agreed to form a team of experts in the field, based mainly in Southeast Asia with the participation of Prof Dr Yukiko Nishikawa at the Graduate School of Global Studies from Doshisha University in Japan.

Whilst developing a textbook is an important mission, it is not always an easy undertaking, especially coordinating with different experts who are not only familiar with the fields but also the preparation of teaching materials. In addition, we also wanted the textbook to reflect the situation of peace and conflict in the region; so, bringing in educators, practitioners, and scholars from within the area was both a challenge and a must.

Thus, following an immense effort by Prof Askandar to coordinate and edit the chapters, the fourth series of the textbook, *Peace and Conflict Transformation in Southeast Asia*, finally materialised. I am so grateful for the meaningful contributions that the editor and all the authors made to the preparation of this textbook. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights at Oslo University for their continued support. Finally, I extend my thanks to Magdalen Spooner, the copy editor, and Sunsanee Suthsunsanee, the education project manager, for their tedious work in ensuring the quality of this publication.

Sriprapha Petcharamesree
Convener, the AUN-HRE

Bangkok, October 2021

Preface

It took us a while to come up with this sourcebook. The idea to write a book with local content and cases that could be used as a sourcebook by students was one we had considered for a long time. In the meantime, we used materials by other writers in the field of which there are many, especially from the west. Indeed, such excellent materials made us reconsider our idea. What could we write about that had not already been published by other experts in the field? One could even say that using materials by other writers is easier and better because many of the ideas, concepts, theories, and frameworks are excellent and comprehensive. However, our personal experiences working and teaching in this field has also taught us that our students comprehend better when given examples from the region they can appreciate, understand, and relate to. As such, almost all the cases presented in my classes come from the region.

Over the years, I have gained much experience as a scholar-practitioner in this field. My work outside the classroom involves applying and implementing the theories, concepts, and approaches that I teach in class to actual conflict situations on the ground. While some worked, others did not. Along the way, I learnt to adapt theories and concepts or devise new ideas or approaches to suit real-life situations. These experiences were then taken back to the classroom and conveyed to students as lessons learnt and reflections for discussion. All courses I teach benefit from this approach, especially 'Theories and practices of conflict resolution' and 'Strategies and skills of conflict resolution.' Together, my students and I strive to understand the theories, discuss their application to actual situations in the region, and reflect upon their suitability and challenges in practice. What this shows is that not everything learnt in classrooms and read in textbooks is true or applicable. It also shows that much can be learnt from exploring situations in the region, and that many of these are not reflected in the textbooks currently being used in our classes. This was also the opinion of many of my colleagues teaching peace and conflict studies in other universities in the region. So, when Dr Sriprapha Petcharamesree of Mahidol University suggested we write a "textbook/sourcebook" on peace and conflict resolution reflecting our own understanding of the field and based on experiences and situations in the region to be used by students in our classes, we could hardly say no. Thus, began the adventure of writing this sourcebook.

Due to the myriad of issues, the first draft of the outline to this sourcebook had fifty chapters and was divided into several parts. I had even chosen the writers for these chapters. In the end, I was brought down to earth by my colleagues for pragmatic reasons, and we finally settled on eight chapters covering the most important topics for our students to understand. A team of writers was assembled, and we held many discussions on what and how to write the chapters. We also decided to bring in other colleagues to enrich the content by writing specific case studies or reflections of their own experiences in doing conflict transformation and peacebuilding in the region. The results are outstanding, and we are so thankful to these contributors for truly making this a much better and more relevant sourcebook.

The team also debated how the sourcebook could be used for teaching. As a result, we decided to list questions at the end of each chapter to encourage discussion. These are not exhaustive as many other questions can be asked about each topic. We are also aware that the sourcebook is far from perfect and can be improved upon. Such imperfections will be left to the readers to find and judge for themselves. For example, we are particularly aware that more case studies are required, especially

from Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. In our defence, we did actually invite potential contributors from some of these countries, but many were unable to join because of other commitments. Perhaps this can be remedied in the next edition.

We are also aware that the sourcebook still lacks "indigenous" ways of dealing with conflict situations or "local wisdom" on conflict transformation and peacebuilding. In our deliberations, we found it difficult to differentiate between "local" and so-called "western" traditions of conflict management. Peace and conflict studies is also a relatively new field in the region and more work and analyses by regional scholars is needed to study and highlight Southeast Asian nuances on definitions of terms and concepts, as well as specific approaches that can be traced to the region. For this edition, the sourcebook mostly utilises the perspective of "mainstream" peace and conflict studies traditions. It is the examples offered in the discussion of theories and the case studies where the Southeast Asian perspective and flavour take centre stage. In a way, it is our way of saying that, yes, the theories are generic, but the approach is contextual. We do, however, make an attempt to highlight some instances where there is a clear Southeast Asian approach to conflict management, like the "ASEAN Way" of decision-making processes and dispute resolution. Finally, we include processes of conflict transformation, peacemaking, and peacebuilding highlighted in other publications, for example, the UN mediation guide. This was done when it was felt that certain types of guidelines could give readers a more comprehensive view of the process. Cropping such guides or simply including short excerpts would not do justice to the information offered therein and may even lead to confusion. We then make the connection between these points and the case studies to ensure better understanding.

In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic meant all our meetings occurred online which was actually great as we met more often despite our different locations. The situation, however, did have an effect on our output as many of us struggled with the stress and difficulties of working online under constant lockdowns. This caused prolonged delays to the sourcebook. But at the same time, we also did not want to produce a sub-standard publication because we know (hope?) that this sourcebook will be used not only by our own students, but also others interested in the field of peace and conflict studies. In the end, we are proud of our work and hope others will find it useful too.

This project is supported by the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo and was coordinated by the ASEAN University Network–Human Rights Education (AUN-HRE) as part of the SHAPE-SEA program. In addition, we would like to thank our sponsors and colleagues at Mahidol University, Thailand and SHAPE-SEA especially Sriprapha Petcharamesree and Sunsanee Sutthisunsanee for their support and patience.

We would also like to thank all the contributors who have taken time to write excellent commentaries and case studies, making this sourcebook so much better: Suwit Laohasiriwong, Joel Mark Barrado, Fuad Mardhatillah, Abhoud Syed Lingga, Sachiko Ishikawa, Suadi Zainal, Josephine Rosa Marieta Soeprapto, Abdul Rahman Alavi, Cynthia Petrigh, Afrizal Tjoetra, Ismail G Kulat, Marc Batac, Yoko Fujimura, Carolyn O Arguillas, Guiamel Alim, Grace Jimeno-Rebollos, Mary Ann M Arnado, Eleonora Emkic, Tamara Nair, and Juanda Djamal.

Our gratitude also extends to the writers of the forewords to this sourcebook: Dr Sriprapha Petcharamesree of Mahidol University, a well-known human rights scholar in the region and former Representative of Thailand to the AICHR; and Professors Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, both Emeritus Professors at the University of Bradford, UK. Professors Woodhouse and Ramsbotham are co-authors (with Hugh

Miall) of the most complete and inspiring textbook in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies – Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Fourth Edition (London: Polity, 2016) – and to have them write one of the forewords is a great honour for us all.

Finally, I would like to sincerely thank my fellow main authors for their effort and commitment to this project: Eakpant Pindavanija, Yukiko Nishikawa, Ayesah Uy Abubakar, Norbert Ropers, Ichsan Malik, and Abubakar Eby Hara. It has been a long journey, but the company has made it a wonderful adventure.

Thanks, keep safe, and take care.

Kamarulzaman 'Zam' Askandar
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With Eakpant Pindavanija, Yukiko Nishikawa, Ayesah Uy Abubakar, Norbert Ropers, Ichsan Malik, and Abubakar Eby Hara.

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List of Abbreviations

AB	Advisory Board
ACCT	ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism
ACSC	ASEAN Civil Society Conference
ACSTF	Aceh Civil Society Task Force
ACTIP	ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons
ACWC	ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children
AHA Centre	ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance
AHJAG	Ad Hoc Joint Action Group
AHRD	ASEAN Human Rights Declaration
AI	Aceh Institute
AICHR	ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
AICOHR	ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies Colloquium on Human Rights
AFMM	ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AMAN	Asian Muslim Action Network
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
AMMTC	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime
AMS	ASEAN Member States
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEANAPOL	ASEAN Chiefs of National Police
ASEAN-IPR	ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation
ASOD	ASEAN Senior Officials on Drugs Matters
APA	ASEAN People's Assembly
APF	ASEAN People's Forum
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ASEM	ASIA-Europe Meeting
AUN	ASEAN University Network
AUN-HRE	ASEAN University Network – Human Rights Education
AWP	ASEAN Women's Program
AWPR	ASEAN Women for Peace Registry
BARMM	Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
BBL	Bangsamoro Basic Law
BC	Bantay Ceasefire
BDA	Bangsamoro Development Agency
BDP	Bangsamoro Development Plan
BIAF	Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces
BIPP	*Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani* (Patani Islamic Liberation Front)
BPA	Business for Peace Alliance (Sri Lanka)
BP2A	*Badan Penguatan Perdamaian Aceh* (Aceh Peace Strengthening Agency)
BRA	*Badan Reintegrasi Aceh* (Aceh Reintegration of Agency)
BRN	*Barisan Revolusi Nasional* (National Revolutionary Front)
BTA	Bangsamoro Transition Authority
BTC	Bangsamoro Transition Commission
BUF	Bishop Ulama Forum
CAB	Comprehensive Agreement for the Bangsamoro
CBCS	Consortium for Bangsamoro Civil Society
CBMs	Confidence Building Measures

CC	Cybercrime
CHD	Center for Humanitarian Dialogue
CLMV	Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
CoHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
COP	Consolidation for Peace
CSCAP	Council for Security and Cooperation in Asia Pacific
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CPI	Consumer Price Index
CT	Counter terrorism
DOC	Declaration on Conduct
DOM	*Daerah Operasi Militer* (Military Operations Zone)
DSW	Deep South Watch
EU	European Union
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EPG	Eminent Persons Group
FAB	Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
FORUM-ASIA	Asia Forum for Human Rights and Development
GAM	*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (Free Aceh Movement)
GAD	Gender and Development
GBC	General Border Committee
GC	Governing Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPH	Government of the Philippines
GPPAC	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
GRIT	Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction
GTA	Gender Transformative Action
HDC	Henri Dunant Center
HDR	Human Development Report (HDR)
HLTF	High Level Task Force
HoM	Head of Mission
HRD	Humanitarian, Rehabilitation, Development
HRWG	Human Rights Working Group
IAG	Institute of Autonomy and Governance
IDB	Independent Decommissioning Body
ICG	International Contact Group
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Commission of the Red Cross
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRP	Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (Mahidol University)
IID	Initiatives for International Dialogue
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IMT	International Monitoring Team
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPP	Insider Peacebuilders Platform
IPRA	International Peace Research Association
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
J-BIRD	Japan Bangsamoro Initiative for Reconstruction and Development

JCC	Joint Ceasefire Commitee
JCHA	Joint Committee on Humanitarian Action (JCHA)
JCSM	Joint Committee on Security Modalities (JCSM)
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JNC	Joint Normalization Committee
JPSC	Joint Peace and Security Committee
JPST	Joint Peace and Security Team
KKR	*Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi Aceh* (Aceh Commission for Truth and Reconciliation)
KOMPAS	*Kongres Mahasiswa dan Pemuda Aceh Serantau* (All Aceh Students and Youths Congress)
KPA	*Komite Peralihan Aceh* (Aceh Transition Committee)
LoGA	Law on Governing Aceh
LMT	Local Monitoring Teams
MARA	*Majlis Syura* (Council)
MASCUF	Mindanao Association for State Colleges and Universities Federation
MBC	Mindanao Business Council
MDG	Millenium Development Goals
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MinHRAC	Mindanao Human Rights Action Center
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MOA-AD	Memorandum of Agreement for Ancestral Domain
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOGOP	Muslim Organisation of Government and Other Professionals
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding (for Aceh)
MPC	Mindanao People's Caucus
MPR	Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction (Nepal)
MPW	Mindanao Peace Weavers
MSN	Mediation Support Network
MSU	Mindanao State University
MTF	Mindanao Task Force
NAP	National Action Plan
NCHR	Norwegian Center for Human Rights
NDU	Notre Dame University
NP	Nonviolent Peaceforce
NPA	New People's Army
NTJRCB	National Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission for the Bangsamoro (NTJRCB)
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OPAPP	Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
OXFAM	Oxford Committee of Famine Relief
PASUC	Philippines Association of State Universities and Colleges
PHDR	Philippine Human Development Report
PMC	Post Ministerial Conference
PNP	Philippine National Police
POC	Peace and Order Council
PRIO	Peace Research Institute of Oslo
PULO	Patani United Liberation Organization
PRC	Peace Resource Centre
PSA	Peace Studies Association
PSU	Prince of Songkhla University
REPUSM	Research and Education for Peace, Universiti Sains Malaysia
SABT	South African Business Trust
SAPA	Solidarity for Asian's People Advocacy
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SEACSN	Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network

SEAHRN	Southeast Asia Human Rights and Peace Network
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
SCHRA	Support Committee for Human Rights for Aceh (SCHRA)
SHAPE-SEA	Strengthening Human Rights and Peace Education and Research in Southeast Asia
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise
SMUR	Student Solidarity for People (SMUR)
SOM	Senior Officials Meeting
STUfPeace	Southern Thailand Universities for Peace
SWS	Social Weather Stations
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TFDCC	Task Force Decommissioning of Combatants Center
TJRC	Transitional Justice Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Economics Social Cultural Organization
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UP	University of the Philippines
UPEACE	United Nations University of Peace
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USIP	United States Institute for Peace
USM	Universiti Sains Malaysia
VSE	Very Small Enterprise
VTT	Values Transformation Training
WDR	World Development Report
WG	Working group
WG-AHRM	Working Group on the ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism
WID	Women in development
WPS	Women, Peace and Security Agenda
YMPN	Young Moro Professionals Network
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality

Contents

Chapter 1

Introduction to Peace and Conflict Transformation

Chapter 1:
Introduction to Peace and Conflict Transformation

Kamarulzaman Askandar[1]

1.1 Introduction

Peace is a term that is both universal and specific. It is commonly understood to be a desirable condition where harmonious relations and positive values reside, and where the well-being of society is taken care of. However, in reality, it has multiple meanings to different actors depending on their objectives, interests, values, and how they perceive their capacity and potential to achieve their goals.

How peace is understood and perceived also influences and affects how we address the 'opposite' of peace – conflict. A whole range of work can be found on the meaning and nature of conflict. In fact, it could be said the study of conflict is more established than the study of its antithesis. More effort has undoubtedly been made to understand the former—its nature, types, levels, and impacts—including the mapping and analyses of conflicts as a way of recognizing its sequences, trends, and dynamics. However, in the words of a famous maxim – to have peace, one must (understand and) prepare for war (conflict). All in the hope of finding ways to effectively address present and future conflict situations and achieve the goal of peace. Southeast Asia is no different in this respect. Indeed, depending on how they perceive such situations, there seems little difference in the way actors in this region approach conflicts.

This chapter seeks to engender an understanding of peace and conflict in the region. It will do this through a preliminary discussion of some of the more general concepts, followed by an analysis of conflict transformation and especially how it is used to encourage change towards a more peaceful and harmonious region.

To begin with, this chapter will discuss the history and evolution of peace theories. Next, the major concepts, definitions, terminology, and frameworks in this field will be surveyed and discussed including the notions of peace, conflict, violence, war, and the strategies and approaches commonly used to address them. At the same time, the author understands that a major challenge in writing about this subject is the plethora of textbooks and publications already existing in the field leading to inevitable similarities and overlaps. Although somewhat unavoidable, the unique selling point of this sourcebook shall be its perusal of alternative or creative Southeast Asian ways of looking at these issues. A more detailed discussion of such concepts, approaches, and frameworks, and especially how are they applied in the region, will be presented in subsequent chapters. Thereafter, a general examination of conflict transformation will be offered. As the main focus of this sourcebook, conflict transformation is significant not only because of its comprehensive nature but also because it describes the evolution of peace and peacebuilding in the region. At the same time, it highlights the "work in progress" nature of many such efforts. Subsequently, the chapter will analyse some cases where conflict transformation has been applied. However, a more detailed rendering of conflict transformation, peacebuilding, and their applications will be covered by Chapters 4 and 5.

[1] With contributions from Eakpant Pindavanija, Suwit Laohasiriwong, Fuad Mardhatillah, and Joel Mark Barrado

Next, this chapter will discuss the relevance of studying these concepts in Southeast Asia. Whilst the region has had its share of conflicts in the past, peace studies only became popular as a field of study here in the 1990s as can be seen from the number of research centres and academic programs created from this period onwards specifically focusing on issues of peace, conflict, human rights, and other related topics. Previously, these were mainly discussed in other research and academic programs including political science, international relations, psychology, sociology, law, and security studies. Thus, the aforementioned burgeoning of developments in the 1990s will be examined in addition to the activities expanding academic work in this field, all of which contribute to peace-building in the region. This will be connected to a general discussion of regional issues, the contexts within which they were established, and the impacts they hope to make. Finally, this chapter will end with an overview of the chapters in this sourcebook.

1.2 History and evolution of peace theories[2]

Until recently, the conceptual perspective of peace theories has been extremely broad as regards terminology. Consequently, this section will not seek to explore all such perspectives but will only draw from significant developments after the world wars when peace studies became an academic discipline. Studies of the evolution of peace theories may be categorized into several dimensions including the philosophical fundamentals of theories, studies of war and peace, studies of conflict, and alternative peace theories.

It would be useful now to refer to some prior studies of peace from philosophers and thinkers throughout history such as the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, whose book, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795), addressed the philosophical reconstruction of interactions between humans and nation states, and asked whether humans even have the capacity to rationally pursue peaceful societies. However, the core value of his essay derives mainly from his comments on the consequences of colonization when Western empires competed to expand their territories through conquest, and in so doing, violated the human rights and dignity of the populations they plundered. Kant regarded colonization using the concept of "universal hospitality" when he emphasized that human beings must acknowledge and learn to understand their differences, and that involuntary acceptance of a dominated power was unacceptable. Further, the right to share the earth's surface was the equal right of everyone. Thus, no one person has more right than another to any proportion of the earth's surface.

To begin with, the evolution of peace theories was mostly based on studies of war mainly because the impact of war results in unstable living conditions. This also involves looking at the nature of human beings (in terms of violence), the causes of violence, the nature of conflict, the capacity for development, and humanitarian approaches. Therefore, it is quite usual for peace theories to be littered with deliberations on war, violence, human development, and democracy. The evolution of peace theories can be categorized into several stages as follows.

[2] This section was contributed by Eakpant Pindavanija, former Director of the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies at Mahidol University, Thailand.

1.2.1 The first stage: Negative peace and the scientific study of war

The formal study of peace and conflict began during the 1930s with Quincy Wright and Lewis Richardson's work on the "quantitative analysis of war" (Wright, 1942; 1965; Richardson, 1960). This was followed in the 1940s by the creation of centres and publications in France, the Netherlands, and the United States, including the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (Guzmán, 2001: 63). In 1948, a peace studies program was introduced for the first time in Manchester College, Indiana, USA. Likewise, in the 1950s, more writings related to the study of peace were disseminated including a research exchange on the "prevention of war" which resulted in publication of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* under the influence of Kenneth Boulding from the University of Michigan. While Herbert Kelman and Anatol Rapoport studied game theories, resulting in 'Theory of games and mathematical apparatus' at the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, J David Singer founded the 'Correlates of War Project' in 1963 (Guzman, 2001: 63). In the late 1950s, some institutions emphasized a negative definition of peace, such as the Richardson Peace Research Centre in Lancaster, UK, and Alan and Hanna Newcombe's Peace Research Institute in Dundas (Guzmán, 2001: 61-62; 2005a: 49-50).

Along with the development of war and peace theories came a re-emergence of humanitarian action that had first been the purview of Christian charities during the colonial era. The concept of a humanitarian approach emerged during the 19th century, when the development of international relations theories played a significant role in the forming of international treaties and organizations such as the Geneva Convention in 1864 and the Red Cross in 1863 (Guzmán, 2001: 62). In particular, the latter played a significant humanitarian role during World War I and was followed by other private humanitarian organizations such as the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM).

The destruction and heavy casualties caused by the Great War resulted in the international community trying to find ways to prevent a reoccurrence of such events. Thus began efforts to study war more 'scientifically.' These were rooted in the notion that civilized nations should never again inflict such massive destruction on the lives of human beings. The first scientific studies of peace involved an exploration of the theories of war called 'polemology' deriving from the Greek word, *polemos* meaning war (against foreigners or strangers). These studies used scientific methods based on quantitative analyses and experimentation to study war and peace (Guzmán, 2001: 63).

The field of international relations was also influenced by the approach taken by security studies which sought to offer rational justifications for the maintenance of forces to protect the sovereignty of nation states (Collins, 2019: 283-286). Guzmán (2001) further interprets the notion by explaining that international wars have been justified philosophically as a deterrence against enemies as in the Latin maxim, "*Si vis pacem, para bellum*," meaning, "If you want peace, prepare for war." Brown et al (1998: 10), however, observed that "*this competitive world is peaceful when it is obvious that the costs and risks of going to war are high, and the benefits of going to war are low*."

More importantly, referring to the principles underpinning scientific studies of war, the conditions of maintaining peace during this theoretical development of 'peace' was the "absence of war." Mathematical and scientific principles consider 'conflict' to contain negative aspects which can be solved, leading to the derivation of *conflict resolution*. (Guzmán, 2001) This concept was later interpreted and expanded upon by Johan Galtung as *negative peace*. Thus, the theory of negative and positive peace

transforms the paradigm of philosophical views of 'peace' and 'war.' Galtung's theory of peace was later widened to include violence of all kinds, namely, direct violence, structural violence, and cultural violence.

1.2.2 The second stage: Positive peace and development cooperation

A scientific status (epistemology) for peace studies having been initiated, this became the foundation of several of Galtung's peace theories when he established the Peace Research Institute of Oslo in 1956 and coined the concepts of *positive peace* and *structural violence* (Galtung, 1969). Prior to this period, most theories had focused on the physical violence mainly resulting in deaths and casualties from war. His term, structural violence, served to widen the scope of the definition to other dimensions. Thus, the pursuit of peace was no longer limited to an absence of war, but could also include improving social, economic, and political conditions.

Galtung (1996) believed that peace studies could be based on scientific methodology which furthermore could be implemented and explained referencing the fields of social and political sciences. If peace equates to an absence of all types of violence, therefore the struggle for peace equates to the struggle to reduce all kinds of violence – hence, peace studies concerns the scientific exploration of peaceful conditions to reduce violence.

From the 1950s to the 1970s, several institutions of peace research were established which focused more on positive peace and the reduction of structural violence relating to the establishment of social justice as a basic need. At this time, the concept was based on the belief that humans and other living beings could achieve their potential through being "developed." Afterwards, the concept was expanded to include the classifications of "developed" and "underdeveloped" as espoused by French economist, Alfred Sauvy (who later coined the term, "third-world") (Sauvy, 1952). As such, positive peace then encompassed the notion of developing human potential to satisfy one's basic needs. It was also at this time that humanitarian organizations began to enlarge the scope of their work to include long-term development cooperation, believing that such work could aid political solutions to conflicts. Accordingly, many international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) were established during this period, such as Medico sin Fronteras in 1971. However, the academic validity of the influence of development-based peace efforts has been questioned since such groups were not sufficiently involved in politics, and not only had little capacity to resolve conflicts, but were also not committed to certain values (Guzmán, 2001: 64-65).

Box 1: Peace institutions established during the 1950s to the 1970s

- 1959: Johan Galtung establishes the Peace Research Institute of Oslo, Norway (PRIO) and coins definitions of "positive peace" and "structural violence"
- 1960: The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is founded
- 1963: Walter Izard establishes the Peace Research Society (now the Peace Science International Society of Sweden)
- 1963: The International Peace Research Association (IPRA) emerges from a Quaker congress in Switzerland; national associations for peace are set up in Japan; the Council on Peace Research in History is established in Canada as a reaction to the Kennedy assassination and the war in Vietnam
- 1964: The *Journal of Peace Research* (later known as the *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, and now the *Security Dialogue*) is set up
- 1967: the Caucus for a New Political Science is established – since 1992, it has also played an active role in the affairs of the *American Political Science Association*
- 1972: *Peace and Exchange* (later published by the Consortium of Peace Research, Education, and Development) is founded; COPRED is established by Elise and Kenneth Boulding in 1970
- 1970s: The Institute for World Order (now the World Policy Institute in New York) is set up by Richard Falk and Saul Mendlovitz who also published the magazine, *Alternatives*
- 1973: A chair and programmes in peace research are set up at Bradford University; the Peace Education Commission is introduced as part of the IPRA to make research more accessible to promote learning experiences and a democratic pedagogy in the field
- 1973: The Association of Peace Studies is set up in Japan
- 1974: The Latin American Council of Peace Reach and Asian Peace Research Association is established

Source: Guzmán, 2001: 63-64

1.2.3 The third stage: Disarmament, famines, and refugees

Further developments occurred in the 1980s. Guzman (2001: 66) noted that during this period, peace studies became linked to social movements, especially those working towards nuclear disarmament. As a result, most studies were influenced by the threat of nuclear war. In addition, discussions were widened to include military intervention and other forms of direct violence, repression, and injustice. For example, UNESCO organized the *First Conference on Education for Disarmament* to emphasize the use of non-violent action and civil defence. Publications such as *Nuclear Time* were printed in 1984. *Peace Review* followed in 1989. In 1987, the Peace Studies Association (PSA) was established. Between the years, 1986 and 1987, a feminist outlook on peace emerged espousing major ideas related to the gender perspective and the concept of non-traditional security (Collins, 2019). As a result, discourse on positive and negative peace introduced an analysis of violence against women and children. At the same time, humanitarian action gathered momentum especially in the period after the Vietnam War, followed by similar actions in Cambodia and Afghanistan. Such disputes led to increasing numbers of refugees and displaced persons in various parts of the world. Concern continues to be raised over issues related to development, democratization, and women and children which have brought about increased public participation and enhanced the

role of the media and NGOs from the 1980s till the end of the 20th century. All this has combined to shape a new perspective in human development that goes beyond positivism, masculinity, and colonialism.

1.2.4 Building the future: Culture and ways for peacebuilding

During the nineties, following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the cold war, discussions about peace and the development of peace theories became more complex. Academics and practitioners continued to look for alternative, more constructive ways, of approaching peace. These included promoting dialogue on culture and analysing the cultural and social roots of human relationships based on violence, war, and exclusion (Guzmán, 2001). However, developing peace theories and establishing a culture of peace, requires more than simply asking whether humans are violent. Humanitarian actions also face this challenge. According to the Unit of Humanitarian Studies (1999), several challenges have arisen: understanding independence and neutrality; deciding between the rationales and the urgency of intervention; assessing commitment to long-term development; reinforcing commitment to the weak; and recognizing the role of the victims of exclusion and catastrophes as interlocutors (Guzmán, 2001).

Later, when the UNDP began to focus on other development indicators instead of just economic indicators such as gross domestic products (GDP) and the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the organization started to realize the cultural differentiation between countries and regions (Gimeno and Monreal, 1999; cited in Guzman, 2001: 69). Thus, universal concepts that had been used for decades as guidelines to assist the “underdeveloped” were no longer adequate. Instead, the UNDP introduced Human Development Indicators which covered people’s quality of life in a variety of areas and focused more on their ability to access quality basic needs and living requirements whilst also considering other factors such as quality of education, life expectancy, healthcare, and income distribution, to name but a few. Even higher degrees of concern were included such as the protection of human rights and political participation in a democratic environment, all to ensure escalation of the human condition of living and a reduction of structural and cultural violence.

In summary, peace studies developed from an exploration of human suffering as a consequence of violence. At first, war was considered the major cause of extreme violence affecting human lives leading even to the destruction of societies. Such were the reasons why researchers studied war to prevent the conditions that could lead to conflict between nation states. In this way, they hoped to bring about conditions leading instead to peace. Thus, peace studies sought to create an absence of war (negative peace) in societies. Only later did these develop into factors that harmed people’s needs and living conditions encouraging researchers to explore the concept of structural violence and other causes of human suffering including human rights violations, exploitation, marginalization, and political exclusion. Later still, this expanded into studies on cultural violence and the cultural aspects of peace. The focus on cultural violence aims to understand the attitude and justifications people make to rationalize violent actions against individuals and collective others. Together, the focus on structural and cultural violence influenced the development of peace studies to become one that now focuses on the search for positive peace.

Consequently, peace studies is currently flourishing into many inter-connected fields. While the list is endless, it deepens and refines our understanding of various

approaches to peace such as peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping; connecting this to the frameworks of conflict management, prevention, resolution, settlement, and transformation; understanding better and improving practices of processes for peace including peace mediation processes; promoting and strengthening the inclusivity of all tracks, including the roles played by civil society and especially women and youth groups; improving and creating better capacity-building platforms including the promotion of peace education at all levels; peace journalism; deepening understanding of local cultures, customs, and wisdoms, and elevating them to become platforms for peace in society, and so on. This book will seek to look at these topics in the hope of generating more discussion and understanding about the issues. But first, we will survey the meanings of basic concepts and terminologies used in this field.

1.3 Definitions, concepts, approaches, and frameworks

This section will look at the general definitions and meanings of concepts, approaches, and frameworks commonly used in the field of peace and conflict studies. More elaboration of these and examples of how they are applied will be presented in other chapters. As such, there will be some overlap between this and other chapters, especially Chapters 2 and 3. This is unavoidable, but due care will be taken to ensure they are at least consistent. A discussion of these concepts is first necessary to facilitate understanding of the sourcebook as a whole.

1.3.1 Peace

Peace is often interpreted narrowly as an *absence of war*, which can basically be seen as organized violence between groups, nations, classes, or countries. *External peace* usually refers to an absence of external or inter-state wars while *internal peace* points to an absence of war inside a country or territory. An absence of war has been used to describe negative peace – where society seems peaceful, politically stable, and seemingly void of dissent, especially in the eyes of the powers that be. On the other hand, groups within that society may feel differently because their goals, interests, desires, and needs are not being fulfilled by a system they see as oppressive. Fulfilment of such goals and needs must be achieved for peace to occur. Certain groups may therefore be willing to struggle to achieve these goals even if it means confronting those in power who want to maintain the status quo and preserve the perceived stability. Attempts by these groups to achieve their version of peace may result in conflict with those in power if they are willing to take the risk. Thus, the meaning of peace is vital to discern because it is not always consistent between groups.

As mentioned above, fulfilment of certain goals and needs is crucial towards an attainment of peace. Only when this is achieved will we have so-called *positive peace* – where elements of negative peace are combined with efforts to achieve harmonious relations between parties; and where law and order, which is crucial to maintaining peace and stability in society, is combined with justice; and where a built-in mechanism or framework or system to manage and resolve conflict issues when they arise has been institutionalized within society. The combination of all these will result in the attainment of *sustainable positive peace* – a peace that is positive in nature with the capacity to sustain itself.

As previously mentioned, the evolution of studies in this field has developed along these lines. Prominent peace scholar, Johan Galtung, was the first to coin these terms and was able to observe their influence in studies and research:

> *[N]egative peace studies focus on how to reduce and/or eliminate negative relations, and positive peace studies focus on how to build positive, harmonious relations (Galtung, 2010).*

He also sees peace as a

> *… holistic continuum from negative to positive, reducing and/or eliminating direct and structural violence not only by solving conflicts, but also by building positive, harmonious relations.*

In fact, this sourcebook takes a similar stance – that in order to be holistic and effective in the search for peace, a means to reduce violence of all types must be found whilst enabling the building of better relations between groups.

Galtung (2010) also talks about *structural peace* – where all parties benefit from the way a structure is set up and especially the way relations are set up within the structure. To further elaborate, this involves components of reciprocity, integration, holism, and inclusion in relations. The attainment of structural peace goes hand-in-hand with the process of achieving sustainable positive peace. How this is applied will be discussed further in the chapters on conflict management, conflict transformation, and peacebuilding.

1.3.2 Conflict and violence

Conflict is usually defined as an incompatibility between two or more parties, pursuing and/or defending valuable goals at the same time. Incompatibility encompasses both perceived and actual differences. Parties can refer to two or more actors and can include both internal and external support to conflict areas. Pursuing denotes action taken to achieve a particular goal. But writers, especially from a psychological point of view, have commented that conflict in the minds of actors is already conflict. For example, the preamble to the UNESCO Constitution states that because war (conflict) begins in the minds of men, defences against war must also be constructed in the minds of men.[3]

On the other hand, from a behavioural point of view, conflict begins when action is taken to pursue a goal. Focus then should be on addressing this behaviour and preventing such acts from escalating into violence. Action or behaviour can either be in the form of a pursuit to achieve a goal, or defending a particular goal or position. On many occasions, it can also be both at the same time. Goals can be seen from either a positive or negative angle. Positive goals are situations or targets the parties try to achieve, and negative goals denote situations they seek to prevent or avoid. On many occasions, however, both are present. Such goals are also deemed valuable enough for the parties to want to pursue even to the extent of being in an incompatible position or conflict with others pursuing the same objectives. The level of importance they place on the goals will determine their commitment to pursue said goals and their readiness to use particular modes of behaviour in conflict situations. Further, the type and level of conflict will determine the actions of conflict parties. All conflicts involve interests which are incompatible, but these can either be 'negotiable' or 'non-negotiable' depending on how they are seen or what value has been placed on them. Goals that involve 'values' and are 'intangible' (such as identity) can at times be perceived as non-negotiable and therefore more difficult to resolve.

While 'conflict' is sometimes used interchangeably with 'violence,' there is a crucial difference between the two. A conflict can be violent, although not necessarily so as

[3] 'UNESCO Constitution' UNESCO, available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=%C3%A7&URL_SECTION=201.html, accessed on 25 September 2021.

violence is the highest level of conflict behaviour in the continuum from incipient, latent, and manifest, to manifest aggressive (or actual violence).[4] The first three levels of conflict are non-violent; only the fourth involves violence. By contrast, violence *is* a form of conflict. This connection between conflict and violence will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter on understanding conflict.

Violence can take several forms. *Direct violence* is an aggressive action meant to harm others. *Indirect violence* is when violence is not intended and/or not direct but happens anyway and targets the surrounding environment. Indirect violence can also include structural violence, although structural violence can actually be intended. *Structural violence* refers to inequitable structures causing harm, misery, repression and/or alienation of certain parties or segments within society. It can manifest in the way societies are initially constructed – for example, how the constitution, laws, or policies are formulated, designed, and then implemented.

Structural violence occurs when policies that are formulated and implemented are discriminatory and exclusive to the point that individuals and groups are being treated differently, with little access to processes for reviewing or redressing the situation. Structural violence can also mean that the surrounding context is such that human suffering happens because of abuse within the system and failures to address issues and crises within society. For example, famine and sufferings caused by corruption and mismanagement of the economy by elites, or by continuous crises and civil wars. An understanding of violence is important to the pursuit of peace as they are connected and can even be seen as opposite sides of the same coin. Simply put, the absence of direct or personal violence will lead to negative peace, while the absence of structural or indirect violence will lead to positive peace.

Another related concept, *cultural violence* usually involves acceptance of the use of force as a legitimate form of behaviour within society, especially in crisis situations. It also legitimizes both direct and structural violence. As such, the negation of this is crucial to the attainment of sustainable positive peace. Conflict and violence will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.

The root of a conflict then is contradiction, or incompatibility, or a clash of goals between parties. This contradiction can result in violent behaviour depending on how serious the parties see the situation. At any stage of the conflict process, negative attitude and behaviour can emerge and combine to increase the intensity and level of the contradiction. In fact, they affect each other continuously in a cycle of conflict. Approaching this situation in a proper manner is crucial. Depending on who they are and how much they value the objectives, parties will tend to use approaches and frameworks most suitable to their needs, interests, and values. These can either be management, resolution, settlement, or transformation, all of which will be discussed in the following sections.

1.3.3 Conflict management

In order to understand how conflict situations are addressed it is useful to look at how the main approaches are framed. *Conflict management* is an umbrella term that covers various approaches to conflict. It should be noted that these approaches are sometimes used interchangeably because of overlapping concerns and processes (in the same way that 'mediation,' for example, is sometimes used to cover different types of third-party intervention). This happens because many scholars in the field are drawn not only from academia but may also include practitioners whose approaches and activities do not fall under a single category or approach.

[4] See Chapter 2.

The field of conflict management is best understood as a complex and multidisciplinary field with contributions from a wide variety of disciplines including peace and conflict studies, international relations, political science, economics, sociology, philosophy, psychology, and international law. Elements from these disciplines are incorporated to improve our understanding of the issues and enhance our knowledge of how to address them, from the inter-personal through to international levels.

Conflict management usually involves the creation of systems and mechanisms to address the concerns. It can help the parties by providing a platform to improve communication and to problem-solve, as well as to channel differences through an agreed procedure which either already exists or was created for this purpose. The goal of conflict management is generally to preserve the peaceful status quo, maintain stability, and prevent the conflict from escalating. In many cases, conflict issues may still be present, except they are contained (containment) and prevented (prevention) from disrupting relations further. This is why conflict management is seen as an umbrella approach under which other ways of addressing conflicts are located.

Conflict management sees violent conflicts as a consequence of differences of values and interests within and between communities, especially when not managed well (Miall, 2004). As a result, Miall points out that conflict resolution may be deemed unrealistic and the best that can be done is to manage and contain it. Occasionally, conflict can be settled through compromise if violence is set aside and relations are continued. Conflict management, in this instance, can be seen as the art of intervening in an appropriate manner to achieve settlement. The intervention can also include the creation of suitable institutions to guide and manage the conflict in positive ways. As Bloomfield and Reilly (1998) state:

> *Conflict management is the positive and constructive handling of difference and divergence. Rather than advocating methods for removing conflict, [it] addresses the more realistic question of managing conflict: how to deal with it in a constructive way, how to bring opposing sides together in a cooperative process, how to design a practical, achievable, cooperative system for the constructive management of difference.*

Research in this field has largely focused on the analysis of contextual and process variables concerning inter-personal, inter-group, and international conflicts – the sources and nature of the conflict, as well as third party characteristics and strategies that may be conducive to better conflict management. The analysis is usually viewed from either a *subjectivist* or *objectivist* approach, although in many situations the lines between these are blurred (Reimann, 2004). The subjectivist approach to conflict primarily focuses on the *perceived incompatibility of goals* – that goals are subjectively viewed as incompatible, due to misinformation, cultural misunderstandings, misperceptions, mistrust, and emotional stress (Reimann, 2004: 3). This can be compared to the objectivist approach that might see the goals as actually being compatible – thus, overlapping interests can be brought forward as meetings points for discussion. However, the way these interests are seen can also be subjective, depending on the intentions and goals of the actors.

As for analysing conflict situations on the ground, it is best to regard them as dynamic processes involving a mixture of subjective features such as identities, needs, and interests, and objectives ones such as an unequal distribution of resources. To focus only on one approach will fail to give the whole picture. For conflict management to be effective, the divide between subjectivity and objectivity requires bridging, combining different conflict management strategies such as conflict settlement

through a power mediation approach, with conflict resolution strategies such as facilitation or dialogue workshops. The effectiveness would, of course, also depend on the stage of conflict being addressed. The development of procedures for conflict management should not be rigid or static. They should be dynamic and adapted to suit the changing dynamics of the conflict situation, taking into account the roles of different actors and their strategies. The different tracks of actor will be discussed in another chapter. For now, the meanings of the different approaches and techniques of conflict management will be appraised.

To understand these approaches, we need to look at the way they see the following – underlying theory, origins of the conflicts, the reasons behind the protractedness, actors involved, strategies taken, criteria for successful outcome, and the nature of peace being pursued. Reimann (2004) indicated the usefulness of understanding conflicts as one of the following: as a problem of political order/status quo; as a catalyst for social change; or as a non-violent struggle for social justice. Understanding conflict as a problem of political order can be regarded as a conservative approach with the intention of preserving the status quo. In contrast, looking at a conflict as a potential catalyst for social change focuses on the transformative role that conflict can play, especially when combined with non-violent approaches for social justice. This is core to the conflict transformation approach. However, it is not saying that one approach is preferable to the other as different contexts and dynamics need to be assessed at as well. There must be some kind of balance when addressing the situation as pushing for the maintenance of order and the status quo might lead to oppression and the preservation of unequal social conditions (structural violence), while unchecked efforts to push for change might lead to civil rife and anarchy (violence).

The techniques of conflict management are many and varied and can include strategies such as conflict and violence prevention, and conflict suppression and avoidance, to name but a few. These will be discussed in the following section.

1.3.4 Conflict prevention

Conflict prevention is usually connected to an action that prevents something or an event from happening. It can be to either prevent a conflict from happening or stop a conflict situation from worsening. For this reason, prevention strategies may be applied throughout the whole range of conflict situations from the incipient level all the way to the manifest aggressive level. In many cases, however, it is mostly used to prevent a situation from becoming (more) violent and destructive, or from reoccurring again. This can be described as being reactive to the event. On the other hand, prevention can also be proactive by addressing latent issues before they arise and creating the infrastructure for constructively managing differences in society (see the discussion on conflict avoidance below). In this sense, it is closely connected to peacebuilding and the process of promoting sustainable positive peace. Another concept closely connected to conflict prevention is violence prevention.

1.3.5 Violence prevention

Violence prevention allows conflicts to occur and even sees the usefulness of bringing up incompatibilities between parties if this can lead to the addressing of injustices and contradictory issues within society (structural violence). Conflict and violence are not the same – conflict can even be useful to the point that it is tolerated and encouraged; but violence in any form is discouraged and rejected. The line is drawn at violent behaviour in espousing one's interests and needs. The Carnegie Commission's report on 'Preventing Deadly Conflict' (1997) developed this idea into a distinction between *structural prevention* (strategies to address root causes) and *operational prevention* (strategies to impede the emergence, escalation, and spread

of violence).[5] From this perspective, it is compatible with the approach to achieve sustainable positive peace described above.

1.3.6 Conflict suppression

This occurs when the conflict situation is recognized but conflict in pursuit of goals is impossible, owing to the coercive power of potential opponents. This would be typical in an asymmetric conflict situation. On the surface, everything seems peaceful, but danger lurks beneath. Peace in this sense is a relative absence of violence (negative peace), and is generated by police efficiency, coercive sanctions, and apathy. It is not precipitated by the settlement or resolution of the conflict situation. Suppressed conflict characterizes conflicts within states rather than between them.[6]

1.3.7 Conflict avoidance

Conflict avoidance includes techniques to avoid the development of contentious issues and goal incompatibilities. Conflicts can arise over a wide variety of issues, so conflict avoidance constitutes an attempt to avoid controversies over certain issues within society. However, the idea of avoiding conflict is not really popular among conflict researchers. Deutsch, for example, suggests that, "*conflict avoidance has harmful consequences. A conflict does not disappear, it festers underneath the surface and has many indirect effects*" (Deutsch, 1987: 39). Nevertheless, Deutsch does recognise that "*occasionally, it is useful to avoid conflict. Sometimes the issues in a conflict will disappear with the passage of time or a change of circumstances*" (Deutsch, 1987: 38). He further adds that "*there are also conflicts that are not likely to be resolved successfully if they are confronted. Often such conflicts are best handled by mutual recognition that they are avoided*" (Deutsch, 1987: 38).

Mitchell (1981) proposes three avoidance strategies. If a major source of goal incompatibility is role or resource scarcity, then the strategy must first focus on ways to avoid it. The second strategy, which may or may not be used in conjunction with the first, is to influence demand by way of affecting the underlying value structure within the social system, or what society regards as desirable objectives. The third strategy is to develop shared, overarching, or super-ordinate goals to avoid the growth of conflict situations between parties. Super-ordinate goals have been known to unite former enemies and begin the move towards fostering better relations. However, Mitchell admits that these strategies have their limitations. The first two, especially, only work successfully when the goal incompatibility in question arises from a relative distribution of resources and roles. They are unlikely to have any effect on ideological conflicts or conflicts over matters of survival, where one party tries to defeat the other. The only strategy to apply to these types of conflict is to develop tolerance for non-conformity and difference through a process of socialization.

When this value of tolerance has been well "socialized" and accepted among the parties, the next step is to "institutionalize" it formally. This can be done by formulating and implementing laws within a state, or by signing treaties or declarations between them. If a conflict cannot be avoided, then efforts must be made to prevent it by moving it from a latent to a manifest stage, specifically by stopping destructive behaviours which may emerge from the pursuit of incompatible goals (conflict prevention). This sort of conflict prevention encompasses two types of processes: those that prevent disruptive or undesirable behaviour; and those which confine it to acceptable activities. The first type includes inhibiting or deterring destructive

[5] 'Preventing deadly conflict: Final report' Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997, available at https://www.carnegie.org/publications/preventing-deadly-conflict-final-report/, accessed on 25 September 2021.

[6] For more information on suppression at the inter-state level, see the section on conflict containment below.

conflict behaviour by removing or controlling the resources necessary to carry it out, or alternatively, by deterring non-approved behaviour through the threat of sanctions imposed by some legalized force. As mentioned above, these strategies are more conducive to the management of internal rather than international conflicts. Also, successful suppression using these techniques will likely result in the continued existence of latent conflict where parties are conscious of the goal incompatibility, but nonetheless, are able to improve the situation in a satisfactory way. The attitudes and perception of conflict remain unchanged, and the situation itself is resolved. However, there is every possibility the bubble will burst once the perceived threat of retaliation breaks down.

1.3.8 Conflict containment

This best describes the prevention strategy of stopping recognized (but latent) conflict from developing into manifest conflict behaviour and is applicable especially to international conflicts. Thus, conflict behaviour is "contained" through the imposition of self-restraint. In the ASEAN context, self-restraint is crucial as a conflict management strategy as it too seeks to prevent disruptive behaviour through the "*principles of compensation or self-imposed restraint on action in pursuit of goals*" (Mitchell, 1981: 272). Accordingly, parties or groups finding themselves in situations of conflict may refrain from behaving disruptively in pursuit of their goals because they believe such disruption of valued cooperative relationships is too costly. These situations usually begin with the gradual formation of political or economic interdependence, so when an intense conflict situation arises, the value of these relationships will be weighed against the disruptive behaviour. Most importantly, these arrangements consider the 'cost' of using non-sanctioned behaviour to a valued set of relationships. In other words, any group or party willing and able to contemplate the use of disruptive behaviour to pursue its interests, must also count the cost of breaking up such relations. The perceived costs of disruptive behaviour to valued relationships therefore often discourages parties from crossing to the manifest stage of conflict. This effect works best when parties place a high value on their relationship, and least well if the relationship is not considered of great value. Although scholars have pointed out that, in many cases, even the strongest and most complex cooperative relationships have failed to prevent serious conflict situations from becoming manifest, it is still a useful ploy to encourage parties to think of the pros and cons of employing destructive behaviour in any given situation.[7]

1.3.9 Conflict settlement

Conflict settlement describes

> *conflicts which are ended, either by agreement of or by acceptance of the parties, even though the underlying conflict of interest may not have been resolved (Miall, 1992).*

Settlement techniques are usually aimed at

> *altering conflict behaviour (stopping the use of violence and coercive strategies or achieving some form of temporary truce); and then reaching a compromise solution in which parties make "fair" sacrifices of some form of the goals in a dispute in order to achieve others (Mitchell, 1981: 275).*

Parties do not necessarily have to change the nature of their goals or objectives to reach a settlement, resulting in unchanged underlying goal structures, conflict attitudes, and party perceptions. There is every chance that a "settled" conflict might once again resurface.

[7] See Chapters 3 and 7 of this book for examples of the ASEAN way of regional conflict management.

The intent of conflict settlement is to stop destructive behaviour from continuing. The dominant groups can reach an agreement that satisfies their interests. Often the cost of continuing the conflict is high and a negotiated settlement is preferable to a painful increase in the intensity of the conflict. A settlement can be the minimum point of agreement, but it can also form the beginning of a more comprehensive agreement that will address all the issues and resolve the conflict.

As mentioned above, conflict settlement refers to strategies that aim at ending direct violence and achieving sustainable win-win solutions without necessarily addressing the underlying causes of the conflict. As such, it sees conflict as a problem of political order and a challenge to the status quo. Violent conflict is regarded as a result of incompatible interests and competition for scarce resources, especially power and territory. However, while a zero-sum perspective is usually pervasive in this approach with parties estimating their chances of success, a positive-sum outcome is also probable given that parties may also base their strategies on the rational choices available to them. They will calculate their interests and work towards a rational and mutually profitable goal.

As Reimann (2004: 8) states:

> *… conflict settlement can be conceptualized as a non-zero sum game in which a gain for one party need not necessarily be at the expense of the other. Integrative and distributive bargaining based on rational choice models of behaviour will, thus, prove to be cost-beneficial to decision makers on both sides. While the distributive approach is traditionally associated with zero-sum bargaining, the integrative approach considers bargaining to be a shared problem between negotiation partners and seeks to identify and capture a non-zero sum or positive-sum result.*

Research in this area, then, has focused on understanding the contexts and conditions surrounding the situation and the impacts they have on the interests and positions of the negotiating parties. Research has also focused on the characteristics and strategies of the main actors and how third parties can help transform a zero-sum conflict to one that allows for the end of a conflict via some form of political agreement.

1.3.10 Conflict resolution

Conflict resolution addresses the root causes giving rise to conflicts such as unmet basic human needs and finds ways to ensure the relevant issues are brought up for discussion and addressed. (This is usually accomplished through a negotiation process and may involve the assistance of a third party in the form of a facilitator or mediator.)

The techniques of conflict resolution are aimed at

> *providing a solution which is generally acceptable to parties of the conflict, which they themselves have evolved and which for these reasons is self-supporting (Mitchell, 1981, 276).*

Herein lie the differences between settlement and resolution. While the former only settles immediate problems without solving the underlying issues, proponents of conflict resolution propose techniques which seek to alter all the components of a conflict: situation, behaviour, and attitudes. One technique is to enlighten the parties themselves by actively bringing them into the process. Such involvement will give parties a clearer analysis of the situation and of one another, as well as the options available and will hopefully help them to further appreciate, accept, and implement solutions to the conflict.

Conflict resolution then is a *process-oriented activity with the intention of addressing the underlying causes of direct, structural, and cultural violence*. As mentioned above, structural violence defines the social, political, and economic structure of a conflict situation when unequal power, domination, and dependency are perpetuated, while cultural violence refers to the social and cultural legitimization of direct and structural violence. In contrast to conflict settlement, conflict resolution begins by looking at protracted conflicts as a result of unmet human needs as the origin of protracted conflicts can often be found in the underlying needs of conflict actors. Research in this field has been influenced by Azar's work on *protracted social conflicts* and Burton's *human needs theory*. Thus, Burton (1990) points to a universal drive to satisfy basic needs such as security, identity, recognition, food, shelter, safety, participation, distributive justice, and development.

The aim of conflict resolution then is to make the parties aware of these underlying needs and even if they cannot compromise, to encourage them to redefine their interests and positions. It therefore sees conflict as a shared problem with a mutually acceptable solution. The purpose is not to eliminate the conflict as such but to eliminate the violent and destructive manifestations of conflict that can be traced to such unmet needs and help them to transcend this by exploring, analysing, questioning, and reframing their positions and interests. In addition, the conflict resolution approach emphasizes the intervention of third parties working to foster new ways of looking at situations and improve relationships. In the process, they will seek to explore the roots of the conflict and identify creative solutions they may previously have missed. Hopefully, this will help to move parties from a zero-sum position to a more positive and constructive one that is more conducive to resolving the conflict.

1.3.11 Contingency and complementarity in response to conflict

So far, this chapter has surveyed the various approaches to conflict situations – from management to resolution. Conflict transformation will be discussed in the next section. Another way of visually explaining the approaches is by examining the *hourglass model* as presented by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011) in Figure 1 below. Here, they combine Galtung's idea of conflict and violence with escalation/de-escalation phases to produce an hourglass model of conflict resolution responses.

Figure 1: The hourglass model of conflict phases and conflict resolution responses



Source: Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2011: 14

The middle part of the model outlines the normal sequence of an escalating and de-escalating conflict – difference, contradiction, polarization, violence, war, ceasefire, agreement, normalization, and reconciliation. The meanings of these terms are self-explanatory and will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. For the moment, while it is understood that conflict fluctuates and is dynamic, the sequencing presented here gives an example of the levels of conflict present in any given situation. Whatever inputs are put in place can result in conflicts going up or down, following the reasoning by Deutsch as mentioned earlier. Simply put, if you want a situation to become positive, you must insert positive inputs and *vice versa*. The left and right columns of the model list the various responses available as inputs.

> *The hourglass represents the narrowing of political space that characterizes conflict escalation (the top half of the hourglass model) and the widening of political space that characterizes conflict de-escalation (bottom half of the hourglass model). As the space narrows and widens, so different conflict resolution responses become more or less appropriate or possible (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2011: 13).*

Some of the responses have been discussed in this chapter while others, especially in the right column, including the various approaches to peacebuilding, peacemaking, and peacekeeping, will be discussed further in other chapters (see especially Chapters 3, 4, and 5). For this part of the discussion, a quick explanation about the meanings of these responses is presented below.

- ***Peacebuilding*** – a long term effort to transform conflict through a comprehensive plan to change all aspects of the conflict, especially the actors involved, relationship structures between the actors, and the structure of the conflict itself. These efforts start as soon as possible and involve all levels of conflict actors, especially Tracks 2 and 3 (see Chapters 3, 4 and 5) which create a strong base and platform for peace to occur. Key to peacebuilding is conflict transformation (of all types and forms) which will be discussed in the next part and Chapters 4 and 5.

- ***Cultural peacebuilding*** – a process of transforming the way actors see and act towards conflict. Key here is the transformation of actors' attitudes.
- ***Structural peacebuilding*** – a process of transforming the structures that have contributed to the rise of the conflict; not only physical structures such as institutions or laws, policies, and activities that have caused the conflict, but also relationship structures between the actors.
- ***Peacemaking*** – an initiative that sees the main actors involved in a (peace) process working to find ways to avoid violence and/or prevent violence from escalating. This can be done either bilaterally or with the involvement of a third party in a peace mediation process (see Chapter 5) to achieve conflict settlement.
- ***Peacekeeping*** – involves third parties sanctioned by the main actors and mandated by the formal peace process to keep peace on the ground while the process is ongoing. The mandate can also include a focus on monitoring ceasefire violations, supporting and enhancing development-related activities, and peace support including capacity-building exercises (see Chapter 5).
- ***War limitation*** – refers to the norms and regulations of actions permissible during war, including national and international laws, and guidelines of international humanitarian law (IHL), many of which have been influenced by the discussion on just war traditions. The term "conflict containment" describes the situation when conflict is violent or at the stage of war. Violent confrontation needs to be contained. In peace parlance, this stage calls for "war limitation" and "peacekeeping." During war time, when conflicted parties employ most of their resources in waging war, intervention to stop violent destruction as a consequence of war becomes very necessary. In some circumstances, especially where there is a ceasefire agreement, third-party interventions using force to keep the peace could be appropriate in order to stop the violence and enforce the agreement.

Examples of response and capacity to the strategic responses are presented by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall as follows.

Table 1 Conflict resolution techniques, complementarity, and the hourglass model

Stage of conflict	*Strategic response*	*Examples of response and capacity*
Difference	*Cultural peacebuilding*	▪ *Problem-solving* ▪ *Support for indigenous dispute-resolution institutions, and CR training* ▪ *Fact-finding missions and peace commissions* ▪ *Culture of tolerance and respect* ▪ *Multiple and inclusive identities*
Contradiction	*Structural peacebuilding*	▪ *Development assistance* ▪ *Civil society development* ▪ *Governance training and institution building* ▪ *Human rights training* ▪ *Track 2 mediation and problem-solving* ▪ *Institutional capacity* ▪ *Constitutional and legal provision* ▪ *Legitimacy and social justice*

Stage of conflict	*Strategic response*	*Examples of response and capacity*
Polarization	*Elite peacemaking*	▪ *Special envoys and official mediation* ▪ *Negotiation* ▪ *Coercive diplomacy* ▪ *Preventive peacekeeping*
Violence	*Peacekeeping*	▪ *Interposition* ▪ *Crisis management and containment*
War	*War limitation*	▪ *Peace enforcement* ▪ *Peace support and stabilization*
Ceasefire	*Peacekeeping*	▪ *Preventive peacekeeping* ▪ *Disarmament and security sector reform* ▪ *Confidence-building and security enhancing measures* ▪ *Security in the community through police training*
Agreement	*Elite peacemaking*	▪ *Electoral and constitutional reform* ▪ *Power-sharing and decentralization of power* ▪ *Problem-solving*
Normalization	*Structural peacebuilding*	▪ *Collective security and cooperation arrangements* ▪ *Economic resource cooperation and development* ▪ *Alternative defence*
Reconciliation	*Cultural peacebuilding*	▪ *Commission of enquiry/truth and justice commissions* ▪ *Peace media development* ▪ *Peace and conflict awareness education and training* ▪ *Cultural exchanges and initiatives; sport as reconciliation* ▪ *Problem-solving as future imaging*

Source: Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2011: 16

The strategic responses and examples highlighted in Table 1 above will be discussed in other chapters of this sourcebook. In addition, case studies will be shown to highlight the applications of these responses particularly noting innovations from the region. Choosing which responses to apply at any given situation will depend on the specific case in question: the type of conflict; the issues involved; the actors involved; the level and intensity of the conflict; whether support is available from stakeholders and other actors; past experiences of addressing the conflict; and the outcome pursued. At the same time, interveners must be ready for all possibilities, including the possibility of utilizing more than one approach at the same time. This can be seen as a *contingency* and *complementarity* model, expanding on the work of Fisher and Keashly (1991). 'Contingency' here refers to the nature and phase of the conflict and the need to be prepared with the appropriate approach, while 'complementarity' refers to the combination of appropriate responses to be chosen to get the best possible outcome. Complementarity also refers to how peace actors from various tracks (Tracks 1, 2, and 3) and locations (local, national, international) can each complement the work of the other. The key components involved in the conflict transformation approach will be discussed in the next section.

1.3.12 Conflict transformation

Conflict transformation is used in this sourcebook to describe many efforts to create sustainable positive peace in Southeast Asian societies and is closely connected to the peacebuilding approach. Together these two approaches have contributed to the evolution of peace formation in the region, especially in intra-state conflicts, moving away from the more commonly used strategies of conflict management and conflict prevention. This *transformative peacebuilding* approach and its applications in the region will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5. This section will briefly introduce the concept of conflict transformation.

Conflict transformation is a process of change. It means moving from an unpeaceful situation to a peaceful one, from a situation of negative peace to one that is positive, while at the same time investing in efforts to make the change sustainable. Transforming deep-rooted social conflicts is not only about resolving the main issues (conflict resolution), it is also about the process of getting there. Moreover, it involves restructuring relationships, putting in new infrastructures for peace, and promoting a culture of peace in society – the same goals and processes of peacebuilding. John Paul Lederach (1997: 84) noted this about peacebuilding:

> *A process-structure for peacebuilding transforms a war-system characterized by deeply divided, hostile and violent relationships into a peace-system characterized by just and interdependent relations with the capacity to find non-violent mechanisms for expressing and handling conflict. The goal is not stasis (stagnation) but rather the generation of continuous, dynamic, self-regenerating processes … Such an infrastructure is made up of a web of people, their relationships and activities, and the social mechanisms necessary to sustain the changes sought. This takes place at all levels in society. An infrastructure of peacebuilding is oriented toward supporting processes of social change generated by the need to move from stagnant cycles of violence toward a desired and shared vision of increased interdependence.*

Social systems change when their members individually adjust and transform their own worldviews, brought about by new experiences and/or personal transformation from within. At the same time, there are also other contextual and external factors, which can influence change to a new direction. Challenging existing values within the system, however, requires creative transformation strategies that begin with a willingness to challenge the basic assumptions of a system. In a way, transformation and peacebuilding go together because peacebuilding necessitates transformation of the very system, structures, and processes that created the conflict in the first place, making transformation a necessary part of peacebuilding. The approach of this book is to look at these as a complementary and integrative framework of *transformative peacebuilding.*

Regarding conflict transformation, Lederach (1995: 201) remarks that,

> *Transformation … has the suggestive advantage of being both descriptively rich in regard to conflict dynamics and prescriptively embedded in a framework that underscores a more holistic view of conflict. Descriptively, 'transformation' suggests that conflicts affect and change things in potentially destructive or constructive directions. Conflict transforms relationships, communication, perceptions, issues, and social organization – to mention a few. Prescriptively, transformation is concerned with broader social structures, change and moving towards a social space open for cooperation, for more just relationships and non-violent mechanisms*

for handling conflict, or what might be understood as dynamic and increasingly peaceful relationships.

Conflict transformation provides a more holistic view of conflict because it points descriptively towards the dialectic nature of conflict, and better acknowledges the dynamics of conflict of moving in certain predictable phases, transforming relationships and social organizations along the way. By doing so, it is able to better prescribe a solution to the conflict. Conflict transformation involves the empowerment of parties. It also involves digging out the applicable factors within the culture of the parties that might contribute to the transformation process. Rupesinghe (1996) suggests that each specific culture has enough resources within itself to resolve its own conflicts. The task of conflict transformation then is to empower those involved to use these resources to transform the conflict situation and to change the structure of society to one that is peaceful and just to all. The focus then starts with the transformation and empowerment of local actors or parties because change starts from within, and as Lederach says, the solution comes from the "soil of conflict."[8]

The transformative peacebuilding approach then sees a need to move beyond a surface analysis of events to identify the underlying processes that can lead gradually to long-term systems change. This includes the underlying structures that shape individual actions and that create the conditions that encourage violent struggles in society. Analysing economic and institutional structures that generate conflict as well as instituting policy responses to change them is not enough. Deeply embedded attitudes and patterns of relationships between groups of people historically shaped by conflict needs to be transformed as well. Transformative peacebuilding needs the involvement of all components of society (the state, civil society organizations (CSOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs)) to contribute to the transformation of a whole range of social processes. Discussion of this conflict transformation approach will be deepened in Chapters 4 and 5 with examples and cases from the region. The rest of this chapter will look at the evolution of peace and conflict studies and how this has contributed to the transformative peacebuilding approach in the region.

1.4 Foundations of peace and conflict studies in Southeast Asia

The region has had its share of conflict issues and events in the past, but peace and conflict studies only became a new field of study in the 1990s. This can be seen from the number of research centres and academic programs that were created during this period to specifically focus on issues of peace, conflict, human rights, and other related subjects. Previously, these issues were mainly discussed in other research and academic programs including political science, international relations, psychology, sociology, law, and security studies. However, the 1990s saw the beginning of new centres to study peace and conflict with new research and academic programs being introduced at institutions of higher education.

A small sample of academic and semi-academic centres, bodies, and networks for peace in the region includes the following:

- Southeast Asia Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN)
- Southeast Asia Human Rights and Peace Network (SEAHRN)

[8] Examples of the transformation and empowerment of local actors from the soil of the conflict are presented in Chapters 4 and 5.

- The Program on Strengthening Human Rights and Peace Education and Research in ASEAN/Southeast Asia (SHAPE SEA)
- Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, Southeast Asia (GPPAC-SEA)
- ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (ASEAN-IPR)
- ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)
- Asian Muslim Action Network (AMAN)
- Action Asia
- Research and Education for Peace, Universiti Sains Malaysia (REPUSM), Malaysia
- *Serikat Pengajar Hak Asasi Manusia* (SEPAHAM), Indonesia
- Institute for Human Rights and Peace Studies, Mahidol University, Thailand
- Centre for Peace Studies, Prince of Songkhla University (PSU), Thailand
- Rotary Centre for Peace Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand
- Peace Resource Center, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand
- Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPCS), Cambodia
- Centre for Peace and Security Studies, (PSKP) Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia
- Centre for Peace Studies, Universitas Syiah Kuala, Aceh, Indonesia
- Center for Peace Education, Miriam College, Philippines

This is just a sample of institutions focusing on peace and conflict studies. Peace is also taught in academic programmes focusing on politics, international relations, human rights, sociology, and law. While it is notable that some countries may have more centres and institutions for peace education and research than others, this may be due to a greater degree of openness to discuss and research such issues. Another reason may point to the existence of more conflict situations and the need to understand the nature of conflicts and to encourage peace through peace education and research. The topic of peace education will be discussed further in Chapter 4 as part of a discussion on conflict transformation.

The focus on peace education and research is an important one in the approach of transformative peacebuilding. Peace education and research helps transform situations by doing the following:

- Providing information and creating awareness about the conflict situation;
- Changing and transforming the mindsets of people;
- Encouraging the search for alternatives through a survey of lessons learnt from conflict situations;
- Providing a platform and safe venue for the discussion of difficult and sensitive subjects;
- Raising the capacity of those involved in peace activities and programs as well as affected groups and communities; and
- Connecting the different tracks as well as internal and external actors involved in doing peace and conflict transformation work.

Many of the people doing these activities can also be described *as insider peacebuilders/mediators* (see Chapter 5) contributing from within as they are part of the "soil of the conflict."

It can be noticed from the list of centres given above that some institutions combine the study of peace and conflict with studies of human rights. This is natural because these focuses complement each other. In fact, since the mid-2000s onwards, the focus on human rights has been stronger in the region with many universities starting new

human rights programs or introducing such courses into their programs. Many were introduced in law programs or faculties at these universities. Peace studies courses, on the other hand, remain in peace studies programs or within political science and international relations programs. For a survey of human rights and peace education in the region, please see *The Remapping and Analysis of Human Rights and Peace Education in ASEAN/Southeast Asia* by the program on Strengthening Human Rights and Peace Education in Southeast Asia (2019).

The following examples illustrate the activities and programs carried out by academic peace institutions that have had an impact on the transformation for peace in the region. Three institutions/programs are highlighted: the Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN), the Program on Strengthening Human Rights and Peace Education and Research in Southeast Asia (SHAPE-SEA), and the Aceh Institute (AI). A program to support the Bangsamoro peace process in Mindanao organized by the SEACSN and Universiti Sains Malaysia, in partnership with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), known as the Consolidation for Peace (COP) program is also presented as a transformative peacebuilding effort by scholars and their partners contributing to peace in the region.

1.4.1 The Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN)[9]

SEACSN was formally established in 2001 as a platform to support and promote the study of peace and conflict in Southeast Asia. There has been a growing interest in peace and conflict studies in the region since the early to mid-nineties, as evidenced from the growing number of academic programs and institutions focusing on peace studies, e.g. the Institute for Dispute Resolution (IDR), Khon Kaen University, Thailand (established in 1994) and the Research and Education for Peace Unit, Universiti Sains Malaysia (REPUSM) (established in 1995). Apart from working on their in-country studies, they have also organized regional workshops and seminars. Informal personal connections between scholars were gradually established through these activities. In 1999, REPUSM conducted a workshop on 'New dimensions of conflict and challenges for conflict management in Southeast Asia' in Penang, Malaysia. It was a gathering of scholars and participants representing seven countries in the ASEAN region. As a result of this successful meeting, they were inspired to form a network of individuals and institutions involved in peace and conflict resolution research and practice. Several other academic institutions and other non- government organizations were also invited to form part of the network's core group. They met again in July 2000 and organized a workshop from which they produced a proposal to set up SEACSN. This proposal was then submitted to the Department of Research Cooperation (SAREC) of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) for support. In April 2001, SIDA accepted the proposal and signed an agreement to help create SEACSN. Since then, REPUSM has served SEACSN as its Regional Secretariat organizing various programs and activities of the network at both national and regional levels. The stated objectives of SEACSN are as follows:

(1) To promote cooperation and collaboration among researchers working in the area of peace and conflict research in Southeast Asia.
(2) To promote research in peace and conflict resolution in Southeast Asia in accordance with the themes of SEACSN.
(3) To produce a body of work on conflict analysis and conflict resolution.
(4) To conduct a Southeast Asian conflict mapping exercise.

[9] This section was contributed by Suwit Laohasiriwong, Deputy Regional Coordinator, Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN); also former President of Nakhon Phanom University, and Director of the Institute for Dispute Resolution (IDR), Khon Kaen University, Thailand.

The projects and activities of SEACSN were based on the following themes and issues:

(1) The state and the people (civil society and governance, self-determination, centre-periphery relations, development, natural resources, environment)
(2) Ethnicity (ethnicity, religion, culture, ethno-nationalism)
(3) Inter-state relations (border and inter-state relations; regional organizations; external state relations)

Even as the first phase of SIDA-funded activities ended in 2004, SEACSN continued as a platform to encourage peace and conflict studies in the region through various scholarly and advocacy activities with international, national, and local partners. It has also partnered with other international organizations such as the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) and the Southeast Asian Human Rights and Peace Network (SEAHRN) to play a positive role in empowering peace scholar-activists and transforming difficult situations in the region. An example of this is the Consolidation for Peace (COP) program described in the following section.

1.4.2 The Consolidation for Peace (COP) program

The Consolidation for Peace program (COP) was organized by the Research and Education for Peace, Universiti Sains Malaysia (REPUSM) in collaboration with the Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) from 2006 to 2014. It aimed to support transformative peacebuilding efforts in conflict areas in the region. REPUSM and SEACSN have long been active in transformative peacebuilding in places like Aceh and Southern Thailand including organizing consultation meetings between the conflict stakeholders, initiating the creation of bodies for peace (i.e. Aceh Institute and Southern Thailand Universities for Peace or STUfPeace), promoting peace education, and providing a platform for discussion among peace activists and scholars in the region. They have also facilitated exchanges between parties and stakeholders from different conflict areas. The experiences of organizing all these activities were put into creating the COP program, which started out as a platform for exchanging ideas and experiences in a semi-academic seminar setting and progressed into a program to directly support peace processes in the region, especially the GPH-MILF[10] peace process.

The COP worked under a simple premise (which in peace studies is also known as doing *action research*) – that sometimes a process for peace needs to slow down, take stock of what is going on, reflect, ask some difficult questions, come up with a framework, theory, or approach to address these questions, connect with like-minded people, and even create new partnerships to move on. This is especially true for those working within the context of a peace process.

For the organizers, one of the most important tasks begins with the selection of participants for the program. It helps that the REPUSM has a Mindanao Peace Program managed by Dr Ayesah Abubakar[11] who is a Bangsamoro person herself with very good connections to various parties in the Philippines. The selection process goes like this – first, the main parties have to be there. They are joined by others with a stake in the conflict and the peace process such as representatives from civil society organizations, politicians, political and other interest groups, academia, and the media. There were also occasions during the COP when representatives from the facilitating country and the International Monitoring Team (IMT) from the Mindanao peace process were present.

[10] That is, the government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
[11] Before working at REPUSM and SEACSN, Dr Ayesah Abubakar was the first Chair of the Young Moro Professionals Network (YMPN) in the Philippines.

The COP program generally provides space for participants to informally discuss issues, including difficult ones, without worrying about the implications. Discussions were conducted under the Chatham House rules and were always frank and informative. The program provided space for the main parties to inform the participants about what was going on within the process as well as to hear the worries and concerns of the people affected by the conflict. Clarifications and suggestions on how to move forward were made. This form of consultation is important because, thus far, there had been few opportunities for the parties to consult with the stakeholders and their constituencies about the process. The COP participants also always included resource persons, experts in their fields of various aspects of peacemaking and peacebuilding[12] from the region and beyond, as well as selected actors from other conflicts and peace processes in the region. The program was facilitated by a team of scholar-practitioners[13] from REPUSM and SEACSN who were well known and acceptable to all the parties and stakeholders. In addition, the program was done in partnership with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), a respected international development agency[14] and an important contributor to peacebuilding in Mindanao. Other local partners also contributed to support the program.[15]

This REPUSM-SEACSN-JICA partnership in transformative peacebuilding resulted in six COP programs, one spin-off program for the promotion and expansion of peace education in Mindanao (MASCUF)[16], and two "Dreamkeepers" programs for Southern Thailand. The programs are described below:

COP1: '*The Consolidation for Peace Seminar: Peacebuilding and Strategic Planning for Aceh and Mindanao*' 23-26 January 2006

This was the first COP program with a focus on Aceh and Mindanao, organized on the campus of Universiti Sains Malaysia. The campus was chosen as the venue because of security reasons. Putting the program under the umbrella of academic freedom in the university allows for frank discussion and the participation of 'sensitive' groups. This was the first time that both the government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) sent their representatives to participate in this type of peacebuilding platform outside the country. The Aceh delegation included Acehnese leaders from various sectors: representatives from the provincial government (led

[12] Experts who have joined the COP program include Prof Oliver Ramsbotham and Prof Tom Woodhouse from Bradford University, UK, and Gen Tan Sri Zulkifeli Md Zin, the first head of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Mindanao, and later Chief of the Armed Forces of Malaysia. Liberation movements in the region also participated in some of the programs, including the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Bersatu, and the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO).

[13] The program was facilitated by Prof Kamarulzaman Askandar (Coordinator of REPUSM and SEACSN) and Dr Ayesah Abubakar (Program Manager of the Mindanao Peace Program at REPUSM). They were supported by Norazrina Md Jabarullah (Program Manager at REPUSM) and student-volunteers from REPUSM. Throughout the years, this student-volunteer peace crew has successfully organized many peace programs at REPUSM-SEACSN as part of their study program. They include: Lukman Age, Che Mohd Aziz Yaacob, Aizat Khairi, Mohd Na'eim Ajis, Chai Lee Choo, Normia Salindal, Faridah Abubakar, Dewi Karina Kamarulzaman, Suyatno Ladiqi, Julayda Hashim, Muhammad Haekal Kamarulzaman, Azman Zahareiman, Zulfadli Zainal, Suadi Zainal, Afrizal Tjoetra, Elviandy, Eleonora Emkic, Yoko Fujimura, Mior Khairul Azreen, Oshanta Thalpawilla, Kumphi Thongpoon, Ghazalee@Khosale Awae, and Phaison Daoh.

[14] Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was a crucial partner to the program. It provided the financial support and credibility associated with an internationally respected development agency. The partnership started when Madam Sadako Ogata became President of JICA in 2003 and developed a new approach of combining development assistance with peacebuilding in conflict-affected areas, especially Mindanao. Many JICA personnel were crucial to making the COP programs successful, especially Senior Advisor for Peacebuilding, Dr Sachiko Ishikawa, Naoki Ochiai, and staff members at the JICA Malaysia office (Mr Umezaki, Mr Ikura, Mr Tsutomo Nagae, Mdm Suzuki, and Ms Mayumi Suehiro).

[15] These include the Institute for Bangsamoro Studies (IBS) led by Prof Abhoud Syed Lingga, the Aceh Institute (AI), and the Southern Thailand Peace Network (later to become the Southern Thailand Universities for Peace or STUFPeace).

[16] Mindanao Association of State Colleges and Universities Federation Inc (MASCUF).

by GAM leaders who are now part of the provincial government), representatives from civil society organizations, and those working with donor agencies. This COP also included a small group of participants from Southern Thailand composed of academics and local leaders wanting to learn lessons on peacebuilding from the Acehnese and Bangsomoro peacebuilders.

COP2: *'The Consolidation for Peace Seminar II: Building Sustainable Peace in Aceh, Mindanao, and Southern Thailand*' 2-6 September 2007

This was a follow-up to the first COP program. This time, several locally-based peacebuilding partners joined as co-organizers – The Aceh Institute (AI), the Institute for Bangsamoro Studies (IBS), and the South Thailand Peace Network (STPN).

COP3: *'Consolidation for Peace (COP3) for Mindanao: Strategic Planning for Peace Post MOA-AD*' 12-16 January 2009

For this third COP, the peace process in Mindanao became the main focus. The GPH-MILF peace process collapsed in 2008 due to some parties requesting the Supreme Court to delay the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) on 5 August 2008. This resulted in the Supreme Court issuing a restraining order on the signing of the agreement and subsequently declaring the whole process to be unlawful for lack of consultation with affected parties. Violence erupted on the ground in Mindanao with some MILF commanders separating and creating the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and attacking government forces and civilians. Something needed to be done to help save the process and get it moving again.[17] It was under this context that the third COP was organized. The parties and other stakeholders were very responsive to the idea of participating in this COP to discuss how to revive the process. It was also here that ideas on the International Contact Group (ICG) came about as a response to the issue of "guarantors" in a peace process.

COP4: *'The Consolidation for Peace Seminar 4 (COP4): Transforming the Conflicts and Supporting the Peacebuilders in Aceh, Mindanao, and Southern Thailand'* 21-25 February 2011

The focus of COP4 was to look at the challenges and lessons arising from processes around the region. The Mindanao process was back on track with the addition of the ICG since 2009 and the election of a new president in 2010 with a renewed commitment to achieving peace in Mindanao. The Aceh situation was improving despite intra-party competition for power among former members of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). Issues also arose with regard to implementation of the Helsinki MoU and the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA). It was important for participants from the Mindanao process to see what was going on in Aceh and to learn from this experience. An unmentioned agenda for COP4 was also to accelerate discussion on Southern Thailand. The intensity of the conflict there had not really abated since the surge of violence starting in January 2004. This, despite efforts by various actors to reduce the violence and tension. An intra-party consolidation was necessary as one of the first priorities. Different factions from the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) were invited, resulting in the participation of three factions. The former leader of Bersatu, an umbrella organization trying to unite the various Patani parties back in 1989, was also present. Discussions were held between these parties and participants from Aceh and Mindanao in an attempt to give the Patanis an alternative to pursuing their struggle and to provide examples and guidance on involvement in a formal peace process, from the experiences of the Acehnese and the Bangsamoros.

[17] In fact, it was during the non-signing ceremony itself on 5 August 2008 in Putrajaya that REPUSM and JICA began discussing COP3. It was agreed that something needed to be done urgently to rescue and sustain the process.

COP5: '*The Consolidation for Peace for Mindanao (COP5) Seminar*' 16-20 January 2012

COP5 returned the focus back to Mindanao. There was now greater commitment on the part of all parties to push the peace agenda forward in Mindanao. COP3 was designed to save the peace process. COP4 went back to learning lessons from the region. Now the time had come to accelerate momentum for Mindanao. It was also useful that a new Philippines president had come into power in 2010. President Benigno Aquino III committed himself to secure peace in Mindanao and finished the job that his mother, President Corazon Aquino, started in 1987. His pledge was also important given the fact that presidents in the Philippines are only allowed one term of six years. To the minds of many, including the organizers of the COP program, this presented them with both an opportunity and challenge – to try and finish the process by 2016. Accordingly, the same basic formula previously used was enhanced. This time participation really needed to be from the highest levels possible. A political settlement was in sight and individuals in decision-making positions from both sides needed to be there, rather than just reading reports from colleagues or staff members sent to the program. It was thus that COP5 participants included the Secretary of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), Chairs and members of the peace panels from the GPH and MILF, representatives from the Philippine Congress and Senate, local government leaders including five provincial governors from affected areas in Southern Philippines, and representatives from civil society organizations including participants from the church, ulama, scholars, NGO leaders, and media representatives.

The program had several clear objectives: (1) To generate ideas to fast track the peace process by giving relevant information about the status of the process to the stakeholders, including a number of donor organizations apart from the JICA; (2) To expand the support for the peace process by including national leadership – from the Philippine Congress and Senate. It is the support of this wider group that is crucial to strengthening peacemaking; (3) To encourage further participation of the media/journalists by increasing their understanding of the dynamics and status of the peace process to enable them to inform the public effectively; (4) Finally, to use the COP as a venue for internal Bangsamoro consolidation—among the MILF, traditional leaders, and other civil society leaders.

Local politicians including five governors from Bangsamoro provinces as well as representatives from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) were also invited for their different views on the GPH-MILF process. Infighting between the Bangsamoro groups had contributed to disunity and loss of political power. This was detrimental to the peace process and needed to be addressed.[18] COP5 added to the groundwork and contributed to the achievement of the Framework Agreement for the Bangsamoro (FAB) signed the following year in 2012 and the Comprehensive Agreement for the Bangsamoro (CAB) in 2014. Some participants from COP programs consequently became part of formal peace negotiations—as observers and even members of the negotiating panels on both sides, including one COP participant who was appointed by the MILF to the negotiating panel of the MILF as a representative of the non-Muslim indigenous people.

COP6: *'The Consolidation for Peace for Mindanao (COP6) – Post Agreement Implementation: Building 'Capacities for Peace' of Bangsamoro Stakeholders*' in Hiroshima, Japan, 23-26 June 2014

[18] This proved a most difficult task. The Bangsamoro groups (MILF, MNLF, and traditional politicians) have a long history of competing for power, territory, and influence in the area. Moving forward would mean agreeing on some kind of formula for power-sharing; or to acknowledge leadership of a particular group in a specific area; or at the very least, for an understanding to be reached that no group would become a 'spoiler' in the present process. This had to be done carefully so as not to disturb the balance and provoke sensitivities. One lesson learnt in this process was that informal discussion over meals was more likely to achieve understanding than direct talks in front of an audience of stakeholders.

The last meeting in the COP series was held in Hiroshima, Japan from 23-26 June 2014. More than sixty participants representing major parties and stakeholders were invited to participate in this historical event. The main focus of COP6 was on development efforts to help support and sustain the peace agreements signed between the GPH and the MILF. Two key questions were: how to ensure a sustainable and durable peace; and how to make peace and development interventions complement each other. Hiroshima was chosen because of the historic nature of the city as a site of the atomic bombing of 1945.[19] An important point of COP6 was the presence of President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines, together with the Chair of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim.

(a) Mindanao Educators Peace Summit

'*Transforming the Conflict in Mindanao through Peace Education and Quality Higher Education*' 11-16 January 2010, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Pulau Pinang, Malaysia

In 2010, the COP program was expanded to include the Mindanao Educators Peace Summit which was jointly organized with the Mindanao Association of State Colleges and Universities Foundation Inc (MASCUF). As such, forty participants including thirty university presidents from MASCUF were invited to participate to find ways to strengthen and widen the platform for peace through improving peace education in Mindanao. Also present were Annabelle Abaya, the then Secretary of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), and representatives of the Philippines Commission on Higher Education (CHED). Peace education is important because it improves students' knowledge, increases their skills in addressing conflict issues and situations, and enhances a positive attitude.

Specific objectives of the program included: to review peace-oriented efforts in the context of history and current events *vis-a-vis* the mandates, functions, and programs of the State Universities and Colleges (SUCs); to identify and/or define the peace initiatives of SUCs on an individual or collective basis, and to see how these could be further pursued and enhanced through the Mindanao clusters of the Philippine Association of State Universities and Colleges (PASUC); and to provide policy recommendations/alternatives for higher education to address the peace and development imperatives of Mindanao. At its conclusion, the presidents from MASCUF agreed to play their part in utilizing education as a platform for doing transformative peacebuilding. They even came up with the MASCUF Penang Declaration at the end of the Summit. The details are as follows:

(1) There is an agreement that MASCUF shall promote peace education.
(2) Implementation of Executive Order 570 by institutionalizing peace education in SUCs in Mindanao.
(3) Collaboration among SUCs in undertaking peace education programs in the areas of instruction, research, and community extension.
(4) Recommend to the Commission on Higher Education, the identification of regional peace consortia, together with civil society groups, and to appropriate funds therefore.
(5) Strengthen MASCUF as a Peace Network working together for a common agenda and sharing its resources.
(6) Recommend to the Office of the President the observance of Muslim and Indigenous People's (Lumads) holidays all throughout Mindanao.

[19] Moving the COP from Penang to Hiroshima was important for JICA to showcase JICA's role in peace-building efforts in Mindanao to the Japanese public. The event, especially the presence of the Philippines President, was well covered by the Japanese media. For obvious reasons, regular COP participants, as well as the organizing committee from REPUSM, were also happy with this new choice of venue for COP6. This became like a 'school trip' for the participants and a platform for bonding and improving relations. The participation of media practitioners from the Philippines also meant that the event was reported daily to the public back home.

(7) MASCUF as a Peace Network should be involved in the national agenda for a peace process.

(b) STUfPeace and the "Dreamkeepers" program

Finally, a joint collaboration between REPUSM, SEACSN, and JICA on the COP also resulted in two programs focusing on enhancing transformative peacebuilding in Southern Thailand (which was separate from the involvement of Southern Thailand's participants in the COP programs). These formed part of efforts to create a body of "scholar-practitioners" and peace activists among Southern Thai scholars and students. The Dreamkeepers program or 'Promoting the Peace Dream: Creating and supporting the "Dreamkeepers" in Southern Thailand,' was organized at Universiti Sains Malaysia in Penang in 2007 and 2008. Six universities from the area were invited to participate including Prince of Songkhla University (Hatyai campus), Prince of Songkhla University (Pattani campus), Hatyai University, Thaksin University, Princess of Narathiwas University, and Yala Rajabhat University. As a result, some university peace clubs were set up by the returning Dreamkeepers, and the Southern Thailand Peace Network (STPN) was formed by university lecturers although this was later renamed Southern Thailand Universities for Peace (STUfPeace). Peace activities in Southern Thailand later expanded to include many other actors but the initial contributions of the earlier Dreamkeepers and scholar-activists from STUfPeace were crucial.

In conclusion, the COP programs organized by the REPUSM/SEACSN/JICA partnership showed how important the transformative peacebuilding process is and illustrated how scholar-practitioners can contribute to peace in the region. The next section will look at this process from an angle that includes a focus on human rights education.

1.4.3 Strengthening Human Rights and Peace Research and Education in ASEAN/SEA Program (SHAPE SEA)[20]

The Strengthening Human Rights and Peace Research and Education in ASEAN/SEA Program (SHAPE SEA) envisions a Southeast Asia where the culture and values of human rights, peace, and democracy are instilled through widespread research, teaching in higher education, and informed policy advocacy. The program is the brainchild of the ASEAN University Network-Human Rights Education Theme (AUN-HRE) and the Southeast Asian Human Rights and Peace Studies Network (SEAHRN), and is supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR) at the University of Oslo. The Secretariat is hosted by the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) at Mahidol University in Thailand. It is premised on the assumption that building regional cooperation on human rights and peace in higher education contributes to the promotion and protection of human rights and sustainable peace for all peoples in Southeast Asia. The program believes that threats to human rights, whether in rising populism, shrinking civil society space, increased racism and discrimination, or the impunity enjoyed by human rights violators, cannot be effectively addressed without evidence-based knowledge and a highly skilled network of experts (or champions) in the region.

(a) Strategy and objectives

The overall objective of the program is to *contribute to the improvement of the human rights and peace situation in Southeast Asia through applied research and education*. Its strategy is to directly involve and engage universities to play a more significant role in promoting human rights and peace by contributing research, which can be applied to address concerns, and by increasing the knowledge of human rights and

[20] This section was contributed by Joel Mark Barrado, Program Manager for the program on Strengthening Human Rights and Peace Education and Research in ASEAN/Southeast Asia (SHAPE-SEA).

peace through incorporating human rights and peace into university education. Research and education on the human rights of vulnerable people—which can include anyone whose rights are violated, but more specifically relates to groups in poverty, marginalized from society or facing discrimination, communities surrounded by conflict, or people who lack access to basic services or government protection—works towards ensuring such people have a more secure and just future. Contributing to human rights not only protects the vulnerable but also develops the capacity of those peoples and organizations obliged to provide or protect people in the region. Applying this rights based-approach, the project has contributed to poverty alleviation whilst supporting the rule of law and democratization in the region. The over-all goals of the program can be seen in the following specific objectives:

- To increase by 50%, the number of people able to research, and the number of research products, on peace and human rights from Southeast Asian universities;
- To increase the exposure of human rights and peace research produced by member universities to key stakeholders (students, governments, civil society, and the media); and
- To improve standards of human rights and peace education in Southeast Asia by making relevant research available for textbooks, teaching, curriculum development, and classroom engagement.

(b) Theory of change

SHAPE-SEA's theory of change is to be able to actualise one of the most effective and sustainable ways to move towards human rights and peace, which is through the promotion and strengthening of education and research. The program (and niche or particular contribution to change) is to serve as *incubator and hub* for the development of individual researchers and academics and their community, leading towards the building of a *critical mass of academic-scholar advocates*. This critical mass of academic-scholar advocates will be SHAPE-SEA's main contribution to the improvement of the human rights and peace situation in Southeast Asia, as they serve as the fulcrum for generating/effecting other changes and influencing arenas and other potential change agents like governments and corporations. SHAPE-SEA endeavours to develop academic-scholar advocates as individuals (as local agents of change in their countries and individual higher education institutions) as well as a community (developing collaborative advantage to leverage greater change).

(c) Commitment to peace and conflict transformation

From 2015 to the present, SHAPE-SEA has worked to achieve academic excellence and contribution on the following themes: ASEAN and Human Rights, Business and Accountability, Governance and Justice, Academic Freedom, and Peace and Security. While Peace and Security is deemed an intersectional theme, proponents of the program realized the need to further increase knowledge and capacity on this theme. The rationale is as follows:

> *ASEAN still has a number of ongoing conflicts, all of which have human rights dimensions. Research needs to be done to ensure that issues of peace, conflict transformation, and reconciliation, form part of the education and research. By having conflict transformation as part of the scope of the program underscores the fact that peace and human rights are mutually reinforcing in nature. This theme will concentrate on detailing the measures to ensure human rights are respected and protected in ongoing conflicts in the region, in particular ensuring the rule of law, the operation of human rights during conflict, the protection of vulnerable groups, and understanding how peace-building*

and conflict transformation can contribute to improvement of compliance with human rights standards (SHAPE-SEA, Phase 1 Proposal, 2015).

SHAPE-SEA was able to support and conduct research projects, lecture tours, educational workshops, national seminars, capacity-building activities, and advocacy efforts at the national and regional levels. Academic publications were also produced on the issues of peace and conflict transformation. These efforts have been the highlights of and prove the relevance of integrating peace frameworks and building societies that fully support and embrace conflict transformation in every part of Southeast Asia.

1.4.4 The Aceh Institute (AI)[21]

The Aceh Institute is a non-profit Aceh NGO founded by a group of Acehnese scholar-activists with support from regional scholars, at the Research and Education for Peace Unit, Universiti Sains Malaysia (REPUSM) in 2003. It was created as a think-thank to support conflict transformation and peacebuilding activities by increasing the intellectual capacity of Acehnese human resources through a combination of scholarly work and activism for Aceh.

Aceh at that time was locked in the midst of a prolonged violent armed conflict where incidences of death and human suffering were happening on a daily basis. This started in 1976 when the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM or Free Aceh Movement) started a self-determination struggle for the Aceh province, bringing forth retribution from the Indonesian authorities, resulting in massive violations of human rights and suffering for the Acehnese. The height of such retribution occurred when Aceh was declared a *Daerah Operasi Militari* (DOM) or Military Operations Zone between 1989 and 1998, and subjected to various acts of violence, humiliation, and dehumanizing actions. The collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998 and the ensuing dialogues between the government and GAM did bring short relief between 1999 and 2003, and even hopes for peace with the initiation of a peace process facilitated by the Henri Dunant Centre (HDC). But the peace talks collapsed in May 2003. The introduction of military and civil emergencies brought progress for peace to a halt and a return to war and suffering for the Acehnese.[22]

The Aceh Institute was formed in the context of this tense situation. The motivation then was to create a platform to help transform the conflict and contribute to the eradication of all forms of violence; to realise the ideals of peace in Aceh and change the paradigm for the resolution of the conflict which, up to then had been based on the security, the military, and violent approaches; and to bring back respect for humanity to Aceh and a human approach to resolving the conflict.

These were the underlying drivers that triggered the enthusiasm of a number of activists, academics, and researchers from Aceh and the region to join together to create the Aceh Institute. Together, they are committed to transforming a situation with a high level of complexity and a range of multi-dimensional dynamics including political, cultural, economic, and religious dialectics.

The Aceh Institute was created as a platform for Acehnese scholar-activists to find permanent conflict resolution and work towards building positive peace for Aceh. Among the programs initiated were the peace research program, and the interdisciplinary public dialogue and discussion programs. In addition, the Institute also provided assistance in designing development planning at the rural level; training on conflict resolution, peace, and human rights; and intellectual

[21] This part was contributed by Fuad Mardhatillah, Senior Lecturer at the State Islamic University, Banda Aceh, Indonesia, and Former Executive Director of the Aceh Institute.

[22] For more details of the conflict in Aceh and the Aceh peace process, see the case study in Chapter 5.

empowerment programs in the fields of social, political, cultural, and religious affairs based on human rights, and always under the guidance of non-violent Islamic teachings. For intellectual empowerment efforts, the Aceh Institute also conducted a number of trainings on the research and writing of scientific papers. This was to encourage intellectual sensitivity among Acehnese scholars and to encourage the younger generation to be enthusiastic about writing smart and creative ideas in response to the situation around them. The results of these activities were then selected and uploaded to the Aceh Institute website to be shared with a wider audience.

The Aceh Institute also gained international prominence as shown by the interests of international donors and researchers to collaborate with it on a number of projects. International researchers also regard the Aceh Institute as a host and reference point for consultation and data on various research activities. Finally, despite the best efforts and successes of the Aceh Institute, like other non-governmental organizations working for peace in Aceh, it has suffered from a number of problems, including a low level of creative ideas in the community, a low level of institutional financial independence, and ignorance in matters of scientific knowledge management. So much so, that the treasure trove of knowledge and 'best practices' produced by the institution, seems to have almost disappeared. Fortunately, the institute is still here, although the scholar-activists actively involved in its activities have spread their wings and created other platforms for peace research, education, and activism. Some notable ones include the International Center on Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies (ICAOS) and the Center for Peace Studies, both at Syiah Kuala University in Banda Aceh. (Other examples include the Aceh Civil Society Task Force (ACSTF) and the Consortium for New Aceh, both of which will be discussed in Chapter 4.)

1.5 Conclusion and overview of the sourcebook

Chapter 1 surveyed and discussed the major concepts, approaches, and frameworks in this field. These include the notions of peace, conflict, violence, and the strategies, approaches, and frameworks to address them. A more detailed discussion of these along with examples and cases from the region will be presented in subsequent chapters. Chapter 1 started with the evolution of theories in this field to put the evolution and development of peace studies in perspective and to give context to the discussion. It then went on to highlight the basic meanings of the major concepts and approaches.

The chapter also put emphasis on conflict transformation as an important approach to achieve peace in the region. Conflict transformation was chosen as the main focus of the sourcebook not only because of its comprehensive nature but also because it aptly describes the evolution of peace and peacebuilding in the region. It also highlights the "work in progress" nature of many efforts for peace in the region. The conflict transformation approach was then combined with the strategies of peacebuilding to become the transformative peacebuilding framework for achieving sustainable positive peace. This presents the basic approach and framework for achieving peace in the region and will be highlighted throughout this sourcebook. This framework is also presented as being the most suitable because it takes into account the contingency and complementarity nature of these efforts.

The chapter then presented some examples on how this transformative peacebuilding approach has been applied and implemented in the region. The examples show how the evolution of peace, conflict, and human rights studies and the application of this approach by regional scholar-practitioners together with their partners and networks have made contributions to peace in the region. Other examples and the contributions of other actors will be presented later. A more detailed discussion of

conflict transformation and peacebuilding and their applications will also be done in other chapters especially Chapter 4. A survey of all the chapters in this sourcebook is presented as follows.

Chapter 2 on 'Understanding Conflict' will continue with a discussion on the theories and concepts within the field of peace and conflict studies. The chapter will begin by explaining the nature of conflict, starting with an exploration of conflict within oneself and with others by elaborating its characteristics. It will also address the importance of social cognition to the causes of conflict. Further elaboration will be made on conflict theories and frameworks by explaining the terminology of conflict and by using the conflict triangle and protracted social conflict frameworks. The latter part of this chapter will focus on conflict analysis by addressing the types and causes of conflict, the actors in a conflict, and the conflict dynamics through conflict mapping exercises.

Chapter 3 will focus on conflict management and prevention as an important means to approach violent conflicts. How has the region handled violent or potentially violent conflicts, individually and collectively? What formal and informal ways are there to manage and prevent violent conflicts? How do states in Southeast Asia maintain positive relations while having various internal, inter-state, and internationalized conflicts? To manage and prevent violent conflicts in the region, it is also vital to grasp extremism there, which has a long history and has become more and more difficult to handle in a globalized world. What are the causes of the extremism in Southeast Asia and how has the region managed violent extremism? These are some of the questions that this chapter will explore.

Conflict management and prevention, in general, entail both formal and informal mechanisms. Given the diversity of the countries and people in Southeast Asia, as well as the complexity and abundance of problems in the region, multiple formal and informal efforts, both within each state and among ASEAN member states collectively, are vital. For this reason, the chapter will explain conflict management and prevention, taking both formal and informal mechanisms into consideration. While the formal mechanism has been gradually institutionalized in recent years, the informal mechanism has also been gradually recognised as the "Southeast Asian" or "ASEAN Way." The chapter, therefore, will also explore how and in what ways the ASEAN Way contributes to and characterizes conflict management and prevention and *vice versa*.

In a contemporary globalized world, even local conflicts cannot avoid the effect of globalization. The effects are not only financial and material, but also ideological and political and involve the significant influence of great powers. Some conflicts in the region have, indeed, been internationalized, thereby enhancing cross-border crimes including trafficking, the circulation of small arms and light weapons, and an extensive network of criminal and armed groups. This chapter therefore will explore extremism in Southeast Asia, which has become one of the key denominators exemplifying violent conflicts and will examine how individual states and ASEAN collectively manage the ebb and flow of violent extremism in the region. The ways violent conflicts and extremism are handled in Southeast Asia help us not only to understand the region's conflicts but also the nature and characteristics of the states, society, and people that have been striving for peace and prosperity in the region.

Chapter 4 will focus on the concepts and approaches of conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Conflict transformation will be explained as an approach to bring about change in protracted regional conflict situations. It will start with a discussion of the protracted and systemic nature of the conflicts and explain why they need to be transformed for peace to be achieved. As such, the chapter will focus on the transformation of context, issues, structure, personal, and group as a way to bring

about the agenda of transformation. This should be done as part of a process of peacebuilding which necessitates looking at the context, timeline, and actors involved, and the strategies employed in this process. The involvement of civil society and other stakeholders is crucial to this process. Examples of their involvement will be highlighted through case studies and boxes that focus on their activities and contributions. The chapter will also look at peace education as an essential long-term component of conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Further, the role of the media and peace journalism will be highlighted.

Chapter 5 will look at how conflicts are ended. The focus will be on approaches and frameworks for ending a conflict including bilateral processes between two actors as well as peace processes that have seen the involvement of third parties in the region. The chapter will explain how these processes normally start, the actors involved, the difficulties and challenges they face, and how these have been overcome. Steps in negotiation and peace mediation processes will also be explained and discussed. Among the cases from the region that will be highlighted in this chapter include the Aceh conflict, the Mindanao/Bangsamoro peace process, and Maluku. These will either be discussed as examples to explain the approaches/frameworks and/or be highlighted as case studies. Finally, the chapter will also look at what happens after a peace agreement has been signed and what needs to be done in order to ensure the sustainability of the peace process. This focus on sustainability will be continued in Chapter 6.

Chapter 6 will look at one of the most difficult goals to achieve in a post-agreement or post-war/conflict situation which is sustaining peace. Many conflicts relapse due to a number of factors including flawed and incomplete peace agreements, improper implementation of agreed decisions, lack of economic and human resources to support the implementation, and competition over positions and other post-conflict "spoils." Conflict may also continue to persist because of unfinished business as a result of failed reconciliation processes. Chapter 6 will therefore look at the context of post-war/conflicts and focus on factors that can lead to a successful sustainable positive peace situation. Reconciliation issues including the need to address justice and the past in a way that can prevent conflicts from arising again will be discussed. Development is also essential to the post-war/conflict agenda and will be discussed in detail, along with the role of business actors for peace. Finally, the important and positive role of women and gender issues in sustaining peace will also be discussed.

Chapter 7 will consider the regional framework for peace, in particular the role of ASEAN cooperation in assisting the process of resolving various conflicts in the region. Because of its nature as an intergovernmental organization, ASEAN has been seen more as a body to help manage conflicts and reduce tensions between member states (inter-state-conflict). This role, although not entirely successful, has at least prevented open conflict and war between member countries. To a certain degree, ASEAN was seen as successful in fostering its identity and developing its own approach for managing conflicts called the ASEAN Way. Increasingly, ASEAN has been urged to go beyond its traditional security role and contribute to overcoming social and political issues occurring within its member countries. However, ASEAN has yet to come up with an effective approach and framework for this role. Its role is often limited by principles of cooperation such as the principle of sovereignty and not interfering in the affairs of other countries or non-intervention. Nonetheless, efforts to improve itself on this matter are ongoing.

There are at least two mechanisms at work in the region. The first is the official or organizational approach to conflict management, and the second involves initiatives of individual ASEAN members. Examples of the first include establishment of various institutions to promote peace and human rights such as the ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (ASEAN-IPR), the ASEAN Centre for Humanitarian Assistance and

disaster management (AHA Centre), and various other ASEAN sub-organizations. An example of the second is the involvement of individual ASEAN member countries as facilitators and interlocutors in conflicts happening in the countries of other members. For example, the role of Indonesia and Malaysia in the facilitation of the Mindanao/Bangsamoro conflict, and the role played by Malaysia in Southern Thailand's peace process. In the context of a regional framework for peace, ASEAN has evolved since the early days of its formation and continues to search for its ideal form.

Finally, **Chapter 8** will conclude this sourcebook by summarizing the key lessons that can be learnt from the process of transformative peacebuilding in the Southeast Asian region. It will also look at both the achievements and challenges in doing this and highlight the actions necessary to improve this effort.

Discussion questions

1. Why is peace described as a "work-in-progress" in Southeast Asia?
2. How has world politics affected the development of peace studies?
3. How has peace studies developed in Southeast Asia?
4. How do we connect 'contingency' and 'complementarity' with conflict transformation and peacebuilding?
5. How do we decide which conflict resolution approach to use in any given situation?
6. Is conflict transformation a more comprehensive approach compared to conflict resolution?
7. Why is conflict management considered an 'umbrella' approach?
8. Can we identify which approach to address conflict is most commonly used in Southeast Asia?
9. How have peace studies and human rights organizations and networks contributed to peace in the region?
10. What are the main challenges in achieving sustainable positive peace in Southeast Asia?

Recommended reading

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Chapter 2

Understanding Conflict

Chapter 2:
Understanding Conflict

Eakpant Pindavanija[1]

2.1 Introduction

The dream of a peaceful society has led many scholars to explore the necessary conditions to achieve this ambition. Any study of peace requires an understanding of its two orientations, namely, conflict and violence. With or without our awareness, violence and conflict exist in society in various forms, scopes, and with a variety of impacts. Some may engage in personal conflicts, while others may participate in wider types of disputes such as political, social, and international conflicts.

This chapter seeks to understand conflict by exploring various conflict theories and notions of peace. To do this, it is first essential to understand conflict. To this end, questions regarding conflict and the nature of human beings quickly arise such as whether any direct or indirect relationship between the two orientations even exists. While most have experienced some degree of conflict in their lives, this does not necessarily mean more discord is inevitable. Clarifying its characteristics in relation to human behaviour would help us to understand ourselves as subjects of conflict while also offering insights into the very nature of such situations.

There are particular reasons why conflict is studied in the light of human behaviour: first, conflict relates to humans either singly or in the company of others; second, the causes and effects of conflict mainly concern the living conditions of human beings; and finally, understanding and overcoming conflict in the community is a task better achieved by the community itself, since we as humans are responsible for own conditions of living. Aside from understanding human behaviour relating directly to conflict, knowledge and attitude also play a crucial role in understanding, participating, mediating, engaging with, and resolving conflict situations. Therefore, this chapter will further explore the human cognition relevant to the conditions of the emergence, escalation, or de-escalation of conflict. Further, understanding such cognition enriches our capacity to view conflict in its various guises, including conflict that eventually turns violent. Violent conflict may not always escalate in a linear fashion, meaning it is not necessarily dynamic. Understanding both violent and nonviolent conflict helps us to view it in a broader perspective.

Since the era of the world wars, a number of scholars have tried to conceptualize and pursue an understanding of conflict by establishing ‹peace studies’ as an academic discipline, thus providing a philosophical backdrop to the development of peace and conflict theories. Accordingly, this chapter aims to explore some of these fundamental theories by clarifying their frameworks. One leading peace scholar, Johan Galtung, was among the first to define the meanings of *positive peace* and *structural violence*. As such, he proposed a *conflict triangle* to clarify levels of latent and manifest conflict as well as to describe the relationship between attitudes, behaviour, and contradiction as components of conflict.

Another peace scholar, Edward Azar, developed the idea of a *protracted social conflict* which outlines the additional conditions possibly contributing to the creation and prolongation of a social conflict. These factors are identity related, and the result of acts of oppression including isolation, exclusion, and limitation of social, economic, and political participation, which may result in reciprocal

[1] With contributions from Ichsan Malik, Kamarulzaman Askandar, and Norbert Ropers.

violent action by the victims of oppression. This theory is applicable to many social conflicts in Southeast Asia.

In addition, this chapter will examine conflict in relation to human perception and clarify conflict phenomenon with fundamental theories. However, despite common understandings of conflict, it must be said that no two conflicts follow the same pattern. As such, the capability to analyse conflicts is paramount (making it one of the most studied subjects in this field) because the ability to assess each situation systematically helps to provide alternative solutions. To analyse conflict, certain elements must be taken into account, namely: (1) the profile and type of conflict; (2) the causes of conflict; (3) stakeholder and conflict mapping; and (4) the dynamics of a conflict. This chapter first elaborates these elements, then will seek to put conflict analysis theories into practice.

Peace studies contains two major components: theories of violence and theories of conflict. According to Galtung (1986), the term 'peace' exhibits these two components: an absence of violence in all its forms, and the transformation of conflict by peaceful means. Therefore, this chapter will clarify the concept of violence while elaborating the characteristics and conditions of violent and nonviolent conflict to help readers understand that conflict does not always lead to violence, and even when it does, windows of opportunity to settle the violence can often be found. In other words, peace studies encompasses the nature of conflict, fundamental conflict theories, conflict analysis, and the distinction between violent and nonviolent conflicts.

2.2 Nature of conflicts

After World War II, many countries in Southeast Asia faced conflict situations in various forms including inter-state conflicts continuing as a consequence of the colonial period, and inter-state conflicts due to disputes over natural resources on both inland and offshore territories. In addition, most countries in the region have also experienced intra-state conflict as a result of social, cultural, identity, ethnic, political, and economic issues. Indeed, some have been ongoing for extended periods of time.

Any understanding of the nature of conflict should begin with a philosophical background comprising a conceptual framework of conflict and the cognitive processes through which individuals perceive it. Such an underpinning will also help to reveal various perspectives of conflict such as its characteristics and roots, including conflicts in human nature and behaviour.

2.2.1 Characteristics of conflicts

People usually perceive conflict as a series of contradictions and/or clashes between two or more parties, often involving opposing ideologies. Thus, conflict is mainly rooted in opposing views leading to arguments, stress, and disputes which can sometimes escalate. However, viewing such situations in this light results in a negative perception of conflict resulting from a fear of adverse impacts.

Conflict transformation, however, considers the process a normal part of human relations. As social animals, humans need to connect and communicate with others, and accordingly, interpersonal relationships become necessary. Considering conflict as a regular part of life gives it an inevitability and removes the negative connotation. It also allows opportunity for creativity so in some cases, it may even be regarded as a motor for change. Indeed, conflict transformation enables us to see the positive in such situations and could even bring about change or inject creativity into human relationships and society (Galtung, 1996: 70; Lederach, 2003: 5).

To understand its nature, it is first vital to explore the definitions of conflict. As expected, many interpretations have been suggested. Ross Stagner, an industrial psychologist, sees conflict as a situation involving at least two human beings pursuing the same goal, where the goal cannot be achieved by all (Mitchell, 2014). Another widely accepted definition of conflict is «*a pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups*" (Ramsbotham et al, 2005). This asserts that conflicts are triggered by the incompatible goals of stakeholders or conflicted parties. Such contradictions are reflected in conflicted parties considering each other the opposition or enemy, and therefore as obstacles to each other's interests, values, and lives (Galtung, 1996; Mitchell, 2014). Wallensteen (2019) further argues that at certain levels, the dispute may be sparked by *issues* referring to the incompatible positions of conflicted parties and defines the conflict from the composition of three major components namely, incompatibility, action, and actors. As such, a conflict is "… *a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources*" (Wallensteen, 2019: 17-18). He also acknowledges that conflicts could begin from stakeholders holding certain perceptions leading to the erection of barriers to protect one's own interests and values (including identity, standpoint, and experiences) – in other words, in some conflicts, a process affecting the formation and development of conflict emerges.

Referring to the definitions of conflict mentioned earlier, it may now be useful to ask some questions regarding the components of conflict in which stakeholders are the key actors in the emergence of conflicts. One may ask whether two or more stakeholders are required to make a conflict. Primarily, conflict emergence may be described in two forms. First, conflict in the form of a ‹dispute' certainly requires two or more people, and in some circumstances, stakeholders could be enormously expanded to cover not only individuals but organizations, institutions, or even nations. However, in other circumstances, conflicts may only need a single individual or party. In this situation, it is called a ‹dilemma' – where an individual pursues two or more different and incompatible goals. In the past, peace and conflict scholars focused mainly on conflicts requiring two or more stakeholders, leaving the dilemma aspect to psychologists as an individual matter. However, the study of dilemmas has since been incorporated into mainstream conflict studies, because recent research has found that individual dilemmas can indeed impact social actions. For example, individual choices or concerns could lead to collective prejudices that could in turn shape certain attitudes resulting in social actions.

Conflicts involving two or more parties can be looked at using five categories of reasons. Moore (1996) explains these as: (1) information conflict, (2) interest conflict, (3) relationship conflict, (4) structural conflict, and (5) value conflict. The first relates to a lack of accurate information, or different sets of information obtained by stakeholders. At particular points, understanding and interpretation of information can also cause conflict. The second refers to competition over perceived or actual incompatible needs and involves conflict as an aspect of context, process, and psychology. The third relates to and is caused by a misinterpretation of perceptions, stereotypes, miscommunication, and repeated misbehaviour. Structural conflict relates to oppressive behaviours exerted on others including inequality and limited resources or opportunities, as well as the organizations and social structures causing the imbalance of power. Finally, value conflict is viewed as one of the most important causes because such conflicts often underlie other causes of conflict. In particular, they refer to differences in perception and actual belief systems and include incompatibilities in values and behaviour as a result of different beliefs, ways of living, ambitions, and religious beliefs. The ability to identify these five types of conflict helps us to understand the causes of conflict and enables appraisal of such situations using conflict assessment and mapping.

2.2.2 People's cognition and conflict

While violence and conflict theories comprise the major components of peace studies, according to Galtung (1996) the discipline has its basis in epistemology which verifies the affiliation of social science and other disciplines including science and applied science. It is crucial to study the philosophical fundamentals of epistemology as it encompasses the theory of knowledge. If one assumes that conflict formation is related to the attitudes and perceptions of human beings, understanding how that knowledge is obtained, discovered, proofed, and passed on is also essential to understanding perception, truth, and the justification of truth and knowledge. As such, this chapter will seek to explain people's cognition and conflict through the lens of philosophical principle, which may differ from scientific and psychological notions of cognitive conflict (the studies of cognitive dissonance and the misconception of beliefs and ideas).

Before exploring cognition and the attitude of conflict, it is necessary to understand the meaning of epistemology. This chapter aims to give a comprehensive explanation of conflict theories by thus defining epistemology. Honer proposes that, "*Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature, sources, limitations, and validity of knowledge*" (Honer et al, 2006: 63). In other words, the question, "How do we know what we know?" signifies implication of the source of the knowledge, the limits of human knowledge, and the validity and accuracy of that knowledge.

Epistemology from the Greek root, *episteme* (knowledge) plus *logos* (science), means the science of knowledge. Hence, it is imperative to question our assumptions about human knowledge. The importance of epistemology to peace and conflict studies can be clarified by the variation of values in society when people form communities or associate with like-minded people causing shared values to become the group's collective values.

Epistemological inquiry is essential to understand the causes, factors, and conditions of conflict. It helps us to identify different aspects of the contradiction of perceptions, concepts, and ideologies including the ‹attitude' of stakeholders in a conflict. The interpretation of knowledge emanating from different sources and cognitive processes results in contradictions; questioning existing knowledge could assist in clarifying the validity and accuracy of knowledge. Further, the process of epistemological inquiry could be applied to collective perceptions in the wider scope of conflict, and can be used as an example of the connectivity between peace and conflict studies. Other epistemic studies could assist readers to explore how our brains address intangible concepts. If my perception fails to recognise something, can it be counted as the truth? And what do we mean by 'the truth'? Could the truth of today become an untruth tomorrow? Can something be true just for one but not for all? Are we actually learning something new or are we merely becoming aware of something we already knew? Is it even possible to know something for sure? (Honer et al, 2006: 47-109) These kinds of philosophical question help us to understand epistemology better, as well as improve our comprehension of conflict situations.

2.2.3 People's cognition and attitude to conflict

Upon considering the nature of conflict and people, and reflecting on the process of peace and conflict, one sees that people's cognition and attitude to conflict can either be positive or negative or even somewhere in between. Negative attitudes stem from the perception that conflict heralds danger, fighting, war, and destruction. By contrast, a positive attitude may regard conflict as an opportunity, enabling creativity to bring about positive change whereas those adopting an in-between viewpoint may see conflict in terms of differences and diversity (see Table 2.1 below).

Table 2.1 Different attitudes to conflict

Negative attitude	In between attitude	Positive attitude
Danger Risk Argument Fighting War	Differences Diversity Having two or more stakeholders Competition	Opportunity Non-violent means Creativity Motor of change Innovation

Source: Pindavanija and Ouaprachanon, 2018

These differences in cognition and attitude may drive a person's direction and response to conflict differently. In many circumstances when conflict is viewed negatively, especially when one feels threatened, one may decide to escape or eliminate the situation. Or given the same circumstances, someone else may prefer to confront their opponent and choose to engage in violence, thus escalating the conflict to a higher level. Conflict transformation, however, aims to develop opportunities to improve conflict situations, for example, by encouraging people to pursue mutual understanding through creativity.

Friedrich Glasl (1999), an Austrian conflict and mediation specialist, classifies cognition and attitude to conflict into two major categories, namely: (1) *conflict avoidance* whereby people seek to avoid and escape conflict situations, are afraid to hold different points of view, try to avoid revealing their anger/real feelings, devalue themselves, or give less value to their own self-interest as compared to others; and (2) *belligerence* whereby people tend towards aggression, use force over others, are harmful to others, are self-centred, and give priority to their own self-interest.

Both attitudes are rooted in fear. Those who tend to avoid conflict are afraid of being identified as unemotional or inhuman if they behave violently. They may also be afraid of hurting other people or otherwise of being hurt and rejected. As such, people in this group prefer to avoid others and will withdraw from conflict situations. By contrast, belligerents are more likely to engage in conflicts, often violently, for fear of being labelled unstable or cowardly. Therefore, they may choose to express their aggressive emotions and feelings. Accordingly, people in this group would rather inflict pain than retreat from a conflict situation. Glasl (1999) argues that neither cognition offers much benefit to conflict transformation. On the contrary, they may worsen conflict situations in the long run. Hence, he proposes an alternative cognition in which he emphasizes the capacity to engage meaningfully in conflict. The cognition of *conflict capability* assumes that the right to assertiveness is guaranteed. In other words, conflicting parties and stakeholders are deemed to hold equal rights to exist and express their opinions, resulting in all the basic rights of all stakeholders being of primary concern (see Table 2.2 below).

Table 2.2 The basic assumptions behind conflict avoidance, conflict capability, and belligerence

Conflict avoidance	Conflict capability	Belligerence
Avoids conflict; fears different opinions; depresses emotional feelings; gives priority to the interests of others over his/her own	Has capacity to engage in conflicts with creativity; secures rights of all stakeholders	Capable of using violence, force; harmful to others; self-centred; gives priority to his/her interest over others
Conflict drains energy, therefore keep away from it!	Aggression is energy; I will channel it in positive ways!	Conflict allows me to experience myself – it increases my vitality!

Conflict avoidance	Conflict capability	Belligerence
Open conflict brings unnecessary destruction!	Conflict helps us to get away from outdated patterns!	Only chaos will give rise to the new!
Conflict only deepens opposites; differences are basically insoluble!	Differences are vitally necessary; working out differences benefits everyone!	Consensus is often an illusion because 'war is the father of all things!'

Source: Adapted from Glasl, 1999

A person's cognition and attitude towards conflict often depends on his/her past experience and includes their beliefs and knowledge accumulated from disparate backgrounds and environments. Understanding a party's cognition and attitudes enables better visualization of the formation of conflicts and any ensuing behaviour thereof, helping us to develop techniques and mechanisms to engage and cope with conflict situations creatively and by peaceful means.

2.3 Conflict theories and frameworks

The best known conflict theory can be traced to Galtung who examines relationships by use of the *ABC of conflict*, namely: Attitudes/Assumptions, Behaviour, and Contradiction/Content. The contradiction component exposes the incompatibility between stated goals in a system. This ABC triangle seeks to examine the formation of conflicts and the nature of life, explaining that contradiction and conflict may give rise to frustration and dissatisfaction. Conflict can be perceived both positively and negatively depending on whether it is considered a danger/threat to life or an opportunity to accomplish more satisfactory goals in life. This chapter will focus on two major areas of conflict theories. First, it will explore the ABC *conflict triangle* as elaborated by Galtung, Mitchell, and lastly by Azar in his *protracted social conflict* (PSC) theory. Second, the conflict transformation theory as well as the social healing and conciliation theories of Lederach and Philpott will be presented.

2.3.1 Conflict triangle

The conflict triangle expounds three components in the formation of conflicts. Referring to the previous section on the cognition of conflicts, it is appropriate to re-emphasize here that one of the most fruitful premises in peace and conflict studies is epistemology. The study of people's perceptions and one's interpretations of those perceptions link several sections of this chapter. As previously mentioned, perception, truth, and knowledge inform people's cognitions and attitudes. Thus, one's perception, truth, and knowledge of a conflict will shape the attitude/assumption of the conflict as well. This attitude is crucial since the accuracy of perception and its interpretation may vary widely. Such variations play a significant role in the formation of people's attitudes to conflict situations.

Mitchell (1981) further clarifies conflict formation by use of the conflict triangle. Consequently, he explains that the

> *conflict situation [refers to] any situation in which two or more social entities or 'parties' (however defined or structured) perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals (Mitchell, 1981: 17).*

He goes on to state that such situations are sources of social structures and may not be relevant to existing value systems, and that perceptions of scarcity and physical limitations of the amount of material goods at any one point in time may also play a

part (Mitchell, 1981: 18-20). Thus, a situation that could be a source of conflict mostly refers to a social structure that causes the perceived or actual incompatible goal and scarcity of means of living, whether or not it is justified by the perception or actual value of the value system. He further elaborates that the "*attitude*" component of conflict formation

> *consists of those psychological states or conditions that accompany (and frequently exacerbate) both conflict situations and resultant conflict behaviour, and the major assumption of the psychology of conflict is best regarded as an exacerbating factor, rather than a prime cause of social and international disputes (Mitchell, 1981: 25).*

The driving attitude is in one way an instrument to the degree of conflict; in certain circumstances, it may cause an escalation to violence. This attitude could be influenced by the aggressiveness, intra-personal tension, and aggregate frustration of conflicted parties, and interacts with the value system and social structure in the same way as the source of a conflict situation. The relationship between psychological factors and the sources of a conflict situation could even be inter-reactive. Mitchell (1981) also emphasizes that certain attitudes may create an "*unreal conflict*," or a conflict caused by

> *the process of scapegoating, the process by which the frustrations, fears and hostility generated within a particular group of people, either by continual stress and deprivation, or by specific events or actions by others, are redirected onto a third party as the target of accusations, competition, and (often) violence (Mitchell, 1981: 27).*

The unreal conflict occurs when stereotypes play a central role in people's perceptions, and very often become a collective attitude leading to fear, hatred, and hostility. For example, during the COVID-19 outbreak, specific groups such as immigrants or marginalized people were accused of being super-spreaders despite the fact the virus can be spread by anyone. This type of stereotyping can lead to violence especially when people are consumed by fear and loathing. In addition, attitudes that involve hostility and misperceptions and which dehumanize the opposing party may be conducive to conflict escalation. However, Mitchell (1981) elaborates that,

> *[C]onflict attitudes and perceptions are assumed to be factors arising through the stresses of being in a conflict, rather than factors fundamentally causing conflicts, […] (Mitchell, 1981: 27).*

Another component of conflict formation is "conflict behaviour" defined by Mitchell as,

> *[A]ctions undertaken by one party in any situation of conflict aimed at the opposing party with the intention of making that opponent abandon or modify its goals (Mitchell, 1981: 29).*

In other words, some people consciously act in particular ways to change his/her opponent's goals and objectives. Thus, *"[C]onflict behaviour should consist of actions aimed at affecting the other party, either directly or indirectly, but certainly by intention*" (Mitchell, 1981: 29). However, such behaviour and actions may not necessarily be violent. Actions aiming to change an opponent's goals could even help stakeholders pursue their objectives. Some behaviours are also specifically aimed at affecting third parties to solicit their support. However, in other cases, self-destructive action may be undertaken by adversaries to destroy an opponent's reliability.

The three components of the conflict triangle are inter-related and each has the potential to affect the others. The basic structure of social and international conflict could be composed of:

> *a situation of incompatible goals, a range of psychological conditions experienced by the parties involved, and a set of related behaviours used to achieve the disputed goals (Mitchell, 1981: 32).*

These are further elaborated as follows.

(A) *Attitude* signifies both the rational and emotional aspects of stakeholders/actors. Rational thinking emanates from past experiences that shape certain sets of knowledge and is used to justify the people and situations with which they become involved. Moreover, the source of information and the reality displayed beforehand drive the emotional effects for the stimulation of perception, such as the anger and hatred that is felt when one is unsatisfied with a situation or unable to achieve one's goal. Hostility and fear occur when one faces a threat to one's life, the loss of one's identity, or the loss of some interest or benefit. These attitudes can be both individually and collectively constructed.

(B) *Behaviour* signifies the actions of stakeholders/actors in the conflict. The cause of this behaviour could be related to certain attitudes or assumptions or could occur without such influence. On the other hand, some behaviours can lead to a perception that shapes attitudes as well. These consist mainly of physical actions that are obviously perceived by others. Some behaviours may be considered violent.

(C) *Contradiction/Content* signifies the issues or structure of the conflict situation, and the obstacles that impede conflicted parties from reaching their goals or satisfaction. In many circumstances when the contradiction or content involves one's basic needs or interests, it is also considered a structural aspect of the social relationships of stakeholders/actors.

Galtung (1996) expounds on the relationships between the three components of A-B-C, and the interrelated cycle. Conflicts occur when the components of attitude, behaviour, and contradiction are combined at manifest levels of conflict. In several conflict circumstances, attitudes begin to take shape through people's cognitive processes, for example, minority groups may learn from story-telling or historical records of crucial past events showing how their ancestors were cruelly abused over a long period of time. This party, having become aware of the past or present unjust situation, with or without the validation of received information, may now hold certain *attitudes/assumptions* and will prepare and perceive the conflict situation accordingly. The subconsciousness of potential conflict parties is formed when one party or more inclines towards negative actions. Repeated behaviours could spiral the situation, thus escalating the attitude and contradiction to such an extent that it will fuel a fully manifested conflict at a later stage. In such circumstances, conflict behaviours could become *ritualistic*. For example, in a country such as Thailand, where political conflicts have become recurrent over the past decades, frequent public demonstrations have led governments, especially authoritarian ones, to exercise confrontation strategies at all times even if demonstrations are peaceful.

Furthering discussions on the definition of peace, violence, and conflict, one can also use the conflict triangle to explain spiralling escalations of violence. Thus, when "*Violence breeds violence, the triangle becomes the projection of a spiral that may run its course in the same way as a fire, stopping when the house is burnt down*" (Galtung, 1996). Such an attitude could accumulate aggressiveness from the negative cognition, while the behaviour aspect depends on the capacity of actors to escape latency to the manifest conflict. On the other hand, the combination of

attitude/assumption and contradiction/content may raise awareness of a so far dormant conflict in a person's subconscious. This aggressiveness may increase when the unjust structure or systematic dysfunction of relationships is revealed through dialogue. Thus, attitude, behaviour, and contradiction are interrelated, and it matters little which component formulated the conflict. As it develops, the negative energy from one component may eventually exacerbate or produce negative energy in the others. To de-escalate the conflict, it is necessary to generate positive energy from any one of the components and allow it to radiate so as to lessen the potency of the others to create violence.

2.3.2 Protracted social conflict in Southeast Asia

An expert in international relations in the field of quantitative analysis of interstate conflicts, Azar proposed the theory of *protracted social conflict* in 1990. We already know that conflict emerges because of differences, very often involving identities such as nationality, race, ethnicity, religion, culture, and many other issues affecting the value of people in society. We have also learnt that conflict emerges when two or more persons or peoples, becoming stakeholders, pursue the same goal, and one stakeholder perceives the other as an obstacle to reaching that goal; therefore, the goals of stakeholders become incompatible. As regards protracted social conflicts, these definitions still hold. However, the collective values of people must also be taken into account. As Azar puts it:

> *Protracted social conflict focuses in the first stance on identity groups. However, it is the relationship between identity groups and states which is at the core of the problem (Azar 1990: 7, cited in Ramsbotham et al, 2016).*

Azar emphasizes the four clusters that comprise the preconditions for protracted social conflict within or across states to emerge. First, *communal content* or the substantive identities of the community such as religion, ethnicity, culture, and race are at stake and could become the cause of protracted social conflict. Second, *deprivation of human needs* including political and development needs could affect one's substantive means of living and affect wider scopes of security. Third, *governance and state's role* including the monopolization of governmental power. Azar asserts that the role of state authority is to exercise power to regulate social action, protect citizens, and to provide collective goods. But once this power is monopolized by a limited number of people, the population in general loses its political capacity, resources are no longer distributed fairly, and minority groups are excluded. Such are the preconditions of protracted social conflict. Finally, Azar clarifies the importance of *international linkages*. Thus, another dimension stems from the political and economic dependencies of weak nation states which may have been subdued by external forces. Similarly, the existence of international support to ground actors including diaspora groups may prove significant. Support can be in the form of military, economic, political, or even just moral support to sustain a conflict. These four preconditions are summarized in the following table and further expanded in the discussion below.

Table 2.3 Azar's preconditions for protracted social conflict

Clusters of Preconditions	Characteristics	Related Factors
Communal content	- Multi-communal composition - Ethnic domination	- Colonial legacy - Historical pattern of rivalry among communal actors
Human needs	- Deprivation of human needs - Individual and communal needs	- Accessibility of needs - Access to political and economic power - Degree of human development
Governance and the state's role	- Monopolization of governmental power - Deprivation of security, political, and social needs - Lack of communal acceptance	- Regime type - Level of legitimacy - Level of autonomy - Policy formulation capacity of the state
International linkages	- Economic dependency of nation states - Political and military clientele relationships	- Level of state autonomy in economic system - Degree of denial of access by communal groups - International political camps - Reliance on imported weapons and arms

Source: Azar, 1990: 7-12

The first precondition of protracted social conflict is "communal content." The term "community" referred to here is "*a generic reference to politicized groups whose members share ethnic, religious, linguistic or other cultural identity characteristics*" (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2015: 49). It is more likely that protracted social conflict will arise in a society characterized by a multi-communal composition (Azar, 1990: 7). The two combined factors most likely to initiate protracted social conflict are colonial legacy and an historical pattern of rivalry and contest among communal actors. The formation of multi-communal societies by a colonial power was often influenced by the principle of divide and rule. The colonialists were particularly inclined to create unique political landscapes incorporating many communal groups or otherwise divided nations into two or more states. Another related factor is ethnic domination and rivalry among communal groups where the state is dominated by a single communal group that does not accommodate the needs of other segments in society. In this case, these other groups may become marginalized.

The second precondition is the deprivation of "human needs." The term "needs" does not only mean material needs – it also refers to individual and communal satisfaction and well-being. However, a lack of material needs alone may not be enough to trigger a protracted conflict (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2015: 50-51). The conceptual framework initiated by Azar emphasizes "political and development needs" along with the social mechanisms instrumental to meet those needs. The requirement to meet material needs includes accessibility to social institutions, the ability to benefit from economic mechanisms, and political participation. Thus, protracted social conflict often stems from an imbalance in development approaches, a lack of equal or fair distribution of resources, and a lack of healthy political participation. Minority groups are often excluded, and in a multi-communal society, only dominant groups are able to benefit from and have access to scarce resources.

Third, “governance and the role of state” that lead to

> *deprivation or dissatisfaction of human needs for physical security, access to political and social institutions, and acceptance of communal identity as political pluralism is largely a result of social, political, and economic interactions (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2015: 51).*

The state has a vital role in regulating, protecting its citizens, and providing collective goods. The precondition of protracted social conflict emanates from dissatisfaction or deprivation of people’s basic needs as a result of state action or inaction. Therefore, states must act impartially in order to govern effectively. However, in a society laden by conflict, governments usually fail to act fairly to all communal groups. The more democratic a society, the more likely a state will perform fairly. Moreover, in an authoritarian society where social policies and economic participation may be inadequate for certain groups, it is more likely governmental structures will be monopolized with resulting high levels of exclusion; thus, the potential of protracted social conflict is increased.

Finally, as regards “international linkages,” Azar proposes two models as follows: (1) economic dependency, meaning the state relies heavily on the international economic system. However, compliance with such a system may affect the security needs and satisfaction levels of multi-communal groups; and (2) political and military clientele relationships, meaning the state will form alliances with stronger states to secure protection and security. In so doing, it may be forced to comply with the policies of stronger states that can be contradictory to the needs of its own people.

The four clusters of preconditions to protracted social conflicts may not necessarily lead to manifest conflict. Azar proposes a *process dynamic* mechanism to interrupt the escalation of such preconditions into manifest conflict.

> *In reality however, the existence or even recognition of these conditions by communal groups may not lead to an overt or manifest conflict. Our model of the process dynamics of protracted social conflicts attempts to elucidate factors which are responsible for the activation of overt conflicts (Azar, 1990: 12).*

The process dynamic composes of three components namely: (1) communal actions and strategies, (2) state action and strategies, and (3) built-in mechanisms of conflict (Azar, 1990: 12-15). A multi-communal country where one particular ethnic group dominates the political, social, and economic functions may eventually reach a conflict situation when living conditions no longer satisfy all communal groups. However, this would-be-cause of escalation to protracted social conflict requires a trigger to make it manifest. The trigger could be a controversial issue affecting the overall social, political, and economic structure, or it could be a localized event such as an attack on one individual with strong communal ties. As Azar puts it:

> *The trivial event tends to become a turning point at which the individual victimization is collectively recognised. Collective recognition of individual grievance (or incompatible goals) naturally leads to collective protest* (Azar, 1990: 12).

This collective recognition of grievance is clarified as a strong value of affiliation, that Amartya Sen (2006) coins “the violence of illusion.” The degree of repression and oppression by rulers could spill over into multiple issues, and bring about escalation of the mobilization of resources and the formulation of diverse strategies (Azar, 1990). Hence,

> *[t]he type of initial conditions, the organization and mobilization of communal groups, the emergence of effective leadership, the strategies and tactic of this leadership, and the scope and nature of external ties, become important determinants of the dynamic of the social conflicts (Azar, 1990: 14).*

On the other hand,

> *[a] protracted social conflict can be resolved or at least kept latent if the state accommodates communal grievances and improves the satisfaction of communal needs in the initial stage (Azar, 1990: 14).*

The state's actions and strategies could be instrumental to the escalation or de-escalation of the protracted social conflict, but very seldom will a state choose alternative ways to accommodate such grievances. On the contrary, most state actors respond to the demands of communal groups by taking repressive action. This may escalate to potential violence and prolong the vortex of protracted social conflict.

> *Under these circumstances, states try to contain a conflict situation within a national boundary by attempting to sever links between domestic communal actors and external support groups. When such containment strategies do not work, state actors seek their own external assistance (Azar, 1990: 14).*

Such strategies imply rulers' harsh responses to be the norm and denotes a "winner takes all" attitude where a dominant community continues its domination.

Other components of the process dynamic are built-in mechanisms of conflict, meaning the historical factors and experiences that shape the behavioural properties of protracted conflicts. The importance of cognitive processes and individual perception explained in the previous part of this chapter, is also relevant to the behaviour and attitude of communal groups experiencing the conflict. This history and experience shape the anger, fear, hostility, and beliefs of each communal group, eventually resulting in the creation of collective negative images of the opposing group thereby solidifying protracted social conflict. In other words,

> *Parties subject to the continual stresses of protracted conflict tend to become closed-minded. In these cases, proposals for political solutions become rare, and tend to be perceived by all sides as mechanisms for gaining relative power and control (Azar, 1990: 15).*

And,

> *The protracted social conflicts result in negative-sum outcomes because of their innate behavioural properties: protractedness, fluctuation, and actor and issue spill-over. There are no winners, rather, all the parties to the conflicts tend to be victimized in the process (Azar, 1990: 15).*

Protracted conflicts affect all conflicted parties, no matter the actor or the communal group he or she belongs to. Moreover, they will lead to neither a clear victory nor a clear winner. Continuity of conflicts for long periods of time affect stakeholders physically and psychologically and will eventually impact a society's politics and its economy. The process of protracted social conflicts reduces capability to develop political, social, and economic structures and institutions. In addition, people who live in such environments tend to feel hopeless and unable to initiate actions to handle the conflict situation. Attitudes of hatred, fear, and hostility also play a significant role in polarizing conflicted parties. Consequently, the situation

will degenerate and further deteriorate physical security, leading to institutional deformity, psychological ossification, and increased dependency and clientelism (Azar, 1990: 16-17). The physical and social infrastructures of society may even be destroyed interrupting development of living conditions, at the same as the state fails to satisfy the needs of all communal groups including the dominant one. Moreover, protracted conflicts may destroy or weaken political institutions as well as encourage social fragmentation. Psychologically, people who live in cycles of protracted social conflict must live and interact with their hated and feared opponents leading attitudes and perceptions to become ever more rigid, possibly even breeding a kind of war culture. Finally, after a long period of time, actors may be forced to rely more on the support of external groups, and in so doing will lose control over their lives because decision-making would also depend on external actors.

In summary, protracted social conflicts are characterised by four clusters of preconditions, namely communal content, needs, governance, and international linkages. They are usually initiated, triggered, and may escalate into a protracted stage by a process dynamic resulting in the physical, institutional, and psychological suffering of all communal groups or conflicted parties. Accordingly, there can be no winners. Instead, the result may be a general weakened social capability for self-reliance which may allow external influences to intervene. For example, the deep south of Thailand falls into this protracted conflict category. This led a group of peace academics led by Norbert Ropers (2014) to conduct a number of workshops in order to develop an insider peacebuilder platform to clarify the factors related to the protracted social conflict. In addition, as part of a discussion on conflict mapping and analysis, the diagram will also highlight how conflict drivers play a part in such situations.

2.4 Violence and nonviolent conflict

Cognition to conflict explains the many ways in which people perceive conflict. For example, some may hold negative perceptions of conflict due to a fear of violence, but not all conflict necessarily ends violently. Others may view it as an opportunity to develop a mutual understanding resulting in positive outcomes and an innovation of progressive ideas. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2016) propose a theory *of conflict escalation and de-escalation* arguing that although conflicts can indeed escalate into violence and war, most have a turning point, and at such points, violence can be reduced and the situation normalized even to the point of reconciliation. To ensure a common understanding of the term ‹violence,’ the following section will define violence and some notions regarding violent behaviour. Thereafter, it will discuss the theory of conflict escalation and de-escalation to clarify stages of the conflict by using the *hourglass model* to explore capabilities to apply conflict resolution, management, and transformation mechanisms to each stage of the conflict.

2.4.1 Understanding violence

The term ‘violence’ is commonly understood to mean physical behaviour that has the potential to cause harmful consequences and be a threat to life resulting in death, physical injury, and deterioration or damage to one’s mental condition. Physical violence also includes violence done to oneself (self-harm) such as suicide and self-injury. However, the term is most often applied to actions and interactions *between* people in society. Thus, violent acts range from self-harm to civil war, war between nations, genocide, and wars against humanity. Discussions on the notion of violence in relation to human behaviour and how to reduce it are century-long. While one group of academics believes such behaviour is inherent to humans and

influenced mainly by biological factors, others have identified the significance of cognitive processes, learning, and experiences.

Discussions on the notion of violence generally begin with a philosophical and scientific debate on whether it is determined by 'nature' (innate to humans), or 'nurture' (acquired behaviour). A hundred years later, the debate is still ongoing. The former was first justified utilizing biological arguments. For example, Cesare Lombroso (1876) suggested that criminal behaviour results from man's primitive instinct that increases the likelihood of some to behave in a criminal manner. As such, it is caused by biological mechanisms (Englander, 2012: 64). As Englander puts it:

> *There are at least two different types of biological influences: (a) genetic influence and (b) biological environment influences (Englander, 2012: 64-65).*

She goes on to explain that,

> *Genetic influence refers to the blueprints for behaviour that are contained in a person's chromosomes, while biological environment influences, are events that affect a person biologically but are not encoded in deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) (Englander, 2012: 65).*

By contrast, behavioural psychologist, John Watson (1878-1958), coined a revolutionary theory of violent human behaviour when he argued that,

> *[T]he genesis of troubled behaviour [lies] in the individual's psychological environment and it [is] the environment that exert[s] the most profound influence on behaviour, rather than any biological influences (Englander, 2012: 66).*

However, modern biological theories propose that even if a person has grown up in a violent environment, that person need not necessarily adopt violent behaviour.

> *Thus, in summary, two major pieces of evidence suggest the importance of biology as well as learning: (a) the early emergence of aggressive behaviour as a stable characteristic in some individuals, and (b) individual differences in vulnerability to noxious environmental influences (e.g. having violent parents) (Englander, 2012: 68).*

Aside from the nature versus nurture debate, academics have also sought to clarify several factors and causes of violence. This discussion will now examine an array of violent behaviour ranging from self-destructive to international violence.

Peace studies emerged from the study of war, because war was considered a major cause of violent actions having a destructive impact on people's lives. As mentioned previously, the definition of peace includes the absence or reduction of violence of all kinds, and is situated in nonviolent and creative conflict transformation (Galtung, 1996: 9). Therefore, to understand the causes and contributing factors of violent acts, it is essential to understand the characteristics of all kinds of violence. Definitions of violence can be broad and refer to particular meanings in various disciplines such as medical science, gender studies, physics, social science, psychology, anthropology, and political science. However, physical violence can be categorized into three groups, namely: (1) self-directed violence, (2) interpersonal violence, and (3) collective violence.

With the exception of physical violence, Slavoj Zizek (2008) further categorizes such acts into subjective, objective, and systemic violence. The first refers to acts of direct violence which cause physical harm such as crime, terror, and physical abuse. Objective violence refers to any harm done to sources of symbolic values which primarily do not have a direct effect as in physical harm, but could be the cause and justification of physical violence. Objective violence includes discrimination, racism, and marginalization. Finally, systemic violence relates to social structures and may have a catastrophic effect on social, political, and economic systems (Zizek, 2008: 1-2). In other words, Zizek widened the scope of violence to something broader than its physical forms by also including its symbolic and systemic forms. Peace studies touches upon several dimensions of such theories including Galtung (1996) who also defines other types of violence.

Galtung (1996) categorizes violence into three major types, namely: (1) direct, (2) structural, and (3) cultural. Direct violence can occur in person, social, and world spaces and is intended by individuals acting singly or inside collectives (Galtung, 1996: 31). In addition,

> *Direct violence can be divided into verbal and physical, and violence harming the body, mind or spirit. All combinations leave behind traumas that may carry violence over time (Galtung, 1996: 31-32).*

Accordingly, direct violence does harm to a person's physical organs, as well as to certain conditions humans require in order to live a life well. By contrast, "*structural violence is defined as built into the person, social and world spaces and is unintended*" (Galtung, 1996: 31). Galtung's definition of structural violence can be viewed alongside Zizek's notion of systemic violence and is implicated in social, political, and economic structures leading to systemic exploitation and support structural penetration, segmentation, fragmentation, and marginalization within society. Finally,

> *[C]ultural violence serves to legitimize direct and structural violence, motivating actors to commit direct violence or to omit counter acting structural violence. [It] can be intended or unintended (Galtung, 1996: 31).*

Cultural violence relates to attitudes, either individual or collective. The cognitive processes that bring about hatred, fear, and hostility and which are the roots of structural penetration, fragmentation, and marginalization are thus considered to be cultural violence. Such processes could be derived from personal or interpersonal perceptions as well as collective perceptions depending on how people's values and certain sets of accepted societal norms or beliefs are influenced.

To elaborate further on the relationship between the three types of conflict, the means and sources of violence should also be discussed. At some levels, direct, structural, and cultural violence are interrelated. For example, direct violence is related to physical harm, whether inflicted by oneself or another perpetrator. In incidences of direct violence, a victim may be physically wounded and this wound may eventually become trauma leading eventually to broader effects such as fear, hatred, and hostility which could later manifest as a justification for violent reactions.

The above clarification of the types of violence should be considered alongside the explanations for positive and negative peace. It is commonly believed that the goal of peace building is to reduce the violent impacts of war, resulting in such wars ending and perpetual peace as the ultimate goal. This belief is now being challenged. A new idea of peace has arisen which merely emphasizes a reduction in all kinds of violence. As a result, the focus of peace studies has now shifted towards positive peace in which easing physical and life-threatening violence now plays just one part

of the equation. The question remains should the reduction of direct, structural, and cultural violence be the ultimate outcome of positive peace?

2.4.2 Understanding nonviolence

To pursue a peaceful society, it is necessary to reduce violence of all kinds. However, if conflict is a normal part of human nature, this could prove difficult. So, should a peaceful society include the capability to handle conflict through nonviolent means? It is generally believed that conflicts should be resolved, managed, and transformed without violence. Therefore, the concept of nonviolence has emerged as an alternative path to the pursuit of particular goals without harming oneself or others. In addition, the use of nonviolent means necessitates avoiding actions and behaviours that are conducive to structural and cultural violence as well as physical violence. The notion of nonviolence was coined by John Adams (1856) when he explained in a letter to Thomas Jefferson that,

> *[T]he shooting war that came later was no part of the revolution; it was only an effect and consequence of it. The revolution was in the mind of people and it was affected from 1760 to 1775 in the course of fifteen years, before a drop of blood was shed in Lexington (Adams, 1856: 172; cited in Wood, 2016: 114).*

Wood clarifies this use of nonviolence during the colonial American revolution by underlining actions taken by the colonists before the declaration of war, pointing out that, "*The pre-revolutionary colonists organized hundreds of acts of nonviolence [and] non-cooperation that grew bolder and more defiant year after year*" (Wood, 1993; cited in Wood, 2016: 114) even though eventual recognition of the revolution was based on liberalization from the colonial empire by the efforts and sacrifices of many patriots. Wood (2016) further points out that the pre-revolutionary nonviolent resistance movement is often ignored by some historians, perhaps due to lexical shortcomings – at that time, no word existed to describe nonviolent activities.

The term *civil disobedience* was first coined by Henry David Thoreau in his 1848 lecture on 'The rights and duties of the individual in relation to government' which was finally published in 1866, four years after his death, under the title, 'Civil Disobedience' (Wood, 2016: 116). The phrase,

> *civil disobedience, [refers to] a nonviolent, sometimes illegal, act undertaken by individuals or groups to oppose government actions that they believe are unjust, and it is the obligation of individuals to produce a 'counter friction to stop the machine' of government when the government is in the wrong (Wood, 2016: 116).*

Thoreau's concept of civil disobedience was not widely known

> *until the last half of the twentieth century [when] a seismic shift took place. Ordinary citizens across the globe for the first time gained access to knowledge and a vocabulary that could help them plan nonviolent insurrections. Successful campaigns built on civil disobedience became epidemic (Wood, 2016: 116).*

Wood points out that nonviolent campaigns increased across the world in the last decades of the twentieth century although there were even earlier instances of such movements (Wood, 2016: 120). One of the best known was led by Mohandas K Gandhi when he organized the campaign for justice for Indian minorities in South Africa. Soon after his return to India in 1915, Gandhi led his famous campaign for Indian independence from British colonial rule, a movement that has been widely recognised and discussed (Wood, 2016). Many scholars and practitioners have since

referred to the nonviolent actions taken as prime examples of nonviolent actions that have the potential to overthrow oppressive dominant powers. Many other civil resistance movements also took place in, for example, Russia, where soldiers killed 100 peaceful demonstrators in St Petersburg as they tried to present a petition to the Tsar (Ackerman and Duvall, 2000; Sharp, 2005; cited in Wood, 2016: 118-119). Similarly, during the early 1900s, a number of peaceful demonstrations took place in Asia including in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Likewise, in Burma, people joined nonviolent movements against British colonial rule, whilst Burmese indigenous regimes successfully used such tactics to oppose Japanese occupation during World War II (Wood, 2016). One of the most successful peaceful demonstrations in Southeast Asia occurred in 1983 when 2 million people campaigned against the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos forcing him to seek asylum in the United States (Wood, 2016).

One of the most recognised and discussed works on this topic was written by Gene Sharp in 1973. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* offers a theoretical framework for his *theory of power* that systematically explains nonviolent action and its social mechanisms. Sharp's theory explains the relationship between more powerful actors (which normally means state authorities and government leaders holding superior power – in many cases dictatorial power), and weaker actors who are subject to those superior power holders. As Wood put it, "*Sharp divides the people in modern society into two groups – rulers and their subjects*" (Wood, 2016: 137, Martin, 1989). To apply Sharp's theory to nonviolent action, it is necessary to visualize society using the political power dimension whereby society is divided into rulers and the ruled. In such a scenario, rulers are likely to exercise oppressive power over their subjects enforced through social mechanisms such as legitimacy, governance, bureaucracy, the civil service, security apparatus, the courts, and the police. Power can also be exercised through many other social, economic, and cultural sectors and institutions.

The situation in Thailand after the 2014 coup provides a good example of how rulers exercise power. When the military seized power from an elected government in May 2014, it set up a ruling committee called the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) to exercise totalitarian power by decree. Both the NCPO and the military controlled the government and imposed a number of laws through NCPO orders and laws which were then enacted by the National Legislative Assembly whose members were fully appointed by the NCPO. Many of these laws are considered dictatorial, disregarding the rule of law (Pindavanija, 2017). Moreover, the junta government enforced some laws to silence activists offering peaceful resistance to the coup. Following Sharp's theory of power, such action can be explained by the use of state power encompassing bureaucracy, the military, and the police under the control of a person or a group. Thus,

> *Sharp defines political power, which is one type of social power, as the totality of means, influences, and pressures—including authority, rewards, and sanctions—available for use to achieve the objectives of the power-holder (Sharp, 1980: 27; cited in Martin, 1989: 214).*

Sharp further interprets sources of power, stating that "*the power is not intrinsic to rulers*" (Martin, 1989: 214) meaning that some sources of power can emanate from other authorities, human resources, skills, and knowledge (Sharp, 1973; cited in Martin, 1989). Referring to the junta in Thailand, the unity of the military, police, bureaucrats, technocrats, and capitalist conglomerates (i.e. the junta's sources of power) stems from the existence of an authoritarian and traditional "deep state" which holds invisible power and which has long opposed democratization. Sharp clarifies the basis of these sources of power in his second key concept, namely the *consent theory of power* when he argues that "*these sources of the ruler's power*

depend intimately upon the obedience and cooperation of the subject" (Sharp, 1973: 12; cited in Martin, 1989: 214, Wood, 2016: 137). According to this notion, a ruler's power depends on the obedience of the subjects; if subjects refuse to obey and cooperate, the ruler's power will decrease. This concept lays the groundwork for Sharp's argument against the "*common idea that power is a monopolistic entity residing in the person or position of a ruler or ruling body*." As such, he argues that "*power is pluralistic, residing with a variety of groups and in a diversity of locations, which he calls loci of power*" (Martin 1989: 214). The term, *loci of power*, refers to sources of power that reside neither with a ruler by him/herself nor by a particular group of people, but instead rests in several groups. The sources of power and the capability of subjects to withdraw their obedience and cooperation to the ruler raises an important point concerning Sharp's consent theory of power: "Why do men obey?" (Sharp, 1973) Some causes include "*habit, fear of sanctions, moral obligation, self-interest, psychological identification with the ruler, zones of difference, and absence of self-confidence among subjects*" (Sharp, 1973: 16-24; cited in Martin, 1989: 124). However, nonviolent actions that reduce the power of a ruler by a subject withdrawing his/her obedience and cooperation should be carried out proactively. According to Sharp, "*passivity and submissiveness are of no concern [;] nonviolent action is related to activity, challenge, and struggle*" (Sharp, 1973: 65; cited in Martin, 1989: 124). Referring to Thailand's political struggle over the past few decades, its rulers implemented several strategies to minimize the chances of their subjects withdrawing their consent, and to snub nonviolent actions organized by its opponents. Sharp's theory of power remained fundamental to nonviolent action in the following decades. In the course of his studies, he proposed 198 methods of nonviolent actions that are widely discussed and used as guidelines by nonviolent practitioners.

According to Sharp[2] (1973), these 198 nonviolent methods can be placed into three categories namely: (1) protest and persuasion, (2) non-cooperation, and (3) intervention (Sharp, 1973; cited in Wood, 2016: 138). Of the 198 methods, 58 relate to protesting and persuasion methods including formal statements, communication with a wider audience, group representation, symbolic public acts, pressure on individuals (mainly officials), drama and music, processions, honouring the dead, public assemblies, and withdrawal and renunciation. In relation to Sharp's consent theory of power, protest actions comprise a statement to rulers that the people are withdrawing their consent. Simultaneously, persuasion actions seek to stimulate the loci of power. The more people are convinced, the more they will stop being obedient, further expanding the loci of power.

Non-cooperation is divided into three types, namely: social, economic, and political. The first includes ostracism of persons, non-cooperation with social events, customs, and institutions, and withdrawal from the social system. Economic non-cooperation can be further divided into two types, namely economic boycotts comprising action by consumers, workers and producers, middlemen, owners and management, holders of financial resources, and even governments. Another type of economic boycott is the strike including symbolic strikes, agriculture strikes, strikes by special groups, ordinary industrial strikes, restricted strikes, multi-industry strikes, and a combination of strikes and economic closures. Political non-cooperation consists of the rejection of authority, non-cooperation with the government, alternatives to obedience, actions by government personnel, domestic governmental action, and international governmental action. Finally, other methods of nonviolent intervention may include psychological, physical, social, economic, and political interventions. All such nonviolent methods are proposed under Sharp's consent theory of power and all aim to decrease the ruler's domination. Over the past decades, many of these methods have been developed to suit various situations.

[2] Sharp, G, '198 methods of nonviolent action' Albert Einstein Institution, available at https://www.aeinstein.org/nonviolentaction/198-methods-of-nonviolent-action/, accessed on 24 September 2021.

However, to achieve the goals of the movement, nonviolent methods require careful design using appropriate strategies. Wood (2016) describes the process by outlining the careful steps subjects must take from deciding which nonviolent methods and strategies to use to ensuring goals are clear and attractive to both supporters and potential recruits.

Table 2.4 Nonviolent methods, strategies, and goals

Methods	Strategies	Goals
(1) Protest and persuasion (2) Non-cooperation (3) Intervention	- Timeframe - Coalitions - Leadership - Winning defections - Third parties - Backfire - Go digital - etc	- Clear goals - Foreground to attract broad support - Might be changed according to the proceeded campaign

Source: Wood, 2016: 140-145

A nonviolent campaign requires proper strategic planning, encompassing "*plans, policies, and schemas that guide decisions about which methods to choose in connecting protest, resistance, and intervention*" (Wood, 2016: 140). Wood further elaborates that nonviolent strategies should take into account factors such as timeframe, coalitions, leadership, winning defections, third parties, backfire, and the use of digital technology. Timeframes are important because most successful nonviolent campaigns are long term movements. Thus, "*strategies should be based on an understanding that a nonviolent movement may take years and even decades to achieve success*" (Wood, 2016: 142). Nonviolent campaigns also require wide public support. In addition, leadership is another crucial factor. Most successful nonviolent movements have multiple leaders in order to gain support from a wide range of actors from disparate social sectors. This emphasizes the principle of loci of power which suggests that the power of resistance should come from a variety of sectors and locations. Another factor that could contribute significantly to success or failure is the unity or disunity of the rulers. "*The nonviolent movement that can fracture the unity among the rulers is often successful*" (Wood, 2016: 142). A number of nonviolent movements have drawn sympathy from the ruler's force and armed authorities. Once these groups hesitate to inflict violence or harm dissidents, the movement could reach a critical point of success. Another contributing factor is the involvement of third parties. As Wood puts it, "*Armed insurrections are often dependent on outside organizations and states to provide them with cash and weapons*" (Wood, 2016: 143). Therefore, it is highly possible that intervention from an external third party could jeopardize the value of nonviolent movements. At the same time, Wood (2016) stresses that the most successful nonviolent actions should minimize reliance on external third parties. Very often, such involvement can reduce the ability of movements to call for support and public sympathy. In addition, Wood (2016) emphasizes the use of information technology to benefit such campaigns. Where digital media is widely accessible, campaigners should use this channel to communicate and explain their goals to widen their support base.

Ideally, the design of nonviolent strategies enables subjects to discourage obedience and cooperation with rulers to change social, political, and economic structures. However, even nonviolent strategic planning must take violent circumstances into account because the government or targeted rulers may respond with violence; thus, reflecting on how to prevent such retaliation is always useful. Indeed, a brief perusal of the history of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries reveals that targeted rulers consistently retaliate with violence. As Ackerman and Kruegler point out, "*Many*

brave and astute practitioners of nonviolent conflict have met with bitter and costly defeat" (Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994: 1).

Ackerman and Kruegler (1994: 23) propose three principles of strategic nonviolent conflict: (1) development, (2) engagement, and (3) conception. The first includes the formulation of functional objectives, the development of organizational strength, secure access to material resources, and an expansion of the repertoire of sanction. In other words, practitioners need to ask, "*What can be done to create the most advantageous environment for strategic nonviolent conflict?*" (Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994: 23)

The principle of engagement aims to attack the targeted rulers' strategy for consolidated control, mute the impact of the rulers' weapons, and alienate the rulers' support whilst maintaining consistent nonviolent discipline. In this case, the question that must be asked is: "*Once the conflict is engaged, how should we interact with the opponents so that nonviolent sanctions will have the maximum effect?*" (Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994: 23).

Finally, the principle of conception comprises evaluating actions and activities considering the levels of strategic decision-making, while taking into account that the movement could be adjusted according to the vulnerabilities of the protagonists, and the continuity between sanctions, mechanisms, and objectives. The question then to be asked is: "*How should we think about what we have already done to the opponents and what are we trying to do to them if the conflict continues?*" (Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994: 23) Careful planning and assessment of nonviolent movements using these principles could help practitioners organize such campaigns more successfully.

In this chapter, nonviolence has mostly focused on the term's original concept and how widely it is recognised. The term, nonviolence, was first coined to conceptualize peaceful movements during times of conflict. At the same time, it was understood that during times of social conflict, power relations will almost always involve conflict. On the other hand, violent social conflicts are also related to the use of violence by state authorities; therefore, nonviolent movements are also always related to such power relations. However, with the continuing development of peace studies as a discipline, nonviolent conflict can refer to certain situations where conflicts have not yet escalated to violence as well. However, it is too easy to just declare violence a stage of conflict. It only occurs once the conflict has escalated to a certain level, but many other factors can turn a conflict violent. Hence, explanations have been proffered to help us understand the factors and conditions that might escalate a conflict, or others that might de-escalate a violent conflict to normalcy and eventually to reconciliation.

2.4.3 Conflict escalation and de-escalation with regard to violence

Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2016) expound the theory of *escalation and de-escalation of conflicts* by incorporating the stages of conflict situations (see Diagram 2.1 below). Conflict emerges from differences existing within society. Even though human identities and characteristics may demonstrate similarities, such differences cannot be denied. Differences are part of human nature and must be endured as it is not possible to force people to be the same. Similarities help form identities and affiliations within society (Sen, 2007). Human beings tend to build up social affiliations through shared identities, eventually forging groups. To join a particular group, people must share similar values, attitudes, interests, and demonstrate loyalty to the group to engender a sense of togetherness. While perhaps beneficial in the formation of a community, this togetherness also excludes others and creates a sense of 'otherness' (Sen, 2007).

Diagram 2.1 Conflict escalation and de-escalation



Source: Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2016: 15

Similar identities encourage people to affiliate themselves into groups. Members of a group usually share values that may differ from those of other groups. As a result, inter-group conflict may arise and escalate to such an extent that said differences may be seen as contradictions especially when members of different groups feel their respective ideologies to be incompatible. Conflict escalation could reach the stage of polarization when a perceived incompatibility of ideologies becomes a confrontation of collective identities. For example, in Thailand, extreme right wing people tend to hold authoritarian and conservative ideologies. As such, they consider the new generation of liberal activists as a threat to their identity and to those considering themselves guarantors of the stability of the country. By contrast, liberal activists see conservatives as an obstacle to progress. The resulting polarization ensures that members of each group sharpen their ideologies and intensively disseminate them amongst themselves to further advance the polarization process. Through this cognitive process, ideologies become knowledge and "justified true beliefs," nurturing the group's sense of collective values. At this point, the dynamic of conflict may not necessarily rise to the level of violence, as conflict mechanisms and tools exist to address the situation at each stage of escalation and de-escalation. However, it is entirely possible such polarization could escalate to violence.

Examples of political polarization that escalated into violence can be found in Thailand in 2010 and 2014. Specifically, hate speech dehumanized people, especially the protesters, and prepared the ground for physical violence. Ironically, heated confrontations between different groups of protestors gave state actors an open invitation to intervene and for the military to seize power. The situation in Southern Thailand provides yet another example of conflict escalation to violence and occurred when state authorities undervalued the identities of a large majority of local people; hence, the latter's attitude geared towards confrontation. The situation was exacerbated by a sense of injustice and a lack of social and economic development. This prepared the groundwork for polarization between state actors and local people. As a result, aggressive behaviour occurred often turning into deadly and violent conflict.

According to the rule of gravity, what goes up must eventually come down. In non-delectable circumstances when conflicts escalate from polarization to violence and war, it is necessary to try to prevent the destruction of war by calling for a ceasefire. Ceasefires provide room for conflicted parties to reinitiate political and diplomatic activities and to engage in peace processes in order to move the conflict towards an agreement. Once an agreement has been reached, the possibility of a return to normalization arises. The last stage of the journey occurs when previous opponents reconcile and finally reconnect. The word 'reconciliation' is particularly significant as in many cases, before the conflict manifested, social relationships were satisfactory

but when bitter conflict broke out, healthy associations were destroyed and replaced by acrimony. Thus, to reconcile means to reconnect the strands of healthy association.

Expanding on this framework, Mitchell (2014) explains the reasons behind conflict escalation as follows: (1) the escalation of conflict signifies a rise in the degree of counter reactions between conflicted parties; (2) mobilization of resources indicates the effort made by conflicted parties to gather more resources; (3) enlargement of stakeholders refers to conflicted parties calling for alliances to engage in the conflict, thus complicating the situation; (4) polarization is the process during which the senses of 'togetherness' and 'otherness' raise the possibility of violence. Therefore, hatred, fear, and hostility combine to expand the scope of the conflict beyond its original cause; (5) dissociation occurs when conflicted parties refuse to establish any means of communication, thereby limiting opportunities for stakeholders to acquire information from their opponents; and (6) conflict entrapment describes a stalemate situation where despite stakeholders/actors using their utmost resources, they still cannot claim victory. Yet, they continue to believe there is no other way to resolve the conflict but to continue the confrontation.

2.5 Conflict mapping and analysis[3]

Conflicts do not emerge without cause. Rather, adverse conditions and other factors lead to the formation of conflict situations. Those causes and factors usually vary depending on the stage of the conflict – whether incipient, latent, manifest, or manifest aggressive. To systematically analyse a conflict situation, one must understand these conditions by acquiring the appropriate knowledge, skills, and tools. This whole exercise is called *conflict mapping and analysis*.

Conflict mapping offers an overview or big picture of the entire situation. In a mapping exercise, the background and history of the conflict are first examined because even the most complicated of conflicts must have started somewhere. To begin, a timeline of significant events would indicate the dynamic nature of the conflict. It can also be used to highlight the causes, condition, and the trigger issues of the conflict that have previously caused it to escalate. Conflict mapping also scrutinizes the parties and other stakeholders involved, particularly identifying their needs, fears, and relationships. This is essential to identify overlapping interests which may suggest certain actions to unite the parties and overcome the conflict issues. Conflicts can flare up over many issues and at multiple levels. They can occur between states (inter-state) or within a state (intra-state). For example, conflicts can be revolutionary, or be related to state-formation, ethnicity and religion, public policy, or developmental, environmental, and socio-political issues. How a conflict is approached depends on how it is defined. Moreover, previous attempts to manage, resolve, and transform the conflict situation should be analysed because identifying any lessons learnt could be vital. Finally, conflict mapping exercises are also useful to recognise potential hot spots and give early warnings as to what is happening on the ground to enable preparations for interventions to be made.

To begin mapping and analysing a conflict, the following information should first be gathered:

(1) Summary description of the conflict
(2) Conflict history – origins and major events
(3) Conflict context – geographical boundaries, political structures, relations, decision-making methods; interpersonal to international context

[3] This section was contributed by Ichsan Malik, Norbert Ropers, and Kamarulzaman Askandar.

(4) Conflict parties – primary, secondary, interested third parties, nature of power relations, leadership, parties' main goals, and potential for coalitions
(5) Issues – *facts-based*: disagreement over judgement or perception of *what is*; *values-based*: disagreement over *what should be*; *interests-based*: disagreement over *who will get what* in the distribution of scarce resources such as power, wealth, territory, and so on
(6) Dynamics – events signalling the surfacing of a dispute; issue emergence, transformation, proliferation; polarization; spiralling; stereotyping
(7) Management and resolution attempts – outcomes; alternative options and implications

2.5.1 Conflict mapping tools

A number of tools can be utilized to help simplify this process such as the *onion analogy* (that maps the needs, interests, and relative positions of conflicting parties), the *conflict tree* (that maps the core problem, root causes, and effects of the conflict), and the *conflict mapping* exercise (that analyses the main actors involved and the relations between them) (Fisher et al, 2000). Other tools can assist to map the *timeline* and the dynamic progression of the conflict, and to analyse the *needs and fears* of the main actors.

The onion analogy can be used to help analyse the different ideologies of conflicting parties and consists of three layers. The outer or first layer is the standing point as seen by all parties in the conflict. The second refers to each group's ultimate aim or goal, indicating what they want to achieve in conflict resolution, for example, fair treatment for all. The third layer comprises need (or necessity). However, one must first discern each party's most important need. One example is the maintenance of security and respect between all parties. It must be noted that the onion analogy is particularly useful when carried out by the parties themselves.

Meanwhile, the conflict tree uses an analogy to help decipher the main issues of contention. There are three categories in this type of analysis. First, 'tree roots' are analogous to the root causes of a conflict. Second, the 'tree trunk' refers to the core problem or the main conflict issue. Third, 'tree branches' refer to the various effects or impacts of the conflict. By examining these sequences of issues, effective ways may hopefully be found to understand and resolve them.

Conflict mapping is a visual technique that describes the various parties involved and the relationships between them. It specifically helps conflict assessors observe the roles and relationships of stakeholders (actors). To create such a map, all involved parties must be identified including not merely the main parties, but also indirect parties, supporters, and any other interested stakeholders. In so doing, the relationships, alliances, problems, and enmities between the groups must be analysed. As a consequence, inferences may be made about the central actors involved and their potential roles including assisting in addressing the conflict. Conflict mapping also clarifies the conditions of the conflict, creating a clear picture that may eventually be useful in designing a conflict resolution process to avoid igniting violence. Other useful tools for evaluating conflict include looking at the timeline of the conflict and a needs and fears analysis of the main actors.

The following discussion will examine how some of these tools have been used to map the conflicts in Afghanistan and Southern Thailand. Regarding Afghanistan, the situation will be assessed using the history and timeline of conflict tool, followed by the source of conflict and conflict mapping tools. Thereafter, the self-determination conflict situation will be analysed using the needs and fears tool, as well as the drivers of the conflict tool.

The first tool looks at the history of the conflict. This basically portrays the escalation and de-escalation of conflict events in time and space. When did the conflict first occur? What happened or which incident first caused the conflict? Was it a dispute, land annexation, or did it involve the murder of a political activist? The history must begin at the starting point of the conflict and continue until the current situation and include all conflict escalation and de-escalation. Afghanistan's history of conflict is given below.

Diagram 2.2 History of the conflict in Afghanistan



Source: Ichsan Malik

Afghanistan was chosen as an example because of its long history of conflict. Its source and actors are also clearly defined and documented. The conflict in Afghanistan began following the fall of the monarchy in 1973 and the rise of the Republic of Afghanistan. At that time, conflict escalation was still at the limited violence stage despite the many casualties. Casualties rose further when the Soviet Union invaded in 1978 and increased even more following US involvement in 1986 but drastically decreased as a result of the Geneva Accord in 1988 and continued to fall when Burhanuddin Rabbani was elected as president. In 1996, the violence reached a peak when the Taliban occupied Kabul resulting in a civil war. The violence then decreased after the Bonn Agreement and continued to decline when the United Nations became involved and Hamid Karzai was elected. Nevertheless, the situation flared up again when the US deployed troops there in 2008. In 2014, the violence decreased once more when Ashraf Gani was elected as president and continued to decline during the Islamic Cleric Conference in Jakarta in 2018. Notwithstanding, to this day the conflict continues, and the violence seems to be spiralling out of control with a large portion of the country now under the control of the Taliban.

The second tool analyses the sources of conflict by listing the factors of conflict and consists of conflict triggers, conflict accelerators, and the sources of conflict. In the case of Afghanistan, the conflict trigger was the state's abject failure to address the issues affecting its people. This manifested itself in a power struggle and can be seen in the country's failure to choose a type of governance – whether a monarchy, communist state, republic, or an Islamic government under the Taliban. Second, the conflict was accelerated by the invasion of first, the Soviet Union, then the United

States whom some have pointed to as the primary reason for the ensuing chaos. However, it could be argued that the true sources of conflict in Afghanistan are actually related to poverty, low levels of education, radical organizations, ethnic divisions related to warlords, trust issues, and other factors such as interference by neighbouring countries like Pakistan and Iran.

Diagram 2.3 The sources and factors of the conflict in Afghanistan



Source: Ichsan Malik

The conflict map of actors tool takes into account their position, power, influence, affiliation, and relations.

Diagram 2.4 Conflict map of Afghanistan



Symbol:

a. Gray connection
b. Hostile
c. Conflict
d. Tactical Alliance
e. Strategic Alliance

Source: Ichsan Malik

The first step is to identify all the actors involved in Afghanistan's conflict, including both domestic and international. From the map above, the domestic actors involved are the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Taliban, and Nahdatul Ulama Afghanistan (NUA). International actors include the UN, USA, Russia, India, China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Indonesia.

The second step illustrates the power of each actor. The power and influence of actors is manifested by the size of the circle surrounding the actors. A larger circle indicates greater power and influence emanating from economic power, politics, and the weaponry owned by each actor. As can be seen above, the external power of other countries is well balanced. At present, however, the power and influence of the government takes precedence.

Thereafter, the next step is to examine relations between the actors involved. Grey relations are symbolized by dashed lines. Tactical alliance relations are symbolized by slim lines consisting of two arrows at either end. Strategic alliance relations are symbolized by thick lines consisting of two arrows at either end. Hostile relations are illustrated by wavy lines, while conflict relations are symbolized by electrical lines. However, to glean more accurate information on actor relations, a deeper dig into the data is required.

Following these three steps, we are now able to identify and map the actors involved in Afghanistan. The picture reveals that the government is in conflict with the Taliban. The US is also involved in a conflict with the Taliban while simultaneously juggling hostile relations with Iran. At the same time, the government of Afghanistan has built tactical alliances with other countries. Finally, strategic alliances between the US and Saudi Arabia have arisen, with similar alliances occurring between the Taliban and Pakistan.

The next tool is the needs-fears mapping tool. As an actor-oriented clarification tool, the issues, interests, expectations, needs, and fears of each actor are listed in a table. This allows for comparisons and references. This tool can be used to assess conflict actors by examining their needs and fears whilst also making hypothetical assessments of the needs and fears of the opposing side. Moreover, it can be used by third parties to clarify her/his assumptions of the parties. Further, it can also form part of a facilitation or mediation process as a way of putting these needs and fears on the table for each side to see. At the same time, it can comprise part of the conflict perspective change exercise where each party fills in a table for the other actors as a way for each to be aware of and understand the opposing side's views. To illustrate these points, a needs-fears mapping of the conflict situation in Southern Thailand will now be undertaken (see Box 2.1 below) as presented by Ropers and Anuvatudom (2014). This will be followed by an analysis of the drivers of the conflict in Southern Thailand.

Box 2.1 Needs-Fears mapping and drivers of the conflict in Southern Thailand[4]

The conflict in the Deep South of Thailand has been well researched since its re-escalation in 2004. The majority of this research came to the conclusion that the conflict was deeply rooted in the history of the region between the Thai state and the local Malay-Muslim respectively Malay-Patani population and that its essence can best be described as an ethnopolitical legitimacy conflict (McCargo, 2008; 2012; Abuza, 2009; Satha-Anand, 2009; Askew, 2010; Joll, 2010; Barter, 2011; Jitpiromsri and Engvall, 2013; Jory, 2013).

[4] This part was contributed by Norbert Ropers. From: Ropers, N, and Anuvatudom, M, 'A joint learning process for stakeholders and insider peacebuilders: A case study from Southern Thailand' Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, 2014, Vol 2, No 2, pp 277-296.

This research has also emphasized that the conflict—as in many similar cases—has developed a complex dynamism of its own, including the self-reproducing character of high levels of violence and securitization as well as non-politically driven violence. Finally, another key feature which triggered some significant research is the enigmatic character of the resistance movement and its organizational set up. But this latter aspect has somewhat changed in light of the Peace Dialogue process which the Thai National Security Council (NSC) and the leading resistance organization, the National Revolutionary Front (Barisan Revolusi Nasional or BRN) agreed upon on 28 February 2013 (Lamey, 2013).

During the last decade, a multiplicity of activities were initiated to promote peace. While the majority of these efforts focused on security- and development-related programs, there has also been a significant increase of initiatives by CSOs, academic institutions and individuals linked to various state institutions, particularly after 2007. As mentioned above, this had been the context in which the idea of the Insider Peacebuilders Platform came up to create a kind of neutral space for peacebuilders and politically active stakeholders from within the conflict (therefore called "insiders") to collectively analyse the conflict and explore ways for its transformation.

Positions, interests, needs, and fears of main actors in the conflict			
Category	***Thai State***	***Liberation Movement***	***CSO Sector***
Position	*Sovereignty and territorial integrity, that Thailand is one indivisible Kingdom*	*Independence from the Thai State, with its own Nation State*	• *Peace and justice* • *People's empowerment* • *Self-determination (except in foreign affairs, military, and finance) (Malay CSOs)* • *Social order (Thai CSOs)*
Interest	• *Ensure law and order through necessary measures to prevent and suppress violence* • *Centralization and upholding "Nation, Religion and Monarchy" that constitute national security* • *Flexibility of governance through current form of decentralization*	• *Autonomy, political freedom* • *Power to determine how they live and how they allocate resources*	• *Upholding equality, no discrimination* • *Significant decentralization* • *Significant local administration (Malay CSOs)* • *Harmony within pluralistic society (Thai CSOs)* • *More power to determine local affairs*
Need	• *Protection of Thai identity* • *Upholding honour and dignity of Thai State* • *Political stability*	• *Equality* • *Freedom to live their lives according to religious faith and culture*	• *Political participation* • *Recognition and getting cooperation from all sides*
Fear	• *Losing authority and territory* • *Losing economic interests*	• *Being assimilated, ethnically, religiously, and culturally to the extent of losing their Malay-Patani identity* • *Being unable to establish Patani Nation State* • *Insincerity of Thai State*	• *Losing life and being unsecured* • *Being misunderstood by the State and society that they are helping the movement* • *Being deprived of political participation*

The factors that make a conflict violent and protracted: *This activity focuses on the drivers of the conflict. In all protracted conflicts, one can find multiple drivers that are linked with each other and create the famous self-reproduction of rivalry, confrontation, them-and-us-perceptions, and violence. While one phenomenon results from a particular driver, it can then give rise to other drivers in a contiguous chain which results in a system whereby all drivers are entangled. This is to say that most cause-effect relationships do not function in a linear fashion but are linked in a complex web-relationship with each other. These attributes reflect the fact that while all parties attempt to take action to advance their respective objectives, each and every one of them in turn lend force into constructing a system and generating complementary factors that drive and feed into the conflict itself. In the end, not a single entity has control over the situation or the system at all (Koerppen et al, 2011). Participants were first asked to choose some conflict-related phenomena and identify factors that trigger and sustain those phenomena. Based on these causal factors, they were then asked to identify what drives those factors. With this tool, participants develop a more comprehensive understanding of why the conflict has reached the current protracted stage and appears to difficult to resolve. This enables them to see the complexity of the situation as well as opportunities for intervention.*

Diagram 2.5 Conflict drivers in protracted social conflict in the Deep South of Thailand



Line A: Violence Circle
Line B: Peace Efforts
Line C: Obstacles to Peace Efforts

The very complex system of conflict drivers which the participants generated can be illustrated in a simplified version as shown above. The starting point and centre of the diagram are 'Violent Incidents' as the key indicators of the protracted conflict. Around this centre, three 'loops' are identified which indicate the connection of various drivers of the protracted conflict. The first loop (line A) involves incidents of violence. This is an amalgamation of various events including targeted killings and bomb attacks. Participants were of the view a combination of many interlinked drivers sparked the violence. Some of them related to efforts to "defend their identity," be it as a Thai Buddhist or Malay Muslim. Besides drivers related to the protection of cultural identity, other drivers were linked to retaliation against State officials' actions which were perceived as humiliating. At the same time, the State enforced an Emergency Decree (which gave security agencies special rights) as an instrument to address violence in the region. Yet the enforcement of the Emergency Decree was one of the factors interpreted as a denial of justice and equal treatment spurring retaliation against State officials. And these loops finally fed themselves, creating the trap of an ongoing protracted conflict. To break this loop, a radical change is necessary with respect to one or the other driver.

The second loop (line B) is the circle involving conflict resolution efforts that represented attempts to reduce violence. These included advocacy campaigns by CSOs to prevent human

rights violations that were the consequence of some State officials' actions. Peace talks among individuals representing the State and some fractions of the Malay-Muslim movement, as well as dialogue forums on decentralization, tried to promote conflict transformation. But so far, these efforts have only had a limited impact with the exception of efforts to reduce human rights violations. A large group of participants explained this failure as a result of the limitations of the Thai political system concerning effective democratic participation and problem-solving capacities. These factors are summarized in the third loop (line C) which can be described as a specific obstacle to conflict resolution.

2.5.2 The dynamic framework for conflict prevention and peace[5]

The next segment will look at the dynamic framework for conflict prevention and peace using Indonesia as an example. Indonesia endured difficulties during the late 1990s and early 2000s as a result of several interconnected issues including an economic crisis, political upheavals, ethnic and religious confrontations, and the resurgence of various groups fighting for independence, all of which resulted in a chaos that almost brought the country to the brink of collapse. Conflict mapping exercises and analyses were done during this period in an attempt to understand the causes of these problems and the actors involved in the conflicts. At that time, the analyses performed were static and partial in nature with the elements of the conflict evaluated independently. During mapping, several popular tools were used to recognise the sources of conflict.

Consequently, the results of these analyses lack linkages to connect the sources of the conflict and the actors involved due to the dynamic nature of the issues and the constantly changing entities as the conflict progressed. A concrete example may be found in the violent conflict in Maluku which has been identified as an "intractable conflict" (Coleman, 2006). An intractable conflict is an extremely complex protracted conflict involving a history of domination and counter-domination amidst unfair relationship situations, and represents interrelations between the economy, politics, and culture. This type of conflict is usually very emotional, insult and violence ridden, and may comprise high identity involvement at all levels of society. All parties become victims as well as perpetrators in the conflict. Basically, Coleman and Bar Tal's understanding of intractable conflicts is similar to Azar's concept of protracted social conflict explained earlier in this chapter. According to these authors, a conflict occurs because of existing identity differences such as nationality, race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, and culture. As such, these kinds of conflict are complicated and difficult to resolve.

Learning from the violent conflict in Maluku (which contained religious connotations) in 1999-2003, as well as several in-depth studies on conflicts in Indonesia over, for example, natural resources and political conflicts in Papua, and the Aceh conflict in 2012, Ichsan Malik (Malik, 2017) created a *"dynamic framework for conflict prevention and resolution."* This can be used as a tool to map conflicts and their resolution efforts and to prevent conflicts. Five main elements must be mapped and analysed in detail: (1) the escalatio n-de-escalation elements of the conflict; (2) conflict-causing factor elements; (3) conflict actors; (4) stakeholders; and (5) political policies. These five main elements are interrelated as a single system which is dynamic in nature because each element can influence the other.

[5] The next two sections were contributed by Ichsan Malik.

Diagram 2.6 Dynamic framework for conflict prevention and peace



Source: Ichsan Malik, 2012

Several factors triggered the formulation of this dynamic framework as a conflict prevention tool. In particular, an appeal was made by UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in 1992 regarding the importance of preventive diplomacy in preventing and resolving conflicts both between and within countries including the 1994 genocide in Rwanda which occurred due to a lack of early detection and early response to the conflict. Another violent conflict involving ethnicity occurred in May 1998 in Jakarta, and again nothing was done to prevent escalation of the conflict which eventually affected thousands of people. Moreover, the Maluku conflict also occurred due to a lack of intervention, and was triggered by the economic and political crisis in Indonesia. These situations became the driving factors behind efforts to develop effective conflict mapping frameworks to detect conflict escalation early, enabling quick responses to resolve conflicts from the outset before they are allowed to escalate into violence.

Referring to the diagram above, any conflict escalation needs to be detected. When disputes become tense and actors are mobilized, the conflict will escalate. If such tension and mobilization are left unnoticed, the situation may deteriorate fast leading to a malfunction of systems (such as law and order) in society. The conflict will escalate even further when casualties are involved. The worst result of such a scenario is mass violence leading inevitably to more fatalities. *Conflict building* occurs when conflict escalation continues. However, it can be controlled or even stopped by the use of dialogue, ceasefires, and by ending hostilities, all parts of what is called peace-building.

The second element of the dynamic framework concerns conflict triggers, defined as a sudden and extreme event such as the assassination of a political figure. Such events can escalate the conflict especially if linked to the political or religious affiliation of the victim which could act as a conflict accelerator. Incidents such as these can be equated to a fire being doused with gasoline. However, the root cause of the conflict is usually something else entirely. These unresolved conflict issues include discriminatory or suppressive policies, bad governance or weak law enforcement, a large economic gap, or corruption. While triggered by specific events, the escalation may actually result from a cumulation of these effects. To continue the analogy above, dry leaves may be susceptible to fire, but will only burn if a smouldering match is dropped onto the pile. Likewise, a small fire can become a devastating wildfire if a strong wind is blowing.

The third element in the framework concerns actors who may be extremely sensitive to conflict escalation and other factors in a conflict. The first group of actors are the *provocateurs*. Such provocation is usually taken for granted by the second group, the *vulnerable*. While this situation could be stopped by the third group of actors, the *functional* group, such actors rarely do their job properly. Due to tensions already running high, this results in the vulnerable group being mobilized. As a result, conflicts can easily escalate.

The fourth element comprises stakeholders who have an interest or stake in keeping the situation as peaceful as possible and consist of those who can impact the conflict as well as those affected by it, including the state, security sectors, civil society, and grassroots organizations. Cooperation and coordination between functional groups and stakeholders is necessary to stop and resolve the conflict.

The fifth and final element is the political will of the government as the main actor and stakeholder of most conflicts. However, the government itself may become part of the problem when it legislates laws that discriminate or otherwise adversely affects certain segments of society through suppression, corruption, and bad governance. Such actions can be a source of conflict or even trigger escalation of conflicts. All elements of conflicts and their dynamics are detectable from the onset because most indicators can clearly be spotted. As such, they become the moving parts of the comprehensive dynamic framework map.

2.5.3 Implementation for early detection and early response

The elements of the dynamic framework can also be used as a basis for early detection and early response as part of a conflict prevention exercise. The result of such an analysis is usually a report. Two types of reports for early detection and early response describe the result of the dynamic framework analysis: (1) a routine monthly report that records and analyses events on a monthly basis, and (2) a conflict trend report that records and analyses all conflict incidents in a certain area on an annual basis.

There are two main parts to the routine monthly report: a background analysis of the social, economic, and political conflict, and an analysis of the three basic elements of the dynamic framework. The conflict escalation-de-escalation element will be analysed and reported in the form of diagrams. The conflict source element will take the form of narratives of triggers, accelerators, and structural sources of the causes of the conflict. Similarly, the conflict actor element will take the form of dynamic narratives. Every month, routine analyses will be carried out in predetermined areas. The data used can be primary/direct data from interviews or secondary/indirect data from mass media sources available in the region. Hence, current data on the escalation of conflicts, the source of conflicts, and the actors involved can be all collected.

By contrast, the conflict trend report is carried out only once a year and consists of three parts. The first comprises a social, economic, and political background analysis together with a conflict history analysis of the reported year. The second consists of a comprehensive analysis of the five main elements of the dynamic framework including conflict escalation de-escalation narratives and conflict diagrams; factor/source of conflict narratives in the form of triggers, accelerators, and conflict structural source narratives; narratives from all conflict actors and stakeholders; and an analysis of government policies and actions supporting conflict resolution that reflect its political will. The third part consists of recommendations for conflict prevention in the coming year. Trend analyses are usually fuelled by secondary data and mostly emanate from the mass media which intensively reports on issues in society, especially conflicts within or between communities. The annual

analysis usually comprises of data from January to December of the reported year. To complement secondary data, focus group discussions may also be held with relevant experts.

Both reports can be used as a basis and point of departure for early conflict detection and early response activities. They can also serve as a basis for making new policies for conflict prevention/mitigation by the government and other stakeholders. In the context of early detection, reports can be immediately distributed and presented to interested parties as part of decision-making efforts. Similarly, in the context of early response, reports can be used as a basis for immediate decision-making to stop existing violence. Finally, reports may prove useful in the context of counter-narrative activities, mediations, negotiations, dialogues, declarations, and peace campaigns.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter drew an overall picture of the principles and theories of conflict and violence to pave the way for an understanding of conflict situations. The awareness that we live our lives surrounded by ubiquitous conflicts in a world sometimes run by conflicts, encourages us to ask whether conflicts are good or bad, and to wonder how we would react or interact in similar situations. Such musing allows us to identify different types of conflicts as intrapersonal (dilemma) or at the opposite end of the spectrum as a fully-fledged multiparty conflict in an international dispute. This chapter discussed the various parameters of conflicts along with clarifying theories to help readers understand the nature of conflicts and the different perspectives and perceptions of those involved. Moreover, this chapter explored conflict theories that philosophically explain the nature of conflict and the linkages between human behaviour and conflict situations.

To fully understand conflict, one must refer to the philosophical principle of epistemology which invites us to reconsider and use philosophical inquiry to challenge existing knowledge, truth, beliefs, and the perceptions shaping our attitudes. This understanding of the philosophical fundamentals of peace, violence, and conflict is required for constructive and critical thinking. People's attitudes are an important component in the formation and manifestation of conflict and are closely linked to behaviour and contradiction. These three dimensions constitute the substance of potential conflict. Conflict that persists through generations is called protracted social conflict and is mainly related to the unequal recognition of values by peoples living in the same society.

This chapter clarified the categories of preconditions to protracted social conflict based on its contributing factors and actors, and explained how they relate to the dynamic of conflict situations. Protracted social conflicts can emerge in multi-communal societies where such preconditions exist. Ethnic, social, political, and economic factors often exacerbate the situation, causing it to become persistent. In some cases, such circumstances can spiral downwards and circles of conflict may repeat themselves due to initial and additional conditions emanating from the dynamic of the conflict itself. Protracted conflicts are exhausting and may escalate into violence. If so, the results of violence may intensify the conflict even further. In some situations, the different values and beliefs held by communal groups could minimize access to basic needs thereby affecting their psychological condition and reducing the strength of social institutions as a whole, which could increase dependency on external parties.

It is argued that conflict is a part of human nature which is unlikely to be eradicated either within oneself, with others, or within society. It is therefore important to avoid conditions where conflicts can turn violent. As such, this chapter outlined some basic knowledge about violence including its scope and types. It also discussed the fact that violence is not an inevitable stage of conflict situations but only one possible outcome. Thus, there is no direct and necessary link between conflict and violence; conflict may be ubiquitous but violence is not inevitable.

Instead, various detectable stages of conflicts can lead to either escalation or de-escalation. In some circumstances, the application of certain mechanisms can even halt the escalation and transform it into a nonviolent conflict. Accordingly, this chapter provided several anchors or methods to analyse conflicts whether as outsiders or as stakeholders in order to understand how to appropriately engage such situations. In many Southeast Asian nations where social conflict occurs between state rulers and citizens, a nonviolent approach can be used to facilitate social transformation. This field in conflict theory highlights the use of nonviolent movements and action as a peaceful means of instigating social change and to develop democratic societies. This chapter then explored this field from its origins to the various practices it espouses to help us engage in a process of social change while minimizing the risk of violence. However, the use of nonviolent approaches may still not be enough to prevent conflicts from escalating into violence and war. As such, the discipline has developed some mechanisms and examined the conditions necessary to de-escalate conflicts, perhaps even to the point of reconciliation. To understand these conditions and mechanisms, analytical tools were provided to help readers analyse conflicts based on its components, actors, contributing factors to its formation, and its eventual resolution. Such tools are called conflict mapping.

In particular, conflict mapping helps conflict assessors to systematically assess the conditions, profiles, types, causes, stakeholders, and the dynamic of conflicts, in order to develop appropriate techniques to address conflicts. Such mapping can be applied to various types of conflict ranging from interpersonal to international. Assessors using this tool can be both outsiders or stakeholders seeking an appropriate solution to the conflict.

Overall, the basic theories of conflict and violence presented in this chapter will help readers to further explore the notions of peace, conflict, and violence. The following chapters will make clear the linkages between theoretical frameworks and practical situations.

Discussion questions

Epistemology and cognition:

1. What do we mean by an "epistemological basis to peace studies" and why is it important?
2. Why do people perceive conflicts differently?
3. How important are history, records, and story-telling to conflict situations?

Peace, violence, and conflict theories:

1. What are the relationships between conflict and violence? Are they directly related?
2. Clarify the types and dynamics of violence. Give relevant examples.
3. Is violence commonly a stage of conflict?
4. Why do people have conflicts with each other?
5. Define the following terms: nonviolence, nonviolent action. Name some key actions in Southeast Asia that fall under these categories.
6. Analyse the relationships between power theory and nonviolent action and relate this to a real situation in Southeast Asia.
7. Explain escalation and de-escalation of conflict by providing a brief example for each stage.
8. What are the preconditions of protracted social conflicts and how do we address them?

Recommended reading

1. Ackerman, P, and DuVall, J, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Non-Violent Conflict*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.
2. Azar, EE, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*, Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990.
3. Malik, I, *Resolusi Konflik: Jembatan Perdamaian*, Jakarta: Penerbit Kompas, 2017.
4. Ramsbotham, O, Miall, H, and Woodhouse, T, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 4th ed, Polity, 2016.
5. Ropers, N, and Anuvatudim, M, 'A joint learning process for stakeholders and insider peacebuilders: A case study from Southern Thailand' *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding*, 2014, Vol 2, No 2, pp 277-296.

Chapter 3

Preventing and Managing Violent Conflicts

Chapter 3:
Preventing and Managing Violent Conflicts

Yukiko Nishikawa

3.1 Introduction

Conflicts in Southeast Asia, which are neither simple nor insignificant, differ in type and have diverse causes mirroring the everyday problems of the countries and people in the region. Violent conflicts in the region are also not small in number, and although many are unresolved, most states in the region insist they are well-managed, contained, or handled. Conflict management is achieved using various techniques or strategies, such as confidence-building, deterrence, isolation, intermediation, community-building, intervention, and non-intervention. These approaches are critically important for preventing violence due to conflict escalation and exacerbation and the need to quickly manage crises arising from such conflicts. Notably, distinctive mechanisms and methods can be chosen depending on the nature of the conflict, the desired outcome, and institutional capacity.

While conflict resolution is an ideal goal, conflict management often maximises the total gain for both parties (Boulding, 1990: 37). Thus, Chapter 3 will focus on conflict management and prevention as important approaches to violent conflict. Because we cannot prevent all conflicts, conflict management and prevention will focus on mechanisms and methods to minimize, manage, avoid, and prevent *violent* conflicts. In addition, this chapter will explore how Southeast Asia prevents conflicts from deteriorating into violence and how it mitigates and contains violent encounters.

Violent extremism is the key denominator that complicates and prolongs conflicts in contemporary Southeast Asia. Extremist groups are active in the region, ranging from religious to political. Violent acts such as terrorism and bombings are often linked with extremist groups boasting both global and regional networks. Hence, this chapter will explore extremism in Southeast Asia while discussing conflict management and prevention and examine how individual states and ASEAN manage its ebb and flow. Even local conflicts cannot escape the effects of globalization in the contemporary world. These effects are not only financial and material but also ideological and political and are significantly influenced by countries and groups with extensive worldwide networks. Indeed, some Southeast Asian conflicts have been internationalized, enhancing cross-border crimes, trafficking, small-arms and light-weapons trade, and the networking of criminal and armed groups. The management of violent conflicts in Southeast Asia helps us to understand not only the region's conflicts but also the nature and characteristics of the states, societies, and people who strive for peace and prosperity there.

3.2 Violent conflict patterns in Southeast Asia

Understanding violent conflict patterns is critical to grasp conflict prevention and management approaches, methods, and strategies. Violent conflicts in Southeast Asia are either intrastate or interstate; however, even intrastate conflicts are not immune to violence. Conflicts in the region are generally 'low-intensity' and 'prolonged' or protracted. In addition, many countries in Southeast Asia commonly experience one-sided violence instigated by organized non-governmental groups or by a government against its civilians.

3.2.1 Intrastate conflicts

Quantitative studies on armed conflict have identified Asia as one of the regions with the highest incidences of violent conflicts. For example, one of the world's most renowned conflict datasets, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP),[1] shows that 2013 saw the largest number of violent or armed conflicts in broader Asia, including Central and South Asia as well as Southeast Asia, although armed conflicts in Asia have declined since the middle 2000s (Bosetti and Einsiedel, 2015: 3-5). Notwithstanding, Southeast Asia keeps a low profile in terms of armed conflict intensity and fatalities.[2]

Graph 3.1 Number of deaths by conflict type in Southeast Asia



Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)

Graph 3.1 above outlines death counts due to different types of internal armed conflicts between 1989 and 2019 in several Southeast Asian countries.[3]It shows unequivocally that the region's most impactful violent internal conflicts involved the state or the government as a party. In addition, most countries in the region have experienced or are currently experiencing violent conflicts linked with state formation issues. In a sense, these conflicts are colonial legacies and pertain to disputes over control of territories within a sovereign state and boundaries driven by ethno-nationalist movements seeking political autonomy from the central government for self-rule, greater control over local resources, or the creation of new states based on their communal identities. Most cases show what is called asymmetric conflicts between the central government (or its allies) on the one hand, and a group of armed actors representing certain identity group(s) (ethnic, clan/tribal, religious) on the other. These are essentially conflicts of identity which have nothing to do with state boundaries. Therefore, they entail complex issues, including a particular group or groups' language, religion, culture, communal identity, access to economic resources, and political opportunities. One or more of these

[1] This quantitative study aims to extract certain region- and country-specific trends of violence and conflict characteristics and is available at https://ucdp.uu.se/.

[2] When using violence and conflict datasets, particularly those showing death tolls and violent incidences, it is important to highlight data sources and data collection methods because different datasets often have huge discrepancies (see Box 3.3 below).

[3] The terms used for conflict types in Graph 3.1 are the author's, and are based on the UCDP dataset. 'State-involved' conflicts are those in which the state or government is a participant. 'No state involvement' refers to conflicts between the armed forces of organized groups that do not include the state or government.

issues are usually identified as triggers of secessionist movements. Many of these state formation conflicts have been seen in Mindanao, south of the Philippines; in Indonesia, specifically West Papua, Aceh, and Timor; in southern Thailand; and in Myanmar specifically Kachin, Karen, and Shan (see Table 3.1 below).

Table 3.1 Intrastate conflicts

Country	Duration (years)	Outcomes
Thailand: South	53	Not resolved
The Philippines: Mindanao	49	Not resolved
Indonesia: Aceh	52	Resolved
Indonesia: West Papua	57	Not resolved
Indonesia: East Timor	24	Resolved
Laos: Homong	45	Unresolved
Vietnam: Montagnards	62	Unresolved
Myanmar: Kachin	57	Not resolved
Myanmar: Karen	70	Not resolved
Myanmar: Arakan	70	Not resolved
Myanmar: Shan	67	Not resolved

Source: Based on international conflict datasets

Table 3.1 above lists the major state formation conflicts in Southeast Asia, most of which have been active for more than half a century. Hence, violent conflicts in the region are deemed 'long-lasting' or prolonged. The key elements of some of these conflicts, such as those in Myanmar, are in fact derived from issues that emerged during colonial times. While many such conflicts are currently active, none of them have escalated into nationwide, large-scale civil war. This may be one reason why Southeast Asian conflicts are considered to be of 'low intensity.'

Besides state formation conflicts, violent encounters based on ideology occur in the region as well. Often referred to as revolutionary conflicts, their goal is to replace the government with one that subscribes to a certain ideology. In Southeast Asia, these conflicts involve communist groups, such as those in Malaysia *vis-à-vis* the Communist Party of Malaysia (from 1948 to the early 1990s), Thailand *vis-à-vis* the Communist Party of Thailand (between 1976 and 1983), and the Philippines *vis-à-vis* the New People's Army (NPA) (since 1969). Many revolutionary conflicts have been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the NPA, known as the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines, remains a security threat. While the NPA and the Philippine government have entered into peace talks, they have reached an impasse, and such conflict remains unresolved with future negotiations elusive (Parameswaran, 2020).

3.2.2 Interstate conflicts

Most interstate conflicts in Southeast Asia are territorial and rooted in colonial times, because their borders were often drawn without consideration for the ethnically, religiously, and linguistically different groups living there. Accordingly, the legitimacy of such borders has been contested by diverse groups in border areas, generating territorial disputes (see Table 3.2 below).

Table 3.2 Territorial conflicts in Southeast Asia

SETTLED		
Countries	**Date Ended**	**Agreement**
Laos - Vietnam	1977.7.18	A treaty delimiting land boundaries
	1986.1.24	A complementing treaty
	1990.3.1	An additional protocol
	2007.11.27	A supplementary treaty to the Border Treaty
Vietnam - then People's Republic of Kampuchea (Cambodia)	1982.7.7	An agreement concerning historically waters (the coast of Kien Giang Province, Phu Quoc Island, and the Tho Chu Island on Vietnam's side and the coast of Kampot Province and Poulo Wai Island on Cambodia's side). Negotiations will be reconvened at a suitable
	1983.7.20	A treaty on the settlement of border problems/an agreement on border regulations
	1985.12.27	The treaty on the Delimitation of the Vietnam-Kampuchea Frontier
	2005.10.10	A supplementary treaty to the 1985 treaty
Malaysia - Vietnam	1992.6.5	An agreement to engage in joint development in areas of overlapping claims to continental shelf areas to the south-west Vietnam/to the east-north-east coast of Peninsular Malaysia
Laos - Myanmar	1994.6.11	An agreement relating to the land boundary (along the Mekong river)
Thailand - Vietnam	1997.8.9	An agreement delimiting their continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) boundaries in a disputed area in the Gulf of Thailand to the south-west of Vietnam and to the north-east of Thailand
Indonesia - Malaysia	2002.12.17	A territorial dispute over the Ligitan and Sipadan Islands in the Celebes Sea. Judgement made by the ICJ on December 17, 2002.
Vietnam - Indonesia	2003.6.11	An agreement on the delimitation of their continental shelf boundary in and area to the North of the Natuna Islands (after 30 years of negotiations)
Cambodia - Laos - Vietnam	2006.10.10	A treaty defining the tri-junction point of the land boundaries of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam
Singapore - Malaysia	2008.5.23	A territorial dispute over several islets, i.e. Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks and South Ledge. Judgement made by the ICJ on 23 May 2008.
Cambodia - Laos - Vietnam	2008.8.6	A treaty defining the tri-junction point of the land boundaries of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam
Cambodia - Thailand	1954-1962	Thailand sought claim to Preah Vihear causing Cambodia to bring the case to the ICJ which then ruled the temple a part of Cambodia's territory
	2008-2013.11	ICJ judgement concerning the territory of the promontory of the Preah Vihear
UNSETTLED		
Countries	**Date Started**	**Issues to be resolved**
Cambodia - Thailand	1970s	The land border and the maritime borders in the Gulf of Thailand (maritime zones overlap)
Cambodia - Laos	1950s	The land border. The two countries came to an agreement to withdraw troops from the border regions in the northern Preah Vihear province (2019.8). The two countries continue negotiations

Malaysia - Thailand - Vietnam	1970s	A multilateral dispute relating to an area of overlapping claims in the Gulf of Thailand
Malaysia - Thailand	1950s	The land border
Malaysia - the Philippines	1963/68-	The eastern part of the state of Sabah
Singapore - Malaysia	1960s-	The Pedra Branca
The Philippines - Vietnam - Brunei - Malaysia (China-Taiwan)	1950s-	Spratly Islands
Vietnam - Indonesia	1960s-	The delimitation of the EEZ between the two countries. By 2018, more than 10 rounds of talks had been held. In 2019, the two countries agreed to speed up maritime delimitation and establish provisional common guidelines
Indonesia - Malaysia	1970s- (2008-)	A dispute over a sea block (Ambalat) in the Celebes sea in the east coast of Borneo.

Source: Based on selected international datasets

Table 3.2 above illustrates that all Southeast Asian nations are, in one way or another, involved in territorial disputes with neighbouring countries.[4] Nevertheless, fatalities in interstate conflicts remain relatively low (see, for example, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research's 'Conflict Barometer 2020'[5]) as opposed to intrastate conflicts. Many intraregional, interstate conflicts started as far back as when the countries first gained independence and remain unresolved. Notwithstanding, some conflicts underwent continuous, decades-long negotiations to arrive at reasonable conclusions. In 2003, for instance, after 30 years of negotiations, Vietnam and Indonesia finally agreed to resolve their dispute over the continental shelf boundary. This strengthened both governments' efforts to continue and expedite negotiations on maritime delimitation, which have been ongoing since the 1960s (Septiari, 2019). To summarize, while interstate conflicts in Southeast Asia are old and long-standing, they have remained less violent. Hence, they are 'prolonged' and 'low-intensity' conflicts.

3.2.3 Violent extremism: Regionalizing and internationalizing conflicts in Southeast Asia

Apart from intra- and interstate conflicts, one other emergent issue regarding violence in Southeast Asia concerns growing instability due to extremism or extremist ideologies. Graph 3.1 above shows that many countries in the region experience one-sided violence. Examples of violent acts by extremist groups include the Jakarta bombings in January 2016 and May 2017, the Malaysia terrorist attacks in 2016, and a 2015 Hindu shrine bombing in Bangkok. While Sabah has been the subject of a lengthy territorial dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia (see Box 3.5 below), it was also the site of a siege conducted by a band of Islamist fighters who were found to be members of the Abu Sayyaf (in the southern Philippines). Likewise, in 2017, militants associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), occupied Marawi, a Mindanao city.[6] According to one analyst, the southern Philippines is becoming an important spot for foreign terrorists; among those killed in the Marawi siege were fighters

[4] This list of Southeast Asian interstate conflicts is based on several international conflict datasets and does not include all the region's conflicts, only selected ones.

[5] The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research's 'Conflict Barometer' can be found at https://hiik.de/conflict-barometer/current-version/?lang=en.

[6] The Islamic State (also known as ISIS) controls territories in Syria and Iraq and conducts global jihad. For more details about these organizations, see Burgat, 2008, Mohamedou, 2007, McCants, 2015, and Ingram et al, 2020.

from India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. A similar situation may occur on the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar where many persecuted Rohingya Muslims have fled, especially as mujahideen in Indonesia and Malaysia have expressed an interest in helping them (Westerman, 2017). Indeed, in areas with prolonged conflict, the threat and risk of expanding extremism and radicalization are high.

Extremism is defined as the advocacy of extreme religious, ethnic, or political views promoting extreme, violent, or illegal actions to achieve their goals. Extremism arises from the transformation of an individual's beliefs from conventional to radical and from their expectation of drastic changes in society (Healey, 2017: 34). Therefore, extremism is often discussed in tandem with 'radicalization.' According to Justin Healey, when a person or group justifies fear, terror, and violence as a means to effect ideological, political, or social change and then acts accordingly, the result is violent extremism (Healey, 2017: 34).

In Southeast Asia, violent extremism is frequently discussed in the context of Islamic ideology because of the significant Muslim population in the region. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei are Muslim-majority countries whereas the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Myanmar have minority Muslim populations. Since the early 2000s, violent Muslim extremism has been the primary cause of instability and the main security challenge in Indonesia and the southern Philippines. However, in the contemporary context, more diverse types of extremism have also been identified, reflecting different motivations and causes, including specific ideologies such as religious beliefs, political movements, economic or environmental concerns, or separatist and ethnic causes. Extremism has also been seen in more Southeast Asian countries including Malaysia and Myanmar (Bajpaee, 2017).

Box 3.1 Buddhist and Muslim extremism in the context of political changes in Myanmar

Since 2010, Myanmar has experienced change from decades of army- or Tatmadaw-led isolation to a 'disciplined' democracy, drawing much worldwide attention. As a country with several protracted intrastate or state formation conflicts, its government has attempted to maintain domination over the ethnic Burmans, which constitute approximately 60%–70% of its population, while dozens of minority ethnic groups have also been fighting for autonomy or increased representation – notably the Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mon, Rakhine, Shan, Wa, and Rohingya.

Among them, the Rohingya Muslims have been serious victims of Myanmar's protracted conflict. They are not recognised as an ethnic group by the government, which argued that they are migrants from Bangladesh and as such, have conducted military offensives against them. This internal conflict then led to a wave of anti-Burmese and pro-Rohingya jihadist rhetoric (Steckman, 2015: 11). In 2012, Muslim perpetrators instigated violence against the Buddhist community. Several terrorist groups also used the Rohingya situation to justify local jihad (Steckman, 2015: 12). Complicating the situation were religious extremist groups' growing use of social media networks to radicalize and recruit Muslims (Rohingya and Kaman) and even non-Muslims (Karen and Shan).

This situation is further confounded by right-wing Buddhist nationalism, which Myanmar has increasingly recognised since its democratic change in 2011. While extremists are a small part of Buddhism in Myanmar, some monks continue to propagate violence against Muslims. Violent incidents have taken place between non-Rohingya Muslim minorities and Buddhist extremists. For example, Ashin Wirathu, a controversial Buddhist monk from Mandalay, promoted violence against Muslims and conducted social media campaigns against the Rohingya. A renowned anti-Muslim Buddhist group, the '969 movement,' even called on Buddhists to boycott Muslim businesses.

The country now faces both Muslim (jihadist) and Buddhist extremist elements that have turned into serious security threats. Nevertheless, understanding the situation as merely a religious conflict or a clash of religious ideologies would be disingenuous. Benjamin Zawacki, Senior Legal Advisor for Southeast Asia at the International Commission of Jurists, rightly pointed out that violence must also be attributed to the government's "systemic discrimination" against the Rohingya (Zawacki, 2013: 18). Myanmar's political, social, and economic systems (manifested in its laws, policies, and practices) seem designed to discriminate against certain ethnic and religious minorities. As a result, this systemic discrimination of Muslims empowers Buddhist extremists to justify direct violence against the Rohingya and other Muslim minorities. Therefore the rise of extremism in Myanmar (both Muslim and Buddhist) is, to a great extent, due to the country's hegemonic state-building process and exploitative development, which are intended to discriminate against ethnic and religious minorities.

In Myanmar, for instance, along with Muslim extremism, Buddhist extremism, which targets Muslim minorities including the Rohingya, has now also become a concern, (Subedi 2020) (see Box 3.1 above). However, explaining extremist violence solely through the lens of religion and religious ideologies in Myanmar and even other Southeast Asian countries may be an oversimplification. In many cases in the region, extremist violence can only be clarified via the dynamics of the state-building process and the exploitative development linked with inequality and discriminatory policies.

Meanwhile, political extremism is now recognised in Malaysia and Indonesia, as evidenced by the radicalization of previously non-militant civil society groups, such as the Islamic Defenders Front in Indonesia (Facal, 2019). In addition, while Thailand has shown no evidence of jihadists making inroads into its southernmost provinces (the site of a long-standing Malay-Muslim insurgency) (ICG, 2017), it does not eliminate the risk of future jihadism. ISIS-related or other jihadists may target Thailand although its Malay-Muslim society and Muslim religious leaders, both traditionalists and reformists, have so far not sympathized with transnational jihadism.

It is widely known that Southeast Asia is home to multiple extremist organizations such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Ansharud Daulah Islamiyah and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur in Indonesia, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, and Darul Islam Sabah in Malaysia. Not only do they cause sporadic violence or criminal acts, they also affect local or intrastate conflicts in various ways. For instance, they recruit and train their members providing them with financial and material support, which prolongs, complicates, and exacerbates local conflicts. Established in 1993, JI has become one of the most renowned extremist organizations in the region, having long-standing contacts with international groups such as al-Qaeda[7] and ISIS as well as regional organizations including Abu Sayyaf, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and the Rajah Sulaiman movement in the Philippines. Young Muslims trained by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan have been involved in conflicts in Mindanao, Maluku, and Poso in Indonesia and Myanmar (Gunaratna, 2007: 424). Further, Islamist camps exist in various conflict-prone areas in Southeast Asia, such as Mindanao, Poso in Kalimantan (Indonesia), and the Myanmar-Bangladesh border (the Rohingya camps) (Gunaratna, 2007: 424).

Understanding extremist violence in Southeast Asia helps us to comprehend how hegemonic state-building and exploitative development are closely associated with inequality and unfair policies against ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities, or marginalized groups in some areas in the region. While many repressive regimes have been catalysts for radicalization, the political process or democratization has also contributed to it, as seen in the growth of radical religious groups in Myanmar and Indonesia. Another dimension involves local conflicts in Southeast Asia that

[7] Formed in 1988, Al-Qaeda fought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It has carried out several terrorist attacks around the world, including attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

have led to the creation of jihadi groups, such as the communal conflict in Poso (Central Sulawesi) and Ambon (Maluke) (Chernov-Hwang and Schulze, 2018). In prolonged-conflict areas, international extremist or terrorist groups repeatedly attempt to influence marginalized people to promote their ideology through, for example, Islamic study groups and schools. Nonetheless, several local factors in Southeast Asia explain the dynamics of growing radical and extremist ideologies *vis-à-vis* protracted conflicts. Indeed, it has become more complicated and challenging to prevent and manage violent conflicts influenced by regionally and globally networked extremist groups in Southeast Asia.

3.3 Preventing violent conflicts in Southeast Asia

At the end of the cold war, the prevention of violent conflict developed from the vision of a more peaceful world without an East-West rivalry. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary-General at the time, promoted preventive diplomacy as the first pillar of the UN's work for peace and security in the 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*. Today, conflict prevention remains part of the UN's policy, and the policy of many regional organizations, the Group of Eight (or G-8), and of governments' foreign policies. Most would agree that rather than responding to large-scale violent conflicts after they have occurred, preventing them would be a better choice not only financially but also morally and strategically. In fact, researchers now believe that acting before a conflict intensifies is better than trying to terminate them (Miall, 1992: 126: Berkovitch and Langley, 1993: 688-689).

Despite the lack of consensus on the definition of conflict prevention, it mostly pertains to actions that help prevent conflicts before they develop into active or violent ones. Conflict prevention strategies do not consist of specific actions but rather a wide variety of activities such as mediation, confidence-building, early warning, human rights promotion, and peace-building, to name but a few. These can be applied at different stages of conflicts: from peace-making efforts to preventing conflict escalation to peacebuilding activities in post-conflict areas to preventing conflict recurrence. Preventing conflicts is usually more challenging than resolving and managing such situations, as prevention requires predictive capabilities. Active measures to thwart conflicts require strategies beyond "acting early," mobilizing "political will" or instilling a "culture of prevention." In Southeast Asia, different regional documents, both formal and informal, have mentioned the creation of a "peaceful community" and the promotion of "peaceful cooperation" and the "peaceful settlement of disputes" (see Box 4 below). In 2003, the term, "conflict prevention," was even used in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (or Bali Concord II), which was adopted as part of ASEAN's effort to enhance its security (see section (A)(12)).

3.3.1 Multiple prevention efforts

Armed conflict can be averted through official and unofficial or informal measures rather than a single or particular action in the form of direct and structural prevention. For example, in the case of the South China Sea conflict provides a good example (see Table 3.2); while sporadic violence has the South China Sea conflict, concerned parties undertook formal and informal measures between 1992 and 2002 to prevent larger-scale violence, enabling them to sign a nonbinding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (see Box 3.2).. In this process, official efforts were conducted with the help of ASEAN while unofficial contacts enabled parties to join a series of confidence-building workshops ('Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea') initiated by Indonesia in 1990.[8] Meanwhile, unofficial

[8] The first workshop was held in January 1990 in Bali. It hosted only delegates from the then six ASEAN countries. Other countries were invited the following year. China's initial stance was one of reluctance, as it did not want to regionalize the SCS issue.

activities supported official efforts to realise the ASEAN-China dialogue (Truong and Karim 2016: 3; Hayton 2014: 257). This case demonstrated the importance of both official and unofficial efforts for conflict prevention and management.

Box 3.2 Efforts to prevent and manage violent conflicts in the South China Sea (1992–2002)

The South China Sea (SCS) has been another source of conflict in which Brunei, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia have different and overlapping territorial claims. The SCS is rich in natural resources, with natural gas and hydrocarbon reserves. It is also a critical route for international trade and has thus become a site of great power politics. All countries in the conflict have argued over the 'true' history of the two island chains in the SCS – the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands.

Since the end of World War II, there has been an ebb and flow of tension over the ownership of islands and reefs in the SCS; previously, no such claims had been asserted. China made a claim on a few features of the Spratlys in 1946 and Woody Island (part of the Paracel island chain) in 1947. In 1955 and 1956, China and Taiwan increased their presence on several islands, but the situation changed in the early 1970s with the discovery of oil beneath the SCS. The Philippines, China, and South and North Vietnam then moved to take control of these islands. China seized the Paracels from Vietnam in 1974 and moved into the Spratly Islands in 1988, which increased tensions. Moreover, its aggressive occupation of Jonson Reef led to the deaths of several dozen Vietnamese. The tension dissipated for a while, but another wave of tension arose when China built bunkers on Mischief Reef in 1995. While there have been casualties in this conflict, it has not deteriorated into a full-scale war or armed conflict among claimants. Because the conflict parties included non-ASEAN members, rules of conduct to address differences shared by ASEAN member states were not necessarily applicable in this context. Nevertheless, several collective actions by ASEAN member states between 1992 and 2002 can be considered measures to prevent large-scale violence or violent conflict.

First, ASEAN member states made a formal declaration on the SCS issue to promulgate an informal code of conduct, including the non-use of force and the peaceful resolution of disputes (the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the SCS adopted in Manila on 22 July 1992). Through this declaration, at least the relevant ASEAN countries in this conflict could reaffirm the norms embodied in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). Second, in response to China's occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995, ASEAN censured China through a joint statement calling for restraint. It forced China to step back and cooperate with ASEAN (Majumdar 2015: 77). Third, at an ASEAN ministerial meeting in July 1996, ASEAN members agreed to take measures to prevent conflicts from escalating and establish a basis for stability in the region. Although China did not want to discuss the SCS issue in a multilateral forum, ASEAN met with China in late 1997 and they issued a joint statement expressing their commitment to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Subsequently, in 2000, ASEAN and China held a meeting to reach an agreement on a regional code of conduct in the SCS. In these formal efforts, informal or track-two diplomacy (unofficial contacts and activities), which were undertaken in a flexible and nonthreatening manner, helped to realise a confidence-building process through a series of workshops on 'Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea,' initiated by Indonesia in 1990.

Ultimately, in 2002, ASEAN persuaded China to sign a nonbinding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) hoping that it would lead to an agreement on a code of conduct between ASEAN and Chinese foreign ministers (Majumdar 2015: 78). The 2009 ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint also addressed the SCS issue by calling for a full implementation of the DOC. The DOC included peaceful dispute settlement and cooperation and confidence-building measures based on consensus and peaceful resolution without resorting to threats or the use of force. The parties involved in the DOC were not only China and relevant ASEAN countries but also included other ASEAN member states. The DOC was a reflection of ASEAN's common norms for conflict management and comprised a step towards preventive diplomacy. Although the SCS remains a volatile venue of conflict, as constantly

heightened tensions have been witnessed among the parties in the 2010s and a resolution remains uncertain, the measures undertaken between 1992 and 2002 illustrate Southeast Asia's or ASEAN's efforts towards conflict prevention and management.

Source: The ASEAN Post <https://theaseanpost.com> (30 July 2020).

Conflict prevention is usually divided into two types: direct and structural (or, for some, 'light' and 'deep' prevention, respectively). Direct prevention consists of measures undertaken to thwart often imminent situations from relapsing into armed conflicts, such as diplomatic intervention, private mediation efforts, and the withdrawal of military forces. In the South China Sea case, ASEAN's attempt to set up a meeting and issue a joint statement in 1997 is considered a direct prevention measure as it aimed to reduce antagonistic relations through direct contact or dialogue between the relevant parties.

Structural prevention, on the other hand, refers to long-term measures addressing the underlying causes of conflict and relations along with escalating and triggering factors. Hence, the scope of structural prevention is wide and includes economic development assistance, increased political participation, and enhancing political culture and community relations. Simply put, many activities can be adopted to build domestic, regional, and international conflict management capacity. In the case of the South China Sea, unofficial confidence-building measures involved elements of both direct and structural prevention. Thus, on the one hand, the workshops attempted to invite relevant parties to the conflict and included territorial matters on the agenda, which were considered more urgent. On the other hand, the workshops also discussed resources, scientific research, environmental protection, legal matters, and navigation safety (Hayton 2014: 257-258), which although broader were nonetheless indirectly related or long-term issues. While China found the workshops were conducted too quickly and covered too many topics (Hayton 2014: 258), addressing such a wide variety of concerns helped extract issues specific to China and other parties to the conflict. The workshops also helped to identify key underlying issues and parties' needs. In that sense, they contained elements of structural prevention.

The South China Sea case demonstrates that both direct and structural, as well as official and unofficial efforts, can help parties arrive at a point of agreement. However, a set of measures, rather than a single action, is usually more helpful in overcoming an impasse.

3.3.2 Conflict preventors in Southeast Asia

Several perceivable factors, norms, and key policies of Southeast Asian nations, to a certain extent, work as preventors of violent conflict. Violent conflicts or wars take place when certain conditions are met, such as the availability of arms, the prevalence of a belief to use them, and the absence of a system to stop the violence. Therefore, in theory, removing these conditions should reduce the risk of violence

or violent conflict. In fact, many existing approaches against violence and armed conflict aim to remove the root causes and conditions of armed conflicts. As the previous sections have illustrated, despite the high number of potentially violent conflicts in Southeast Asia, the intensity of most have remained relatively low although incidences of violence and sporadic clashes involving armed groups and state security forces within a country or between states have been recognised. To explain this situation, understanding the *preventors* of violent conflict is crucial. At least in Southeast Asia, five major issues can be identified as preventors of armed conflicts.

a) The prioritization of development (or developmentalism) and its success

Most Southeast Asian governments prioritize economic development, as their legitimacy depends on economic performance. This common belief enabled sustainable intraregional cooperation and sometimes involved member states despite various disputes and politically and ideologically difficult periods. Throughout the 2010s, the largest market has been intraregional trade (around 23%-25 % of ASEAN trade) (ASEAN, 2019: 17-18), and thus, such countries have been economically interdependent. In reality, the overall economic performance of each country and ASEAN members collectively is relatively successful, maintaining a good growth rate (measured by real gross domestic product or GDP) (ASEAN, 2019: 6). According to World Bank economists, wealthier societies protect their assets better, making violence a less attractive prospect (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Fearon and Laitin, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). They also suggest that growth and conflict prevention initiatives are mutually reinforcing. These, in fact, reflect the policy and practice of developmentalism in Southeast Asia. As such, each country's prioritization of development and ASEAN states' gradual economic interdependence has worked as a preventor of large-scale armed conflicts.

b) Norm-building, rules of behaviour, and their formation process

ASEAN developed common standards to regulate intraregional, interstate relations, such as non-interference, consensus-based decision-making, enhanced consultations, and unofficial or informal negotiations. Some of these key principles are now detailed in the ASEAN Charter (e.g. Art 2) and other ASEAN documents (see Box 3.3 below), and over the last several decades, these norms and rules of behaviour have become the actual practice of interstate relations. Although these standards aimed to manage interstate relations, some of them, including non-interference and consensus-based decision-making, sought to reduce and stop the escalation of domestic conflicts (Kivimaki, 2012: 406)[9] and create a more stable regional order (Sridharan, 2008: 22). While these norms help to avoid intrusive actions both externally or internally, the region's norm development process also seems to have contributed to better regional identity-building. In fact, these standards are treated as specifically ASEAN, or the "Southeast Asian Way," and have accordingly strengthened Southeast Asian identity and united ASEAN member states.

[9] On this point, Kivimaki explains that due to the principle of non-interference, external military support for rebels was reduced, and thus, conflicts avoided escalating into wars. Another possible explanation is that ASEAN countries seek to comply with the non-interference policy, particularly in state formation conflicts, thereby preventing the spread of insurgency from one country to another.

Box 3.3 Principles for peace and stability in key documents in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asian states gradually formalized their key principles governing relations between states. Preventing and managing conflicts has been part of efforts to *"strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations"* as stipulated in ASEAN's founding document in 1967 (Declaration on the Establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or the Bangkok Declaration, para 1). Two other important ASEAN documents, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the TAC, both signed in 1976, serve as guides to achieve this overall objective. The Concord emphasizes *"peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences"* (para 6) and urges member states *"individually and collectively, to create conditions conducive to the promotion of peaceful cooperation"* (para 7). The TAC, which is the key code of conduct governing relations between states, also emphasizes the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter IV), including preventing disputes from arising, refraining from threats or use of force, and dispute resolutions among members through friendly negotiations (Art 13). Article 2 of the TAC stipulates the fundamental principles governing interstate relations: (1) mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; (2) the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, or coercion; (3) noninterference in one another's internal affairs; (4) settlement of differences or disputes through peaceful means; (5) renunciation of threats or use of force; and (6) effective cooperation among members.

These principles, which were adopted in the ASEAN Charter entered into force in 2008, expected all member states to resolve all disputes peacefully in a timely manner through dialogue, consultation, and negotiation (Art 22) to achieve the ultimate purpose of ASEAN: *"[t]o maintain and enhance peace, security and stability and further strengthen peace-oriented values in the region"* (Art 1-1). As part of the efforts of the ASEAN Community in general and the ASEAN Political and Security Community in particular, confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy are emphasized as important instruments of conflict prevention (Blueprint B-1-18).

These intra-regional principles are also strengthened by a wider forum in Asia. Specifically, the ASEAN Regional Forum, inaugurated in 1994, which is a multilateral forum for official consultation on peace and security issues, and includes major countries in the Asia-Pacific region, set two objectives: (1) to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and (2) to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific. The idea and importance of conflict prevention and management of relations are therefore shared by both ASEAN and Asia-Pacific countries.

c) ASEAN centrality

Illustrative of Southeast Asian norm development, ASEAN's inclusion of its ten members has symbolically unified the region.[10] ASEAN meetings provide ample opportunity for interaction and networking among member countries' officials and politicians. As such, member states have strengthened their personal ties and rapport has been cultivated at all levels of ASEAN meetings, which then serve to reinforce bilateral relations. More importantly, such opportunities have facilitated conflict management and prevented the escalation of bilateral problems and other issues. In addition, different opportunities in regional organizations usually enhance a sense of mutual trust and shared responsibility for common regional interests. ASEAN's community-building efforts, specifically its political and security aspects, and the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) has helped to cultivate trust and confidence. Beyond that, in the

[10] For more details about the historical development of ASEAN, see Chapter 7 of this book.

post-cold war era, several extra-regional frameworks have emerged, including the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asian Summit (see Table 3.3 below).

Table 3.3 Intra-regional and extra-regional co-operation

	Regional Agreements/ Treaties in Southeast Asia	Major Events in Southeast Asia	Extra-Regional Co-operation
1967	**Bangkok Declaration**	Established the ASEAN (Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore)	
1971	**Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration**		
1976	Declaration of **ASEAN Concord, Bali**		
	Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia (TAC)		
1979			**ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC)** starts
1980			The fore-runner of **Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC)** starts
1984		Brunei joined ASEAN	
1989			**Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC)** is launched
1992	Agreement to establish **ASEAN Free Trade Area** (6 members)		
1994			**ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)** is established
1995	**Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SANWFZT)** (took effect in 1997 except the Philippines)		
1996		The ASEAN Summit meeting begins to be held every year (officially every 3 years with informal meetings in-between)	The first meeting of **Asia-Europa Meeting (ASEM)**
1997	**ASEAN Vision 2020**	Laos and Myanmar joined	**First ASEAN+3 (APR)** Summit is held
1999		Cambodia joined ASEAN	Joint statement on East Asia Cooperation
2001	The Philippines ratified SANWFZT		
	Rules of Procedure of the High Council of the TAC		
2002			**Asia Co-operation Dialogue (ACD)** starts

	Regional Agreements/ Treaties in Southeast Asia	Major Events in Southeast Asia	Extra-Regional Co-operation
2003	**The Bali Concord II** (Three major pillars of an ASEAN Community)		China and India accepted the TAC
2004			Japan and Pakistan (July) and South Korea and Russia (Nov) accepted the TAC
2005			**East Asia Summit (EAS)** is established
			New Zealand and Australia accepted the TAC
2007	**ASEAN Charter**		Cebu Declaration on East Asian Energy Security
	ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism		
2009	**ASEAN Political and Security Community Blueprint**		Russia and the US accepted the TAC and Joined in EAS
	Inaugurated **ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)**		
2012			A free trade agreement (**Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: RCEP)** negotiation is launched.
2015	**ASEAN Free Trade Area**		

The development of extra-regional cooperation has also helped to strengthen ties among ASEAN states through interaction with other regional actors. For instance, ASEAN has become a centre for East Asian regionalism through its membership in institutional arrangements, indulging ASEAN+3, the East Asian Summit, ARF, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). In such wider Asian contexts, together with the rise of China's influence in Asia, the importance of ASEAN unity is recognised among member states to preserve ASEAN centrality. Accordingly, regional stability has become a common interest and this has apparently restricted member states' internal and intraregional conduct as regards the prevention of violence and violent conflicts.

d) Second-track activities

Focus should be placed on second-track activities in Southeast Asia that significantly increase opportunities for conflict prevention and management. Much of ASEAN's preparatory work is channelled through semi-official levels of cooperation. Its founding members established institutes for strategic and international studies and organized conferences for government officials and scholars. They also convened many workshops for peace and preventive diplomacy in the region. As illustrated in efforts to prevent violence in the South China Sea (see Box 3.2 above), second-track activities have provided alternative communication channels to overcome disparities and impasse. Many multilateral Track 2 networks and confidence-building measures have also contributed to conflict prevention in Southeast Asia.

e) A web of bilateral cooperation

Most ASEAN countries have bilateral agreements between member states regarding security matters. Such examples include the Malaysia-Thailand border agreements

and the Malaysia- Philippines anti-piracy agreement. Cross-border security issues are abundant in the region, and because Southeast Asian countries have cooperated to address them, they have strengthened their efforts to deal with imminent security threats. These bilateral relations work as preventors while wider regional cooperation also strengthens ASEAN identity and the ASEAN way.

3.3.3 Monitoring violence and early warning

Defined as the "*regular and organized collection and analysis of information on violent conflict situations*" (OECD, 2009), early warning systems are essential to reducing conflict escalation. Likewise, conflict prevention and the preventive aspect of diplomacy are also crucial to the success of early warning systems.

As such, Southeast Asia has monitoring systems for violent incidents in major conflict areas, including Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, where encounters regularly occur as a result of long and sustained internal conflicts. Despite the large number of international conflict dataset programs, these monitoring systems provide locally collected data on violence and violent conflicts and therefore enable a better regional understanding of important changes in conflict trends and tendencies towards types of violence (see Box 3.3 below). However, systemic analyses is necessary to provide timely warnings and these have not yet been developed in the region although some locally networked (non-governmental) organizations and transnational groups have used data on violence for their track-two actions.

Box 3.4 Violent incident monitoring systems in Southeast Asia

Ending conflicts does not necessarily mean ending violence. Formal agreements by relevant parties of a conflict usually reduce the intensity of violence, but less lethal and localized violence remains a threat. For example, in Aceh, after the 2005 peace accord, cases of violent crime and political violence increased. It is common to see distinctive patterns of violence in post-conflict countries. Thus, monitoring violence is vital to prevent and manage conflicts before it becomes prevalent.

Therefore, understanding trends of violence and measuring progress in handling it require data. Several datasets and reports on armed conflicts and violence are available worldwide, such as the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the Geneva Declaration's Burden of Armed Violence reports, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (conflict database), the Institute for Social Research (ICPSR), and International Crisis Behavior. In Southeast Asia, local data is collected to monitor violent incidents with support from some international donor agencies and governments. Major monitoring systems include the Deep South Incident Dataset (Thailand), the Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System (the Philippines), and the National Violence Monitoring System (Indonesia).

Indonesia's National Violence Monitoring System is, for example, based on data from various subnational newspapers (more than 100), diverse academic papers, and national publications. The use of diverse local data sources, however, generates huge discrepancies in the number of violent deaths presented by global and local datasets. Local data sources often enable us to understand important shifts in conflict trends and to find tendencies between armed and other types of violence.

Websites
'National Violence Monitoring System, Indonesia' is available at http://snpk.kemenkopmk.go.id/
'Conflict Alert' (or the Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System for the Philippines) is available at https://conflictalert.info/
'Deep South Watch' (Thailand) is available at https://deepsouthwatch.org/th/dsid

3.4 Managing violent conflicts

Norms, rules, and the socialization patterns of conflict parties are important in conflict prevention, management, and resolution because the preferred methods or approaches in handling conflicts depend on the existing system or agreed social and legal norms, customary practiced communication, and socialization tendencies. Hence, understanding the ASEAN way or the Southeast Asian way is vital when comprehending conflict management in the region.

3.4.1 The Southeast Asian way of managing interstate conflicts

The Southeast Asian security system has been predominantly bilateral (Caballero-Anthony, 2002: 534). As discussed earlier, ASEAN countries have a web of bilateral agreements particularly when handling cross-border security issues such as piracy, trafficking, and other transboundary crimes. This practice also applies to regional conflicts. While many territorial conflicts exist in the region, most are solved through bilateral negotiations. For example, in the Sabah dispute, ASEAN did not attempt to 'resolve' or mediate, and other member states kept their silence regarding the conflict (see Box 3.5 below). Only Indonesia took action, but it merely attempted to urge the involved parties to enter a cooling-down period. Also, in the conflict between Cambodia and Thailand over the Temple of Preah Vihear, ASEAN again did not play a mediating role or resolve the conflict (see Box 3.6 below). Both Cambodia and Thailand are member states. Although Cambodia once requested appropriate involvement from ASEAN, it only sent civilian observers after both countries agreed to a ceasefire.

Box 3.5 The Sabah dispute (involving the Philippines and Malaysia) and conflict management

The territorial dispute over Sabah, formerly known as North Borneo, between the Philippines and Malaysia began in the 1960s and remains unresolved. Sabah is a 29,000-square-mile area at the northeast corner of Borneo Island. The coastline offers anchorage and profits. Since Sabah became a state within Malaysia in 1963, the Philippines has claimed ownership of the area.

North Borneo (Sabah) was given to Sulu Sultan Salah-ud-Din Karamat Bakhtiar by Brunei's Sultan Abdul Hakkul Mubin. From 1735 to 1742, it was controlled by the Sultanate of Sulu. Nevertheless, the British or the British North Borneo Company took control of the territory between 1878 and 1946 under a treaty signed in January 1878 between the Sultan of Sul and Baron de Overbeck and Alfred Dent as a contract of lease, grant, and concession of the territory for an annual payment of USD5,000.

The roots of the two countries' claims were derived from an 1878 treaty between the Sulu Sultanate (which controlled Sabah at the time) and the British North Borneo Company. The Philippines considered the 1878 treaty as a lease whereas Malaysia viewed it as a grant and concession. The people of Sabah were allowed to be part of the Malaysian Federation in 1963 by the United Nations as its people favoured such a move. In 1962, the Philippines made an official claim of sovereignty. As a result of talks between the Philippine and British governments in 1963, further discussion was undertaken through diplomatic channels. The Manila Accord was signed that year between the Federation of Malaya and the Philippines which agreed on a peaceful resolution. In this context, Indonesia, as a third party, took action towards making the parties agree to a cooling-off period instead of attempting to resolve the conflict.

In 2013, the issue drew attention again when Jamalul Kiram III (a claimant to the throne of the Sultanate of Sulu) and more than 200 supporters invaded Tanduo village in Sabah to make a

territorial claim. Malaysian security forces surrounded the village, and the resulting encounter led to at least 68 deaths. The territorial claim remains unresolved.

Members of ASEAN were adamant in not expressing their views on the conflict. This is largely because a non-interference principle is maintained in the region, and thus, no member wanted to regionalize the conflict. As such, ASEAN has never taken a stance in addressing these fundamental issues between the Philippines and Malaysia.

From these cases and other practices in Southeast Asia, three characteristics of conflict management in the region can be identified. First, ASEAN or its member states are seldom proactively involved in resolving conflicts between member states to avoid conflict regionalization. Even when ASEAN or some of its member states are involved, they merely provide facilitation or urge the conflicting parties to take a breather. Accordingly, member states, as third parties, do not attempt to address the root causes of conflict, which sometimes results in relevant parties bringing the case to the International Court of Justice. Such was the case with the above-mentioned Cambodia-Thailand conflict and the one between Malaysia and Indonesia over the Sipadan and Ligitan islands. In the long run, this practice of non-interference with member states' conflicts prevents mistrust and distrust towards other member states or ASEAN itself, as interference often carries over to other instances of interference and causes divisions among member states.

Second, while ASEAN members uphold non-interference and have reached a consensus on this point, Southeast Asian states usually do not hasten the termination of conflicts. Whilst it may be ideal to resolve conflicts at an early stage, Southeast Asian nations are aware that many conflicts in the region are deeply rooted in history, and thus, prefer not take a short-term approach through only official opportunities. Instead, they use a mix of official, unofficial, and second-track channels to gradually find a way out. As seen in the territorial dispute between Vietnam and Indonesia (regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary), ASEAN states view their conflicts from long-term perspectives, often spending decades in both formal and informal negotiations.

Third, as a result of the first and second characteristics, most conflicts in the region are *managed* rather than resolved. Conflict management generally involves limiting, mitigating and/or containing violent conflict without necessarily solving it. The terms *conflict resolution* and *conflict management*, while used interchangeably at times, are clearly distinct in the literature. On the one hand, conflict resolution refers to the elimination and termination of conflict, through which fundamental differences and grievances are resolved. Conflict management, on the other hand, is the elimination of violence or a de-escalation of hostility despite the continued presence of the conflict's root causes (Azar and Burton, 1986). Conflict resolution requires interference to identify and address the root causes of conflict whereas conflict management allows for a less formal progress and avoids direct

confrontation between the parties. Southeast Asian states often take timeouts and prevent conflicts from being "*bogged down in unfruitful quarrels*" (Hoang, 1996: 70; Caballero-Anthony, 1998). This practice allows relevant states to review their positions and arrive at mid- and long-term agreements.

Box 3.6 Cambodia-Thailand conflict over the Preah Vihear Temple

In 2008, conflict arose between Cambodia and Thailand over the surrounding area of the Preah Vihear Temple. As with many other countries in Southeast Asia, Cambodia and Thailand share a colonial legacy of an equivocal border, and this conflict has had more than 50 years of history. The two countries share an 800-kilometre land border, which was demarcated when Cambodia fell under the French protectorate. The border was drawn based on Franco-Siam agreements in 1904 and 1907.

In 1954, Thailand asserted its claim to Preah Vihear, north of Phnom Penh. Cambodia then brought the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1959 to regain its cultural heritage based on the treaties and other documents agreed to in the colonial era. In 1962, the ICJ concluded that the temple is "situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia" based on a 1908 Franco-Siamese map, which shows the temple within the Cambodian border.

Although ownership of the Preah Vihear Temple has been made clear by the ICJ, the frontier around the cliff remained in dispute. In 2008, tensions increased before the temple's inclusion in the list of World Heritage sites. Thailand's claim this time was not about ownership of the Preah Vihear Temple but that of the surrounding area. Both countries then sent troops to the frontier. In August 2008, Thai soldiers occupied the Ta Moan complex (the western area) and built a temporary fence whereas Cambodia occupied the Ta Krabei Temple (east of Ta Moan) and sent soldiers to the non-militarized area. Confrontations occurred in the following weeks albeit without fighting.

Cambodia consulted with ASEAN and the United Nations for their appropriate involvement as regards peace and stability in the region, yet this failed to bring about change. In October, the first clash took place, wounding one Cambodian and two Thai soldiers due to rifle and rocket fire. The two armies exchanged fire later in the month, in April 2009, and several times in January and February 2010. In April, the battles left 18 dead and displaced many residents. The level of violence escalated in 2011 despite opportunities for the two sides to discuss containment and management of the conflict.

In February 2011, Indonesia, as chair of ASEAN, took the initiative to make both countries accept ASEAN civilian observers to monitor the situation and maintain the ceasefire. In April 2011, Cambodia filed a request to the ICJ regarding interpretation of the 1962 judgment. On 18 July, the ICJ issued measures and ordered both countries to remove troops from a "provisional demilitarized zone" that includes the area. In 2013, the ICJ decided that Cambodia had sovereignty over the whole territory of the Preah Vihear cliff, and both Thailand and Cambodia agreed with the judgment.



When looking at the distinction between conflict resolution and conflict management, the former is clearly a more thorough undertaking and ambitious, as it attempts to resolve the fundamental causes of conflict. Nevertheless, managing conflict frequently becomes advantageous for both parties especially when, for example, countries prioritize a minimum level of stability and order for economic development like Southeast Asian states and respect the principle of non-interference. This does not mean that ASEAN states or ASEAN itself will not take any other action. As previously stated, it also offers various opportunities and efforts through its second-track activities, including research, workshops, conferences, and seminars. There are also different venues for discussion among ASEAN member states such as side meetings in regional engagements, both official and unofficial. By participating in these, member states wait for appropriate timing or the ripe moment to encourage parties to thoroughly discuss and find fundamental points for resolution.[11] From a longer term perspective, ASEAN usually takes such opportunities to *persuade* and *push* parties to manage conflicts in the region.

Conflict management, meanwhile, is often necessary for a certain period when conflicting parties' hostilities are too high for negotiation or resolution. Nonetheless, when the ripe moment does arise later, parties may directly discuss and negotiate. In that sense, conflict resolution and management are not always separate issues; together with prevention, they form part of a continuum in many real-life cases, working side-by-side at different levels and within different issues in a conflict or conflict curves. As explored in the previous section, when we understand conflict types, regional norms and principles, socialization patterns, and consider the history of interstate relations, it makes sense why conflict management, rather than conflict resolution, is more frequently seen and perhaps even preferred in Southeast Asia.

The characteristics of the Southeast Asian way of conflict management tells us why the ASEAN or Southeast Asian approach to conflict is assessed so differently. While some analysts have pointed out that it has been ineffective at addressing conflicts because it rarely resolves them at an early stage, other scholars consider such an approach to be relatively successful, as only a few conflicts have turned into all-out wars, and only a small number of new conflicts have emerged as a result of intraregional intervention.

3.4.2 Managing intrastate conflicts

One important strategy to address intrastate conflicts in Southeast Asia is to prevent them from being regionalized or internationalized, as armed groups can easily gain support from other countries in the region. In particular, preventing such support from other countries affects the scale, intensity, and duration of violent conflict. The key underlying principle of this strategy is non-interference. In the broader regional strategy, such arrangements enable countries to concentrate on their own intrastate conflict(s) and economic development, which is the organizing ideology of the region. Development itself helps reduce grievances, which has also been one of the preventors of violent conflict in Southeast Asia.

When intrastate conflicts are not internationalized, each state authority has several options to deal with its conflicts within its own boundaries. Each government handles intrastate conflicts in the region in three broad ways. First, in many past and present cases, state authorities use coercive measures to suppress anti-government and revolutionary movements or insurgencies. Especially with regard to violent conflicts associated with state formation and secessionist movements, state authorities (including Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Myanmar) usually

[11] The notion of the "ripe moment" was suggested by William I Zartman. It centres on parties' perceptions of a mutually damaging stalemate and a way out. Such stalemates provide the push to begin negotiations whereas the way out provides the pull into negotiated solutions. See Zartman, 2008: Chapter 14. See also the discussion of "ripeness" in Chapter 5.

take suppressive measures (e.g. arresting the leaders of such movements) to stop their activities.

Second, because many secessionist and insurgent movements operate in border areas, Southeast Asian states enter into bilateral agreements to deal with them. For example, Thailand and Malaysia have agreements to fight piracy in the Sulu Sea. Malaysia also has bilateral cooperation agreements with the Philippines and Singapore and conducts military exercises. Such agreements are especially important in handling insurgencies because they can have serious destabilizing effects throughout the region. In addition, states rarely interfere in intrastate conflicts with each other. For example, in Southern Thailand, a state formation conflict has been closely linked with the border areas of Thailand and Malaysia. Although Malaysia is sympathetic to the Malay-Muslim people in Southern Thailand, the Malaysian government has never been involved in the issue because it is considered Thailand's internal problem. Therefore, non-interference or respecting sovereignty has been a principal underlying strategy when addressing intrastate conflicts, and all members have a strong consensus on this point.

Third, all Southeast Asian countries have made efforts towards economic development, particularly rural development, to improve the living standards of rural people, which helps reduce the risk of insurgent or rebellious movements in the long run. Some analysts have identified a link between state formation conflicts and the grievances and marginalization of rural populations. Acknowledging this issue, ASEAN states have undertaken rural development programs such as those in Mindanao, West Papua, and Aceh.

3.4.3 Growing challenges towards the ASEAN way of conflict management

Despite some positive aspects of the ASEAN way of managing and preventing violent conflicts, growing instability due to extremism highlights its limitations. While extremists have diverse objectives and ideological foundations, they commonly target locally destabilized and marginalized areas. In particular, venues of prolonged intrastate conflicts in the region have now fallen under their influence while major cities have been hit by sporadic violent acts. Accordingly, the conventional ASEAN way of managing violent conflicts may rather enhance the chances of extremist groups to freely act in unstable areas.

In addition, the region is no longer enjoying as much economic growth as it did in the past decade partly because of the overall stagnation of the world economy. Beyond that, coping with disparities or vast inequality caused by overall economic expansion over several decades is an imminent issue, as it is one of the factors associated with political and economic marginalization in most countries. China's growing influence in the region also changes the outlook of the overall political environment. Superpowers now highlight the Indo-Pacific rather than the Asia-Pacific in countering China's emergence, in which ASEAN centrality is less emphasized. Accordingly, some key preventors of conflicts in Southeast Asia are becoming weaker at changing the regional and global political and economic environment. In other words, the region may soon no longer be able to maintain benefits and order through its conflict management strategies which have helped its cause over the past several decades. As many critics of the ASEAN way have pointed out, Southeast Asian states may need to strengthen their institutional framework to enforce conflict prevention and management mechanisms to overcome emerging and ongoing challenges that may seriously affect its regional stability.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter explored the ASEAN or Southeast Asian way of managing and preventing conflicts and explained how it works in real-life cases. This approach simply aims to prevent conflicts from being internationalized or regionalized. The states in this region avoid conflict by not interfering in each other's internal matters. When interstate conflicts arise, neither ASEAN nor its member states attempt to resolve them. Each state then concentrates on handling its own conflicts. The overall strategy in Southeast Asia is to prevent conflicts from escalating rather than settle or resolve them, which reflects the ASEAN way. Some salient characteristics and traditions in conflict prevention and management in Southeast Asia include their informality, patience, and respect for different traditions, which are applied in tandem with formal methods. The formal principles are supported by a tacit approach, including avoiding conflict and indefinitely postponing handling such situations. In addition, informal or track-two diplomacy often supports formal efforts for conflict prevention and management.

Many commentators argue that ASEAN's role in conflict resolution is limited and passive partly because of the absence of institutional frameworks and enforcement mechanisms. The High Council is supposed to play a prominent role in dispute settlement, with its rules and procedures decided in 2001,[12] but thus far it has not been used. Limitations regarding institutional frameworks and enforcement mechanisms have also been discussed in light of the ASEAN way, which is marked by consultation and consensus-building through leaders' meetings and burdened with the principle of sovereignty.

Nevertheless, the situation in Southeast Asia may be evaluated differently. If the ASEAN way is understood as a process-oriented, non-intrusive, and long-term method that does not expect an immediate resolution of conflict, it can be assessed as a pragmatic or realistic way of living or co-existing with low-level and low-intensity conflicts, which then allows states in the region to focus on economic development and attract investments. Such an approach at least avoids creating animosities which could potentially enhance the escalation, renewal, and emergence of violent conflicts. Assessment of the usefulness and effectiveness of conflict prevention and management depends on what we assume are appropriate ways, timing, and methods of handling conflicts. Due to the way Southeast Asian states were formed, the ASEAN way was founded on a totally distinct epistemological base and thus saw conflict and peace in general, and sovereignty in particular differently. In fact, the major types of conflict in the region, that is, border/territorial and state formation conflicts, reflect these states' formation processes. Moreover, their views on sovereignty and statehood can be seen through their respective approaches to violent conflict.

Although the ASEAN way of managing and preventing violent conflicts has some positive aspects, Southeast Asian states face increasingly difficult challenges posed by extremism. While efforts to not regionalize or internationalize intrastate conflicts are now disrupted by regionally and globally networked extremist groups, at the same time, venues of prolonged violent conflicts have become ideal sites for such groups to expand their influence. As explored in this chapter, extremism in Southeast Asia has local origins. Because the ASEAN way of managing and preventing violent conflicts is now being challenged, many argue of the need to remove its fragilities when encountering threats by different radical groups. Meanwhile, emerging disparities in the course of economic growth in the region is also urging states to begin minimizing grievances and promote the interests of marginalized people.

[12] The High Council is a ministerial body established under the TAC. It is expected to work towards better management and resolution of conflicts/disputes between ASEAN member states.

Discussion questions

1. What are the major differences between conflict management and resolution?
2. What are the weaknesses of the ASEAN way of conflict management?
3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of ASEAN's role to prevent and manage violent conflicts in Southeast Asia?
4. What are the characteristics of track-two diplomacy in Southeast Asia in order to prevent and manage violent conflict?
5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of informal or unofficial methods of managing violent conflict?

Recommended reading

1. Askandar, K, Bercovitch, J, and Oishi, M, 'The ASEAN way of conflict management: Old patterns and new trends' *Asian Journal of Political Science,* 2002, Vol 10, No 2, pp 21-42.
2. Bercovitch, J, and Fretter, J, *Regional Guide to International Conflict and Management from 1945 to 2003,* Washington DC: CQ Press, 2004.
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Chapter 4

Transforming Conflict

Chapter 4:
Transforming Conflict

Ayesah Uy Abubakar and Norbert Ropers[1]

4.1 Introduction

Transforming conflict is a crucial, if not the most important, step towards achieving sustainable positive peace. This is an essential process that needs to be understood when dealing with conflict situations in the Southeast Asian region. The term *transformation* brings forth ideas and notions of change – of moving from one position or situation to another, hopefully better one. It has many aspects and is utilized at many levels. It involves various types of actors, state as well as non-state, including those that might not be necessarily seen as a main party. In fact, in many situations and contexts, these non-mainstream parties are usually the more important and dynamic actors in transformation activities. Transformation asks difficult questions of the situation and all those involved. The correct answers will contribute towards the goal of building peace. For this very reason, conflict transformation and peacebuilding (or building peace) go together. This chapter will discuss and explore both approaches and investigate how and in what way they have affected conflict situations in the region.

Conflict transformation and peacebuilding are two central concepts in the field of peace and conflict studies. The two are often used interchangeably given the dynamics of overlapping activities, goals, and outcomes in contributing to the achievement of durable peace. Both are types of social intervention which are complex and unpredictable with respect to their success. Some observers like to use the term *non-linearity* to capture this feature of trying to transform conflicts respectively by working towards new, peaceful relationships. The basic driver for this non-linearity trend is the complexity of various drivers of social and political change. It does not follow the predictability of a complicated machine like a plane engine. This will be the first issue discussed in the next section. The chapter will then look at the meaning of conflict transformation and how it contributes to the process of building peace. Some essential criteria including the roles played by various actors such as civil society, the media, business sectors, and scholars of peace education will then be highlighted. Examples of conflict transformation and peacebuilding efforts done in the region, especially in conflict areas like Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh will also be presented to illustrate the approaches and strategies used. This chapter is connected to discussion in other chapters too. For example, Chapter 5 will look at the process of ending conflict and transformation plays a major role in this process. Likewise, Chapter 2 already discussed how we should first understand conflict before we can attempt to address it. We also examined the mapping and analysis of conflicts in Chapter 2 as part of a process of devising strategies to manage and resolve conflicts. This mapping and analysis process will be summarized again here as part of a discussion on systemic ways of thinking in addressing complex conflict situations. We begin with this in the next section.

[1] With contributions from Mary Ann Arnado, Guaimel Alim, Juanda Djamal, Kamarulzaman Askandar, Grace Jimeno-Rebollos, Eleonora Emkic, Carolyn Arguillas, Yoko Fujimura and Tamara Nair.

4.2 A short history of systemic and complexity thinking, and some tools for conflict analysis

This section will give a brief survey of systemic and complexity thinking as a way of highlighting the debate between scholars on the issue of analysing and addressing conflict situations. It will then discuss some mapping tools that have been used to understand conflict, a few of which have also been discussed in Chapter 2.

Systemic and complexity thinking is rooted in a wide current of theories and practices and can be interpreted as a reaction to the early modern tendency of atomizing, separating, and de-constructing with the aim of controlling the course of events. Systemic and complexity thinking represents an opposite concept which is based on the understanding that such kinds of reductionism risked losing key features of the 'whole' which is more than the sum of its parts.

Without going deeper into the history of system dynamics in general our interest is to explain why tools of systemic and complexity thinking have helped to gain a better understanding of the dynamics and the transformation of conflict and peace processes. Three key elements are: the *whole-of-system approach*, the concept of *non-linearity*, and *self-organization* (De Coning, 2016). The first element emphasizes that long lasting conflicts can only be understood if the historical as well as the geographic boundaries are sufficiently taken into account. Prominent examples of this are countries which have been exposed repeatedly to colonial conquest attempts like Afghanistan, all of whom failed because the intruders did not understand how local populations created complex systems to counter attempts used to mobilize themselves against each other.

The second concept of non-linearity has now become a basic feature in many engagements to transform violent conflicts. De Coning (2016) mentions in this context that it is difficult, if not impossible, to foresee the overall impact of various engagements to empower stakeholders engaged in win-win settlements or agreeing to joint pathways. Another reason for slow and unpredictable initiatives to take peace processes forward is that sometimes the main protagonists for initiating political and other changes are deeply split, either because of different political principles or because of personal rivalries.

The concept of self-organization is closely connected to the understanding that complex systems follow their own system of logic. In this context it is important first to mention the difference between complicated systems, (e.g. the functioning of advanced combustion cars) which are very predictable and the complex development of peace processes which are difficult to foresee because many uncertain factors play important roles. But this does not mean it is impossible to influence this development. Liberal economic systems are a classic example of this kind of influence. Obviously, it is also not difficult to predict responses to dramatic changes between parties. Most interesting in this context are developments in which groups of participants engage with each other to contribute ideas for conflict transformation as in the case of the Insider Peacebuilders Platform (IPP) (for Southern Thailand/Patani) (see the discussion of the IPP in this chapter). The concept of 'emergence' is also used for this kind of development.

All three above mentioned concepts play an important role in influencing efforts to promote peacebuilding respectively in conflict transformation. In the case of the 'whole-of-the-system,' the key issue is to identify all factors which have an impact on the conflict and its transformation. This can best be achieved with a systemic analysis of the drivers of the conflict (see below). Non-linearity is a characteristic of systems in which the output is not proportional to the input or that a series of events/ episodes do not bear direct relationships to one another. This describes well, for

example, the challenges of peacebuilding and conflict transformation efforts to find ways to reduce political inequalities of identity groups with the help of autonomy regulations. The concept of self-organization emphasizes that many ambitious and complex political and social changes can best be achieved if the initiators trust the interests and enthusiasm of its supporters. Useful examples of this concept are some autonomy regulations in Asia as well as in Europe.

One of the most fundamental arguments in the context of systemic conflict transformation recommends that learning about the development of a conflict as well as its transformation should be organized in a shared environment (Ropers and Anuvatudom, 2014). This approach was accepted by all who participated in the IPP program between 2011-2014. This can be said of other conflict transformation activities in the region as well (see the COP program in Chapter 1, the Baku Bae movement in Chapter 5, and the "Dreamkeepers" program in this chapter). In the IPP program, the group, aided by some practitioners and academics who joined the joint reflection sessions, decided that five tools would allow participants to gain a good first overview of the drivers and dynamics of the conflict. It was also decided there was a need to visualize the results to enable a more in-depth discussion and that notes should be taken of the issues with which the participants could not find an agreement. These tools are listed as follow (although elaborations on some have also been presented in Chapter 2 in the section on conflict mapping and analysis):

(1) Mapping of actors, their power, and relationships in the form of clusters and connections with each other.
(2) Mapping of conflict issues, positions, interests, needs, and fears.
(3) Mapping of drivers of conflict and those transforming conflicts. This visualization is the most demanding and any complex analysis will require regular updating.
(4) Mapping of the narratives of conflict. This mapping opportunity allows participants to explore historical dimensions as well as working on future-oriented transformation discourses.
(5) Mapping of the current context. This thematic focus was chosen because just a year ago (2020), the Thai government and the BRN agreed to open a political dialogue with each other, and yet, serious problems arose in finding an incremental list of issues to work in a sequential manner towards some kind of an agreement.

This process of mapping and analysing conflicts then becomes the first step towards finding ways to transform the situation and building peace into the systemic approach. The systemic approach posits that the conflict is not linear in nature but dynamic, and made up of various aspects and elements which we must be aware of. Addressing the conflict then needs an approach that is comprehensive and properly addresses concerns at every level. This goes well with the *contingency* and *complementarity* component of conflict transformation as discussed in Chapters 1 and 5.

A visualization of the conflict analysis models is presented in Figure 4.1 below. The next section will discuss in detail the meaning of conflict transformation with examples from some conflict situations in the region.

Figure 4.1 Visualization of conflict analysis



Source: Ropers, 2016

4.3 Conflict transformation

The term *conflict transformation* represents the most ambitious and deepest approach to respond to an escalating or already violent conflict. The term was used by several founding figures of peace and conflict studies and elaborated particularly by John Paul Lederach and Diana Francis. Several likeminded pioneers also used the term based on their understanding that "problem-solving" should be one of the key tasks to transform conflicts. The Berghof Foundation used it as guiding principle because of its deep reaching and holistic character (Bernarding and Austin, 2019). But the term was also characterized as being very ambitious with respect to the changes parties are prepared to undergo, their relationships, as well as the transformation of institutions and discourses (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2016).[2]

It is interesting to note that with respect to terminology, not only the terms used in conflict studies, but also peace vocabulary, has developed specific meanings, and that these interpretations have changed over time. The terminological meanings of conflict management and conflict resolution seem to be the most enduring. While "conflict management" emphasizes pragmatic efforts to contain violent conflicts, "conflict resolution" focuses on the deep reasons of the conflict and attempts to address the attitudes and behaviours of the parties and their structural context (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2016).

This chapter takes the definition of conflict transformation as:

> *A complex process of constructively changing relationships, attitudes, behaviours, interests, and discourses in violence-prone conflict settings. Importantly, conflict transformation addresses and changes underlying structures, cultures, and institutions that encourage and condition violent political and social conflict over the long term (Bernarding and Austin, 2019).*

This part of the chapter will look at how conflict transformation works, especially as regards changing relationships and the behaviours of parties, in effect transforming the course of the conflict. The measures, tools, and strategies of conflict transformation will be further elaborated using cases from Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh as examples. In this section, conflict transformation will also

[2] See also the discussion on conflict management in Chapter 1.

be discussed according to a few main criteria, including transforming the mindsets of actors, and the contributions of various levels and sectors, especially civil society actors. We start by elaborating the main cases.

4.3.1 Conflict transformation in Southern Thailand/ Patani

The Southern Thailand conflict is a *self-determination* type of conflict involving the local Malay-Muslim population, also referred to as the 'Patani' people fighting against the Thai government to address issues of historical injustice.[3] The purpose of this section is not to analyse the conflict from its beginning or to look at its historical development which goes back more than 200 years. For pragmatic reasons, the focus will be on efforts in the last two decades when a new wave of violence surprised the country leading to attempts by the Thai state (transcending various government administrations) and civil society to cope with this development. Without going into the details of the conflict, the key issue concerned the legitimacy of the Thai state´s control of the region similar to many other protracted conflicts between majority and minority communities as occurred in the Philippines, Myanmar, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Northern Ireland, etc. Further reading on the development and analysis of the Southern Thailand conflict include the works of Montesano and Jury, 2008; McCargo, 2009; Nilson, 2012; Jory, 2013; Abuza, 2016; and Engvall et al, 2020.

(a) The response by the state, government agencies, and international actors. In 2004, an armed rebellion by the BRN (*Barisan Revolusi Nasional* or National Revolutionary Front) surprised the country and the international community. The government first responded with a military counterinsurgency strategy in combination with economic development assistance for the local population. This, as a response, is typical to the classical repertoire of 'real-politics.' Within the ASEAN region, political leaders from Malaysia and Indonesia tried to engage in a negotiation process but Thai state officials were apprehensive mainly because it wanted to avoid internationalization of the conflict thereby giving legitimacy to BRN and the other non-state armed groups involved.

(b) Civil society responses and engagements. An open letter by 144 university lecturers initiated the creation of a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) composed of 50 persons including political leaders, civil servants, and other members of civil society. The NRC was tasked to understand the grievances of non-state armed groups and the Patani people and provide recommendations to address these problems. Two years later, the public expressed criticism towards the work of the NRC because of a lack of engagement with the political dimension of the problems. Moreover, one key recommendation from the report—to accept *Bahasa Melayu* (the Malay language) as a working language in the region—was rejected by a large group of influential conservatives, mainly Thai-Buddhists.

Later, various new civil society initiatives were started in the region. Apart from partisan organizations supporting either the Malay-Muslims or the Thai-Buddhists, new organizations focused on providing social and economic support to the victims of violence and their families. They also provided legal assistance to persons accused of or charged in the context of various security laws, and victims of human rights and humanitarian law violations and of torture. In most cases these activities were also linked to women and youth groups who often became the main drivers of public engagement. An example of a civil society initiative that involved student leaders and academics from the universities was the organization of the Southern Thailand Universities for Peace (StufPeace) in 2007. StufPeace organized peace education

[3] The southern region in Thailand comprises officially of the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and the four districts of Songkhla. The Malay, Patani, refers to the former Sultanate of Patani and its people. This is a term used by many local Malays. Some peace activists use the term "Pat(t)ani" to acknowledge the distinction between the province and the history of the people.

activities involving public and private universities and included both Malay-Muslims and Thai-Buddhists. Part of the network's project was the Dreamkeepers peacebuilding seminar-workshops that gathered student leaders and lecturers. The activities were held in a neutral place (at the Universiti Sains Malaysia campus in Penang, Malaysia) where they learned together about conflict and peace, non-violence, practiced conflict mapping and analysis, and also gained knowledge about other conflicts in Southeast Asia. Thus, the Dreamkeepers became a peacebuilding platform that encouraged students to organize peace clubs at their respective universities and to continue interacting and working with each other on various peace projects in the midst of violent conflict (Askandar and Abubakar, 2009).

Another type of civil society initiative—whereby political think tanks and inclusive platforms tried to bring together a broad spectrum of stakeholders—played a crucial role in the development of conflict transformation. Among these was the establishment of the Patani Forum and The Patany which enabled activists to play key strategic roles by offering them platforms to explain and argue in political spaces for some kind of self-determination for the Malay-Muslim community in Southern Thailand.

Another civil society effort was the Insider Peacebuilders Platform or IPP. After seven years of no progress with respect to the ongoing violent conflict, a group of peace activists from all identity communities and different professions established this joint initiative to explore ways to transform the conflict. Being inspired by an American peace-activists´ idea of "Networks of Effective Action" (Ricigliano, 2003), the team came to the conclusion that the venture should start with a joint learning process about the drivers of conflict. This process took about two years and helped to generate a mixed group of about 50 persons with detailed knowledge of the conflict (Ropers and Anuvatudom, 2014). The IPP initiative is still alive, involving ever more participants, and is now guided by an annually elected IPP-Committee of seven persons. However, whether it will play a role in any future dialogue between the Pa(t)tani stakeholders, is an open question. Regardless, it is essential that comprehensive inclusivity is generated for the conflict to be settled.

(c) The level of symmetry between the parties and its transformation. Like many similar cases of minority-majority conflicts, the situation in Thailand between the Malay-Muslim community, the Thai state, and the elite was shaped by structural dominance explicitly articulated in the national concept of 'Thainess' with the three pillars of nation, religion, and the monarchy (Nilson, 2012). In the past, response to this dominance has been both violent and non-violent. It is on this observation that initiatives from the peacebuilding community have become important in expanding the space and platforms for non-violent means as the best option for both the conflict parties and the people of Southern Thailand. On the other hand, empowerment of minorities with respect to their universal human rights and their rights as equal citizens of the Thai state, is a legitimate request and one which has the potential to improve such parties' status at the negotiation table.

(d) Third parties. The term third parties is used differently in the context of conflict. It can refer to parties who are affected by a conflict system but are not key protagonists or actors in a conflict, such as in the case of ASEAN during the nearly fifty years of military government in Myanmar. Since the process of mediation and facilitation took prominent roles in the settlement of conflicts in about 80% of current violent conflicts (*escola de cultura de pau*, Peace Talks in Focus, 2020), observers have used the third party term as regards the process of mediation.

In February 2013, a formal dialogue process was announced by former Thai Prime Minster, Yingluck Shinawatra. In this context, the government of Malaysia was officially acknowledged as "facilitator" for the Southern Thailand conflict and its dialogue process. Two months later, the resistance movement of the *Barisan Revolusi*

Nasional (BRN) published a statement in which they articulated five "Preliminary Demands." One of these demands was that Malaysia should be acknowledged as "mediator" for its direct involvement in the Peace Dialogue process. This request has so far not been endorsed by the Thai government. The process, however, has since evolved to include other actors (MARA Patani) at the table. Since 2020, there are now two ongoing tracks – the one with MARA Patani and Malaysia as the facilitator and a bilateral one between the Thai government and the BRN. Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the two processes and neither has made much progress during this time.

(e) Confidence and dignity expressing measures. Most violent conflicts which last for a long time are characterized by a deeply rooted mistrust between the involved persons. Independent from their involvement as victims, relatives of victims, perpetrators, or relatives of perpetrators, or all such groups, it is difficult for many to engage with the other side. Even to shake hands can be difficult, never mind trusting the other side and giving respect to negotiations and promises. Therefore, it is crucial to create trust, sincerity, and dignity between the parties.

In the meetings between state representatives and non-state armed groups, many governments try to avoid mentioning the name of the other party because it might be interpreted as offering such groups official recognition especially when formal and official peace negotiations have yet to be established. This was the case when the Thai government under the leadership of then Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, agreed with the BRN in February 2013 for the first time on a "General Consensus on Peace Dialogue Process," but still preferred to address the other side as "Party B." Seven years later, Thai representatives for the Dialogue Process no longer have any problem in using the name of the BRN and other non-state armed groups.

The concepts of dignity, trust, and justice deserve to be carefully taken into account when the aim is to work towards a sustainable conflict transformation. Obviously, the issue of building trust between past conflict actors requires particular attention, but there are some models one can learn from. One of these is to focus on developing interpersonal relationships in small steps. Another is based on the Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction (GRIT) concept of Charles Osgood from the time of the cold war. It starts with an announcement of a series of measures of trust-building which are implemented independent from the other side (Demmer and Ropers, 2019).

(f) Peace survey research in Southern Thailand. The end of the cold war in the early 1990s was in many respects a period of ideological, political, and social change. One of these changes was related to the utility of survey research for the settlement of violent political conflicts such as in Northern Ireland. With the support of the political parties in Northern Ireland and a creative methodology as regards the conduct of public polling, it became possible to generate a comprehensive settlement which was accepted by the majority (Irwin, 2002). This polling method has also been practiced in the Philippines by the Social Weather Stations (SWS) and the Asia Foundation in support of the Bangsamoro peace process. The SWS conducted polls monitoring the perception and acceptance of Filipinos towards the peace process culminating in the Bangsamoro Basic Law during the period, 2011-2015.

Southern Thailand, however, lacks an enabling environment compelling political parties to engage in a joint polling experiment. However, a large group of local and national institutions did establish a "Peace Survey" sequence between February 2016 and September 2018 which made several recommendations to motivate political parties (Peace Survey Network, 2019). The following brief overview indicates that survey research results can help to develop a more nuanced understanding of what those affected by the conflict would like to see as steps towards some kind of settlement.

(1) More than two thirds of respondents supported a dialogue between the government and several representatives of the stakeholders in the deep south with a particular emphasis on the involvement of religious leaders.
(2) An even larger group emphasized the need for creating "safe zones" in the region – to protect civilians and respect human rights.
(3) The problem of low quality education including poor language competency in the mother tongue among the majority Malay-Muslim population was emphasized.
(4) The most interesting result related to preferred forms of governance. This part of the survey was most inspired by the Northern Ireland model of generating a kind of just settlement acceptable to all identity groups in the region. Instead of asking about one preferred governance model, respondents were asked to assess levels of acceptance of all options. The acceptance levels were defined as: "Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable, Unacceptable." Remarkably, Northern Ireland's peace negotiations were regularly accompanied by this kind of survey research and in the end, the final agreement came very close to the results of the final survey (Irvin, 2002).

In conclusion, we can say that conflict transformation is occurring in Southern Thailand. All the major parties have had an impact on this process. Much still needs to be done, but at least the foundation has been set.

4.3.2 Conflict transformation in the Mindanao/ Bangsamoro process

Another example of conflict transformation in the region is the case of the Mindanao/ Bangsamoro process.[4] In fact, it can be argued that this has been one of the more successful peace processes in the region.

The armed conflict between the Bangsamoro revolutionary groups in the Southern Philippines (or what is presently known as the Bangsamoro region) started in the early 1970s. It was in 1976 that the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) first signed a peace agreement with the government of the Philippines (GPH) which was then followed by the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. Given this experience from the MNLF-GPH process, the succeeding peace process between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and GPH gathered many lessons learned leading to a conflict transformation of the Bangsamoro conflict. As a result, a more comprehensive peace infrastructure was slowly built, not only among the parties, but also with the involvement of more stakeholders and participants to the process. Among the transformers to the conflict was the emergence of grassroots peace monitoring missions organized by civil society groups, namely, the "Bantay Ceasefire" or ceasefire monitoring by the Mindanao People's Caucus (MPC) and the "*Tiyakap Kalilintad*" or care for peace, by the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS) (elaborations of these two efforts will be offered in the discussion below).

[4] See also the discussion on the Mindanao/Bangsamoro conflict in Chapter 5.

(a) Grassroots monitoring by the Bantay Ceasefire in Mindanao

Box 4.1 Grassroots monitoring by the Bantay Ceasefire in Mindanao

By Mary Ann Arnado

This was a typical outpost of the Bantay Ceasefire during the height of the armed conflict between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 2001-2005. The outpost served as a buffer zone to physically separate the warring parties from each other. In the course of monitoring the ceasefire agreement, the Bantay Ceasefire established numerous outposts such as this to help ensure that rebels, soldiers, and militias alike would not step into negotiated demarcation lines and strictly follow the fragile truce. That was how peace was then fought in the conflict-affected areas. Mostly composed of volunteers coming from the grassroots, peace was built piece by piece, step by step, and one day at a time.

A typical day in a Bantay Ceasefire will usually start with the *azan* (call to prayers) when the Muslims volunteers begin the day with a prayer. After that, they heat water for the native coffee and cook sweet bananas or *kamote* (sweet potato). At around 6.00am, the BC monitors begin to patrol the area by foot and interact with the civilians. They check for any report of unusual events or ceasefire incidents the night before. They record the report or information in the Daily Monitoring Logbook and immediately relay to the Bantay Ceasefire Team Leader any urgent issue that needs to be reported to the Joint Ceasefire Committee.

After the morning patrol, they return to the outpost and cook their breakfast. Food in the outpost is delivered from the Mindanao Peoples Caucus (MPC) office in Cotabato City on a weekly basis. It consists of rice, sardines, coffee, sugar, bread, and some noodles. The food provision is budgeted to cover the consumption of three monitors assigned on a rotation basis each week. Vegetables such as *malunggay* (morinaga leaves), *tanglad* (lemongrass) and squash can be easily gathered in the surroundings for free. The community fisherfolk usually deliver fish if they have a good catch from the Pulangi river or the marsh. Sometimes, coconut, bananas, and corn were also delivered by the farmers. MPC also provided budget for the cell phone load of the monitors together with emergency and safety kits such as medicine, alcohol, flashlights, batteries, and medicinal oil.

After breakfast, the monitors fetch drinking water from a well where they also had to bathe and wash. Thereafter, they proceed with their daily activities beginning with regular visits to the military camp and the MILF camp within their area of monitoring. It is important to regularly talk to each of these combatants to gather information, anticipate brewing issues, and prevent escalation of violence. The monitors who are assigned to the outposts can freely go in and out of the camps because they are accredited as partners of the Joint Ceasefire Committee. The accreditation is very important, otherwise, they could be harmed or attacked, or even suspected of spying if they roam around without proper coordination.

The BC outpost team of three is composed of a Christian, a Muslim, and indigenous representatives (also referred to as tri-people). This was considered important in a highly polarized community where the Muslims do not trust the Christians, the Christians do not trust the indigenous peoples, and *vice versa*. To allay suspicions of possible bias and prejudice on the part of the monitors, Bantay Ceasefire consciously decided to deploy tri-people representatives in the outpost so that each grouping in the community would be able to feel they had a representative to take care of their welfare and concerns.

After the camp visits, the Bantay Ceasefire Monitors attend meetings that may be called by the Peace and Order Council, visit the Barangay Captain, or join a training organized for women. All these activities practically consume their time up to late in the afternoon when they have to return to the outpost. After a short rest, they have to immediately prepare food for supper while there is still light. There is no electricity in the area and the night is pitch black and quiet.

After supper, the monitors usually discuss and evaluate what they have monitored during the day and they also plan what to do the following morning including assignments for each team member. For the next 6 days, this will be their routine until a new batch of BC monitors arrives for the next rotation of assignments. It is not all work though. Sometimes, they get invited to a *kanduli* (festivity/social gathering) or a basketball game, or have a relaxing swim in the river. What keeps them going? It is the strong faith that if people work hard enough, God will reward their efforts and make the impossible possible for them.

In spite of these CSO-led missions and the existing local monitoring mechanisms within both the government and MILF armed forces (as part of their confidence-building measures), ceasefire violations continued and even increased. It was through the Bantay Ceasefire report and lobbying that the idea of an international peacekeeping mission led to establishment of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) in 2004 (Abubakar, 2004). The IMT as a peacekeeping mission was deployed in the conflict areas (see Chapter 5). Its presence not only drastically decreased armed conflict violence but also brought about more confidence-building activities between the two parties. Together with international stakeholders and local civil society groups, this formed part of a much improved peace infrastructure. Peacekeeping has not been exclusive to the parties but has been more inclusive in the process.[5] This component of peacekeeping (IMT and CSOs) has substantially transformed the conflict – from armed violence to negative peace, effectively bringing stability to the peacemaking process or the formal peace negotiations. Also, as a consequence of this negative peace, more peacebuilding activities have been organized with the participation of more people and different sectors of society.

(b) Confidence and dignity expressing measures. As discussed in the case on conflict transformation in Southern Thailand, confidence and trust-building is an elaborate but necessary process in conflict transformation. After being in a violent conflict situation for a long time, moving forward requires trust and respect and this only comes when parties gain confidence in the sincerity of the opposite side. To repeat, it is crucial to create trust, sincerity, and dignity between the parties. A powerful measure of building confidence and dignity are apologies from political and state leaders or official recognition of the other parties' identity such as in the case of the Bangsamoro peace process, where the Philippine President finally recognized the name and identity of the Bangsamoro for the first time.

On 7 October 2012, President Benigno Aquino III announced on national television that the new political entity or government would be called the Bangsamoro – a departure from the previous Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). This was historic, especially for the MILF because it recognized their distinct identity *vis-à-vis* its Filipino identity. While not a formal apology, the significance of using the term,

5 See the case study on the IMT in Chapter 5.

Bangsamoro, was considered symbolic and meaningful as it was seen as granting a form of recognition to the people, their history, and their ancestral domain – the Bangsamoro region. In President Aquino's words,

> *This agreement creates a new political entity and it deserves a name that symbolizes and honours the struggles of our forebears in Mindanao and celebrates the history and character of that part of our nation. That name will be Bangsamoro (Asia News Channel, 2012).*

The impact of President Aquino's pronouncement was unexpected and emotional for many people, especially those living in the conflict areas. During the signing of the Framework of Agreement, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Chair, Ebrahim Murad, emphasized the importance of acknowledging this identity when he stated,

> *Today, after almost 16 years of hard negotiations, interfered with armed confrontations on the ground, we have inked the most important document in the chapter of our history – a landmark document that restores to our people their Bangsamoro identity and their homeland, their right to govern themselves, and the power to forge their destiny and future with their very hands (Murad, 2012).*

4.3.3 Multiplicity of tracks in transforming conflicts

A tool which was developed at an early stage to separate between different levels of engagement with conflicts became most prominent in the form of a three-level Pyramid Triangle (Lederach, 1997).

Figure 4.2 Three-level pyramid triangle



Source: Adapted from Lederach (1997)

The triangle can be broken down into many levels, but the most prominent version is one which separates between the three "tracks" of leadership with respect to management of the conflict: top, mid-level, and grassroots leaders. Some scholar-practitioners have added a hybrid leader with the term "Track 1.5." Some persons, who either belong to the Track 1 level, prefer to engage in conflict settlement on a discreet and informal level, or they may belong to the Track 2 level but try to reach out to decision-makers on the Track 1 level. An example of Track 1.5 is the Consolidation for Peace (COP) for Mindanao (see sections in Chapter 1 on the COP program).

In early uses of this tool, interest was particularly focused on actual and potential peace constituencies. Later, this lens was used in much broader perspectives, i.e. also including actual and potential groups of sceptics, and critics and spoilers of the peace efforts. Currently, in the case of Southern Thailand, this tool can be used to identify and understand in a more nuanced manner the key actors, their interests, and their influence on the situation. As this information became more relevant, activists from all tracks began to develop an increasing interest in the peace efforts. The same is true of Mindanao/Bangsamoro.

Another outcome of the mobilization and engagement of Track 2 and 3 activists was an increase in legitimacy of the transformation process. In this case, more persons and their different opinions became involved. This can have an ambivalent effect. On the one hand, it creates more legitimacy because of a broader spectrum of opinions; on the other, it can make the transformation process more difficult exactly because of these opinions, which in some cases may allow more spoilers who are against any kind of substantive compromise. In the case of Southern Thailand, several socially and politically interested persons were engaged as Track 2 and 3 activists. This development was driven by two connected trends: slow progress on the Track 1 level and the efforts by Track 1 actors to get as much support from Tracks 2 and 3 as possible to increase their legitimacy in a rather stagnant political environment.

4.3.4 Capacity-building for empowerment and problem-solving

According to an observation by the British peace scholar and practitioner, Diana Francis, almost all peace activism consists of constructive communication (2010). One of them is the field of capacity-building organized in the form of workshops, seminars, and trainings. Main topics in this context are the analysis and understanding of the dynamics of conflict, development of strategies for their settlement and transformation, and the engagement and influencing of stakeholders in the political arena. During the last few decades, a wealth of knowledge and practical experiences has been collected and many of the several hundred peace and conflict studies organizations provide trainings and academic courses for conflict management and transformation (Simon Fischer et al, 2000; Schirch, 2013; Levinger, 2013). Examples of these activities in Southern Thailand include efforts by the IPP, STUfPeace, and the Dreamkeepers (as outlined above in the section on transformation in Southern Thailand). The empowerment of actors, by way of increasing their capacities for peacebuilding, in fact, is one of the most important focuses of conflict transformation. These activities have also proven effective in the transformation of conflict in Mindanao/Bangsamoro and Aceh.

This can be seen in the activities of civil society groups such as the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society and the Aceh Civil Society Task Force (see Boxes 4.4 and 4.5 below). While both started by conducting capacity-building and problem-solving activities, they also ventured into mediation and facilitation at both horizontal and vertical levels such as peacekeeping and monitoring at the local levels; advocacy and lobbying at the national level; and consolidating NGO communities in order to build peace constituencies.

The experience of these two organizations also demonstrates that the impact of peacebuilding NGOs may be low especially in the early years of formation. Also, while there was a diversity of peacebuilders, they also demonstrated a lack of unity. This led to the development of consortiums, networks, and alliances such as the CBCS in Mindanao, and the ACSTF in Aceh. Experience shows that unity and joint collaborations work better to improve difficult situations on the ground. The next two sections will highlight the work done by the CBCS and the ACSTF as examples of civil society engagement in conflict transformation work.

(a) Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS) and conflict transformation in Mindanao[6] The Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS) is a network of Bangsamoro-led CSOs with a shared goal to work for human rights; peace and good governance; social inclusion of children, women, youth, indigenous peoples and other sectors; environmental protection and building community resilience to hazards and vulnerabilities; as well as equal access to basic services and livelihood opportunities for all. The network has 29 member organizations and it continues to expand and involve more areas in Mindanao where there is a significant Bangsamoro population. As a consortium, it remains mindful with its inherent challenge of achieving a cohesive voice as a key stakeholder in the peace and development dynamics in BARMM and in Mindanao.

The following are CBCS's basic beliefs and principles:

(a) Having a collective responsibility to build peace in Mindanao and to work for the development and empowerment of BM civil society organizations and their communities (*ummah*) through participatory governance and leadership by mutual consultation (*shura*) and consensus-building (*ijma*)
(b) Maximizing available opportunities for the cause of peace and social justice, human rights, and good governance
(c) Advancing the struggle for freedom and self-determination through unified, peaceful civil society engagements
(d) Engaging in critical collaboration, constructive engagement, and a principled partnership approach in relations with existing government institutions, organizations, groups, and programs
(e) Establishing mutual coordination with Bangsamoro groups that share the same principles in our common advocacy for Bangsamoro self-determination and development
(f) Committing to work with other people and groups who share our vision for peace, justice, and good governance
(g) Increasing our constituency by reaching out to the less organized and involved segments of the Bangsamoro society

In the last decade, the CBCS has implemented programs on community-based peace monitoring, peacebuilding, good governance, and human rights education. It has organized platforms on social cohesion and intra-unity among the BM people and with other faith-based groups. Working with other networks, CBCS had also been actively involved in monitoring the peace negotiations between the MILF and the GPH, and during the post agreement government of the BARMM. All this occurred as part of the Consortium's accompaniment to the GPH-MILF peace process.

The CBCS continues its program in promoting transitional justice through popularization of the study conducted by the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission on legitimate grievances, historical injustice, human rights violations, and land dispossession of the Bangsamoro. This effort is aimed at providing reparations and justice to the victims of massive human rights violations in the past and to foster healing and reconciliation between the Filipinos and the Bangsamoro on the one hand, and the different tribal groups in Mindanao on the other. Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation is an important element of the normalization aspect of the peace agreement between the national government and the MILF. Among the recommendations of the TJRC is the creation of the National Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission for the Bangsamoro (NTJRCB). It is through CBCS's advocacy that such an entity will be an effective platform to usher in not only healing and reconciliation but most importantly to prevent any recurrence of violence.

[6] This section was contributed by Guiamel Alim of CBCS.

Building strong social cohesion (intra-unity) among the Bangsamoro tribes and people with different cultural identities forms part of the CBCS's conflict transformation goal. The consortium organized the PUSH-Bangsamoro (Platform for Unity, Solidarity, and Harmony) and the inter-faith Action Network for Peace in Cotabato City and will expand it to the rest of the provinces in Mindanao where the Bangsamoro, Christian settlers, and indigenous people live side by side.

Part of the organization's conflict transformation activities is to engage in a "peace process" among the tri-people in Maguindanao province with the Bangsamoro, Tedurays, and Christian settlers that have inherited land conflict issues.

CBCS has also entered into an agreement and working coordination with some agencies of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BARMM). The core mission of this agreement is to ensure that this new government (as an outcome of the peace agreement) will uphold transparency, accountability, and participation from many sectors under the principle of moral governance.

(b) Civil society movements and conflict transformation in Aceh[7] The Aceh civil society movement has been very important in transforming the conflict and building sustainable peace in Aceh. Some activities that have been carried out include monitoring and investigating human rights violations, raising awareness about conflict issues, setting up an alternative media platform, capacity-building and peace education, and even engagement with the insurgent movement. Many groups were involved in this movement including Coalition of Human Rights NGOs, Acehkita.com, scholars at leading Aceh universities, the Aceh Institute (AI), and the Acehnese Civil Society Task Force (ACSTF).

The Aceh peace movement also involved students, many of whom participated in and supported the Student Solidarity for People (SMUR). This group formed part of the movement to reform Indonesia in the 1996 to 1998 period. After the Indonesian reformation agenda was achieved on 21 May 1998, the group demanded cessation of the military operation status zone for Aceh (*Daerah Operasi Militer* or DOM). This finally happened on 7 August 1998. The movement also pressured Jakarta to prosecute human rights violations that had occurred during military rule and especially the DOM period in Aceh, as well as to release all political prisoners. The end of DOM for Aceh, however, did not bring peace to the region, as the issue of Aceh independence was again rejuvenated. This demand gained momentum when the province of East Timor was granted a referendum, during which the East Timorese opted for independence from Indonesia after a long struggle that began in 1975. Calls for a similar referendum for Aceh peaked in 1999 with a gathering of a few hundred thousand Acehnese in front of the iconic Baiturrahman Grand Mosque in Banda Aceh. Having had enough of what they saw as abuse and mistreatment by the Indonesian state, support for the Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* or GAM) skyrocketed. Unfortunately, the Acehnese were not as fortunate as the East Timorese. Not only was the demand for a referendum rejected, but military operations also resumed resulting in the killing of civilians in places like Arakundo, Simpang KKA, and Beutong Ateuh in 1999 and 2000.

In response to the increasing violence, Aceh civil society groups initiated several events to discuss, debate, and stimulate strategies and solutions to end the conflict, such as *Kongres Mahasiswa dan Pemuda Aceh Serantau* (KOMPAS or the All Aceh Students and Youths Congress) from 31 January to 4 February 1999. At the international level, the International Forum for Aceh (IFA) led by Jafar Siddiq organized an Aceh Conference in the United States. International solidarity for Aceh was then consolidated to support the advocacy of human rights issues through the Support Committee for Human Rights for Aceh (SCHRA). At the same time, civil

[7] This section was contributed by Juanda Djamal and Kamarulzaman Askandar.

society movements led by student groups and human rights NGOs kept promoting the referendum issue as a way to find a balance in the independence versus autonomy debate.

Another important role of Aceh civil society was to support the peace dialogue as a solution to solve the armed conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the government of Indonesia. The potential for dialogue as a way out of the problem started from an informal meeting between the ground commander for GAM forces, Tgk Abdullah Syafiie with the Ministry of State Secretary, Bondan Gunawan, on 16 March 2000. This constituted a crucial turning point towards the peace negotiation process in Geneva.

In particular, Indonesian President, Abdurrahman Wahid, was keen on peacefully solving the Aceh conflict so invited a Swiss-based organization, the Hendry Dunant Centre (HDC), to facilitate talks with the GAM. The HDC was successful in persuading the parties to sign a humanitarian pause agreement on 12 May 2000 which established the Joint Committee on Security Modalities (JCSM) and the Joint Committee on Humanitarian Action (JCHA). Significantly, it also created a positive atmosphere around ending the armed conflict. However, opposition to the talks and the agreement, especially by elements in the military, challenged its implementation. So much so, the process became deadlocked and high level meetings in Geneva were sought to clarify the agreement. It was then that civil society organizations got more involved, supporting the process by organizing discussions, conferences, and many meetings. These were held everywhere, including at the international level, as a way of highlighting the process and creating awareness around the situation in Aceh.

As a conclusion to this section, it is interesting to note that stakeholders of all parties, including peacebuilding communities, expressed an increasing expectation to understand and occasionally use the terminology of peace dialogues and negotiations, for example, ground rules, shuttle diplomacy, framework agreements, confidence-building measures, deadlines, mediators and facilitators, conditions versus interests, strategic communications, one-text-procedures, back channels, and so on. Nevertheless, the question remains whether such knowledge competence will have an impact on the settlement of the conflict. It is our opinion that this knowledge *will* help stakeholders to understand the process better, and hopefully this will contribute towards the generation of creative ideas to support and even move the process forward.

4.4 Peace through peacebuilding

Since the 1960s and 1970s, the term *peacebuilding* became popular in the context of peace research as a label to emphasize the need to move beyond just “negative peace” and work instead towards a more sustainable “positive peace.” For example, Johan Galtung contributed significantly to this development with his triangle model of *peacekeeping*, *peacemaking*, and *peacebuilding*. In this model, peacebuilding was interpreted as addressing the root causes of the conflict, possibly requiring structural changes towards justice and equality, while peacemaking was primarily seen as ending a violent conflict through negotiation and compromise. The peacekeeping term was an interesting reference to his former separation between peace through dissociation and association.

In recent years, most civil society peace organizations have also adopted the peacebuilding term as captured by John Paul Lederach in his classic book, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (1997). While it was during the period marking the end of the cold war between the East and the West in the early 1990s that the UN was first encouraged to adopt the term, peacebuilding, for their work, initially mainly for post-conflict activities, the term later became increasingly a

catch-all for all kinds of peace-related work, particularly in the realm of development agencies. The rationale of peacebuilding was stated by Boutros Ghali in his report, *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) when he said that, "*Preventive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict peace-building is to prevent a recurrence*." This development found its climax in the equalization of "peacebuilding" and "liberal state-building." Based on the classical liberal Western understanding that peace can be best created and sustained on the basis of free and fair elections, democracy, good governance, human rights, and a liberal economic structure, many international interventions by the UN, the EU, and other Northern states followed this concept.

The "Peacebuilding Consensus" was welcomed by many Western institutions at the time of the breakdown of the USSR, Yugoslavia, and the regime changes of former communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly as the end of the cold war saw the creation of 22 new states and the start of a series of violent conflicts. Most were triggered because ethno-political minority communities, who had previously managed to coexist in the federal states of the USSR and Yugoslavia, were suddenly confronted with the stark realities of life in the new emerging "nation-states" in which majority communities insisted on dominant positions. Obviously, there is a linkage between human rights, democracy, good governance, and peace. However, in reality, most states involved in violent conflicts struggle with these features of liberal statehood. While the UN and other international intervening actors might have good intentions, they are often confronted with unavoidable dilemmas, a lack of detailed knowledge about the social-cultural functioning of societies, and power balances in state structures and political landscapes (Jarstad and Sisk, 2009; MacGinty, 2011; Richmond, 2011; and Ryan, 2013).

The idea of peacebuilding via liberal state-building was particularly presumptuous in cases of conflicts without dominant states such as Bougainville and Papua New Guinea. Volker Böge and his colleagues were among the first who emphasized the hybrid character of many "new wars" in the Global South which would need some kind of "hybrid political order" rather than liberal statehood (2011). Instead, non-state traditional actors, institutions, and customary practices may be more effective in these hybrid cases, particularly if they have a broad-based legitimacy and inclusive participation. Having emphasized the advantages of traditional approaches, the short-comings became increasingly evident particularly when conflicts were dominated by state institutions especially as regards discourse about the reform of a state's political and administrative character.

The development of various peace efforts in the Global South over the last thirty years has demonstrated that only in a small number of cases (i.e. Northern Ireland, Mindanao, and Aceh) is it possible to agree on comprehensive issues including democratization and liberal socio-political matters. In most other cases, it was only possible to achieve compromise with some liberal elements, leaving many other areas to re-establish authoritarian and illiberal structures. This was not only visible with respect to countries suffering from violence such as Bosnia and Hercegovina, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, but also in smaller countries like Cambodia and East Timor.

Such a situation led MacGinty (2011) and Richmond (2016) to help conceptualize alternatives to unrealistic "liberal" peace settlements which also took into account various forms of resistance, agency, and autonomy. The now widely used term of *hybrid peacebuilding* combines traditional liberal peace arrangements with various forms of agency including non-state traditional actors and institutions. While the protagonists of hybridity argue that this approach towards peacebuilding has the advantage of "locally grounded legitimacy" (Uesugi, 2021), critics also argue that "quality" peace should not only be based on local, but also international legitimacy (Uesugi, 2021). In this respect, it is useful to compare various models of hybrid forms (Richmond and Mitchell, 2012; Uesugi et al, 2021).

A kind of complement to hybrid peacebuilding offers the concept of *peace formation* which has also become more prominently parallel to the hybridity concept (Richmond, 2016). However, its background is primarily linked to the history of peace movements from below (Barash, Webel, 2018) and the more recent trend of "local turns" as a key space for political legitimacy. This space became even more prominent when civil society actors of various semi-democratic countries increasingly requested that state-building and peacebuilding be closely linked to each other. Richmond emphasized that peace formations should only be spoken of in the context of existing or emerging nonviolence, the respect of equality, dignity and human rights, the offer of pluralism and intercultural understanding, and participation for all regardless of identity, class, or gender (2016).

In the meantime, the concept of peace formations has been explored and discussed in several contexts (Richmond, 2012; 2013; Aning et al, 2018). One interesting feature is explicit support in the form of *infrastructures of peace* such as the establishment of a Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction in Nepal, or the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) in the Philippines. Another observation relates to countries experiencing long and painful periods of brutal war such as Cambodia as this may lead to a culture of mutual local support and low expectations with respect to state support (Hughes, 2001).

Box 4.2 Definition of peace formation

"***Peace Formation*** *processes may be defined as relationships and networked processes in customary, religious, cultural, social, or local political or local government settings, finding ways of establishing peace processes and sustainable dynamics of peace*" (Richmond, 2016: 34). A special example of a kind of hybrid Peace Formation can be seen in the state of Timor-Leste. While the UN initiated a referendum on self-determination after its history of Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation, this initiative would not have succeeded without a solid customary culture, local churches, civil society, and charismatic national leaders (Molnar, 2011; Leach, Kingsbury et al, 2013; Richmond, 2016).

4.4.1 Working on peacebuilding

Over the years, peacebuilding has been observed as a *top-down* approach by scholars and practitioners alike. This shows a lack of ownership among local communities or those directly affected by the conflict, and consequently, weakens the durability of peace. Examples of this observation can be found in the experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Emkic, 2018) and in the implementation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 1998 Final Peace Agreement in Mindanao, the Philippines (Abubakar, 2019). By contrast, Lederach (1997) promoted a concept of peacebuilding that includes different types of actors and approaches, reinforcing the idea of *peacebuilding from below*. This concept emphasizes the value of ownership, indigeneity, and the inclusion of communities as the main stakeholder in the process of peacebuilding (Abubakar, 2019). Scholars such as Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2011) also developed this idea of *cosmopolitan peacebuilding*. Cosmopolitan peacebuilding states that while peacebuilding from below is a significant contribution to the field, a harmonization of top-down peacebuilding and peacebuilding from below would not only bring about more resources, but more significantly, would strengthen universal values in the attainment of peace. These universal values would include human rights and global citizenship as part of the conceptualization of a shared planet.

In 2005, Kamarulzaman Askandar (2005) observed that during peacebuilding experiences in Southeast Asia, contestation can occur between stakeholders/ actors in the conflict and the peace process itself which could shape behaviour and relationships among such groups (for example, NGOs, international organizations,

and donor agencies). As such, he enumerated three issues crucial to peacebuilding: (1) that it should be built at the location of the root of the conflict; (2) that peacebuilding be at the foundation of conflict resolution and peacemaking; and (3) the need to balance internal and external interests among peacebuilding communities.

In order to better understand how peacebuilding works, Lederach's model of actors and approaches (see Figure 4.1 above) demonstrates three levels of actors from top leadership to middle-range leadership in society, up to grassroots leadership involving the leaders in conflict-affected communities themselves. At every level of leadership or type of actors, many approaches or activities can be organized. These show how particular actors can play unique roles and contribute best to the process. This model also demonstrates the multi-track and interdependent nature of the peacebuilding process.

There are many kinds of peacebuilding strategies and activities such as peace education, peace journalism, conflict resolution trainings, humanitarian and development work, and the setting up of peacebuilding platforms bringing together all types of leaders and actors. Some have been previously discussed as a part of conflict transformation work. An example of a peacebuilding platform is the Consolidation for Peace Program (COP) for Mindanao, Aceh, and Southern Thailand—as organized by Research and Education for Peace at Universiti Sains Malaysia (REPUSM), the Southeast Asia Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN), and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) from 2007 to 2014[8] —which brought together conflict/peace process actors and civil society from both mid-range and grassroots leadership in closed-door seminar-workshops. This platform was designed to support the peacemaking, peacekeeping, and other peacebuilding activities without imposing or interfering on existing structures. Therefore, a platform like the COP must uphold integrity and earn a high level of trust among participants to freely allow the generation of ideas and solutions, thus enabling them to impact the formal peace process.

While peacebuilding activities are numerous and actively undertaken especially by civil society, nonetheless, difficulties arise in measuring its impacts. Monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding activities and programs requires a medium to long term time horizon. However, rarely do we see long-term investments in peacebuilding mainly because evaluating its impact does not often produce immediate and direct results to ongoing conflict and peace processes. An example of this can be seen in the years of peace education programs organized by Balay Mindanaw, the Institute for Autonomy and Governance for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police which have operated in the conflict affected areas of Mindanao since 2006 (Hernandez and Hernandez, 2010). On its own initiative, the AFP also funded the training of its own officers to the Annual Peacebuilding Training with the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute as early as 2005. All these efforts appeared to have paid off during episodes of escalation of armed conflict between the government and MILF forces. The penultimate test occurred in 25 January 2015 with the Mamasapano massacre which almost destroyed the GPH-MILF peace process. In spite of this incident, AFP leadership and its chain of command demonstrated restraint and commitment with the MILF forces and the International Monitoring Team, thus enabling a timely de-escalation of the incident between the PNP and MILF fighters at the height of an intense firefight. However, this transformation of the AFP from "peace hawks" to "peace doves" did not happen overnight. In addition, the improved working relationship between the AFP and MILF armed groups also benefitted from the presence of the IMT and the activities of civil society groups such as Bantay Ceasefire and *Tiyakap Kalilintad*, both community-led peace monitoring missions. An impact of these peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities can be seen in the drastic decrease of incidences of armed confrontations and violence between

8 See the section on the Consolidation for Peace program in Chapter 1.

government and MILF forces from the period 2004 to 2012 when it reached "zero" cases (for further information on the IMT, see Chapter 5). It was during this period that many peacebuilding activities intensified as it is widely known that only when there is a halt to armed conflict and violence can peacemaking occur.

In the context of conflict communities, civil society groups or NGOs will normally venture into multiple types of peacebuilding strategies and activities. As such, these NGOs become resources for peacebuilding whilst also becoming instrumental in forging unity. One example of this consolidation of stakeholders is the Mindanao Peace Weavers which brought together the Bangsamoro, Christian settlers, and indigenous peoples to develop and work together to build a peace constituency, not only in Mindanao but one which would also reach out to the whole of the Philippines. The contribution of the Mindanao Peace Weavers is an example of an inclusive, horizontal (among the communities), and vertical peacebuilding (with all other levels of actors in Lederach's model) process. Figure 4.2 adopted from Lederach's model illustrates the levels of actors and their activities. While the model is simple and straightforward, the realities of making such connections between actors and activities is actually more challenging than it appears to be. Thus, the capacity of the Mindanao Peace Weavers as a "mediator" within its many interest groups and in its negotiating role with the actors, especially with top level or main conflict/peace parties, was in itself a feat of peacemaking and peacebuilding.

Box 4.3 Mindanao Peace Weavers

By Grace Rebollos

Much has been written about the state of poor governance, underdevelopment, and conflicts that historically persist in the Southern Philippines. Notwithstanding its rich natural resources, the area has been populated by socially fragmented and poor communities traditionally trapped at the bottom rung of the Philippines' socio-economic development ladder. The interlocking factors of injustice over the distribution of land and other resources, ethno-religious differences, clan wars, and widespread criminality have led to volatile intra- and inter-group dynamics among the super region's Moro population, Christian settlers, and indigenous people, with outbreaks of violence becoming more likely and frequent.

The realities of instability, volatile security, and the political situation in Mindanao have been the rallying points of local peace advocates and peace builders who have made these the subject of many discussions and solidarity actions. As long-festering hostilities explode into violent encounters every now and then, a determination to carve common ground became more and more imperative. There emerged a need to meet in the spirit of cooperation, complementation, and concerted action towards a common peace advocacy platform. Such were the conditions that led to the birth of the *Mindanao Peace Weavers.*

On 13 to 15 May 2003, a group of peace advocates assembled at the 'Peace in MindaNOW' conference at the Apo View Hotel, Davao City. They came from seven groups representing the broadest network of peace constituencies in Mindanao, cutting across NGOs, academe, religious, human rights groups, peoples organizations, and grassroots communities in advancing a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Mindanao. The peace networks that constituted the founding body were as follows:

1. Mindanao Peoples' Caucus
2. Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society
3. Mindanao Peace Advocates Conference
4. Mindanao Peoples' Peace Movement
5. AGONG Peace Network (CRS)
6. Inter-religious Solidarity Movement for Peace
7. Mindanao Solidarity Network (based in Manila)

These were later joined by the BISDAK (Genuine Visayans for Peace), the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute, Peacebuilders Community, and World Vision Philippines. The group was steered by an executive secretariat composed of the Initiatives for International Dialogue (lead), Catholic Relief Services, the Balay Mindanaw Foundation, and Saligan Mindanaw. These groups coalesced around the metaphor of the "peaceweave," a beloved character that weaves the varied colours and textures of stakeholder communities and actors into tapestries of peace, thus the following excerpt of a poem was included for the founding statement (Rebollos, 2004):

Watch the weavers go!
The fabric is in the making as they
tense up.
Backs ache, arms and hands strain,
patience without end.
They mean to finish their work.
It is not a quiet gentle occupation---
--- this weaving.

It takes strength
to set up the loom,
to pull the threads to fitting tension,
Engaging all — the body and spirit,
requiring total involvement,
producing wholeness and beauty...
And peace!

Specifically, the Mindanao Peace Weavers had the following objectives:

(a) To develop and institutionalize the participation of civil society in the Mindanao peace process;
(b) To provide mechanisms and processes for consensus-building, the sharing of information and expertise, and drawing unified actions among civil society groups on issues concerning peace and conflict in Mindanao;
(c) To develop a critical mass of peace constituency that can engage and influence the actors in a conflict; and
(d) To evolve a common agenda for peace.

These objectives were pursued by the Mindanao Peace Weavers through individual and collective activities that promoted unity, information-sharing, and coordination among peace advocates in the areas of humanitarian protection, peace and human rights advocacy, and peacebuilding. In addition, they sought to engage government and revolutionary groups in formal peace talks. In due course, it became an important launching pad for pursuing joint-coordinated peace advocacy in the campaign for a Bilateral Ceasefire between the government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), even as, years before, the government had forged a peace agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

Through their partner networks, they implemented a civilian-led process of monitoring tactical agreements like ceasefires (Bantay Ceasefire or Ceasefire Watch), addressing the needs of communities displaced by armed conflict, i.e. the evacuees (Bantay Bakwit or Peace Monitoring by Internally Displaced People) and other campaigns to broaden the peace constituency. In addition, they advanced celebration of the Mindanao Week of Peace – a massive peace social marketing activity that began in Zamboanga City in 1997 but which was expanded to all of Mindanao by the Bishop-Ulama Forum. The Forum lobbied for this celebration resulting in a Presidential Proclamation for an annual nationwide commemoration that would begin every last Thursday of November. As such, the Mindanao Peace Week has become the most tangible demonstration of solidarity among the peace-building community in Mindanao.

In summary, peacebuilding can be differentiated from peacemaking and peacekeeping processes based on the following: (1) it is mainly driven by civil society actors; (2) it can happen at any phase of the conflict or peace process; (3) the time horizon of implementation can be from immediate/short term to medium to long term; and (4) it engages multiple levels of actors and stakeholders at both horizontal and vertical levels. Peacebuilding is defined as a point of engagement for multiple actors and stakeholders to re-define their relationship of conflict to peace

including from asymmetrical to symmetrical, inequity to equitable, and violence to non-violence.

4.5 Peace education[9]

Peace education is a peacebuilding strategy that changes the mindset of the wider population regarding peace and war. By definition, peace education encompasses a broad range of pedagogical approaches that aims to nurture the *attitudes*, *knowledge*, and *skills* that contribute to nonviolent, equitable, and sustainable peace. Most definitions given by different scholars profess that peace education teaches individuals and society of a peaceful existence based on nonviolence, tolerance, equality, respect for differences, social and economic justice, international law, and human rights (Reardon and Cabezudo, 2002; Castro and Galace, 2010; Harris, 2008). Moreover, they agree that peace education should not be understood only as a subject in schools through curricula, textbooks, and teaching approaches but should also be understood as a pedagogy that includes education policy, governance, administration, and school management.

According to Hara (2012) and Millhouse (2009), peace education has been criticized for lack of evidence that verifies its impact on building peace. Some scholars would also claim that the field is too wide without a unique theoretical framework, firm methodology, and an evaluation of the outcomes. The measurement of the effectiveness of peace education is a challenge because the results can only be seen in a generation or cohort of students (Millhouse, 2009). However, there are examples of the impact of peace education in some cases of conflict. As discussed in the section on peacebuilding, the experience of the Philippine government's military forces in peace education has shown that transformation is possible. The military forces once known as "peace hawks" have now become "peace doves" for upholding the existence of peace infrastructures (i.e. the coordination and ceasefire mechanism with the MILF).

Ideally, peace education should be incorporated into formal education systems as part of governmental goals to achieve greater social cohesion and harmony. The content curricula in peace education in schools and higher education raises awareness of the nature of unequal relationships within society, develops critical thinking and unity based on democratic principles, provides skills in conflict resolution, and promotes non-violence in the management of conflict in varying spheres-from the personal to wider interpersonal and social conflicts, and intra-state and inter-state conflicts. Peace education is sensitizing transformative, raises awareness, and motivates the learner to take practical action to become peacebuilding actors themselves (Castro and Galace, 2008).

While the study of war and military strategy has been taught in educational institutions for a long time, the study of peace and peace education is relatively new and can be traced to the work of philosophers like Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. These scholars did not teach peace education *per se* but they did emphasize the importance of equal rights, liberty, equality, and social justice within society which are considered aspects of the discipline. Similarly, Gandhi, Mother Teresa, and Martin Luther King established a foundation of peace education as a means of achieving harmony and nonviolence.

Czech educator, Comenius, who was the first European to espouse peace education, claimed it could help one to understand others and shared values could overcome the differences leading to conflict (Carreira and Coulardeu et al, 2014). However, the most influential ideas to the contribution of education to peacebuilding

[9] With contributions from Eleonora Emkic.

were manifested in the work of Galtung (1996). It is his work that highlighted the distinction between negative peace (the cessation of violence) and positive peace (structural changes to address social injustices that may be a cause of violence). Moving from negative peace to positive peace education can help a lot, especially with regard to raising awareness about social injustice and inequalities, forgiveness, and human rights.

Peace education emerged in Southeast Asia more recently but it was in the Philippines that the progress in peace education and its many forms first took root. This developed after the democratization of the country following the 1986 People Power Revolution and its succeeding challenges in social cohesion, political stability, and ongoing armed conflicts with non-state armed groups. The Notre Dame University (NDU) in Cotabato City was the first to offer a graduate degree program in peace and development education in 1987. This started the holistic peace education framework introduced by Toh Swee-hin and Virginia Floresca-Cawagas. An illustration of the framework (see Figure 4.3 below) shows how the petals of a flower includes six themes, namely: (1) living with compassion and justice; (2) promoting human rights and responsibilities; (3) dismantling the culture of war; (4) building intercultural respect, reconciliation, and solidarity; (5) living in harmony with the Earth; and (6) cultivating inner peace (Toh, Floresca-Cawagas, 2010).

Figure 4.3 A holistic framework of peace education



Source: Swee-Hin and Floresca-Cawagas, 2004

These six themes or petals cover responses to direct, cultural, and structural violence in nurturing peace and peaceful values among students and are coupled with principles in pedagogy including holism, dialogue, centrality of values, and critical empowerment. The framework originated from the Philippines and has been replicated in many parts of the world by organizations building their own peace education programs. Castro and Galace also introduced a culture of peace framework drawn from their experiences in the Philippines. The Philippine Framework on the Culture of Peace identifies six dimensions/themes and six values that encompass the continuums of social, political, and economic environment: (1) personal and family integrity; (2) human rights and democracy; (3) poverty eradication; (4) intercultural understanding and solidarity; (5) disarmament and cessation of hostilities; and (6) environmental protection. Notably, both frameworks underscore the comprehensiveness of an education for peace and peaceful values.

Another university, the Mindanao State University in Marawi City also ventured into peace education by integrating it into its foundation courses (Bacani, 2004; Toh, 1992). Other larger universities, for example, in Manila, have also introduced peace education. However, it was only in 2010 that peace education was emphasized as key to peacebuilding among universities operating in Mindanao. As such, the Mindanao Association of State Universities and Colleges Foundation (MASCUF) co-organized its first Mindanao Peace Educators Summit with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and REPUSM in Penang, Malaysia. It was at this meeting that university presidents were urged to become more sensitized on the contribution of peace education and its opportunities to work with government as part of peacebuilding. Non-formal peace education has also become more pervasive mainly as part of NGO capacity-building activities/programs, as well as in international organizations, and government entities undertaking development work in the conflict-affected communities of Mindanao.

In a mapping survey of institutions of higher learning promoting human rights and peace education (SHAPE-SEA, 2019), it was found that 24% of a total of 270 institutions taught courses on peace and conflict studies. While this appears a small number, peace education activities in this region are largely being carried out by NGOs, academe, and other organizations as part of peacebuilding and development projects in conflict-affected areas. In spite of development challenges, it is noteworthy that peace education, its content and pedagogy, has been localized according to the context of countries. This localization has also been expanded to involve indigenous knowledge and cultures in peacemaking and peacebuilding. In particular, this is most interesting as a field of research and practice among local NGOs and researchers as a source of historical and cultural education and is an effective way of bringing about an understanding of peace education that is not foreign or Western, but instead, something that already exists within these societies.

Aceh's peace education experience with high school students led to a curriculum being designed that located the study of peace and conflict within the traditions, culture, and religious philosophy of the Acehnese (Daud, 2007). This is also similar to the informal peace education currently existing in Mindanao as organized by NGOs and academe which explores and integrates not only the philosophy of religious and cultural life in Bangsamoro but also the different world view of other indigenous people called the *lumads* (Perez, 2007). This strategy was particularly useful given its rich oral histories about dialogue, conflict resolution, peace, and reconciliation, including between the Bangsamoro people and the *lumads* of Mindanao (Abreu, 2005; Alejo, 2005). Common to the content of most peace education curricula is a focus on history, skills in conflict resolution, values formation such as tolerance, human rights and non-violence, and action-research skills involving community development work. Peace education in places like Mindanao, Aceh, Southern Thailand, Timor-Leste, and other areas with ongoing conflicts and peace processes serve as laboratories for students learning how to work in conflict and take part in peacebuilding.

Peace education has also been contextualized in a religious setting. Several scholars have done work on Islam and Peace Education by reconciling conceptualizations on peace, conflict, non-violence, and human rights with principles and values in Islam (Santoso and Khisbiyah, 2021; Abu-Nimer and Nasser, 2017). This has also allowed discussions on how peace and conflict can be best understood in the situation of Muslim societies still enduring violent conflicts. In 2009, the UN University of Peace based in Costa Rica published the Peace Education: Islamic Perspectives, Curriculum and Teaching Module. By making this module available to everyone, UPEACE hopes to encourage more teachers to embrace peace education in Muslim communities. Basically this module utilizes the same theories on peace and conflict. However, it attempts to demonstrate how Muslim scholars, leaders, and societies in the past have dealt with conflict resolution, the management of multi-cultural societies,

identity issues, and lessons from religious texts such as the Qur'an. Additionally, some universities in Indonesia (Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta) and Malaysia (International Islamic University Malaysia and Universiti Malaya) now offer courses that contain interpretations of peace and conflict from the viewpoint of Islamic knowledge and traditions.

As introduced by Bishop Tudtud, the Catholic church taught peace education through an inter-religious dialogue between Christians and Muslims in Marawi City in Mindanao in the late 1970s. He "*envisioned human communities having dialogues of life and faith*" not only to foster tolerance but to share religious and life experiences between communities of faith (Ziselberger, 2007). Later, this became the foundation for the formation of the Bishop-Ulama Forum (BUF) – a network of religious leaders from Christian and Muslim communities in Mindanao who aim to pursue the vision of Bishop Tudtud by participating in peacebuilding in the region.

Soon after the success of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG 2000-2015), the UN launched another set of goals for the international community to work on – the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (2020-2030). The MDGs focused on the eradication of extreme poverty, uplifting the social conditions of communities deprived of basic health and education, gender inequality, and to ensure environmental sustainability. The MDGs were of particular relevance to economies grappling with development problems. The SDGs, on the other hand, encompass the MDGs and have also set goals that include the environment, in addition to the economic, social, and political aspects of all countries. A relevant SDG to peace education is SDG 4 on Quality Education with Target 4.7 placing an emphasis on education that will "*promote a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship, human rights and gender equality*" among others.

Box 4.4 SDG 4, Target and indicators

SDG 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.

Target 4.7: By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship, and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development.

Indicators 4.7.1: Extent to which (i) global citizenship education and (ii) education for sustainable development, including gender equality and human rights, are mainstreamed at all levels in: (a) national education policies, (b) curricula, (c) teacher education, and (d) student assessment.

Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Sustainable Development, 'The 17 goals' UN, available at https://sdgs.un.org/goals

ASEAN's University Network-Human Rights Education (AUN-HRE) joint program with the Southeast Asian Human Rights Network (SEAHRN) on the development of human rights and peace studies is one such fulfilment of SDG 4. Another is SHAPE-SEA (the Strengthening of Human Rights and Peace Education in Southeast Asia program) as it is called for short – a partnership with the Swedish SIDA, the AUN, and SEAHRN networks. Its mission is to improve the teaching, research, and development of degree programs among Southeast Asian educators in as many universities as possible. SHAPE-SEA has also embarked on a regional Masters programme on human rights and peace studies in an attempt to strengthen the quality of education in this field.

4.6 The practice of peace journalism

The reporting of conflict, especially of violent conflict is newsworthy in mainstream media. News of this type of crisis situation attracts the attention of readers as it carries a sense of urgency and has security implications affecting society as a whole. At the same time, while reporting such facts may appear simple and straightforward, it is inevitable that the framing of news is usually based on particular agendas, tends to stereotype certain actors, and only focuses on immediate facts without delving into the complicated context of conflicts. Galtung and Ruge (1965), in particular, illustrated the necessity of studying how news is constructed and the kinds of representations it makes to the public. This is where the role of media becomes important in peacebuilding through the practice of peace journalism.

The work of Lynch and Mcgoldrick (2005) contributed significantly to the development of this field. They define peacebuilding journalism as,

> *when editors and reporters make choices of what to report and how to report it that create opportunities for society at large to consider and value nonviolent responses to conflict.*
>
> *Peace journalism:*
> (i) *Uses insights of conflict analysis and transformation to update the concepts of balance, fairness, and accuracy in reporting;*
> (ii) *Provides a new route map tracing connections between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover, and the consequences of their journalism – the ethics of journalistic intervention;*
> (iii) *Builds an awareness of non-violence and creativity into the practical job of everyday editing and reporting.*

Lynch (2015) also cites Nohrsted and Ottesen's suggestion that the practice of peace journalism could be further enriched by applying *critical discourse analysis* (CDA) in the writing and framing of news related to conflict. In particular, CDA helps show how the structures of power in society are both the source and contributing factors to the conflict. It is this deeper understanding of conflict including possibilities of conflict resolution and peace structures that should also be communicated to news readers.

As regards peace journalism in Southeast Asia, Abunales (2016) offers an analysis on the differences in how news was framed according to peace journalism and war journalism in the Philippine media and how it reported the peace process between the government and MILF. As such, he gathered news articles from the Mindanao-based Mindanews.com and the Manila-based, Philippine Daily Inquirer, and presented an expanded framing analysis based on the work of Galtung (2006). He lists the following framing indicators: (1) Context-oriented/Violence-oriented; (2) Highlights negotiations/Promotes antagonism; (3) People-oriented/Elite-oriented; (4) Process outcome-oriented/Ritual-oriented; (5) Probes autonomy/Trivial-oriented; (6) Truth-oriented/Propaganda-oriented; (7) Solution-oriented/Victory-oriented; and (8) Peacebuilding-oriented/Bureaucracy-oriented. Through this framing exercise, students and journalists can be guided on the choices they make in writing news, especially in the context of an armed and violent conflict. Abunales' work clearly shows how a small news organization like Mindanews.com practices peace journalism and how it can become valuable to conflict situations when news and information become a source for peace or contribute to the escalation of conflict and violence. The role of journalists is compelling not only as participants in peacebuilding, and concurrently in educating for peace, but more importantly as stakeholders in the peace process.

There are a number of noteworthy news and information websites that focus on reporting conflicts and the work of peacebuilding in conflict areas. In Aceh, Indonesia, Acehkita.com was a vital source of news especially during military rule in Aceh (before the tsunami in 2004). Another is the website, Aceh Institute, which engaged the public in discussing the peace process between the government of Indonesia and the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* or Free Aceh Movement as the main conflict parties.

Likewise, in Southern Thailand, soon after the 2004 Tak Bai incident, the AMAN News Agency emerged as an alternative media source especially as it utilized the *Bahasa Melayu* language. This is significant because *Bahasa Melayu* is the local language of the Patani people although it is now less spoken by the younger generation due to proliferation of the Thai language – the result of a policy in the formal education system. This explains how language has become a conflict issue in Southern Thailand. AMAN (meaning peace in *Bahasa Melayu*) reports incidences of conflict violence while also giving a human face to the suffering of everyone affected by the conflict. Many stories of ordinary people are often not covered by the mainstream media but AMAN made this a priority.

Similarly, Mindanews.com based in Mindanao, the Philippines is a leading example of peace journalism in Southeast Asia. Indeed, Mindanews is not merely a news agency practicing peace journalism, it also participates in many peacebuilding activities by civil society groups, and has led the training and education of more journalists in this field whilst publishing books and other materials in an effort to build resources on the history of the conflict and peace process in Mindanao (see Box 4.5 below).

Box 4.5 Mindanews was a product of the all-out-war of 2000

By Carolyn Arguillas

I headed a team of reporters in the Mindanao Bureau of a national newspaper from 1991 to 2001, all of us eager to report to a national audience what was happening in our communities. It was important that the issues that mattered most to us would be amplified through the national newspaper we were writing for. There was no Facebook then or social media. There was no modern technology to speak of.

Before we found ourselves in the Mindanao Bureau, we had known each other from the mid-1980s, working for different national newspapers. All those years working for national newspapers were years of struggle for us from the provinces who had to fight for space in the limited pages allotted for provincial news. Of all major island groupings though – Mindanao always topped when it came to front page news. And that was because of the stories on violence. Bad news, sadly, lands on Page One. And even in the provincial pages.

For a long time, it was "Mindanao equals Violence."

For a long time, too, there were only three instances when Mindanao would land on page one. First, stories on violence such as bombings, massacres, wars. Second, disasters; and third, celestial phenomenon like a total solar eclipse. Aside from fighting for space, we also had to fight with the Central Desk in Manila (where all the main offices of the national media are) about how words in Mindanao are misused: we would repeatedly remind them of the misuse of the word "Muslim" to describe kidnappers or terrorists. Sometimes there would be a period when you would not see the words misused. But the problem would recur. And recur. And we would also repeatedly remind. And remind.

The all-out war in 2000 was a major wake up call for all of us. Nearly a million Mindanawons were displaced by that war. We would file our reports on what we witnessed on the ground, on the voices we listened to on the ground, but only a few paragraphs would be used, if at all, as this would be merged with reports from the Defense Beat and Malacañang Palace (the seat of government) in faraway Metro Manila. So what picture of that war would the readers get?

I would receive 90,000 worth of characters from the reporters which I had to reduce to 5,000 characters. And only a few paragraphs would be taken from that heavily-reduced article.

A number of us left the national newspaper to set up MindaNews in May 2001. We were lucky that the internet connection in Mindanao had already improved by then, at least in key areas. We pooled our meagre resources that lasted only for a few months. We thought we could offer the national newspapers their own version of a Mindanao Bureau with a subscription offer of only 10,000 pesos (approximately USD198) but we were told "we already have a Defense Beat." Because that was how Mindanao was viewed then. As Defense Beat. As a security issue.

Despite the many challenges we faced in the last 19 years of our existence, we have continued to do what we set out to do back in 2001: tell the story of Mindanao from the lenses of Mindanao, from the perspective of Mindanao; report on the many faces and facets of Mindanao beyond what the national newspapers, national radio, and television networks report about Mindanao; report on the issues in Mindanao as comprehensively as we can. But we did not stop at news reporting only. We ventured into other aspects of Mindanao – organized media summits and media trainings, photo exhibits, video documentaries, published several books and a news magazine (short-lived though as we all knew how to write but no one knew how to market), did roundtable discussions on pressing issues such as the peace processes in Mindanao, grassroots documentation and reporting trainings, a summer institute of journalism for journalists, journalism students and anyone interested in journalism, and at one point had a summer youth training program in the subdivision where our office is located, teaching kids basic photography, basic newswriting, and yes, even dance.

Like the rest of the country, Mindanao is facing such a huge problem related to COVID-19 and I do not refer only to positive cases of COVID-19 here but also the impact on the economy, including thousands that have lost their jobs and livelihoods. The challenges of reporting on COVID-19 are not only about these difficulties. Several community papers in Mindanao have ceased operations, others have reduced pages or reduced frequencies. Some have shifted to online publication while others have completely stopped. The non-renewal of the franchise of ABS-CBN in May and the closure of all regional stations nationwide, including at least four in Mindanao, have affected the flow of important information to the majority. In many areas in Mindanao, access to television is only through the free ABS-CBN channel.

There are other major issues confronting us in Mindanao amid this pandemic: the fragile transition in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), which includes both the political and normalization tracks, is something to focus on. At least 28,000 more combatants of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front's Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces are still awaiting decommissioning. Another major issue is the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 which is causing unease among various sectors because the usual theatre of war in the campaign against terror remains Mindanao.

A firm grasp of history is important in reporting on Mindanao. Peace journalism trainings can teach journalists skills but without knowing and understanding the history of the conflict, the context of the story is sacrificed.

4.7 Business/private sector as a stakeholder in peacebuilding[10]

Long and enduring violent conflicts carry multi-dimensional roots that may include historical narratives and grievances, struggles with political power and territory, identity issues (cultural and religious), and conflict over resources among many other issues. The dynamics and behaviour of conflicts can also be influenced by such factors as responses from the state, involvement of other sectors including those regarded as outsiders to the conflict, human rights issues, and a cycle of underdevelopment

[10] With contributions from Yoko Fujimura.

and poverty. As to the latter, economic issues are seen as the most visible indicator of the state of the conflict. Thus, while poverty, underdevelopment, and an unstable economy are often attributed as sources of conflicts, they are in reality among some of its outcomes.

In 2005, the World Bank and the Bangsamoro Development Agency produced a Joint Needs Assessment Report on the Key Causes of the Conflict in Mindanao. This report illustrated that the core cause of the conflict was "injustice" as a result of the history and structures bringing about the marginalization of the Bangsamoro people in Mindanao. One aspect was economic marginalization which comprised a driver to the conflict. At the same time, control and interest by a small group of people over the economy also perpetrated the status quo. Moreover, the business sector and investors instinctively protected their interests which could have proved detrimental to a peace process and agreement. Therefore, increasingly this sector was identified as an important stakeholder in peacebuilding. Examples included the Mindanao Business Council and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Business Council which engaged in a dialogue and participated in peacebuilding with civil society (Rood, 2005). Such horizontal peacebuilding was crucial especially during the years when the peace process was not yet understood and received little support from the general public.

While the Philippine Human Development Report 2005 found no direct relationship between poverty and incidences of armed conflict, poverty and poor human development conditions do further deepen the dynamics of conflict and violence. Both the World Development Report (2011) and the UN Human Development Report (2010) cited that human development in the context of conflict was mainly constrained by inadequacies in conflict resolution and peacebuilding (Abubakar, 2019). Thus, it is here that economic development, including the environment and the role of the business sector, must bring about a "pro-poor growth" (Kusago, 2005). Conflict-affected communities need sustainable livelihoods and better socio-economic life and opportunities – as indicators of peace process dividends, but in a manner to bring about economic equality in the midst of marginalization. Wennman (2011) emphasizes that the economic aspect in conflict situations and the peace process will create sustainable peacebuilding and provide immediate peace dividends or show a tangible improvement of economic life among the people (Wennman, 2011).

4.7.1 Involvement of business in conflict and peacebuilding

Efforts to promote a *public-private partnership* in achieving international initiatives such as the Sustainable Development Goals were led by the UN and especially by Secretary General Kofi Anan. However, this idea of engaging the business sector in peacebuilding programs is often met with resistance and scepticism (Berdal and Mousavizadeh, 2010). While the business sector can contribute to addressing socio-economic needs in a fragile area/state, unintended impacts may also further sustain the conflict if advantage is taken of a weak public infrastructure. For example, an enterprise can exacerbate local tension between conflicting communities by employing people from one community or worsen poor governance by engaging in bribery and corruption (Appiah & Jackson, 2015). Another example occurs when enterprises employ former child soldiers from post-war countries (offering minimal welfare) to work in private security forces in country's with on-going wars (Ellesoe, 2017).

More recent studies have focused on the potential role of the private sector in peacebuilding, whilst also advocating for the limited capacity of traditional aid patterns in fragile areas dominated by non-profit sectors. There is also evidence that the private sector has taken initiative in supporting peace processes. As an example,

in Mozambique, the British multinational company, Lonrho, became involved in the peace process after the company realised that the conflict had escalated to such an extent that their investment of GBP53 million was being threatened. Consequently, the company's executive acted as an intermediary and provided company resources and aircraft for the peace talks (Vines, 1998).

Another type of business involvement in peacebuilding is through direct community engagement. Recruiting conflict-affected persons in businesses or providing vocational training and mentorship for returnees are good examples. This type of engagement in socio-economic reintegration for former combatants can be found in the case of Aceh, Indonesia. An additional example can be found in the involvement of business associations in Sri Lanka. Thus, a business association in Sri Lanka invited the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the South African Business Trust to Colombo in 2001 to examine how the local business association could support the peace process. This was followed by a visit to South Africa later in 2002. It was during this trip that the South African Business Trust informed them of the benefits of developing a unique relationship between business and political organizations in the interests of peace. Subsequently, the Sri Lankan association launched a public awareness campaign by urging citizens to voice their opinions on the need for peace. In November 2002, a number of local business leaders established the Business for Peace Alliance (BPA) which aimed to support peace and socio-economic development in Sri Lanka. The BPA is a non-partisan network with a commitment to "*conflict transformation and regional inclusion in peace, socio-economic development, and policy making*" (BPA, 2021).

There has also been an increase in contribution from the private sector as a part of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs. The idea is that a private enterprise, which is already operating in a conflict area, implements projects addressing particular social problems. Thus, oil companies have built schools, hospitals, and housing for locals and provided scholarships for children in many war-torn or poor countries. For instance, PT Agra Budi Jasa Bersama, a mining company in Aceh, Indonesia, has a CSR program to provide school materials. Company CSR programs are mainly based on the enterprises' perceived responsibility to revitalize the economy and adhere to legal obligations as well as fulfilling philanthropic and ethical practices.

Many cases of multinational companies or large-scale enterprises implementing such schemes have been documented but there is little evidence from Small to Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). The engagement with SMEs in peacebuilding requires close attention as the World Bank reports that this sector represents 90% of the business environment and employs more than 50% of workers worldwide (Worldbank, 2020). Although some guidelines and framework for the engagement of the private sector in peacebuilding can be found, current efforts seem to unintentionally favour access to large-scale enterprises.

4.7.2 UN Global Compact

In 2000, the UN provided a mechanism to the private sector to enable it to work for the goals of international development through what is known as the UN Global Compact. As such, it introduced the Ten Principles of the Global Compact covering the dimensions of human rights, labour, environment, and anti-corruption. It is also through this Global Compact that the private sector can get involved in efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2030, including peace, as part of their social impact. In particular, SDG 16's theme of Peace and Strong Justice Institutions includes a target on the reduction of all forms of violence and non-discrimination policies to attain sustainable development as part of the elements of positive peace. After twenty years of these collective efforts, over 13,000 companies

from 162 countries have joined the Compact.[11] Business enterprises are encouraged to join and practice the Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact for these top three reasons: (1) to increase trust in the company through a commitment of sustainability; (2) because of the universal nature of the principles; and (3) to promote action on sustainability within the company. At the regional level, ASEAN also established the ASEAN CSR Network and a CSR policy statement which both align to the SDGs and the Global Compact, including the Ten Principles. ASEAN's commitment to building the capacity of the private sector to implement quality CSR is also reaffirmed by its ASEAN Vision 2020.

While advances in the global initiative and framework for the private sector to contribute to the achievement of SDGs have been made, the majority of enterprise categories lack any kind of framework, especially those involving Very Small Enterprises (VSEs) and Small to Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). This observation is supported by the fact that little progress has been made with few success stories or engagement of local VSEs and SMEs in peacebuilding in post-war and post-conflict situations in either the Sustainable Development Goals Report 2018 or the UN Global Compact Report 2018. It is at this juncture, therefore, that the Ten Principles of the Global Compact and CSR programming and its promotion should be intensified within the peacebuilding community, especially at the local level. Success requires further commitment from the UN to promote the capacity of the smaller-scale private sector to positively contribute to peace to prove they can be trusted peacebuilding partners to governments and non-profit sectors. At the very least, the private sector should learn the *Do No Harm* principles as part of their CSR programs. This will ensure that business enterprises do not any cause harm or escalate conflict situations. See Box 4.6 below for an elaboration on conflict sensitivity and the Do No Harm framework.

Box 4.6 Conflict sensitivity and "Do No Harm"

Based in the US, CDA Collaborative Learning has been involved in action research aimed at improving the practice of peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian work in conflict situations all over the world. Since 1993, the group has used a conflict sensitivity approach which led to the founding of the "Do No Harm" program.

CDA defines conflict sensitivity as, *"The practice of understanding how aid interacts with conflict in a particular context, to mitigate unintended negative effects, and to influence conflict positively wherever possible, through humanitarian, development and/or peacebuilding interventions."*

To further demonstrate the practice of conflict sensitivity, the Do No Harm framework is used as a tool to understand the impact of aid or any intervention in conflict situations. Do No Harm provides the concepts of *Dividers* and *Connectors* that are affected by an intervention, thereby producing *Actions* (from the organization) and *Behaviour* (from its staff). Most importantly, it also introduces the idea of *Options* that can be generated for the improvement of an impact – this as an opportunity for risk mitigation and to ensure that unintended consequences do not lead to an exacerbation of conflicts.

Source: CDA Collaborative, available at https://www.cdacollaborative.org/

In short, the private sector *can* participate in peacebuilding. It *can* seek partnerships or assist the UN, NGOs, academe, or other peacebuilding organizations. Business enterprises, depending on their resources, *can* apply the Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact or the more practical conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm principles in assessing and improving their business operations. More importantly, initiatives in peacebuilding by this sector should be documented and promoted as examples of local and international peacebuilding.

[11] The figures are current as of 21 August 2021.

Engaging the private and business sectors as peacebuilding actors in both short and long-term programs is inevitable. However, this requires further research, the establishment of well-coordinated systems at the national level to monitor and document contributions from the private sector, creative ways to effectively share information at the local level, as well as encouraging more private sector firms to incorporate the promotion of peace in their daily operations. It is also important to strategize how to engage the informal private sector in coordinated peacebuilding as their presence in unstable states especially, is quite substantial. Ultimately, the private sector needs to be convinced that the achievement of negative and positive peace will result in a stable and robust economic environment in the long run.

4.8 Engendering peace

Gender differs from biological sex and refers to the social conditioning of roles, attitudes, behaviour, and other characteristics that are associated with men, boys, women, and girls. Most importantly, gender dynamics involve power relations among the sexes, and the norms, values, and culture that influence and shape gender identity in society. While the study of gender covers all gender, nonetheless, the focus is often on women and girls given the reality that they tend to be marginalized in terms of participation and decision-making in many aspects of life from personal to community to the wider society. It cannot be helped that there continues to be a compelling need to nurture gender equality in many societies– thus, it also comprises one of the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (see SDG 5 on gender equality).

The discourse on gender in the field of conflict and peace studies has its beginnings from feminism and gender studies. Betty Reardon asserts that the gender perspective offers a new paradigm by looking at violent structures in society, such as the patriarchy system. Thus, the patriarchy system and the subservience of women has helped maintain the dominant militarized security system (Reardon and Snauwaert, 2015). Subsequently, this feminist approach to international security has also led to the development of a human security paradigm and a gender and peace approach in peacebuilding.

In the history of conflict and peace processes in Southeast Asia, women's rights and inclusion has increasingly been reflected in the growth of women-led NGOs, the publication of experiences of conflict and peace according to women (*HerStory*), the representation of women in many sectors of public life, and in the development of agendas and issues that now concern both men and women. While the participation of women in peace negotiations, peacekeeping, and security sector reforms are still at an early stage of development, nevertheless, there is a growing consciousness and action towards these goals. This section, which provides some basic discussion in relation to gender and peace, holds the following assumptions:

(1) That different genders experience conflict and peace differently;
(2) That different genders have varied world views, access to resources, needs, and fears;
(3) That responses to conflict, peace processes, including peacebuilding and conflict transformation must include a multi-stakeholder approach and inclusivity – including the aspect of gender;
(4) That engendering peace is in itself a transformative process that works towards durable and sustainable peace; and
(5) That gender perspective and discourse puts emphasis on the agency of girls and women in the situation of conflict and peace, and in the process, may include the involvement of girls and women in conflict and violence.

In order to ensure that gender inequalities are analysed and addressed, intervenors and stakeholders to conflicts are encouraged to practice gender-sensitive approaches and programming as part of peacebuilding and conflict transformation. This framework has been espoused by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) known as the Gender Transformative Action (GTA) framework which:

> *examines, questions, and addresses harmful norms to challenge the attitudes and behaviours that underlie unequal power relations in the peacebuilding and conflict prevention field by empowering women/girls and engaging men/boys* (GPPAC, 2021).

GPPAC's GTA emanates from the rich experiences of its peacebuilding community in many parts of the world. Key to the GTA (see Box 4.7 below) is the realisation that girls and women, especially, need to be more aware of the inequalities that affect their own participation in decision-making within the context of conflict resolution, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, rehabilitation, and development work.

Box 4.7 GPPAC's Gender Transformative Action (GTA)

A GTA in conflict prevention encourages critical awareness of gender roles and power relations and their consequences in violent conflict and war. It is about critically examining, challenging, and questioning the gender norms and power relations that underlie visible gender gaps. GPPAC also utilises the UNFPA (2010) definition of gender transformative programs that, ''*seek to transform gender relations through critical reflection and the questioning of individual attitudes, institutional practices and broader social norms that create and reinforce gender inequalities and vulnerabilities*.''

Transformative change can only be facilitated with an in-depth understanding of the social and gender context using participatory processes that embody communities' visions and constant reflection, action, and refinement. Transformative action begins by examining three broad domains of empowerment:

- Agency: individual and collective capacities (knowledge and skills), attitudes, assets, and access to services
- Relations: the expectations and cooperative or negotiation dynamics embedded within relationships between people in the home, market, community, groups, and organizations
- Structures: the informal and formal institutional rules that govern collective, individual, and institutional practices, such as environment, social norms, recognition, and status

These domains reframe the discussion of empowerment from a focus on women's individual agency to collective responsibility and action, as a move towards transforming the power dynamics and structures that serve to reinforce gendered inequalities. Therefore, it is key for the GTA to engage groups as part of a social transformation to nurture gender equality.

Source: GPPAC, 2021

4.8.1 International frameworks

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (2000) established the women's agenda in international peace and security. A legal document, it requires parties in conflict situations to protect women's rights and well-being and undertakes the participation of women in conflict resolution, peacekeeping, rehabilitation, and development. Moreover, UNSCR 1325 enjoins member-states to, for example, commit to the representation and participation of women; build their capacity; ensure their protection and welfare; practice

gender-based approaches; and puts emphasis on the responsibilities of states towards women affected by conflict. The WPS Agenda, as it is more widely known, consists of four pillars: prevention, participation, protection, and recovery (see Figure 4.4 below). Chapter 6 on Sustaining Peace will also explain these pillars. The WPS has been widely disseminated and covers implementation not only among governments and other parties to conflicts/peace (i.e. non-state armed groups), but also encompasses legislators, civil society groups, and international organizations working in conflict and peace. A concrete commitment to the WPS can be seen in the charting of government national action plans (NAP). By 2019, 42% or 82 countries had produced a NAP. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Indonesia are the first nations to deliver such an agenda thus far. Some countries have been unable to chart a NAP because they do not face an ongoing armed conflict or are still grappling with the application of the WPS given their own social, political, and security landscapes. As such, the development of a NAP for the WPS Agenda is an ongoing area of interest between the international community, governments, and civil society groups in this region.

Figure 4.4 Pillars of the WPS agenda



Source: UNDP, 2019

In 2017, ASEAN produced a Joint Statement Promoting Women, Peace, and Security in ASEAN during its 31st ASEAN Summit in Manila. Through the ASEAN Committee on Women (ACW) and the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC), its Regional Study on WPS was conducted and a report published in 2021. In addition, the WPS Agenda is increasingly becoming a focus of discussion and trainings within ASEAN's sectoral bodies.

Another development to ASEAN's commitment to the WPS Agenda is the creation of the ASEAN Women Peace Registry (AWPR) (see Box 4.8 below). Since its inception in 2018, the AWPR has prepared itself to contribute to the WPS Agenda. However, it is confronted with a dilemma between developing country WPS NAPs or an ASEAN Regional Action Plan. At the height of the COVID-19 virus and its consequential limited mobility, AWPR members met online and produced a message encouraging governments: (1) to apply the four pillars of the WPS in their management and recovery plans during the COVID-19 health pandemic; (2) to practice information-sharing related to the impact of the health pandemic based on gender; and (3) to advance policy-oriented research that can find strategies to respond to the economic needs of women (AWPR, 2020). The message also reiterates the role of women as "one central stakeholder" alluding to both leadership representation and the prioritization of women's issues and problems in decision-making and in managing the crisis.

Box 4.8 ASEAN Women for Peace Registry (AWPR)

By Tamara Nair

The ASEAN Institute of Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR) launched the ASEAN Women Peace Registry (AWPR) on 13 December 2018 in Cebu City, the Philippines at a symposium helmed by the Philippine Mission to ASEAN in collaboration with the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process (Philippines) and with the support of the ASEAN Institute of Peace and Reconciliation, and Ateneo De Manila University. The idea was founded at the ASEAN-Institute for Peace and Reconciliation workshop in 2015 which discussed the role of women in peace and reconciliation. With strong advocacy from the Philippines representative, Ambassador Elizabeth P Buensuceso, participants recommended the creation of an ASEAN Women for Peace Registry. The AWPR did not have a smooth ride given the post-conflict (and possibly current conflict) situation in some member states and also given the problematizing of gender matters within what is a highly militarized and masculinized arena. Issues of gender did not sit easily in matters of peace and security for a long time even though the role of women in peacebuilding was quite obvious in member states such as the Philippines. A number of versions of the registry were rejected owing to the perceived sensitivity of the issue. However, in true ASEAN fashion – the Women's Peace Registry eventually found consensus and was unanimously adopted.

The registry was a means to take stock of women experts in the region, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter. The registry is also in line with the AIPR's pursuit of pooling expertise and the support of ASEAN bodies in its larger efforts towards peacebuilding. The AWPR, under the auspices of the AIPR, would be the latter's contribution towards ASEAN's goal on promoting the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in ASEAN. All ASEAN member states nominated three names to the Registry. Many AWPR members belong to the government (from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), while other members hail from academe and NGO communities.

A number of meetings were convened after its launch where members were consulted in moving the registry's agenda forward. One of the first items was to map the registry's expertise – a process which included members detailing their areas of expertise and what they could bring to the table. A number of events have been organized for AWPR participation and have been well-attended. This has been an on-going process. In 2020, the AWPR saw members' participate in the ASEAN-IPR discussion series on Climate Change and Peace on October 9. The discussion sought to explore further how climate change is linked to peacebuilding and suggested the key to adapting to the effects of climate change was to ensure the continuity of social and economic development as part of peacebuilding efforts. On 30 October 2020, members were also involved in an ASEAN-IPR webinar on empowering women and youth in building sustainable peace. The webinar sought to explore the linkage between empowering women and youth and building sustainable peace, as well as how it could be implemented through various dialogues. Moreover, in November 2020, members' input was sought on a draft ASEAN regional study on Women, Peace, and Security. As far as the AWPR is concerned, the global pandemic and the change in work conditions and travel have not stopped the 'wheels from turning.'

The AWPR is an excellent step towards creating lasting peace in the region. One of the most important strides member states should now take is to think about fully utilizing the registry and the expertise of its members to collect evidence-based research and to fill the gaps in understanding the lived experience of women in the region as a starting point to build capacity among women peace builders in order to make peace efforts durable.

4.9 Conclusion

This chapter began not by explaining and elaborating on conflict transformation, but instead by arguing that the way we see conflict transformation itself needs to be transformed. As conflict is a non-linear dynamic process, so must conflict transformation be. It must contend with the systemic nature of conflict which involves different levels of structures and a variety of actors, all with needs to be addressed and driven by a multitude of interests. Conflict transformation needs to be both focused and ambitious. It needs to focus on elements that must be transformed in order for the peacebuilding process to get going – like issues, actors, contexts, relationships, institutions, and many others. Even if the peacebuilding process proper has not begun, conflict transformation needs to be initiated, or at the very least, be part of the planning. Once the process is ongoing, conflict transformation becomes the driver in the same way that negative elements, interests, issues, and actors are the driver to push the cycle of conflict moving. This is why conflict transformation is an integral part of peacebuilding, which basically is a process of building peace where conflict exists. Scholars and practitioners have difficulty in separating the two, or may place them into two different boxes of approaches but, to many, they go together.

It is clear that both share the same characteristics and emerged at the same period of time. Both also share a view of generational outcomes, especially in dealing with a change from asymmetrical to symmetrical relationships and power structures. Nonetheless, it is the concept of conflict transformation that proposes a "*substantive transformation in the international or regional environment*," thus, requiring transformations that are more concerned with changes of leadership, goals, intra-party change (dynamics and change of behaviour within the party), and changes of actors (those directly involved in the conflict and peace process). Similarly, the modality issues in conflict transformation deals with shaping and re-shaping of the conflict and peace issues (contestation and compromise involved in the context) as compared to a focus on the effectivity of peacebuilding activities and the dynamics among actors.

The early years of the development of peacebuilding have generally been associated to processes after a conflict settlement or agreement has been reached or the post-conflict phase, but this view has changed with the emergence of peacebuilding that is rooted within society itself, or what is known as peacebuilding from below. In terms of timing, it is believed that conflict transformation starts when there is a need and opportunity to stop armed conflict and violence, or as conflict violence prevention. It is here that strategies on conflict prevention and de-escalation of violence become useful to onset negative peace outcomes.

At the same time, the reality is that peacebuilding actors work within the challenges of conflicts – both from short to long term perspectives and from negative to positive peace outcomes. Examples of activities by civil society include peace constituency building (horizontal and vertical peacebuilding), peace education, peace journalism, involving businesses and the private sector, and the engendering of peace to show their transformational impact on conflicts. Experiences and examples of these have been highlighted throughout the chapter – from the formation of the insider peacebuilders group in Southern Thailand, to getting down on the ground to monitor ceasefire violations in Mindanao, to playing advocates for peace by practicing peace journalism, to engendering peace through the inclusion of women in the peace and security agenda. These activities point to the fact that peacebuilding is alive and well in the region and is a positive driver for peace with conflict-affected populations.

International organizations have also taken a practical approach to both conflict transformation and peacebuilding. To an extent, international agencies have been rather ambitious in linking peacebuilding and conflict transformation with an agenda also of promoting human rights and democracy, liberal standards of socio-economic development, and the integration of ecological and environmental

principles. This ambition is, on the one hand, understandable, but unfortunately in some cases, affected countries/conflict situations have been reluctant to integrate these kinds of external top-down policy structures and mechanisms. For example, Aceh and Mindanao/Bangsamoro evolved their own local ways (based on their laws, traditions, and socio-political environment) of re-building peace in their societies. These cases demonstrate that peace-promoting communities have to take into account realistic perspectives of what and how much they can achieve. They have to be prudent and focus particularly on developments at the local level to understand what improvements are possible with whom and how. Peacebuilding and conflict transformation takes place in close connection with immediate actors, perpetrators of violence, victims, interveners, and observers. Therefore, developing the nuanced understanding of *hybrid peacebuilding* and *peace formations* could become one of the next improvements in peacebuilding communities. Chapters 5 and 8 will continue this discussion and elaborate on how we can combine the two approaches of conflict transformation and peacebuilding to become one that reflects the complementarity of the two as *transformative peacebuilding*.

Discussion questions

1. What types of peacebuilding and conflict transformation activities can you find in Southeast Asia or in Asia?
2. How do these activities contribute, or not, to the peace process?
3. What capacities and skills do you think are useful among peacebuilders or to those undertaking peacebuilding and conflict transformation work?
4. What possible peacebuilding and conflict transformation can be done in an ongoing armed conflict? Can you build a scenario using a conflict case?
5. Can you suggest any means or tools to evaluate and show the impact of peacebuilding and conflict transformation in a society?
6. How do you think gender analysis and sensitivity builds peace? Can you cite some examples?
7. In what ways can social media promote peace journalism?
8. At what levels of formal education should peace education be introduced?

Recommended reading

1. Abubakar, A, *Peacebuilding and Sustainable Human Development: The Pursuit of the Bangsamoro Right to Self-Determination,* Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2019.
2. Berghof Foundation, 'Berghof Foundation handbook on conflict transformation' Berghof Foundation, 2012, available at https://berghof-foundation.org/library/berghof-handbook-for-conflict-transformation, accessed on 19 August 2021.
3. Abunales, D, 'Peace journalism: Preparing aspiring journalists to value culture of peace' *Asia Pacific Mediator Educator*, 2016, Vol 26, No 2, pp 252-269.
4. Navarro-Castro, L, 'Peace education in the Philippines: My Journey as a peace educator and some lessons learned' *Journal of Social Encounters*, 2020, Vol 4, No 2, pp 90-95. Available at https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/social_encounters/vol4/iss2/8, accessed on 25 August 2021.
5. Körppen, D, Schmelzle, B, and Wils, O (eds), 'A systemic approach to conflict transformation: Exploring strengths and weaknesses' Berghof Foundation, 2008, available at https://berghof-foundation.org/library/a-systemic-approach-to-conflict-transformation-exploring-strengths-and-limitations, accessed on 25 August 2021.

Chapter 5

Ending Conflict

Chapter 5:
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Kamarulzaman Askandar[1]

5.1 Introduction

Ending a conflict always begins with an intent to resolve but it takes time and effort by all the parties directly or indirectly involved and affected by the conflict. Moreover, it is a complex process requiring a comprehensive approach. The following issues are of particular significance: the different layers of issues and actors; the relationship structures of parties; the potential options and opportunities that might persuade parties to resolve; the transformation processes that need to be carried out before and during the process; and cultivating the lessons learned from past efforts at managing, settling, transforming, and resolving conflicts. In Chapter 1, the meanings and need for *contingency* and *complementarity* as approaches were briefly discussed. As will be explained later in this chapter, such are the keys to ending a conflict: first, one must be prepared for all possibilities to address the conflict and tasks at hand, and be ready to adapt strategies and approaches at any time; and second, one must be able to work with actors and stakeholders from any level of the dispute.

While this chapter will analyse how conflicts are brought to an end, Ramsbotham et al (2011) observe that conflict resolution is broader than conflict termination, and that ending a violent conflict will not necessarily resolve the issues of all parties. At the same time, resolving the issues may not necessarily end the violence. Similarly, it is quite possible that efforts to resolve a conflict may not end a war, and efforts to end a war may not resolve underlying conflicts. This explains why the focus must be on both the transformation of conflict as well as the elimination of violence. Only then can a meaningful outcome be achieved.

The focus of this chapter will be on the approaches, frameworks, and methods used to end conflicts, that is, *peacemaking* in a *peace process* or a *peace mediation process* (involves a third party as an intermediary). Accordingly, this chapter will explain how the process starts, the parties involved, the steps therein, the difficulties and challenges involved, and how these can be overcome. In addition, this chapter will also examine the obstacles in ensuring the success of a peace process and will look beyond the process to post-agreement/conflict peacebuilding, and reconstruction activities. Finally, a number of case studies from the region will highlight the nature and challenges of this process, as well as the lessons that can be learnt from them.

5.2 Peacemaking and third-party involvement

Peacemaking is crucial to ending a conflict and is predominantly aimed at situations involving violence and aggressive behaviour. In addition, peacemaking is often the term used to refer to the process of negotiating a peace settlement by the main actors in an armed conflict. According to the UN, it is an *"… action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter IV of the Charter of the United Nations*" (Agenda for Peace, 1992). It is usually a confined process meaning only the main parties are invited to the table, but its success as a whole requires the participation of wider groups of parties and stakeholders beyond the formal dialogue process. Examples from Southeast Asia include the processes

[1] With contributions from Norbert Ropers, Abhoud Syed Lingga, Sachiko Ishikawa, Suadi Zainal, Josephine Rosa Marieta Soeprapto, Abdul Rahman Alavi, Cynthia Petrigh, Afrizal Tjoetra, and Ismael G Kulat.

in Aceh, Mindanao, and Southern Thailand. The next section will examine the importance of third-party intermediaries in peacemaking processes.

5.2.1 Roles of third-party intermediaries

Wherever possible, parties prefer to negotiate and settle conflict issues bilaterally. This is especially true if the conflict is asymmetric or vertical and especially if one of the parties is a government. Governments in Southeast Asia usually see conflicts within their borders as internal matters and, thus, inviting third party intervention has been seen by such administrations (as the stronger of the two parties) as a sign of weakness, indicating an inability to solve the conflict without help. As the principles of 'non-interference' and 'non-intervention' are widely accepted and cited when other parties, including neighbouring countries, offer assistance, it is therefore unsurprising that it can take a while before parties are willing to accept outside help.

The Aceh conflict, which started in 1976, was handled internally without much success until 2000 when Indonesia finally invited the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) to facilitate talks with the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM or Free Aceh Movement). HDC's work was continued by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) in 2004-2005 resulting in the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which finally settled the conflict. Likewise, the Mindanao conflict benefitted from OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) facilitation through Libya and Indonesia in peace talks between the government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) (1976-1996), and Malaysia's assistance in the peace process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) (2001-2014). However, the Thai government has always refused outside help in settling the insurgency and self-determination struggle in its so-called 'Deep South.' While external support for development, economic, and educational programs were acceptable, the government drew the line at external actors facilitating talks between itself and representatives of the insurgent movement. Despite this, (informal) dialogues and meetings with such groups have been facilitated by, for example, individuals in Malaysia (Langkawi) or Indonesia (Bogor), although both were disavowed by the Thai government as individual initiatives rather than formal talks. This changed in February 2013 when the government finally sought Malaysia's help in facilitating a dialogue with representatives from the *Barisan Revolusi Nasional* (BRN or the National Revolutionary Front and one of the main groups in the Patani liberation movement) resulting in the beginning of the Patani peace process which has continued (albeit inconsistently) until the present and which now includes other groups under the umbrella of MARA Patani (*Majlis Syura Patani* or the Patani Council) and more substantial BRN involvement. And still with Malaysia as the facilitator.

As history has shown, therefore, complex conflict situations are rarely solved by bilateral approaches. Instead, such situations often benefit from third party involvement to help start and sustain the process. Third parties can range from international actors such as countries to international or regional organizations or even to respected individuals with useful connections. Significantly, third parties are usually not directly involved in the conflict. Most of the time, they have no vested interest in a substantive outcome unless it is to resolve the conflict peacefully. As such, they act merely as intermediaries or go-betweens (the specific roles of mediators and facilitators will be discussed in the section on peace mediation processes below). However, the assumption they are *always* external parties is not strictly true as many 'insiders' have also played this role. Further, while third parties can be individuals working alone, they can also be part of informal set-ups specifically created to help the process, such as the Insider Peacebuilders Platform (IPP) in Southern Thailand (see Chapter 4). As part of the local context within which the conflict is occurring, such groups have access to networks of influence and other resources that can be offered to the parties.[2]

[2] See Chapter 4 on conflict transformation and the next section on insider mediators/peacebuilders.

Lederach (1995) suggests that several dimensions can be explored when looking at the role of intermediaries. The first is the relationship dimension and the extent to which the intermediary has relationships with the primary parties. As such, those more closely aligned with one party may be deemed 'insider-partial.' At the same time, outsiders having an interest in a specific outcome even if without a connection to the primary parties may be considered 'outsider-partial.' On the flipside, intermediaries, whether insiders or outsiders, having no personal interest in any specific outcome are seen as 'insider-impartial' or 'outsider-impartial' (Lederach, 1995).

Third parties can play a variety of roles depending on who they are. As far back as 1978, Laue and Cormick formulated a typology of intervention roles for intermediaries, suggesting that some roles are critical to address power imbalances between parties, while others are more useful for convening parties to a process:

(1) *Activist* – rooted in one of the parties, and seeks to organize and position this group to be better able to confront the dominant party. Often crucial in surfacing latent conflict and plays an important role in enabling long-term conflict transformation.
(2) *Advocate* – not a member of one of the disputing parties but serves as an advisor and ally to one of the parties. Can play an important role in empowering the parties.
(3) *Mediator* – not connected to any of the parties but accepted at some level by all. Invited to come in and facilitate discussion between the parties and to assist them to reach a mutually satisfying settlement.
(4) *Researcher* – provides factual information and evaluation of the issues in the conflict that may be used to help forge a solution to some problematic issues.
(5) *Enforcer* – has the power to exert influence over conflicting parties. Often situated in institutions with authority and the power to impose its judgments.

These roles entail capacities to make a contribution to resolving conflict situations. They also suggest a multiplicity of functions intermediaries can play, although realistically it would be difficult for an activist or advocate to be accepted as an independent and non-partisan third party (Laue and Cormick, 1978).

Chris Mitchell (2003) also proposes a series of role functions that can be helpful at different points in the development and resolution of a conflict, from the pre-negotiation phase all the way to the post-agreement phase. During the pre-negotiation phase, intermediaries can play one of the following roles: *Explorer* – determining adversaries' readiness for contact in exploring a range of possible solutions; *Unifier* – improving and enhancing intra-party cleavages and encouraging consensus on interests, core values, and concessions; *Enskiller* – helping parties to develop the skills and competencies needed to enable a durable settlement; and *Convener* – initiating the process of talks, provides venue, and legitimizes contacts and meetings.

During negotiations, intermediaries can play the following roles: *Facilitator* – facilitates meetings to enable a fruitful exchange; *Envisioner* – provides new data, ideas, theories, and options for adversaries to adapt as well as creating fresh thinking; *Guarantor* – provides insurance against talks breaking down and offers to guarantee any agreed solution, as well as adding prestige and legitimacy to any agreed solution.

Finally, in the post-agreement phase, the intermediary can become a *Verifier* – reassures the parties that the terms of agreements are being fulfilled; and a *Reconciler* – assists in long-term actions to build new relationships among and within adversaries. Whatever role or roles the intermediary can play, then depends on who they are, their capacity, the mandate given, the needs and levels of the conflict, and the outcome or outcomes being pursued.

5.2.2 Insider mediators and peacebuilders

As mentioned above, an important actor in the peacemaking and peacebuilding process is the 'insider' who can facilitate and support the process from within. This is seen in many conflict situations in the region where contributions have been made by those from within the context of the conflict as well as those who are trusted for sharing common understandings, interests, and goals with one or more of the main conflict actors. Examples of insiders include groups like the Aceh Civil Society Task Force (ACSTF) in Aceh, the *Baku Bae* movement in Maluku, the Insider Peacebuilders Platform (IPP) in Southern Thailand, and the Research and Education for Peace, Universiti Sains Malaysia (REPUSM), and the Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN) in Mindanao, Aceh, and Southern Thailand.

Norbert Ropers, the prominent peacebuilder and conflict transformation scholar, defines an 'insider mediator' as follows:

> *Insider Mediators are trusted and respected insiders who work at multiple levels in a conflicted society, who have a deep knowledge of the dynamics and context of the conflict, who share a normative and cultural closeness with the conflicting parties and who demonstrate a nuanced sensitivity in their contribution to finding solutions to conflicts that are owned and valued by the parties themselves (Smith and Wachira 2010, quoted by Ropers, 2013).*

This definition describes the insider mediators and insider peacebuilders in this book, as they share similarities in terms of background, nature of work, and approaches to conflicts.

The term, *insider mediators/peacebuilders*, describes key individuals, groups, or networks working to transform the conflict by building and promoting peace from within.[3] The difference between insider peacebuilders and insider mediators is that the former may lack direct access to all the main parties and may not be doing activities that directly link the main parties together. But the activities carried out by peacebuilders do have an impact, both directly and indirectly, on the situation. An insider also need not necessarily hail from the conflict area nor live in the conflict area but instead may have common or shared elements/criteria (may include "identity") with the parties or at least one of the parties. Insiders must also have a deep understanding of the issues and history of the conflict and be in a position to change, or at the very least, affect the situation, and have the potential to become a catalyst for future change through their activities and/or an articulation of their thoughts. In this way, they play a very vital *transformative* role. They are not necessarily trusted by both sides at the same time and might even be accused of favouring one side over the other, but at the end of the day, they are recognised for the actual and potential contributions they can make to the transformation of a conflict situation. In summary, some basic criteria for an insider mediator/peacebuilder can include the following:

- Respected (by all) and trusted (at least by some)
- Works at multiple levels with the ability to connect to these levels
- Has deep knowledge of the dynamics and context of the conflict
- Has some knowledge of peacebuilding (even if unaware of it), the skills to use the knowledge, and the drive to bring about change
- Shares normative and cultural closeness with conflict parties, or at least one of the parties
- Demonstrates sensitivity and creativity to find a solution

[3] See also the discussion on the Insider Peacebuilders Platform (IPP) in Chapter 4.

To these can be added – having knowledge of 'outsider' bodies such as think-tanks, research institutes, donor agencies, international organizations and governments, and can link the parties to these bodies. Crucially, this knowledge enables the insider to connect local peacebuilders and actors to external players, thereby connecting different levels or tracks of actors.

From the discussion above, the roles and contributions of an insider mediator/peacebuilder can be summarized to include the following (although the list is not exhaustive and the points are in no particular order):[4]

- Creates better understanding between parties and communities
- Facilitates informal dialogue sessions
- As a witness in meetings, forums, and dialogues
- Raises the capacity of other peacemakers, peacebuilders, and other stakeholders
- Raises the capacity of conflict parties through training, empowerment activities, and even coaching
- Looks at general and specific needs of peacemaking and peacebuilding and contributes to the fulfilment of these needs
- Corrects power imbalances between the parties
- Helps and supports the peace and peacebuilding process in both formal and informal ways by facilitating talks, holding trainings, advising on strategies, sharpening the focus for discussion, and doing research and advocacy work, etc
- Links up with and possibly supports external (outsider) mediators and peacebuilders
- Links external/outsider mediators and peacebuilders to conflict actors, fellow insiders, communities, and the grassroots
- As a link and potential bridge between the various levels and tracks

The next part will look at the issue of preparing for peace followed by a discussion of the peace and peace mediation processes.

5.3 Preparing for peace: "Ripeness" and the transformation process

Starting a process for peace will be difficult if the parties neither see it as urgent nor necessary to achieve their goals. They may also believe they can achieve their goals through force or threat of force. Usually a precondition of starting a peace process is the realisation that such tactics will not work, thus a negotiated solution may be the preferred option. Consequently, they may have to choose between the costs of continuing or even escalating the conflict or negotiating a solution. This situation has been described by scholars as one that is *ripe for resolution*. Zartman (1995) argues there are certain conditions that can make a conflict "ripe," the main one being a situation of "hurting stalemate" where the parties realise they cannot achieve their goals by increasing the violence and intensity of the conflict. Others have also written about the need for a "ripening process" or one that encourages "ripe moments" for resolution (Druckman, 1986). Despite being seemingly simple and logical, the idea of 'ripeness' and especially of encouraging this process, has been criticized as it can be seen as pouring oil onto a fire to create a sense of urgency for the parties to act.

[4] These points were highlighted by the author during a presentation on insider mediators at a conference at the European Parliament, Brussels, April 2012.

Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2011) observe that a number of authors have suggested modification or criticisms to this approach. Mitchell (1995), for example, distinguishes four different models of the ripe moment: the original "hurting stalemate" suggested by Zartman; the idea of "imminent mutual catastrophe" also proposed by Zartman; the rival model which includes games of entrapment such as the "dollar auction" as espoused by Rapoport (1989), where a hurting stalemate can lead to even greater commitment by the parties; and the idea of an "enticing opportunity" or conjunction of favourable circumstances. At the same time, we cannot reach a hurting stalemate until the actions supposed to trigger it are put into place. If the stalemate persists for a long time, the value of the actions may be questioned and qualified. Stedman (1991) also argues that the hurting stalemate model gives too much attention to power relations between the parties and does not take into account the changes and transformation within the parties, issues, and contexts of the conflict. For this, we need to revisit the approach of conflict transformation, especially the elements requiring change or transformation if they are not to sustain ongoing violence and war.

Contributions been made especially by Vayrynen (1991) and Galtung (1996, 2004) who identified the various ways transformation can take place. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011: 175, 176) summarized these and together with the work of Burton, Azar, and Curle outline the framework for transformation as follows:

(1) ***Context transformation***. Conflicts do not exist in isolation but are surrounded by a social, regional, and international context, which may contribute to their continuation. Changes in the context may affect the conflicts. For example, the collapse of the Suharto government and the reformation movement in Indonesia in 1998 resulted in the transformation of the conflicts in East Timor and Aceh. It brought referendum and eventually independence to East Timor, and while the transformation was less dramatic in Aceh, it did result in an Aceh peace process that culminated in a settlement in 2005.

(2) ***Structural transformation***. Relationships and how such groups perceive and deal with each other would need to be transformed. Asymmetrical relationships need to be made more symmetrical, meaning the parties must be respected and accepted as equal partners in a joint process. This is at times difficult for the dominant party because it would need to acknowledge the demands of a 'lesser' party. This might also be seen as providing legitimacy to the existence of that group. For example, the Thai government avoided dealing directly with the groups involved in the struggle for independence in Southern Thailand until 2013 because it was felt that talking to them would lend credence and credibility to their demands. The groups, on the other hand, cited not being taken seriously as an independence movement as a reason to increase the intensity of the conflict in 2004 – a situation which continues until the present day. Acknowledging the groups and accepting them as 'partners' in a dialogue process has somewhat transformed the way the parties see each other, even if the structure of relationships has not yet been totally transformed.

(3) ***Actor transformation***. Parties may have to redefine directions, abandon or modify cherished goals, and adopt radically different perspectives. This may come about through a change of actor, a change of leadership, a change in the constituency of the leader, or an adoption of new goals, values, or beliefs. Transformation of intra-party conflict and changes of leadership may precipitate change in protracted conflicts. Parties may transform their viewpoints after a change in leadership brings about new objectives and values. For example, the change in leadership in Indonesia in 1998 transformed the structure of governance in the country and the way conflicts in places like East Timor and Aceh were being managed. The same happened when Gloria Macapagal Arroyo replaced Estrada as president of the Philippines in 2000.

One of her first actions was to revive the GPH-MILF peace process and invite Malaysia as facilitator in 2001.

(4) ***Issue transformation***. The position parties take is usually defined by and how they see the issues. Some conflicts involve values that are considered non-negotiable, depending on how they are defined. This makes the conflict even more difficult to resolve. Issues that involve identity especially pertaining to religion and ethnicity are examples of this. People are willing to die and make great sacrifices for what they believe is a 'non-negotiable' issue. Changes in the issues or in the way issues are interpreted, or when issues lose their importance, or when new ones arise, will result in the conflict being transformed. These changes and transformation are closely related to the goals, actors, and context transformation. The demand for independence has always been a difficult issue preventing efforts to start a peace process in places like Aceh, Mindanao, and Southern Thailand. No country wants to see their nation being cut up. However, once the parties agree such a demand will not be on the table, they can focus instead on 'negotiable' issues such as the economy, governance, power sharing, and forms of autonomy – as such, they will be more inclined to participate in the process. Reframing issues and linking them in new ways can therefore transform a process.

(5) ***Personal and group transformation***. Transformation can happen from within and especially from within a leadership. A leader changing his/her mind about the struggle and the means to achieve the group's goals can have a ripple effect on his/her followers. Such a situation occurred when the former leader of the MILF, Ustaz Salamat Hashim, decided it was in the good graces of Islam to receive positively the hands of his enemies when offered in peace.[5] He then convinced the top leadership of the MILF to accept the invitation by President Ramos to participate in a peace dialogue with the government in 1997, which eventually became the GPH-MILF peace process. The same happened in Aceh, when Tgk Hasan Di Tiro and GAM decided to talk to Indonesian government representatives after being persuaded by a facilitator that this was their best chance of peace for Aceh. After the tsunami hit Aceh and other areas in the Indian Ocean in December 2004, the GAM leadership decided to go full steam ahead for peace through dialogue declaring that the Acehnese had suffered enough and they were willing to sacrifice their goals and values for the benefit of the people. This transformation from within contributed to the transformation of the Aceh conflict.

However, despite the positive effects of transformation outlined above, it is also normal for a conflict to intensify and widen, or for more extreme leaders to come in with an even more aggressive agenda and approach. When this happens, further transformation work would need to be done. The significance of the transformation processes above is that they are useful as a framework for analysing what needs to be done to ready the ground for a peace process, akin to 'ripening' a conflict in the previous discussion.

As part of the framework, questions, both general and specific, about the desired outcomes and how to achieve them, also need to be raised in preparation for a peace process. These questions can act as a guide to ensure all aspects of the conflict are covered. When done with conflict actors, this exercise can serve as an eye opener, encouraging thought about the issues that need to be addressed in order to arrive at a successful outcome in the peace process. For example, in working on the Mindanao conflict which can be considered a 'self-determination' conflict, the organizers of the Consolidation for Peace (COP) program (see Chapter 1 of this book) put these questions to the participants:

[5] Personal interview with Ustaz Muhammad Syuaib, former Executive Director of the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), Cotabato City, Philippines, 15 February 2018.

(1) How to satisfy demands for, and resistance to, autonomy, self-determination, and separation?
(2) How to accommodate the needs of minorities, and the insecurities of majorities, in deeply divided societies?
(3) How to identify, or cultivate, moments in which political rather than military initiatives might be fruitful?
(4) How to deal with spoilers, destabilizing actions, and violence deliberately targeted at derailing peace initiatives?
(5) How to deal with former combatants and their weapons?
(6) How to reconcile a society with its fraught past?
(7) How to realise a peace dividend in terms of jobs, housing, and sustainable development, etc?

These questions were posed to get participants of the COP programs, all of whom were stakeholders to the conflicts, to think about the complexities and to break these complexities down into individual inter-connected components. Answering these questions can be a necessary first step towards preparing the ground for an effective peace process and would help to prevent failure. Some possible answers to the above questions can be found in the case studies presented in the following sections which will also look at the history of the peace process, and examine the steps and frameworks of peace mediation processes.

5.4 Peace process

Achieving peace usually begins with envisioning a final product or desired outcome. Although the desired outcome is 'peace,' in many cases a reduction of violence and a lowering of the intensity of a conflict may be a more realistic goal. MacGinty and Ozerdam (2019) suggest that a peace process is an attempt to reach a negotiated outcome in a violent conflict and is meant to recalibrate the conflict in order to reduce the costs of the conflict. Further, they argue that all peace processes are experimental, and that all parties pursuing it have different levels of conviction. Moreover, they agree with Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2016) that most peace processes can be regarded as conflict management as opposed to conflict transformation, where the variables are re-organized but the conflict itself is not eliminated. As such, parties may often maintain their original beliefs and desires but express them differently and in non-violent ways. While a somewhat pessimistic outlook, more importantly, it still constitutes a move to address the issues. Transformation work will have to continue during the process and even beyond it to ensure the transformation and elimination of conflict issues and the achievement of sustainable positive peace.

A peace process then is an initiative that develops beyond initial statements of intent and involves the main antagonists in a protracted conflict. It involves a set of interconnected variables working towards envisioning and attaining the desired outcome – the 'ends.' Peace initiatives to start the process can be formal or informal, public or private. They can be subjected to popular endorsement or restricted to an elite-level agreement. They can be sponsored by external sources or spring from internal sources. Parties will most likely be suspicious of the motives of the other side and may want assurances and guarantees as to their seriousness. Confidence-building measures (CBMs) may also be necessary even if they may be seen as minor or symbolic by some. Many processes start with secretive meetings accompanied often by denials of participation by the parties, while efforts are being made to convince the public and supporters that a negotiated outcome is the best alternative to violence caused by the conflict.

These are among some of the variables that can contribute to the process. At the end, some kind of agreement is reached that may bring the parties to a decision regarding their participation in the conflict. After that, implementation of the agreement is dependent on the political will of the parties and on other factors including the international and economic context. Finally, all peace processes are fragile and many have failed at various junctures.

Peace processes vary according to the issues, context, and types of conflict, as well as the strength of the parties and the national, regional, and global factors surrounding the conflict. As such, we must be wary of making generalizations because what works in one peace process may not necessarily work in another. There is no fixed formula to a peace process. However, this should not stop us from looking at and comparing peace processes for the lessons that can be learned from them. Various activities have been organized by many groups including the SEACSN, REPUSM, JICA, GPPAC, and many others to facilitate discussions between stakeholders of different conflict situations in the region.[6] For example, lessons learnt from the Aceh peace process have been discussed and debated by stakeholders from Mindanao and Southern Thailand on study visits to Aceh on many occasions, and this may have impacted their way of thinking about their own conflict situations and peace processes.

5.4.1 The mediation process

Many peace processes require the involvement of third parties to succeed. This is sometimes called a *peace mediation process*. It is a way of assisting negotiations between the parties to transform conflicts with the support of an acceptable third party. The third party can either be a *mediator* or a *facilitator* depending on the roles specified and the mandates given. A facilitation process is similar to a mediation, but with lesser input in terms of content to the discussion and outcomes. A facilitator mainly encourages parties to talk to one another by offering the traditional 'good office' services or by creating an occasion for parties to meet. Facilitation is also defined in the same way as a 'facilitative mediation.' A facilitator seeks to support peace processes in numerous ways that engage

> *… diverse perspectives about a conflict and a capacity to watch for and build opportunities that increase creative and responsive processes and solutions around conflicts (Lederach, 2005).*

The 'United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation'[7] describes the mediation process as follows (emphasis in bold added by the author):

> *Mediation is a **process** whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with **their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflic**t by helping them to **develop mutually acceptable agreements**. The premise of mediation is that in the right environment, conflict parties can improve their relationships and move towards cooperation. Mediation outcomes can be limited in scope, dealing with a specific issue in order to contain or manage a conflict, or can tackle a broad range of issues in a comprehensive peace agreement.*
>
> *Mediation is a voluntary endeavour in which the **consent of the parties** is critical for a viable process and a durable outcome. The role of the mediator is influenced by the nature of the relationship with the parties: mediators usually have significant room to make*

[6] See the boxes and case studies relating to the Consolidation for Peace (COP) program, the SEACSN, GPPAC, and the contributions of JICA in the Mindanao/Bangsamoro conflict.

[7] 'UN guidance for effective mediation' UN, 2012, available at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA2012%28english%29_0.pdf, accessed on 25 September 2021.

procedural proposals and to manage the process, whereas the scope for substantive proposal varies and can change over time.

Rather than being a series of ad hoc diplomatic engagements, mediation is a ***flexible but structured undertaking.*** *It starts from the moment the mediator engages with the conflict parties and other stakeholders to prepare for a process – and can include informal 'talks-about-talks' and may extend beyond the signing of agreements, even though the function of facilitating the implementation of an agreement may be best performed by others.*

An effective mediation process ***responds to the specificity of the conflict****. It takes into account the causes and dynamics of the conflicts, the positions, interests and coherence of the parties, the needs of the broader society, as well as the regional and international environments.*

Mediation is a ***specialized activity****. Through a professional approach, mediators and their teams* ***provide a buffer for conflict parties*** *and* ***instil confidence in the process*** *and a belief that a peaceful resolution is achievable. A good mediator promotes exchange through listening and dialogue, engenders a spirit of collaboration through problem-solving, ensures that negotiating parties have sufficient knowledge, information and skills to negotiate with confidence and broadens the process to include relevant stakeholders from different segments of society. Mediators are most successful in assisting negotiating parties to forge agreements when they are well informed, patient, balanced in their approach and discreet.*

The guide also states that not all conflicts are amenable to mediation. There are some indicators that suggest the potential for effective mediation. First, and most importantly, the main conflict parties must be open to trying to negotiate a settlement; second, a mediator must be accepted, credible, and well supported; and third, there must be a general consensus at the regional and international levels to support the process. When an effective mediation process is hampered, other efforts may be required to contain the conflict or mitigate the human suffering, but constant efforts should be made to remain engaged so as to identify and seize possible windows of opportunity for mediation in the future.

Generally, a peace process can be divided into three phases: *pre-negotiation, negotiation,* and *the implementation process*. In the pre-negotiation phase, the third party tries to build up trust with the conflict parties, understanding their positions, interests, and perceptions. At the same time, preparations should also be made to create a proper framework for the talks, including preparing the venue, issues, participation, timing, and so on. The negotiation phase is where the parties actually sit and talk to each other about the issues and try to come up with an agreement to settle the problems. The implementation phase refers to when the agreement is implemented.

There are various guides and approaches on how to conduct a peace mediation process. Among some of the more comprehensive ones, this chapter would like to highlight the following guides from the UN, the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), and the Swiss. The remainder of this section will highlight important points raised by these peace mediation guides on how to conduct a successful peace process. Examples of how these guides can be implemented on the ground will be presented in case studies from the region.

A CMI guide states that successful mediation requires a sufficient understanding of the conflict. Among other issues, the history, nature, context and relevant stakeholders of the conflict need to be analysed throughout the mediation process. The guide specifies three factors that teams of mediators should know, *Problem*, *People*, and *Process* (Isoaho and Tuuli, 2013), and to raise questions about these three. Problem refers to the conflict's context and dynamics, and calls for an analysis of the conflict's history, nature, and evolution over time. The questions to be considered here include – what is the nature of the conflict, what are the disputed issues, and how has the conflict evolved? People refers to the parties, actors, and stakeholders involved and/or affected by the conflict. The questions to be considered here include – who are involved and/or affected by the conflict, who are the mediators, and what are the actors' positions *vis-à-vis* the conflict and other actors? Finally, process entails analysing the mediation process itself, the structure, time-frame, inclusivity, and the viability of the process. The questions here include – how viable and needed is the mediation, what should a mediation process look like in a given situation, and what are the pre-requisites of a successful mediation? (Isoaho and Tuuli, 2013)

Once the necessary information is gleaned, a proper approach can be designed. Mason and Siegfried (2007) present a good overview of what a comprehensive approach to a peace process should look like and what the third-party mediator should do at various stages of the process. This is presented in the following table:

Table 5.1 A comprehensive approach to the peace process: Multi-actor, multi-phase, multi-topic

Phases Issues	***Informal Contacts***	***Talks about talks***	***Agreement Phase***	***Implementation***
Goal of the Mediator	• *Gain trust of parties* • *Ripeness* • *Communication channels*	• *Framework for talks* • *From fighting to negotiation*	• *Stop violence* • *Build trust* • *Common vision*	• *Implementation of agreement* • *Political bodies and institutions*
Possible milestones	• *Direct contact to parties* • *Agreement to talk about talks*	• *Clarify issues, agenda, venue, participants*	• *Ceasefire agreement* • *Peace agreement*	• *Transitional constitution* • *Referendum* • *Elections*
Possible activities of Mediator	• *Discrete contacts* • *"Walking in the parties' shoes"*	• *Shuttle mediation* • *Coaching* • *Team up with other mediators*	• *Negotiation strategy* • *Mediate between parties* • *Expertise*	• *Post-agreement mediation* • *Monitoring mechanisms*
Main Challenges	• *Labelling of terrorist* • *Confidentiality* • *Personal safety*	• *Preconditions* • *Competition among mediators* • *Public perception*	• *Logistics* • *Democratic legitimization* • *Human rights/ amnesty* • *Power-sharing arrangements*	• *No longer in the spotlight* • *Monitoring mechanisms* • *"Mediation gaps"*

Source: Mason and Siegfried, 2007

(a) The USIP mediation process framework. The CMI and Mason and Siegfried guides are also reflected in other frameworks. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) outlines and simplifies the six steps in a peace process as follows (Smith and Smock, 2008):

1. *Assess the conflict*
    a. *Understand what the conflict is about – analyse the history and causes of the conflict; assess positions and interests*
    b. *Understand the actors – analyse the parties to the conflict; evaluate civil society and the populace; identify international actors; identify other players*
    c. *Understand the larger context – identify indigenous and international institutions for managing conflict; identify and address characteristics of intractability*
    d. *Understand sources of power and leverage – identify material resources and parties' control over them; assess the relative strength of parties and how it is changing*

2. *Ensure mediator readiness*
    a. *Determine what role is appropriate – determine the right mediation role given backing and resources; ensure mediation strategy is appropriate to mediator's identity*
    b. *Enhance the ability to engage effectively – build credibility; develop and strengthen a broad portfolio of skills; recognize cultural differences*

3. *Ensure conflict ripeness*
    a. *Assess ripeness – confirm that parties believe that outright victory is not achievable; confirm that parties can deliver on agreements; confirm that there is internal political and public support for peace*
    b. *Enhance ripeness – help elite understand costs and benefits; increase pressure on elites through accountability; cultivate leaders who can assume responsibility for negotiations; create balance between parties; change the costs and benefits of the conflict*
    c. *Take into account the legacies of previous mediation attempts – assess positive and negative results of past efforts; consider new sequencing decisions, new settlement formulas, and new actors*

4. *Conduct Track-I mediation*
    a. *Use consultations and pre-negotiations to lay the groundwork – solicit input and build trust; build and sustain political support*
    b. *Determine participants – work with viable partners; manage spoilers; include marginalized groups*
    c. *Arrange logistics – provide a safe, effective and well-resourced working environment; manage information effectively*
    d. *Develop and execute strategies for advancing negotiations – increase parties' trust and confidence; use multiple tactics to facilitate agreement; introduce fresh frameworks; encourage communication with constituencies; use different types of leverage to encourage compromise*
    e. *Engage the public and media – develop channels for public relations*

5. *Encourage Track-II dialogue*
    a. *Identify and coordinate with Track-II efforts – ascertain status and potential of Track-II efforts; focus on activities that build parties' capacity and foster wide support for the process*
    b. *Promote cooperation between tracks – share information and clarify roles; reward Track-II efforts that further the Track-I process; maintain the independence of Track-II initiatives*

6. *Construct a peace agreement*
    a. *Develop a declaration of principles – obtain agreement on basic principles; craft broad outlines of an agreement*
    b. *Assemble a peace agreement – determine a drafting process; translate principles into legally-binding language; incorporate strategies for implementation and monitoring*
    c. *Plan for implementation – make the local population stakeholders and guarantors of the agreement; use metrics to gauge progress; design dispute resolution mechanisms; use external parties to support implementation*

(b) Mediation fundamentals by the UN. Another useful and comprehensive framework is presented by 'The United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation' which presents the key mediation fundamentals for an effective process as can be seen in Box 5.1 below.

Box 5.1 Mediation fundamentals as adapted from 'The United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation' [8]

Preparedness

Preparedness combines the individual knowledge and skills of a mediator with a cohesive team of specialists as well as the necessary political, financial, and administrative support from the mediating entity. Preparedness entails the development of strategies for different phases (such as pre-negotiations, negotiations, and implementation), based on comprehensive conflict analysis and stakeholder mapping, including examination of previous mediation initiatives. Strategies need to be flexible to respond to the changing context. Preparedness allows the mediator to guide and monitor the mediation process, help strengthen (where necessary) the negotiating capacity of the conflict parties and other stakeholders, assist them in reaching agreements, and galvanize support (including among international actors) for implementation. A well-prepared and supported mediator is able to manage expectations, maintain a sense of urgency while avoiding quick-fix solutions, and effectively respond to opportunities and challenges in the overall process.

Consent

Mediation is a voluntary process that requires the consent of the conflict parties to be effective. Without consent it is unlikely that parties can negotiate in good faith or be committed to the mediation process. A range of issues can affect whether conflict parties consent to mediation. The integrity of the mediation process, security, and confidentiality are important elements in cultivating the consent of the parties, along with the acceptability of the mediator and the mediating entity. However, the dynamics of the conflict are a determining factor, and whether parties consent to mediation may be shaped by an interest to achieve goals through military means, by political, ideological, or psychological considerations, or by the actions of external players. In some instances, parties may also reject mediation initiatives because they do not understand mediation and perceive it as a threat to sovereignty or outside interference. In a multi-actor conflict, some but not all, conflict parties may agree to the mediation, leaving a mediator with the difficult situation of partial consent to commence a mediation process. Moreover, even where the consent is given, it may not always translate into full commitment to the mediation process. Once given, consent may later be withdrawn, especially when there are differences within a party. Armed or political groups may splinter, creating new pressure on the negotiation process. Some splinter groups may pull out of the mediation altogether and seek to derail the process.

[8] The 'United Nations guidance for effective mediation' was issued as an annex to the report of the Secretary-General on 'Strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution (A/66/811)' United Nations General Assembly, 25 June 2012, and is available at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA2012%28english%29_0.pdf, accessed on 25 September 2021.

Impartiality

Impartiality is a cornerstone of mediation – if a mediation process is perceived to be biased, this can undermine meaningful progress to resolve the conflict. A mediator should be able to run a balanced process that treats all actors fairly and should not have a material interest in the outcome. This also requires that the mediator is able to talk with all actors relevant to resolving the conflict. Impartiality is not synonymous with neutrality, as a mediator is typically mandated to uphold certain universal principles and values and may need to make them known explicitly known to the parties. To address the issue of impartiality, mediators should: Ensure and seek to demonstrate that the process and the treatment of the parties is fair and balanced, including through an effective communication strategy; Be transparent with the conflict parties regarding the laws and norms that guide their involvement; Not accept conditions for support from external actors that would affect the impartiality of the process; Avoid association with punitive measures against conflict parties by other actors and minimize public criticism of the parties as much as possible, while maintaining frank exchanges in private; Hand over to another mediator, or mediating entity, if they feel unable to maintain a balanced and impartial approach.

Inclusivity

Inclusivity refers to the extent and manner in which the views and needs of conflict parties and other stakeholders are represented and integrated into the process and outcome of a mediation effort. An inclusive process is more likely to identify and address the root causes of the conflict and ensure that the needs of the affected sectors of the population are addressed. Inclusivity also increases the legitimacy and national ownership of the peace agreement and its implementation. In addition, it reduces the likelihood of excluded actors undermining the process. An inclusive process does not imply that all stakeholders participate directly in the formal negotiations, but facilitates interaction between the conflict parties and other stakeholders and creates mechanisms to include all perspectives in the process.

It cannot be assumed that conflict parties have legitimacy with, or represent, the wider public. Mediation efforts that involve only armed groups may send the signal that violence is rewarded. In addition to generating resentment within other sectors of society, this could encourage others to take up arms in order to get a place at the negotiating table. Civil society actors can play a critical role in increasing the legitimacy of a peace process and are potentially important allies.

Mediators have to grapple with the potential tension between inclusivity and efficiency. Mediation processes become more complex (and may be overloaded) when the consultation base expands and/or multiple forums are used to engage actors at different levels. In addition, it may be difficult to engage interest groups that are not easily defined or lack clear leadership, for example, social movements and youth groups. These kinds of issues put a premium on stakeholder mapping, planning, and management of the process.

National ownership

National ownership implies that conflict parties and the broader society commit to the mediation process, agreements, and their implementation. This is of critical importance because it is the communities who have suffered the major impact of the conflict, the conflict parties who have made the decision to stop the fighting, and society as whole that must work towards a peaceful future. While solutions cannot be imposed, mediators can be helpful in generating ideas to resolve the conflict. It is challenging, however, for an external mediator to identify whose ownership is necessary and to facilitate ownership of the process beyond people in positions of power. Cultivating and exercising ownership may require strengthening the negotiating capabilities of one or more of the conflict parties, as well as civil society and other stakeholders, to enable their effective participation in the process and ability to engage on often complex issues. The extent to which the process is inclusive has a direct impact on the depth of the ownership. National ownership requires adapting mediation processes to local cultures and norms while also taking into account international law and normative frameworks.

In promoting national ownership, mediators could:

- *Consult closely with the conflict parties on the design of the mediation process.*

- *Inform civil society and other stakeholders about developments in the peace process (respecting confidentiality, where required) and create opportunities and support for them to engage on procedure and substance.*
- *Guide conflict parties and help them generate ideas for discussion, ensuring they can claim credit for agreements reached.*
- *Identify which conflict parties may need support to strengthen their negotiation capacity and facilitate access to capacity-building support.*
- *Encourage and enable conflict parties to inform and consult with their constituencies, including the rank and file, during the mediation process.*
- *Be aware of the specific cultural approaches to negotiation and communication and leverage those approaches to the greatest advantage of the process; liaise with and ensure support for local peacemakers and wherever appropriate, draw on indigenous forms of conflict management and dispute resolution.*

Coherence, coordination, and the complementarity of the mediation effort

The increasing number and range of actors involved in mediation makes coherence, coordination and complementarity of mediation efforts both essential and challenging. Coherence encompasses agreed and/or coordinated approaches, while complementarity refers to the need for a clear division of labour based on comparative advantage among mediation actors operating at different levels. The actions of the international community, including the United Nations, regional, subregional, and other international organizations, States, NGOs, national and local actors, all have an impact on mediation, even if their engagement in a given mediation process may vary. This diversity can be an asset, as each actor can make unique contributions at different stages of a mediation process. But multiplicity also risks actors working at cross-purposes and competing with each other.

The UN has recommended the following guidance to promote greater coherence, coordination and complementarity in their support and engagement in mediation efforts:

- *Mediation processes should have a lead mediator, preferably from a single entity. Mediation initiatives with two or more entities should be based on a coherent mandate from the relevant entities with a single lead mediator. This provides clarity, minimizes forum shopping by the conflict parties and facilitates coordination and the development of a coherent mediation process.*
- *The decision regarding leadership should be reached through consultations between the relevant entities, taking into account the conflict context and based on comparative advantage.*
- *Acceptability of the mediating body and their mediator by the conflict parties and the potential effectiveness of the mediation should be key considerations.*
- *Organization capacity, capability and available resources should be considered in deciding on the division of labour within the mediation environment.*
- *International actors should consider establishing coordination mechanisms, such as groups of friends or international contact groups, to provide consistent political and resource support for the mediation effort.*

Quality peace agreements

Peace agreements should end violence and provide a platform to achieve sustainable peace, justice, security and reconciliation. To the extent possible in each situation, they should address both past wrongs and create a common vision for the future of the country, taking into account the differing implications for all segments of society. They should also respect international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee laws. Both the characteristics of the process and the contents of the accord determine the viability of a peace agreement. Its durability is generally based on the degree of political commitment of the conflict parties, buy-in from the population, the extent to which it addresses the root causes of the conflict, and whether it can withstand the stresses of implementation – in particular, whether there are adequate processes to deal with possible disagreements that arise during implementation. The implementation of peace

agreements is often highly dependent on external support. The early involvement in the process of implementation support actors as well as donors can help encourage compliance with sometimes difficult concessions made during the negotiations. Although external support is critical to ensure that conflict parties have the capacity to implement the agreement, too much dependency on external assistance can undermine national ownership.

In coming up with a quality agreement, the UN said that the following criteria should be considered:

- *The agreement should aim to resolve the major issues and grievances that led to the conflict, either by addressing the root causes directly in the agreement or by establishing new mechanisms and/or institutions to address them over time through democratic processes.*
- *Where a comprehensive settlement appears unattainable, the mediator should establish with the conflict parties, and through broader consultations, what is the minimum that needs to be achieved in order to commence a peaceful approach to dealing with the remaining aspects of the conflict.*
- *When agreement cannot be reached on other sensitive issues, the mediator should also help the conflict parties and other stakeholders build into the agreement options or mechanisms for these issues to be addressed at a later time.*
- *Agreements should be as precise as possible in order to limit the points of contention that would have to be negotiated during the implementation stage.*
- *Agreements should incorporate clear modalities for implementation, monitoring, and dispute resolution to address disagreements that may arise during implementation. They should also include guidelines on priorities, the obligations of the respective parties, and realistic timetables.*
- *Local capacity and existing national infrastructures to undertake conflict resolution should be evaluated and strengthened. Agreements should provide for strong dispute resolution mechanisms at different levels, including local and international actors as appropriate, so that problems can be addressed as they arise and not escalate.*

With regards to the outcome of the process, Licklider (2001) comments that peace *per se* is not usually the primary goal of those parties resorting to arms as a response to the conflict. Most do so because they feel that the issues and objectives are important enough for them to kill and die for. A settlement then involves some level of compromise where they must abandon some of their goals and aspirations to achieve an agreement. This means that a peace agreement can be a second-best outcome to the parties which runs the risk of them not being totally committed to the terms of the settlement. Making that transition from war to peace then requires many different elements and commitments, not only for the parties but the whole of society, as the risk of returning to war is always there.

The process to achieve peace can also fail for many reasons. Some explanations why so many peace processes and peace accords fail include the following:

(1) The weakness of many post-war and post accord states, many of which may be poor countries with weak institutions. This can have the effect of such countries not being able to properly deliver implementation of the agreement, especially the economic aspects of the post-war reconstruction.
(2) Flaws in the process, which may not have included all the fundamental issues in dispute, or all the key actors, thereby prolonging and even extending the dispute. Not addressing the issues would mean a continuation of these as points of conflict between the parties. Not including all the key actors would result in potential 'spoilers' pushing their own agendas, possibly starting a new conflict track that would then also need to be resolved.

(3) The failure of leaders to carry their followers on the agreement, especially if the expected benefits are disappointing or delayed. This is connected to the capacity, especially economic capacity of the parties, but also includes mismanagement on their part such as corruption and nepotism in distributing the spoils.

(4) Failure to implement the agreement, which only set out a broad agenda rather than the difficult details. This usually happens when an agreement is rushed or not comprehensive enough. Details not agreed upon would be difficult to implement, and more so, if details are actually missing allowing implementing bodies to make their own interpretations (or misinterpretations).

(5) Emergence of unanticipated developments including a resurgence of post-agreement violence.

The guides presented in this section present the components of a comprehensive framework on how to create and sustain a peace process. Adaptation would have to be done to ensure specific issues and contexts are addressed. Each conflict is both generic and special at the same time. The comprehensive framework presented above can be a guide to address the generic-ness of the conflict, while at the same time, the specific nature of the conflict that needs contributions from local practices/traditions/wisdoms would need to be taken into account as well. The framework is also reflective of the various peace processes in the region. The following sections will look at some case studies to highlight both the generic and specific nature of the process in Southeast Asia.

5.5 Case studies

This part will look at a few case studies from the region to illustrate the approaches and steps outlined in the above discussion. The cases presented are the Bangsamoro/Mindanao peace process, the Aceh peace process, and the *Baku Bae* movement in Maluku, Indonesia.

5.5.1 Case study 1: The Mindanao/Bangsamoro peace process[9] [10]

(a) Background of the Mindanao/Bangsamoro conflict

The continuing assertion of the Bangsamoro people for restoration of their independence is the core issue in the Mindanao conflict. Thus, the political relationship between the Bangsamoro and the government needs serious attention because this is perceived as the major cause, or contributor of all its other social, economic, and religious inequities, grievances, and problems (Lingga, 2005a).

Before the arrival of the Spanish colonialists, the Bangsamoro were already in the process of state formation and governance. The first sultanate was established in Sulu as early as the mid-15th century followed by establishment of the Maguindanaw Sultanate in the early 16th century. State formations continued with the establishment of the Sultanate of Buayan, the Pat a Pagampong ko Ranao, and other political subdivisions. These states already had their own system of trade and diplomatic relations with other countries. The Spanish colonial government attempted to conquer the southern Muslim states but never succeeded. These states with their organized maritime and infantry forces successfully defended the

[9] With contributions from Prof Abhoud Syed Lingga, Executive Director, Institute for Bangsamoro Studies (IBS), Cotabato City, the Philippines.

[10] For a comprehensive look at the peace process in Mindanao see, Abubakar, A, and Askandar, K, 'Mindanao' in Ozerdam, A, and MacGinty, R (eds), Comparing Peace Processes, London: Routledge, 2019.

Bangsamoro territories, thus preserving their independence. As the adage goes, you cannot sell something you do not possess, thus, the Bangsamoro argue that since their territories were never part of the land ceded by Spain to the United States in the Treaty of Paris of 1989, Spain never exercised effective sovereignty over their ancestral lands.

Bangsamoro resistance against attempts to subjugate their independence continued even when US forces occupied some areas in Mindanao and Sulu. When the US government promised to grant independence to the Philippines, the Bangsamoro leaders registered their strong objection to becoming part of the Philippine republic. Even after their territories were made part of the Philippines in 1946, the Bangsamoro continued to assert their right to independence. When it became evident to Bangsamoro leaders that it would not be possible to regain independence through political means because of a lack of constitutional mechanisms, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was organized to pursue liberation of the Bangsamoro and their homeland from the Philippines through revolutionary means until they finally agreed to start a peace process in 1975. For over twenty years, negotiations to resolve the Mindanao conflict were confined to the Government of the Republic of Philippines (GPH) and the MNLF until January 1997 when the GPH also engaged in peace talks with another Bangsamoro revolutionary group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

(b) Third party involvement in Mindanao

Third parties have been helpful in bringing the GPH and the Bangsamoro liberation fronts to the negotiating table and keeping them on course despite several stalemates and outright hostilities. The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) was responsible for the peace process between the GPH and MNLF while the process between the GPH and MILF was facilitated by Malaysia.

The Organization of Islamic Conference

Since the Third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1972, the OIC has been actively involved in negotiations between the GPH and MNLF until the final peace agreement was signed on 2 September 1996 in Manila. Libya and Indonesia had also always been part of this OIC engagement. Libya acted for the OIC in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement while Indonesia chaired the Committee of the Eight during the crafting of the 1996 Peace Accord.

The OIC used mixed methods of intervention in the Mindanao conflict – employment of good offices, mediation, inquiry and conciliation, and sanctions (Wadi, 1993). The OIC intervention is summarized below:

- Following its 1972 resolution, the OIC sent a fact-finding delegation to Mindanao composed of the foreign ministers of Libya, Senegal, Somalia, and Saudi Arabia. It also urged Indonesia and Malaysia to exert their good offices to help find a solution within the framework of ASEAN.
- The OIC created the Quadripartite Ministerial Committee during its meeting in Benghazi, Libya in 1973. The mandate of the committee was to look into the conditions of Muslims in the Southern Philippines to signal to GPH that it was not taking the situation lightly.
- On 29 May 1974, President Ferdinand Marcos met President Suharto in Manado. Among the issues tackled in the summit of the two ASEAN leaders was the Mindanao conflict.
- On 21-25 June 1974, the OIC began to mediate. They suggested a framework for resolving the conflict, through negotiation with the MNLF to arrive at a political and peaceful solution.

- In 1974, the Islamic world body established the Filipino Muslim Welfare and Relief Agency to extend direct aid to Muslims in the Southern Philippines to ameliorate their conditions and enhance their social and economic well-being.
- The OIC sent a small contingent to form the Quadripartite Ministerial Committee to monitor the GPH-MNLF ceasefire forged in January 1977. However, the monitoring team failed to prevent a resumption of hostilities in the latter part of 1977.
- Indonesia sent a small contingent to monitor the truce when the GPH and MNLF renewed their ceasefire agreement.
- The GPH and MNLF were able to agree on the terms of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement through the diplomatic efforts of Libya. Indonesia's focused efforts were also helpful to both the GPH and MNLF to reach the 1996 Peace Accord.

The OIC mediation was fruitful in the sense that it was able to bring to conclusion the peace talks between the GPH and the MNLF. However, two decades of negotiations have not solved the Bangsamoro problem. According to the observation of the OIC Secretary-General, the peace agreement did not bring real peace, and disagreement on the interpretation of some provisions led to a resumption of hostilities. Although it deserves accolades for brokering the agreements, the OIC intervention was ultimately unsuccessful in making the parties comply with the terms. The lesson learned from OIC's intervention is that third parties should be concerned not only to see an agreement reached but also to ensure compliance with the terms. In this case, no extra efforts, including close monitoring, were made to ensure the provisions of the agreements were complied with.

Malaysia

Malaysia's third-party involvement in the talks between the GPH and the MILF was mainly in the form of facilitation, although it has also involved itself in mediating issues when appropriate. Santos (2003) describes Malaysia's role as a facilitator as follows: as a 'go-between' conveying positions of the parties; providing a conducive atmosphere and facilities; presence in the talks as a 'referee' and to witness commitments and understandings; helping to bridge differences by shuttling between the parties; administering the talks; and recording and keeping minutes, to detail what had actually been agreed upon.

As mentioned above, Malaysia did not only facilitate but also conducted mediation. In addition, when the GPH Panel would not sign the implementing guidelines on the humanitarian, rehabilitation, and development aspects of the GPH-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001, it used behind-the-scenes negotiations to break the impasse. After government forces attacked MILF positions in February 2003, Malaysia invited the two parties to exploratory talks to investigate new ideas on how formal negotiations could resume. However, instead of convening the resumption of formal negotiations, Malaysia used the exploratory talks as a venue to discuss substantive matters related to ancestral domain.

Malaysia has performed its facilitative and mediation roles generally well. Under its facilitation, the talks moved towards discussions on substantive issues. Agreements were reached on the framework of the negotiations, ceasefires, and the rehabilitation and development of conflict-affected areas. The presence of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) of which Malaysia had the most contingents, also significantly reduced hostile encounters between GPH and MILF forces. However, although Malaysia's involvement in the peace process was welcomed by both sides, Philippine civil society and the media constantly grumbled about what they perceived as stringent rules on confidentiality.

(c) Lessons learned from the evolution of the GPH-MILF peace process

The GPH-MILF peace process went through several stages, reflecting the Malaysian

approach in the peacemaking process. At the early stages, three core themes were explored – security arrangements, rehabilitation and development, and ancestral domain. These were chosen under the assumption that it was better to start discussing easier topics before moving on to more difficult ones in the negotiating process. Other topics were added later as the process progressed, for example, the discussion on ancestral domain also included sub-topics such as concept, territory, resources, and governance.

The peace process not only provided a platform for peacemaking between the parties but also evolved comprehensive peacekeeping and peacebuilding infrastructures. Formal peacemaking was facilitated by Malaysia and done in either Putrajaya or Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia. The peacekeeping structure started way back in 1997 when the first ceasefire between the parties was agreed. Since then, peacekeeping and monitoring has evolved – from local monitoring teams (LMTs) organized by the main parties, to include independently organized, civilian-led monitors known as Bantay Ceasefire (Ceasefire Watch), to the setting up of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) led by Malaysia. The Bantay Ceasefire was organized by a civil society group called the Mindanao People's Caucus (MPC) as a support mechanism to investigate ceasefire violations in conflict-affected areas. As such, it involved local and international volunteer monitors documenting violation incidents despite the ceasefire agreement and the ongoing peace process. The fear was that these violations would negatively affect the process and therefore had to be prevented.[11] When a report with evidence of ceasefire violations was submitted by Bantay Ceasefire to the parties and the Malaysian facilitator, with a recommendation that a more formal peacekeeping and monitoring structure be set up, the International Monitoring Team (IMT) and a deployment of monitors in 2004 (led by Malaysia and including monitors from Brunei and Libya) was set up. The presence of the IMT led to a drastic drop in cases of ceasefire violations: from a high of 698 violations in 2002 and 569 in 2003, only 16 were reported in 2004; in 2012, there were none.[12]

The IMT also had other mandates apart from security and these became more prominent as the focus of discussion in the peace process widened and additional members joined the team. These included – socio-economic monitoring, civilian protection, humanitarian concerns, and rehabilitation. Japan joined the IMT in 2006, deploying socio-economic monitors from JICA, followed by Norway in 2010 which focused on the civilian protection component. A European Union representative also joined the team focusing on the humanitarian, rehabilitation and development component.[13] Finally, the IMT also expanded to include security forces and civilian members from Indonesia.

Peacebuilding and conflict transformation activities by civil society organizations (CSOs) have always been a major contributor to the peace process in Mindanao. The NGO community has had a robust history since the days of the People's Power movement that toppled the dictatorship of Marcos and blossomed under the administration of Corazon Aquino in the 1980s. For Mindanao, civil society activities took off after 2001 following the resumption of the peace process under a new facilitator as they felt the time for peace had arrived. As such, they not only became core anchors on the ground with their activism, but also worked to strengthen the platform of the peace process through conflict transformation and peacebuilding activities.

The role played by the Mindanao People's Caucus in implementing the Bantay Ceasefire has already been mentioned above. Other important CSOs include the Mindanao Peaceweavers and the Mindanao Peace Network which organized the

[11] The Bantay Ceasefire was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.

[12] From a formal report by the IMT Head of Mission in the Consolidation for Peace (COP 6) program, 23-25 June 2014, Hiroshima, Japan. This was organized by SEACSN, REPUSM, and JICA.

[13] See the discussion on the EU's contribution to the IMT in section 5.6.2 of this chapter.

annual Mindanao Peace Week, as well as the Consortium for Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS), a network that works as a peacebuilding platform for more than 60 Bangsamoro civil society organizations. The CSOs became an important part of the peace process as they accompanied the process and provided input from the ground, as well as relaying information from the formal process back to the people. As such, they provided another pillar to the peace process, especially in times of deadlock, and contributed to overcoming challenges. They also combined with international CSOs in strengthening the platform. One example is the Consolidation for Peace (COP) program organized by the Research and Education for Peace at Universiti Sains Malaysia (REPUSM), together with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN).[14]

Another example of CSO contribution happened when the process collapsed due to the non-signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) in 2008. The non-signing not only resulted in the collapse of the process but also the resumption of violence and calls for the replacement of Malaysia as the facilitating country. This setback presented the CSOs with an opportunity to lead the dialogue and fill in the vacuum. As such, a COP program, the '*Consolidation for Peace (COP3) for Mindanao: Strategic Planning for Peace Post MOA-AD'* was organized in Penang, Malaysia by REPUSM and JICA and offered recommendations on how to resume the process and keep the momentum going. Abubakar and Askandar (2019) observed that this moment in the process made the CSOs reflect on their experiences and allowed them to learn some valuable lessons.

> *Some of these reflections included the realisation that the CSOs themselves needed to be in constant dialogue with each other in order to develop a united front. Second, they observed that the efforts of many years of peacebuilding should be scaled up and turned into a national project, not only concentrated in Mindanao. This is important as it showed that the dissenters and spoilers emanated not only from some Mindanao traditional politicians but also from the general public outside of the conflict areas (as far away as Manila), for whom the search for peace in the Bangsamoro region was less urgent. Crucially, they realised that the traditional politicians identified as 'spoilers' in the beginning, and assumed to be under the purview of the government, cannot be left behind but instead must be included in their peacebuilding advocacy. The peace process would need all the support it could get from various actors, including politicians, bureaucrats, business and investors, government security forces, youth, and many other Filipinos, who needed to be convinced that a peaceful Mindanao would benefit the entire country (Abubakar and Askandar, 2019: 169).*

The reflections by the CSOs in COP3 also had an impact on the peacemaking process. As the first meeting that involved the negotiating panels, CSOs, and other stakeholders of the conflict since the MOA-AD debacle, this assembly acted as a platform to renew lost trusts and to start thinking of ways to move forward. One important proposal was to set up an international "friends of the peace process" group. This idea was picked up when talks resumed following the introduction of a group of international guarantors serving as official observers and who would later be known as the International Contact Group (ICG) (Abubakar and Askandar, 2019). The ICG included the governments of the United Kingdom, Japan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, and international organizations like the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Switzerland), Conciliation Resources (UK), the Asia Foundation (US), and Muhammadiyah (Indonesia).

[14] For more detail on the COP program, see Chapter 1.

In conclusion, the involvement of third parties, as the experience in the Mindanao peace process demonstrates, can be valuable in bringing together conflicting parties to talk peace. When negotiations are at a stalemate, third party intervention is particularly useful for breaking the deadlock. However, the role of the third party should not end at the signing of settlement. It is important to see to it that every provision is implemented not just for compliance but in the spirit of addressing the fundamental causes of the conflict to avoid reoccurrence. Equally important is a road map of implementation and benchmarks to guide parties to the agreement, and third parties and funding institutions in the implementation phase. This will be discussed further in the section on 'normalization' at the end of this chapter.

5.5.2 Case study 2: Japan's contribution to conflict transformation in the Mindanao/ Bangsamoro peace process[15]

The peace process between the GPH and the MILF demonstrated a new type of conflict transformation. This process included development and a hybrid form of peacekeeping along with peacemaking endeavours. In particular, Japan's assistance to Mindanao departed from the traditional form of peacebuilding that was heavily dependent on development aid (Ishikawa and Quilala, 2018: 223).

Japan contributed to conflict transformation in the Mindanao peace process in two significant ways. First, Japan's assistance was carried out using a tripartite cooperation arrangement consisting of the International Monitoring Team (IMT), the Mindanao Task Force (MTF), and the Japan-Bangsamoro Initiative for Reconstruction and Development (J-BIRD). Above all, Japan's participation in the Malaysian-led IMT opened new pathways for the country to implement comprehensive support to Mindanao by bridging peace and development. Since Japan was expected to take part in the socio-economic component of the IMT, development experts from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) were deployed. They were eventually seconded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the first-secretaries of the Japanese Embassy in Manila prior to being attached to the IMT in Cotabato, Mindanao. In this way, Japanese members of the IMT wore three different hats: as JICA staff members, diplomats, and members of the IMT. These appointees made most use of the three titles formally and informally on different occasions to navigate Japan's assistance to a new type of 3D (defence, diplomacy, and development) cooperation (Uesugi, 2015: 12).

The MTF, consisting of the Japanese Embassy and JICA, played the key roles of both policy coordinator and general manager of Japan's assistance to Mindanao (MOFA, 2006). J-BIRD was the brand name for Japan's official development assistance to Mindanao, which was initiated and shaped by the first Japanese IMT member and the Japanese Embassy in December 2006 using the Grant Assistance for Grass-roots Human Security Programs. Eventually this was expanded to include technical cooperation, loan aid, and other forms of development assistance to Mindanao (Ishikawa, 2017: 16-17). Japanese IMT members connected activities of the IMT, MTF, and J-BIRD to create balanced assistance to Mindanao as seen in Figure 5.1 below.

[15] This section was contributed by Sachiko Ishikawa, Faculty of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University.

Figure 5.1 Correlated relationships among IMT, MTF, and J-BIRD



Second, JICA took part in mediation seminars called Consolidation for Peace Seminars (COP) in collaboration with Universiti Sains Malaysia. Aside from involvement in the IMT, a series of COP seminars were Japan's most visible collaboration with Malaysia for the Mindanao peace process (MOFA, 2007). As Wennmann argues, there was a growing recognition in the development community for the potential role of mediation outside its traditional role in conflict resolution (Wennmann, 2011: 94), especially when development work is hindered by the suspension of peace talks. Unlike other donor agencies, Japan did not leave Mindanao when the peace process reached a stalemate but instead took part in COP3 in January 2009 to revive it. Penang in Malaysia was chosen as the venue because the participants requested a location outside the Philippines to ensure informal and frank discussions (Ishikawa and Quilala, 2018: 217-18). Some 50 participants attended from Manila, various parts of Mindanao, and elsewhere. Although COP3 took Track 2 and Track 3 approaches, official Track 1 players, including the chief negotiator of the MILF, also attended as observers. At the end of the seminar, the group recommended three interconnected processes: the resumption of formal peace talks, consultation at the community level, and the sharing of information among conflict parties and stakeholders (Askandar and Abubakar, 2009: 150-51). In fact, the participants of COP3 started the consultative process with both the GPH and the MILF (Ishikawa and Quilala, 2018: 218) as illustrated in Figure 5.2 below.

Figure 5.2 Consultation process after COP3



It is also worth mentioning that the impact of COP3 and subsequent COP seminars drew positive attention from the top officials of the concerned parties. In June 2014, COP4 in Hiroshima was thus attended by President Benigno Aquino Jr and MILF chairman, Ebrahim Murad. Although Japan's assistance to the Mindanao peace process went beyond its traditional mandate for peacebuilding and contributed, to some extent, to conflict transformation, this experience will be tested in future cases of her peacebuilding assistance.

5.5.3 Case study 3: The Aceh peace process[16]

The Aceh conflict shows that the use of force and a national security approach cannot end a conflict brought about by a liberation movement. This conflict, which started in 1976, was eventually resolved through negotiations involving international third parties in two consequent peace processes. The Henry Dunant Center (HDC) – later the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), became involved between 2000 and 2003 without much success. The second peace process involved the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) from 2004 to 2005. This was relatively short, informally starting in December 2004 before being suspended following the tsunami that hit Aceh and other areas in the Indian Ocean, and formally from January to August 2005. Negotiations went through five phases (rounds) (Morfit, 2012) resulting in a peace agreement (Memorandum of Understanding) that has lasted almost two decades. The CMI involved other influential parties in Europe, both state and non-governmental organizations. Some even worked behind the scenes, such as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Javier Solana, and Benita Ferrero-Waldner from the European Union, and the Olof Palme Center (Ahtisaari, 2008).

In early 2004, Jusuf Kalla, as the Minister for People's Welfare, launched a secret process for peace talks. He was assisted by his friend, Farid Husein, and Juha Christiansen (a businessman from Finland who had made investments in Indonesia and who was also a close friend of Farid Husein) who contacted GAM leaders in Sweden for peace talks and engaged Ahtisaari in the Aceh Peace Process (Lingga, 2007). Juha approached Martti Ahtisaari with the help of the chief editor of the newsweekly, Suomen Kuvalehti, in Finland. Meanwhile, in late 2004, the new administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice-President Jusuf Kalla came to power, and Kalla renewed his secret efforts in earnest. Juha arranged everything to start peace the talks, and Farid Husein established contact between Ahtisaari and Jusuf Kalla. Ahtisaari then met secretly with GAM leaders and a meeting was planned (Santoso, 2005). The initiative was kept away from government bureaucracy to avoid opposition from national politicians, but Kalla kept President Yudhoyono informed throughout (Lingga, 2007).

Ahtisaari was viewed as a suitable mediator by both parties because he was a former president of Finland and had been involved in several peace efforts around the world (Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Kosovo). In other words, he had prestige, power, an international personality, and was able to mediate fairly and impartially (Acar, 2019). Ahtisaari invited representatives from GAM and the Government of Indonesia (GoI) to meet on 24 December 2004, two days before the tsunami struck. However, the representatives of the two sides were only able to meet for the first time on 27 January 2005, at Koenigstedt Manor in Riipila, Vantaa, about twenty-four kilometres northwest of Helsinki. After five rounds of talks they signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) as a peace agreement on 15 August 2005. The agreement consisted of issues including Aceh's governance, human rights, amnesty and reintegration, security arrangements, the establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), and dispute settlement (Kingsbury, 2006; Cunliffe, 2009). In summary, the agreement covered three main points: (1) the administration of

[16] This section was contributed by Suadi Zainal, Universitas Malikussaleh, Lhokseumawe, Aceh, Indonesia.

Aceh governance; (2) human rights; and (3) amnesty (forgiveness) and reintegration (Basyar, 2008).

During the peace talks, both parties sent their highest rank representatives. Indonesia was led by Hamid Awaluddin (Minister of Law and Human Rights) as head of the delegation, and included Sofyan Djalil (Minister of Communication and Information), Farid Husain (Deputy Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security), Maj Gen (Retired) Usman Basyah, I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja (Director of Human Rights, Humanity, and Social Culture), Widodo Adi Sucipto (the Coordinating Politics and Security Minister Admiral), and Major General Syarifuddin Tippe (the Commander of Korem 012 for Aceh since the late 1990s). Meanwhile, GAM was led by Malik Mahmud (the Prime Minister of the Government of the State of Aceh and the Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front or ASNLF) as head of the delegation, and included Zaini Abdullah (the Foreign Minister), Bakhtiar Abdullah (spokesman), and Mohammad Nur Djuli and Nurdin Abdul Rahman (political officers), and Shadia Marhaban and Irwandi Yusuf (leaders from Aceh). GAM was also supported by several international consultants.

Some of the reasons behind the success of the CMI process include the fact that the peace process took place in a different context. Second, the content of the peace talks was comprehensive, reflected a compromise, was creative, and had high political support from both parties. Finally, the third party's role was imperative in helping the conflicting parties agree on the compromises.

Concerning the third party, the strategies and roles played by the CMI differed from those carried out by the HDC, which failed to reach a peace agreement. CMI served as a facilitator and mediator. As a facilitator, CMI facilitated the arrangements for the meetings between GAM and the GoI, including preparing the place for negotiation, providing for transportation costs, administration, accommodation, and security costs during the negotiation process in Helsinki, Finland. CMI obtained this facility in cooperation with partners, namely the government of Finland and the European Commission (Kurniawan, 2016; Kingsbury, 2005). As Kingsbury (2010) put it, "*The Finnish government funded the first 'unofficial' round of talks, with subsequent rounds becoming more official and funded by the European Union*." The question is, why Helsinki, Finland? There are at least three compelling reasons: to have European Union support in the monitoring of any agreement; to isolate both parties from the press maximally; and to be in a place considered closer to the GAM leadership in Sweden (Nabila and Sulistyo, 2020).

Before the start of the negotiation, Ahtisaari tried to get to know the parties and their experiences, especially GAM. He invited GAM members in Sweden to Helsinki in early January 2005. While at the negotiating table, Ahtisaari asked the parties to lower their demands, resulting in GAM lowering its demands from independence and in the GoI moving beyond the previous autonomy arrangement. From the start of the negotiation, Ahtisaari put pressure on GAM, explaining they would not get international support for independence and that he would persuade European countries and the rest of the world not to recognise Aceh's independence. Meanwhile, without pressure from Ahtisaari, the GoI realised that failure to reach an agreement would disrupt the supply of international assistance for the post-tsunami reconstruction of Aceh (Schiff, 2013).

Next, Ahtisaari changed the wording of special autonomy to self-government thus inspiring GAM to offer the concept to the GoI in the second round of negotiations. Ahtisaari then advised the GoI to agree with the proposals in the next round of negotiations. As a result, in subsequent negotiations, GAM was able to offer its demands under a self-governing model. Another crucial point was GAM's proposal for local party elections in Aceh (Kingsbury, 2015). Towards the final round, CMI and Ahtisaari made a draft Memorandum of Understanding to propose to both parties

to be discussed, corrected, and signed (Kingsbury, 2006; Graf, 2020). The final round also saw the involvement of representatives from the EU and a proposal that the GoI establish a monitoring institution to implement the agreement and authorize appropriate ways to integrate former GAM combatants into society (Zainal, 2015; Pratiwi, 2019). Finally, it was agreed that the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) be formed to oversee implementation of the agreement.

The description above illustrates the strength and achievements of the CMI compared to the previous process involving the HDC. Among the weaknesses of the HDC included the fact that its negotiations focused mostly on humanitarian concerns. The two parties only agreed to stop hostilities temporarily. The HDC was also not well known and did not have sufficient strength to deal with such a conflict situation. The HDC was also weak in overseeing implementation of the agreements. The Joint Security Commission involving HDC, the Indonesian military, and GAM was designed to increase mutual trust and relied solely on the warring parties' goodwill (Tengah, 2007). Perez (2009) stated that the HDC peace process's primary objectives were lowering military tensions, facilitating disarmament, and developing measures of trust. It did not deal with the key theme on the status of Aceh within the country. Another critical variable was the weakness of the HDC in conducting the negotiations because of its lack of experience in handling an international conflict. Finally, HDC did not involve other international organizations, thus placing itself under tremendous pressure (Perez, 2009).

At the same time, the Helsinki MoU in itself was not operational. It required a law as an operational framework. The MoU stated that, "*The new law on Government Administration in Aceh will be enacted and will come into effect as soon as possible and no later than 31 March 2006*" (Asran Jalal, 2009). However, in reality, the Aceh Government Law was only officially signed by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on 1 August 2006, and was called Law No 11 of 2006 concerning Aceh Governance (LoGA) (Asran Jalan, 2009). The formation process took a winding road and involved many parties including the general public, civil society, university academics, GAM, political parties (legislative), and the executive, both at the provincial and national levels. As a result, conflicts of interest could not be avoided. Finally, GAM had to give in on democracy and the many party option. The LoGA also did not explain Aceh's status as a self-governing province, as discussed in the peace agreement (Tengah, 2007).

At the national level, complaints from GAM and civil society about the law was answered with "*This law can be revised later when it is implemented"* (Tengah, 2007; Asran Jalan, 2009). As it turned out, the LoGA was not revised even though GAM, with the Aceh parliament under its control, repeatedly attempted to do so. In fact, the central government even reduced Aceh's authority as specified under the LoGA by implementing the Regional Autonomy Law, which applies nationally. The main reason for Aceh's failure to carry out post-agreement political negotiations was that Aceh is positioned as a sub-ordinate in an asymmetrical relationship, and the negotiation occurred without the imperative of international third parties. This differed from GAM's position in the peace negotiations where it was more symmetrically positioned due to the involvement of the CMI, which could intervene with both parties (Zainal, 2016). Finally, although the AMM had been mandated to monitor the process of changing legislation, it had proved unable to solve the problem leaving a number of unresolved issues remaining. The AMM was more focused on monitoring the decommissioning, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process of former GAM combatants and ruling on disputed amnesty cases (Pirozzi and Helly, 2012). As such, it revealed that the AMM played a significant but narrow role, and that there was a need for inclusive and broad "human security" approaches to peacebuilding (Barron and Burke, 2008).

5.5.4 Case study 4: The Baku Bae movement[17]

The root cause of the conflict in Maluku, Indonesia can be tracked to the colonial era when the Christians of Maluku were given preferential treatment by the Dutch. Following independence, Islam was more favoured and the Muslim community benefitted more from the central government. From a psychological peace perspective point of view, this religious-nuance type of conflict violence in Maluku is known as an 'intractable conflict' (Coleman, 2006). Such conflicts occur when there is a history of domination and injustice in the past towards one group. In this case, the pattern changed when there was a shift in power. When other factors and issues such as economy, politics, and culture are involved, the conflict becomes very complex indeed. It may also be prone to violence especially when provoked by irresponsible individuals and extremists within the two groups for their own reasons.

Gerakan Baku Bae (Baku Bae movement) can be counted as one example of a success story concerning peace mediation processes in Indonesia. The conflict that peaked between 1999–2003 caused great damage (with 5,000 casualties, 500,000 people displaced, and nearly 80% of buildings and houses in the area damaged), and caused the previously heterogenous villages of Maluku to become homogenous and segregated, and the people to become more radicalized (Yanuarti, 2003). During the heat of the conflict, the word 'peace' lost all meaning and became seen as an act of surrender to the other party. The local term '*Baku Bae,*' however, became more popular and was even used by local children to make amends after a quarrel. *Baku* means each other or reciprocally and *Bae* means coming to good terms with each other (Muluk, and Malik, 2009).

This term became accepted by both parties as a discourse towards peace. The *Baku Bae* process was initiated by activists, academicians, and professionals, and was led by some prominent figures including Ichsan Malik and Eliakim Sitorus Lubis who were invited to Ambon by local NGO, *Yayasan Hualopu*, to resolve the conflict on the Lease islands which lie at the center of the Maluku islands in the late 1990s. They arrived in Ambon in April 2000 and were amazed by the sheer intensity of the violence in some areas. The central government had initiated several attempts to end the conflict but to no avail. As experienced facilitators, they realised that grassroots peace initiatives would have to be mobilized. As outsiders, they conducted a mapping of the conflict situation, and worked towards gaining the trust and endorsement of the people of Maluku to start the peace process. With assistance from *Kontras* (*Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan* or the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence) and LBH (*Lembaga Bantuan Hukum* or the Council for Legal Aid Assistance), they conducted a survey/referendum of locals on the current conflict situation. The findings revealed that the people of Maluku had grown tired of the conflict and wanted peace. Their next step was to open lines of communication between conflict parties by organizing a series of workshops.

The facilitators of these workshops evolved into a grassroots peace movement and were inspired by the 'Making Peace' framework of Adam Curle in 1971 (Lederach, 1998). The framework sought to move the situation from conflict to peace through awareness of the injustices and to create balance between the conflicted parties. To increase awareness of the conflict, this movement initiated workshops (called *Baku Bae* workshops) which consisted of four steps: (1) exploration of the attitudes and values needed to obtain peace; (2) analysis of the sources of conflict and the groups involved in the conflict; (3) analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) to obtain peace; and (4) formulating action plans for reconciliation and peace-building. The *Baku Bae* workshops were held 23 times over 3 years and involved hundreds of people in and outside Maluku, representing combatants,

[17] This section was contributed by Josephine Rosa Marieta Soeprapto, National Defense University of Indonesia, Indonesia.

refugees, journalists, lawyers, educators, traditional leaders (kings), religious leaders, NGOs, the military, and police in Jakarta, Ambon, and Jogjakarta.

In order to build trust and to increase political support for the peace movement, the representatives from *Baku Bae* conducted various roadshows for groups of Maluku people residing outside of Maluku, domestically and internationally. Within the country, the roadshows were held in Jakarta, Jogyakarta, Surabaya, Makassar, Palu, and Manado. Outside Indonesia, the roadshows were held in Netherland because many Maluku descendants now live there. The roadshows found many cases of misinformation and distortion of facts. Accordingly, the workshops strove to get the correct information across to participants and audiences in addition to creating the necessary support and platforms for the work to be done by the peace movement in Maluku.

Along with the roadshows, some *Baku Bae* movement activists began to build neutral zones for education and economic activities by building *Baku Bae* traditional markets on Ambon Island. The conflict had separated the people of Maluku along religious lines, therefore the neutral zones of education and the *Baku Bae* traditional markets were vital to the reconciliation process.

Still related to the efforts of building political support for peace-building in Maluku, the *Baku Bae* movement began lobbying the central government to get full support for the peace process in Maluku. During meetings with the President, the Head of the House of People's Representatives (DPR) and the Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces requested contributions from the government in order to stop the violence in Maluku. However, the government itself was divided and was affected by the religious issue, rendering these advocacy efforts ineffective.

Another important activity to build peace was by consolidating various groups of people to enable peace efforts to reach a bigger audience and attract the participation of more people on the ground. For example, journalists from Maluku, along with other similar organizations such as AJI *(Aliansi Jurnalisme Independen* or the Alliance of Independent Jornalists) created the Maluku Media Center which works as a centre for peace information to offer clarification about distorted information spreading in society. In addition, NGO activists created *Tifa Damai*, an NGO formed by the two communities focusing on rebuilding the social, economic, and cultural components of Maluku. Likewise, lawyers created the Legal Aid of *Baku Bae* to resolve any cases related to residential issues, whether because residences had been destroyed, occupied by others, or had changed in ownership. Traditional leaders created the Latupati Maluku Assembly which functions as a conflict early warning and early response body. When tension arises and disputes threaten, the traditional leaders would immediately make efforts to stop it. To this day, all of these organizations still exist and continue to work for peace in Maluku (Braithwaite et al, 2010).

The *Baku Bae* movement shows that a community-initiated and driven platform for peace and reconciliation that takes into account local traditions and practices can be successful. Although difficult, the movement gained credibility through a step-by-step process by building trust among the figures involved in the movement. *Baku Bae* has somehow managed to serve as a mediator between the conflict parties, and this process can be classified as 'transformative mediation' (Ridley-Duff and Bennett, 2010). The two keys in the process were empowerment and recognition. Empowerment enables the parties to define their own issues and find their own solutions. Recognition is about understanding the other parties' point of view. *Baku Bae* started slowly because as a community-driven movement it did not have the legitimacy nor the influence to affect people, even within its own communities. At times, those working in the movement were even branded as traitors to the cause of their own people. However, the slow and long process finally gained momentum with the endorsement of cultural leaders within and outside Maluku, and with the

establishment of *Majelis Latupati*, *Baku Bae* has cemented its mark on the mediation peace process in Maluku.

5.6 Peacekeeping, peace monitoring, and peace operations

This section will survey the meanings and functions of peacekeeping as a way to support the process of ending conflict. The UN divides peacekeeping into three broad categories: (1) Helping maintain cease-fires; (2) Implementing comprehensive settlements; and (3) Protecting humanitarian operations (Agenda for Peace, 1992). Generally, it involves the process of keeping peace on the ground when violence is present in conflict situations. The aims include containing violent actions from escalating a conflict, limiting the intensity and location of the violence once it has broken out, consolidating a ceasefire, and creating space for reconstruction and rehabilitation as part of/after a peace agreement has been signed. In this way, it is an important component of conflict resolution, together with the peace mediation process and humanitarian and development work. Peacekeeping has evolved over the years and is also recognised as peace monitoring and peace operations in some parts of the world. This has to do with the expansion of roles played by the peacekeepers and the mandates given to them.

The traditional view of peacekeeping entails actions undertaken to preserve peace where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by peacemakers. It refers mainly to military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties. Its purpose is to monitor and facilitate implementing an agreement and supporting diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. This is what is known generally as *first-generation peacekeeping*. The framework for this first came out of discussion at the UN level to define the basic principles of peacekeeping in order to guide the work of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) in response to the Suez crisis in the Middle East in 1956 (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). The principles outlined by UNEF I served to define the essence of UN peacekeeping at least until the mid-1990s and were based on the following:

- Consent of the conflict parties
- Political neutrality (not taking sides)
- Impartiality (commitment to the mandate)
- The non-use of force except in self-defence
- Legitimacy (sanctioned by and accountable to the Security Council as advised by the Secretary General) (Ramsbotham et al, 2011)

Thirteen peacekeeping operations were deployed during the cold war period, mostly in inter-state conflicts with the task of monitoring borders and establishing buffer zones after a ceasefire agreement had been signed. These first-generation peacekeeping missions mostly involved lightly armed contingents from small and neutral UN member states.

The 1990s saw an increase in the number of peacekeeping operations as well as the number of countries contributing to the missions, from 26 in the late 1980s to the point where more than half the members of the UN now contribute to these missions. There were also fundamental changes in the nature and function of these missions, where the ceasefire monitoring task of earlier operations evolved into a multiplicity of tasks with security, humanitarian, and even political objectives.

By contrast, the *second-generation peacekeeping* is multi-lateral, multi-dimensional, and multinational/multicultural (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). While its earlier principles still stand, more have been added: (1) that the context is to support peace agreements; (2) that it is assumed any mission will be short term; (3) that the missions are integrated under the UN; and (4) that they are non-forcible (see Table 5.2 below for the functions of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations). However, despite the changing nature of the peacekeeping operations in the early to mid-1990s, confidence over the capacity of the operations declined and with it came a decline in the numbers of troops deployed, the number of deployments, and the budgets committed to peacekeeping. These mostly stemmed from the challenges faced by the peacekeepers and their failure to fulfil their mandates of protecting civilians, humanitarian workers, and even themselves, as was seen in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia in the early to mid-1990s.

Table 5.2 Functions of multidimensional peacekeeping operations

Component	*Function*
Military component	• *Monitoring and verification of ceasefires* • *Cantonment* • *Disarmament and demobilization of combatants* • *Overseeing education and mine-clearance* • *Provision of security for UN and other international activities in support of the peace process*
Civilian police component	• *Crowd control* • *Establishment and maintenance of a judicial system* • *Law enforcement* • *Monitoring, training, and advising local law enforcement authorities on organizational, administrative, and human rights issues*
Civilian component	*Political element* • *Political guidance of the overall peace process* • *Assistance in the rehabilitation of existing political institutions* • *Promotion of national reconciliation* *Electoral element* • *Monitoring and verification of all aspects and stages of the electoral process; co-ordination of technical assistance* • *Education of the public about electoral processes and provision of help in the development of grassroots democratic institutions* *Human rights element* • *Monitoring of human rights* • *Investigation of specific cases of alleged human rights violations* • *Promotion of human rights* *Humanitarian element* • *Delivery of humanitarian aid (food and other emergency relief supplies)* • *Implementation of refugee repatriation programs* • *Resettlement of displaced persons* • *Reintegration of ex-combatants*

Source: Hansen, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, 2004

The 1990s also witnessed the changing nature of conflicts around the world. In the post-cold war period, conflicts became ever more complex. Most happen within the borders of a country, or are civil wars driven not only by ideology or identity but also other grievances such as economic needs. This led to observers noting the emergence of a “new war” where economic needs, greed, and predation drive conflicts and

need to be taken care of (Kaldor, 2006). However, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2011: 152) argued that

> *… there are genuine identity-based and ideology-based conflicts that are fuelled by the failures of existing government structures to accommodate legitimate political aspirations or to satisfy needs, and that economic motives do not explain the deeper dynamics of most major armed conflicts.*

In Southeast Asia, it should be noted that many serious intra-state conflicts (civil wars) revolved around a combination of issues like identity, power, ideology, governance, human rights, and the correction of perceived historical injustices, even as economic issues also play a part. This presents us with a situation where peace-building approaches now need to focus on resolving not only the core issues but also new emerging issues such as the economy and development. This also has implications for peace operations in the region, where mandates need to be formulated with an awareness of economic reality in particular conflicts. This brings us to the third-generation peacekeeping which sprung out of the post 1990s period.

Third-generation peacekeeping now needs to address a combination of issues which arose in the second-generation peacekeeping phase including ineffectiveness of impartial and non-forcible peacekeeping operations, the lack of financial and general supports, and the perceived imposition of Western interests and values on non-Western countries especially since most missions are led by countries in the West. Another question was how to better improve the conflict resolution aspect of peacekeeping. In short, peacekeeping operations are no longer being seen as peacekeeping missions alone in the traditional sense but have evolved into something else where the distinction between peacekeeping, peace monitoring, and peace enforcement is blurred to the point that it becomes possible to redefine such activities simply as 'peace operations.' Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2011) observed that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) made an attempt to develop principles that would serve as guidelines for third-generation peacekeeping operations, addressing issues like consent, impartiality, non-use of force, pace of deployment, legitimacy, and the promotion of national and local ownership of the peace process. However, this attempt failed and the result was the continuation of many existing practices plus modifications or adjustments made to individual operations depending on the mandates and context of the situation. Southeast Asia has actually witnessed this evolution of peacekeeping operations from more traditional missions such as in East Timor where the main function of the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was to provide transitional security for a new government, to the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) which was tasked with supporting the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) aspects in Aceh, to the International Monitoring Team (IMT) which was sent to Mindanao as a peace monitoring operation only to develop into a classic example of a third-generation peacekeeping mission.

5.6.1 Case study 5: The International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Mindanao[18]

The International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Mindanao was deployed in 2004 with an annually-renewed mandate to ensure peace on the ground in Mindanao while negotiations between the government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were taking place in Malaysia. Its main responsibility was to monitor the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement and subsequently to monitor the security, humanitarian, rehabilitation, and development

[18] This section was contributed by Col (Rtd) Abdul Rahman Alavi, National Defense University, Malaysia, and former member of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) representing Malaysia.

aspects of the agreement (Zamrose, 2017). The initial deployment of the IMT comprised of 60 members made up of 4 Libyans, 10 Bruneians, and 46 Malaysians. They were deployed to five geographical conflict-affected areas throughout Mindanao, namely, Iligan City, General Santos City, Davao City, Zamboanga City, and Cotabato City, with its main headquarters located in Cotabato City (Jubair, 2007). Thus far, the IMT has deployed 15 teams since 2004. IMT 15 is scheduled to end its mission in April 2021. Its current strength is 28 members, comprising 19 military personnel, 3 police personnel, and 6 civilians. The inclusion of two civilian Japanese representatives in 2006 and one civilian representative from the European Union (EU) in 2011 widened the scope of the team as these civilian members focused more on the development and humanitarian aspects of the mission (IMT14).

The IMT organization was structured to allow a clear implementation of its functions and responsibilities, with a clear distinction of the functions of the components relating to its mandate and tasks. It was headed by a Head of Mission (HoM) led by Malaysia along with a Deputy HoM, and assisted by a Secretariat. The IMT was composed of three components. The *Security Component* was led by Malaysia and Brunei. Its main function was to monitor the ceasefire and conduct joint field verifications on alleged ceasefire violations reported by any party. The investigation findings and report on the alleged ceasefire violations would then be forwarded to the respective GPH and MILF peace panels. The *Socio-Economic Assistance Component* was led by Japan while the *Civilian Protection Component* was led by Malaysia assisted by four local NGOs, namely the Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP), Mindanao Human Rights Action Centre (MinHRAC), Mindanao People's Caucus (MPC), and the Muslim Organization of Government and Other Professionals (MOGOP) (Ochiai, 2020). The basic structure of IMT organization is given below.

Chart 5.1 IMT organizational structure



Source: Extracted from the 'IMT-14 End of Mission Report'

The team faced challenges and difficulties in upholding the mandated tasks as both the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) were guilty of ceasefire violations on many occasions. Often these violations occurred not because of tactical manoeuvres but because of feudal conflicts, locally known as *rido* (Abubakar, 2005), and a lack of coordination on the movement of troops in controlled areas. These incidences sometimes escalated into

violence and exchange of fire between government forces and the MILF, affecting local communities and displacing villagers. As such, camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) became a common sight in these affected areas. The presence of the IMT in conflict- affected areas of Mindanao managed to reduce the number of incidences drastically and curtail the exodus of IDPs. The team achieved this by implementing the mandates and strictly following the IMT terms of reference.

In addition, the IMT responded to cases of ceasefire violations by applying a number of action plans such as conducting negotiations with both parties; conducting investigations and verification of violations in the presence of representatives from all parties; having weekly movement coordination meetings to notify both AFP troop movements in MILF controlled areas and BIAF troop movements in GPH controlled areas; and organizing peace advocacy programs in the community.

Consequently, the IMT successfully contributed to a reduction in the number of ceasefire violations since it first came to Mindanao in 2004 as presented in Graph 5.1 below. As can be seen, the number of ceasefire violations dropped considerably upon establishment of the IMT. However, incidents increased abruptly in 2008 and 2009 when IMT operations were suspended after the Supreme Court of the Philippines declared the peace process was both illegal and unconstitutional due to the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) debacle (Torres and Bordadera, 2008). Soon after, heavy fighting broke out between some factions of the MILF and the AFP, leading to the displacement of around 600,000 people (Canuday, 2008). By contrast, zero incidents were reported for three consecutive years from 2012-2014. However, in 2015, the Mamasapano incident broke the zero-incident record.

Graph 5.2 Ceasefire violation incidents 2002-2017



Source: Extracted from the 'Head of Mission Annual Report 2018'

The presence of the IMT in Mindanao itself contributes to the *confidence building* process between the conflicting parties. It was successful in preventing large scale violence and reducing the number of casualties and IDPs. As a result, a large number of IDPs have returned to reoccupy their abandoned residences as a consequence of the IMT's IDP returning program. Thus, the IMT in Mindanao presents a good example of a peace operation that combines its main focus on security with instilling trust and confidence in the process through its many activities and programs. The presence of the IMT successfully sustained the peace and prevented a security crisis that would have engulfed the region (Zamrose, 2017).

Since 2004, fifteen IMT groups have been deployed to Mindanao and it is assumed that they will remain at least until the next Philippines presidential election schedule in 2022. The continuance of the IMT after 2022 will have to be based on the needs of the situation on the ground and the peace process, and of course, on the IMT's ability to fulfil its mandates. As regards its mandates, the IMT has vastly reduced ceasefire violations. In 2019, while 42 protest letters were submitted, only five joint field verifications were conducted. This means that only five alleged violations were registered and verified. In 2020, out of 40 protest letters submitted, only 1 joint field verification was registered and conducted. It can therefore be concluded that ceasefire violations reduced significantly over the years meaning the IMT has successfully achieved its mandated tasks.[19] Second, on the peace process itself, formal establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) and the appointment of MILF Chair, Al Haj Murad Ibrahim, as the interim Chief Minister of BARMM on 22 February 2019 (Roque, 2019) characterizes peaceful coexistence within the community and the stability of security within the region. Both these factors indicate that the presence of IMT in this peace operation has been successful although its continued presence in Mindanao must be reviewed after the Philippines general election[20] (Ya'cob, 2021).

5.6.2 Case study 6: The EU contribution to the International Monitoring Team (IMT) in the Mindanao/Bangsamoro peace process[21]

The Mindanao peace process has provided opportunities for highly creative peace process architecture instruments. Within this goldmine of peacemaking experience, the EU contribution was innovative for 3 reasons:

(1) The contribution of the EU component in what was largely then an ASEAN effort, built upon a 'regional blocs' diplomacy, in a non-UN setting.
(2) The contribution of civilian oversight to the mission brought a 'multiplier effect' on the ground to the already existing civilian component (CPC) led by NGOs. Furthermore, by deploying senior experts enjoying diplomatic status, the EU provided political and diplomatic backing to the civilian component of the mission, enhancing not only its quality and numbers, but its level, thus bringing humanitarian issues higher on the agenda.
(3) On the political side, and in relation to the UN 3125 WPS agenda, it made the deployment of female, technical experts a reality – as opposed to male, security sector generalists which previously contributed 100% of the mission staff.

According to the Guidelines on the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation, and Development (HRD) Component of the International Monitoring Team (IMT), signed by both parties under Malaysian facilitation on 3 June 2010, core tasks of the component included:

> *(1a) Observe and monitor the implementation of the humanitarian, rehabilitation and development aspects of the agreements signed between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), including issues related to internally displaced people, for a period of 12 months;*
> *(1b) Monitor the observance of international humanitarian law and respect for human rights.*

[19] Telephone interview with Maj Gen Dato' Anuar Tai, the Head of Mission IMT-15, 3 March 2021.
[20] Telephone interview with Maj Gen Dato' Ya'cob Samiran, the Head of Mission IMT-14, 4 March 2021.
[21] This section was contributed by Cynthia Petrigh, former member of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) representing the European Union (EU) as the international humanitarian law (IHL)/human right (HR) expert.

An Associated Task which would also be discharged by the experts was to:

> *(2c) Contribute to confidence building generally, and in particular, contacts between community and religious leaders.*

This broadening of the mission's focus in the same area of responsibility (AOR) was accompanied by a necessary freedom of movement for the EU experts who were under *the administrative authority* of the Head of Mission (HoM) (Art 5a). The first deployees and their HOM agreed would not be under HOM authority for other aspects than those pertaining to logistics management and staff security.

The criteria for monitoring humanitarian/IHL issues were strictly technical. For example, before deciding to monitor a reported IHL/HR alleged violation, the expert would examine certain factors: is the incident within the ceasefire mandate area; is it related directly or indirectly to the conflict; is it plausible/is the source credible; or would it constitute an IHL or HR violation if confirmed?

The parties greatly facilitated the monitoring, through their CCCHs (ceasefire monitoring teams). The command and control levels were such, in both the AFP and the MILF, that information regarding upcoming visits circulated well and the experts were never exposed to any access or security incident when a visit was announced and agreed upon through the IMT/CCCH mechanism.

Under these conditions, there were no 'no-go' areas for the EU IHL/HR expert (in 2011, she was the first of IMT's staff to conduct monitoring missions to Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi-Tawi). As a result of her efforts, the number of field monitoring visits sky-rocketed; more technical expertise was introduced; there was overall a better acquaintance with the principle of neutrality; and her approach encouraged a wider range of key informants.

In practice, the HoMs at that time, did not exercise any control on the selection of investigative issues or areas, nor on reporting contents. The humanitarian component (EU) report was annexed to the main report without alterations. Generally, there was no political interference, from the IMT HoM, from the EU delegation, or from the parties. Over time and once the cultural gap had been bridged, more technical expertise were introduced and shared with other components with joint missions also conducted.

As a result of the above-mentioned agreement, arrangements, and approach:

- The IMT obtained a deeper and more sophisticated knowledge of the area of responsibility (including access to previously unmonitored areas; updates on military camps; and more comprehensive and inclusive reports on ceasefire incidents).
- The gender dimension was introduced and mainstreamed (through training, data collection and findings: for example, a field survey conducted by the IMT with EU funding showed that 60% of women didn't feel safe in the area of responsibility).
- The efficiency of combined civilian-military monitoring was demonstrated.

The following examples of cooperation between the parties and the IHL/HR expert show the level of trust and respect enjoyed over the period. In that sense, the EU experts succeeded in contributing to initiating and putting in place confidence-building measures.

- After collecting and confidentially issuing monitoring reports for 6 months, the IHL/HR expert invited both parties to separate meetings to check their commitment and alleged violations by their troops.
- A number of cases were solved through dialogue; for example, the general commanding the AFP's 6th Infantry Division agreed that his troops would evacuate a mosque.
- The IHL/HR expert was authorised by the EU and the IMT to respond positively to the MILF's request for IHL/HR trainings.

Overall, the EU contribution allowed an increase in the level of expertise to the IMT, improved cooperation between the components, and successfully introduced confidence-building measures, allowing space for the ongoing, and eventually successful, political dialogue.

5.7 Post-settlement/conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction

This following part will examine how to ensure the sustainability of peace after a settlement has been reached. It will look especially at the aspects of peacebuilding and post-settlement/conflict reconstruction. These terms have had different interpretations in the field leading to misunderstanding among those working on transforming war situations to peace. It is important to note that how they are defined and implemented will depend on the context of the situation and the approach employed by implementing actors.

The concept of *peacebuilding* first became popular in 1992 with the publication of *An Agenda for Peace* by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. This came about in the aftermath of the cold war when the international community was optimistic about the coming era of international cooperation and peace and the potential role of the UN in driving this agenda. Within this context, peacebuilding refers to actions to identify and support indigenous structures that would help to strengthen and solidify peace in order to prevent the conflict from relapsing.

However, in the years since the *Agenda for Peace*, the scope of peacebuilding has widened to include the political, economic, social, and psychological aspects of such activities. Accordingly, scholars such as Lederach (1997: 20) began to see peacebuilding as a process throughout the course of a conflict that helps to transform it. Therefore, peacebuilding is:

> *A comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates and sustains the full array of processes, approaches and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities and functions that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct. Such a conceptualization requires a process of building, involving investment and materials, architectural design and coordination of labour, laying of a foundation and detailed finish work, as well as continuing maintenance.*

Peacebuilding from this perspective then is something that happens during the process of ending a conflict and achieving peace – while the conflict is still ongoing, unlike earlier notions which only saw it as a post-settlement or post-conflict activity.

At the same time, it does continue to the post-settlement/conflict period because without continued efforts to ensure proper implementation of the agreements and to carry on other activities such as reconstruction and reconciliation, peace will not be sustained. Peacebuilding then is a multi-faceted and multi-actor process that encompasses a wide range of challenges, from creating a positive security environment and functional governance structures, to responding to the basic needs of war-affected communities including activities of reconstruction in the post-settlement/conflict period.

The term, *reconstruction*, refers to three clusters of activities: (1) physical, socio-economic, and political rebuilding; (2) capacity-building and institutional strengthening; and (3) structural reforms. Notwithstanding, peacebuilding in a post-settlement context also tends to include a wider range of activities from security sector reform to socio-economic and political structuring. In other words, the focus of such activities can no longer be neatly categorised but may expand and overlap.

The UN, under Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, saw post-conflict reconstruction as a process whose main objectives include the following:

> *… Disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring of elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 11).*

This approach proposes a variety of focuses for planning and implementation in the post-settlement context and identifies possible areas to be used as platforms for sustainable peacebuilding. This reflects too the perspective of most international organizations since the end of the cold war when reconstruction became a vehicle for global nation-state building interventions as part of liberal peacebuilding agendas. Political reform is an essential component, not because it can turn back the clock, but as a way to create a peaceful environment that will prevent a return to violence.

These then form part of the challenges faced by reconstruction, which as mentioned above can belong to four main categories: (1) Security sector reform, (2) Governance, (3) Socio-economic recovery, and (4) Justice and reconciliation. Dan Smith (2004) describes this as a "peacebuilding palette" from which interveners can select and combine activities to suit particular situations. Using the timeframes of short-term, medium-term, and long-term, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2011: 229; and Box 8.2 on post-war reconstruction: 213) explain and illustrate the process as follows:

- *Security sector reform*
  Short-term: Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, including control of child combatants, and separation of army/police
  Medium-term: Security sector reform including consolidation of new national army, integration of national police, control of small arms and light weapons, and demining
  Long-term: Demilitarization of politics, transformation of cultures of violence

- *Political framework*
  Short-term: Establishment of transitional government, constitutional reform
  Medium-term: Establishment of institutional structure of governance in all spheres of life, good governance via accountability, rule of law, justice system
  Long-term: Establishment of a tradition of good governance, which includes democratization of parties, media, NGOs, and inculcation of a democratic culture, promotion of human rights

- *Socio-economic foundations*
  Short-term: Provision of humanitarian relief, essential services of education, health and welfare, and communications, repatriation and return of refugees and IDPs, food security
  Medium-term: Rebuilding of infrastructure, housing and services, livelihoods, and employment opportunities, and reintegration of displaced populations
  Long-term: Stable long-term macro-economic policies and economic management, locally sustainable community development, distributional justice

- *Reconciliation and justice*
  Short-term: Overcoming initial distrust, dialogues between leaders of antagonistic groups, grassroots dialogue, other bridge-building activities
  Medium-term: Managing conflicting priorities of peace and justice, truth and reconciliation commissions, and recovery of truth
  Long-term: Healing psychological wounds, trauma therapy, prosecution of war criminals, long-term reconciliation

Among the most immediate challenges to the peace process and the transition from war to peace in a post-war context is the process of *disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration* (DDR). According to the UN Department of Peacekeeping, disarmament is the collection, control, and disposal of small arms and light weapons, and the development of responsible arms management programs in a post-conflict context. Demobilization is a process by which the armed force of a government and/or opposition or factional forces either downsize or completely disband. Reintegration is the procedure whereby former combatants are integrated into the social, economic, and political life of communities. These three processes are important to ensure the success of a peace process, especially in the short term. The continued existence of arms and ammunition can cause concern because they can be redeployed and used by spoilers intent on disturbing any new found peace. In particular, demobilization signifies a symbol of intent to reduce the potential of violence and can be seen as a commitment by the parties to the process. Reintegration is similarly important as a way of injecting normalcy back into the lives of former combatants as they return to peaceful civilian roles. However, this might prove difficult especially if former combatants lack the means and skills to support themselves, have been traumatised by their war experiences, or have been rejected by their communities. Experiences of implementing this DDR process will be presented in the two case studies on Aceh and Mindanao below.

5.7.1 Case Study 7: The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process in Aceh[22]

The section on the IMT above described the work done by monitors in Mindanao. Another notable operation in the region was the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) which implemented disarmament and demobilization processes as part of the 2005 Helsinki MOU.[23] The AMM consisted of representatives from the EU (125 personnel), ASEAN (93 personnel), and the local community (70 persons) (Braud and Grevi, 2005) and was scheduled to occur between 15 September 2005 to 15 December 2006. Its specific mandates were: (a) to monitor the demobilization of GAM and to monitor and assist the decommissioning and destruction of its weapons; (b) to monitor the

[22] This section was contributed in part by Afrizal Tjoetra, Universitas Teuku Umar, Aceh, Indonesia, and Suadi Zainal, Universitas Malikusalleh, Lhoksemaue, Aceh, Indonesia. Information on the Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA) mostly came from Radhi Darmansyah, Ayesah Abubakar, and Kamarulzaman Askandar. See, REPUSM and JICA, 'Brief report on the Bangsamoro study trip to Aceh' 2014.

[23] See, 'Aceh Monitoring Mission' European External Action Service, 1 January 2015, available at https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/aceh-amm/index_en.htm, accessed on 23 September 2021.

redeployment of the non-organic Indonesian military (TNI) and police personnel; (c) to monitor the reintegration of active GAM members into society; (d) to monitor the human rights situation in the context of the tasks above; (e) to monitor the process of the legislation change in Aceh; (f) to rule on disputed amnesty cases; (g) to investigate and rule on violations of the MOU; and (h) to establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties (Schulze, 2009). However, as will be shown below, not all of the mandates were properly implemented by the AMM.

Decommissioning is a crucial part of post conflict processes. In Aceh, this was monitored by many groups aside from the AMM. In particular, the international community, including UN agencies and NGOs, played an active role which contributed to the success of the mission. In addition, commitment from both parties was high. As a result, some 33,000 Indonesian military personnel and police troops were withdrawn from Aceh. GAM also demobilized about 3,000 of its combatants and handed in 840 firearms to be destroyed. This number exceeded the figure mentioned in the MOU because many were actually home-made. However, some issues still arose as many fighters proved reluctant to accept the Helsinki MOU. Thus, it was jointly decided by GAM and the central government that any such fighter still found to be in possession of or using guns would be declared a criminal.

To conclude, the AMM was generally successful in the disarmament and demobilization part of the DDR process. On the other hand, reintegration proved more difficult as it was mainly left to conflict parties to implement through the creation of a formal agency, the Aceh Reintegration Agency (*Badan Reintegrasi Aceh* or BRA) which worked under the governor to reintegrate former combatants and assist conflict victims.

The BRA was formally created on 15 February 2006 with the following wide-ranging objectives: (1) To empower and develop the economy; (2) To provide social help; (3) To provide social support for those unable to work; (4) To support physical and mental rehabilitation including psycho-social help; (5) To prepare support for various forms of employment including farming and fisheries; (6) To rehabilitate civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights; (7) To implement reparation in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission for Truth and Justice in Aceh (*Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi Aceh* or KKR).

In performing its duties, the BRA worked with various levels of the Aceh government as well as non-governmental organizations, local universities, and medical practitioners. The main targets for their activities were former combatants, political prisoners, and victims of the conflict. The first Chair of the BRA was an academician, Prof Yusni Saby, a former president of the Ar-Raniry Islamic University. The second was M Nur Djuli, a former GAM negotiator. Since January of 2013, BRA changed its name to the Aceh Peace Strengthening Agency (*Badan Penguatan Perdamaian Aceh* or BP2A).

From the beginning, BRA had a very difficult job to do. It was tasked to return Aceh to normalcy by handling the issues and grievances of those most affected – the victims, former combatants, and survivors of the conflict. Consequently, it had to assist victims of torture, financially support the survivors, deliver health assistance, rebuild destroyed homes, and give assistance to those handicapped by the fighting. It also introduced a scheme to provide *diyat* assistance or financial compensation to the heirs and family members of individuals killed during the conflict. The term, *diyat*, which is Arabic, means both blood money and ransom, and derives from *Sharia* law.

The process of giving compensation and support starts with the compilation of requests or proposals. In no time at all, BRA received more than 65,000 proposals requesting aid. Inquiries into the validity of these proposals could not even be done

due to lack of funding. The BRA then had to collect data from the field to classify those affected by the conflict as former combatants, victims, or survivors as a way of determining who should receive compensation, and to design proper recovery and rehabilitation programs. Examples of the actual compensation given follows below (Radhi et al, 2014).

The BRA awarded IDR30 million (USD2,482) for every house burned during the conflict. In addition, it had to build approximately 29,000 houses although funding only covered 22,000. In total, it cost about IDR2.1 trillion (USD1.74 billion) to finance the cost of all the housing claims. Interestingly, according to the BRA, the Acehnese wanted cash and not land in compensation (Radhi et al, 2014).

Victims received IDR5 million (USD415) each for cash assistance. Former combatants received a higher amount, with each person allocated IDR25 million (USD2,074); IDR5 million (USD415) for cash assistance, and IDR20 million (USD1,659) for livelihood assistance (Radhi et al, 2014). Compensation from the reintegration fund was just given to 3,000 former GAM combatants as outlined by the Helsinki MOU. However, in reality, there were many more GAM combatants than stated in the MOU. Thus, allegedly for the sake of fairness, former GAM commanders divided the money allocated to them for distribution amongst those not on the list although as a result, some were accused of corruption and favouritism. There was also a proposal to establish a pension system for the victims but it was never implemented.

The Indonesian government also asked the BRA to assist about 65,000 militias. However, GAM refused since the term was not stated in the MOU. In order to request funds from donors, the Aceh Peace Resources Center (APRC) was established. Money to support the reintegration programs came from the USAID, the European Union, the World Bank, UN agencies, as well as some foreign embassies.

As a way of maintaining its influence among former GAM combatants, GAM formed the Aceh Transition Committee (*Komite Peralihan Aceh* or KPA*)* and transformed itself into a political party, *Partai Aceh* (PA), with the intention of becoming a legal political actor by competing in provincial and local elections. Consequently, former GAM members won and held various government positions from governor down to district levels.

Finally, complaints about the implementation of the peace agreement in Aceh included the obvious shortcomings of post-agreement bodies like the BRA, which did not have the capacity and funds to deliver the objectives tasked to it. Observers claimed it had become something akin to a bank teller, merely doling out cash to victims and former combatants without creating a platform to support long term economic development which would have been more beneficial in the long term and which it had been tasked to do (Radhi et al, 2014). Observers also noted infighting among former GAM leaders and members competing for positions in the new Aceh government which caused factions. At the same time, given their general lack of capacity and knowledge to govern—as leading forces in a jungle and holding an elected post in a state parliament or government are hardly equivalents—it was felt that due care needed to be taken to prepare them for this task. However, the speed of the peace process in Aceh did not allow such care to be taken. The next part will look at the process of normalization in Mindanao.

5.7.2 Case study 8: "Normalization" and the GPH-MILF peace process[24]

The Annex on Normalization agreement was signed between the government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) panels on 25 January 2014 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The agreement was both tied to enactment of the then Bangsamoro Basic Law (BOL), later enacted and signed into law on 27 July 2018, and ratified as the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) or Republic Act No 11054 on 21 January 2019.

Shortly after ratification, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte signed and issued Executive Order No 79 on 24 April 2019 to fully implement the Annex on Normalization. Meanwhile, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), as the transitioning body, also categorized implementation of the GPH-MILF agreements into a political track and a normalization track. The other legal basis for the normalization aspect was the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) signed between the GPH and MILF Panels on 15 October 2012 in Manila, Philippines which stated that, *"Annex on Normalization is an integral part of FAB and outlines and elaborates additional details on Normalization."*

In addition, the Annex on Normalization states that*:*

> *Normalization is a process whereby communities can achieve their desired quality of life [and that it] … aims to ensure human security in the Bangsamoro. It helps build a society that is committed to basic human rights where individuals are free from fear of violence or crime and where long held traditions and values continue to be honoured.*

Such is the importance of normalization in the lives of the Bangsamoro people who have suffered the consequences of armed conflict for the last five centuries.

In essence, the normalization aspect is composed of ten major components: (1) Policing; (2) Transitional components including: the Joint Normalization Committee (JNC), the Joint Peace and Security Committee (JPSC), the Joint Peace and Security Team (JPST), and the Task Force Decommissioning of Combatants Centre (TFDCC) under supervision of the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB); (3) The decommissioning of MILF combatants alongside a needs assessment of their communities as bases for socio-economic programs; (4) Re-deployment of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from the Bangsamoro; (5) Clearing of UXOs and landmines; (6) Disbanding of private armed groups (PAGs); (7) Socio-economic and development programs for BIAF members, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and poverty-stricken communities; (8) Transitional justice and reconciliation based on the recommendations of the Transitional Justice Reconciliation Commission (TJRC); (9) Resource mobilization; and (10) Confidence-building measures that include transforming the six major MILF camps into peaceful and productive communities, issuing pardons and amnesties, and resolving cases of persons charged with or convicted of crimes and offences connected to the armed conflict in Mindanao. In terms of implementation, only the first and second items above can be considered settled. The decision on policing, which was forwarded under the BBL, was denied by the Philippine Congress. Instead a Regional Police Office was established by the Philippine National Police in Bangsamoro.

[24] This section was contributed by Ismael G Kulat, civil society activist and long-time observer of the Mindanao peace process. To contact him, email: ali_ashgar27@yahoo.com? Email add: ali_ashgar27@yahoo.com

At the moment, only the "Decommissioning of MILF Combatants" aspect of the Annex is visible and running, with the target of decommissioning approximately 40,000 combatants by the end of BTA's term in 2022 upon which an Exit Document can be signed. The decommissioning process will be undertaken in four phases as follows: the first phase was seen as a "symbolic decommissioning" involving only 145 MILF forces and 75 firearms and was completed on 16 June 2015; the second phase (2019-2020) involved 30% or 12,000 of its forces and approximately 2,500 firearms; the third phase (2020-2021) comprised 35% or 14,000 of its forces and an estimated 2,800 firearms; and the fourth phase (2021-2022) is set to encompass the final 35% or 14,000 of its forces.

At present, 12,000 forces in the second phase have already gone through the "validation process" and received PHP100,000 in cash as part of a promised package worth over PHP1 million committed to each decommissioned MLF member. Such a promise was pronounced by Naguib Sinarimbo, spokesperson of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in the media when he stated that, *"A package worth PHP100,000 in cold cash, housing, and social services worth PHP 950,000 awaits every Moro combatant set to be decommissioned."*[25] However, confusion arose as regards the remaining PHP950,000 which some decommissioned members thought they would also receive in cash but which a MILF source said was ear-marked for the reintegration process including training, housing, and so on. One decommissioned combatant stated that, *"The second batch decommissioned around 12,000 forces [and] underwent a rigid validation process conducted by IDB Team."* Further, he admitted that while all the decommissioned forces were able to receive the PHP100,000 in cash, *"none of those decommissioned forces was able to receive the committed social package, neither any concrete information on how and when will they be able to avail it"* (Kulat, 2021).

Second, decommissioning also involved a validation of the MILF Forces including "*a needs assessment of Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) members and their communities."* (Annex on Normalization, Item C(3)). So far (in February 2021). To date, this important component of the MILF decommissioning process has not been done.

Third, paragraph 9 of the decommissioning components stated that: *"The decommissioning of MILF forces shall be parallel and commensurate to the implementation of all agreements of the parties."* (Annex on Normalization, Item C(3)).

However, the decommissioning of MILF combatants is the only component being implemented for now with the remaining seven, which were supposed to be running "parallel and commensurate" nowhere to be seen. (Annex on Normalization, Item C(9)).

Next, the gradual re-deployment of AFP forces from Bangsamoro areas which was supposed to take place "parallel and commensurate" to the decommissioning of MILF Forces has again not been forthcoming. Thus, if 30% of MILF forces have been decommissioned, the AFP was expected to redeploy 30% of its forces too. In reality, many places like Sulu and Basilan have experienced an *increase* in military contingents. This is especially true for Marawi City where there is an ongoing plan to establish a large military camp despite vehement opposition by its residents, especially inhabitants of "Ground Zero" who are still living in evacuation centres. Several headlines prove such assertions as can be seen by a Presidential Communications Operations Office release which declared "*President Rodrigo Roa Duterte leads the groundbreaking ceremony of the construction of a military camp at*

[25] Cabrera, F, 'More than P1-million package awaits every decommissioned MILF combatant' Minda News, 27 August 2019, available https://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2019/08/more-than-p1-million-package-awaits-every-decommissioned-milf-combatant/, accessed on 23 September 2021.

the old City Hall in Marawi City on January 30, 2018" [26] and as also reported in the Rappler: "*Duterte creates group to study creation of new military camp in Marawi*." [27] Clearly, such headlines are contradictory to the meaning and spirit of the agreement.

Further, both the disbanding of PAGs and the clearing of UXOs are vital for a return to normalcy in Bangsamoro. Without those components of normalization, peace and security will remain an elusive dream. However, although there has been a noticeable decrease of armed encounters between government forces and the MILF, there are still ongoing military operations in different parts of the territory against other armed elements. On the other hand, increasing cases of *rido* have occurred both within MILF ranks and other armed groups. In short, civilians continue to be displaced due to military operations and other armed conflicts. These should have been deterred if there was to be a "parallel and commensurate" implementation of components of normalization to be followed by a re-deployment of the AFP and a disbanding of the PAGs.

Other lapses in implementation include the non-functioning of bodies proposed to address important issues related to the conflict. For example, the Joint Peace and Security Team (JPST) which was mandated to maintain peace, order, and security in Bangsamoro during the transition period has proved ineffective. In the last two years of the BTA, armed actions, bombings, killings, displacement of civilians, and on and off military operations in pursuit of armed and rido related incidences have occurred. [28] The same goes for the transitional justice and reconciliation component, which was supposed to address historical injustices and respond to legitimate grievances, massive human rights violations, and marginalization through land dispositions committed against the Bangsamoro. Very little has been heard of developments on these matters.

In summary, all remaining seven components of the normalization aspect were considered vital to achieving enduring peace in the Bangsamoro as envisioned by the BOL in its preamble *"to establish an enduring peace."* Sadly, implementation of the majority has not even started despite the BTA term nearing its end. In addition, an effective information system has yet to be established, resulting in rampant speculation about what the process intends and how it is to be implemented. One senior Bangsamoro civil society leader commented he could only speculate on the status of normalization of the GPH-MILF peace agreement (Kulat, 2021). At the same time, he also felt that only a few individuals were handling the process, observing that:

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[26] Presidential Communications Operations Office (PCOO), 'President Duterte leads groundbreaking of new military camp in Marawi' PCOO, 30 January 2018, available at https://pcoo.gov.ph/news_releases/president-duterte-leads-groundbreaking-new-military-camp-marawi/, accessed on 23 September 2021.

[27] Tomacruz, S, 'Duterte creates group to study creation of new military camp in Marawi' Rappler, 20 November 2019, available at https://www.rappler.com/nation/duterte-creates-group-study-military-camp-marawi, accessed on 23 September 2021.

[28] The situation was captured by International Alert news when it reported that:

> Clashes between MILF and MNLF commanders happened in Pikit over several days in April and in Matalam on April 29. There were also clashes in the towns of Sultan Kudarat and Guindulungan on April 12 and May 14 to 15, respectively. Firefight erupted again in the boundary of Pikit and in Pagalungan rom May 7 to 10. Recurring conflict played out between two MILF commanders in Pikit from April to May.

From 'Violence over land intensifies in the Bangsamoro amid pandemic' International Alert News, 24 June 2020, available at https://www.international-alert.org/fr/news/violence-over-land-intensifies-bangsamoro-amid-pandemic?fbclid=IwAR05qBgN4zozteo4GOECJTKtFrkE7P9TWaUpLMVf_lUbSmxMVkudIi3nmVI, accessed on 23 September 2021.

> *Imagine a head of the Joint Normalization Committee who is a member of BTA, at the same time as a Member of Parliament, running two or three Ministries or Offices respectively, and a member of or Chairman of different special bodies and committees, and the like, all at the same time? This is why one Moro intellectual remarked on one occasion that unless they are superhuman, they cannot fulfil all those mandates (Kulat, 2021).*

Finally, some have suggested that the Bangsamoro and their leaders are mostly concentrating on implementation of the political track at the expense of normalization (Kulat, 2021). Based on observations of the situation on the ground, coupled with discussions in the media and public discourse, it seems as if most activities are geared towards the political track – the BTA or the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region. Accordingly, little is being discussed or done about normalization except decommissioning the MILF. This is worrisome because without successful implementation of the components of the normalization track, hope for long-lasting peace in the Bangsamoro will remain a dream. Normalization is necessary to address "*the destruction of the moral fiber of the Bangsamoro*" as a result of centuries of armed conflict, as mentioned in the 9-Point Agenda at the start of GPH-MILF peace talks (Kulat, 2021). Normalization is the solution that will help the Bangsamoro live normal lives again. Thus, proper and complete implementation of the process is crucial. However, it has also been noted that the slow pace of implementation is the fault of both parties, both in the process itself and in the funding of mechanisms and programs. Accordingly, it will need concerted effort from both sides to ensure successful implementation of the normalization process.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter looked at the process of ending conflict. However, ending conflict is not only one action but a combination of actions concerning multiple players and a combination of processes at multiple levels. This chapter mainly examined the peacemaking part of the process as well as the framework surrounding it and emphasized the overlapping nature of the activities and time frames involved.

The political will to resolve such issues is a vital first step towards ending conflicts. Thus, political will starts and sustains the process. The decision to start a formal peace process is almost always accomplished from the top down and can occur for many reasons. Such was the case in Southern Thailand when leaders of the insurgent movement decided if and when they wanted to be part of the process. Sometimes personal transformation is the catalyst as occurred in the Mindanao peace process, when the GPH-MILF process began with initiatives from leaders of both sides. Sometimes it is the context that is transformed which connects to and impacts on other aspects of the conflict, such as in Aceh when contexts in 2003 and especially 2004, resulted in first personal, then group transformation of GAM's leadership. The same is also true of the other side. Government leaders decide if and when they want to be involved in a process. And if and when they want to acknowledge informal initiatives and perhaps upgrade them to 'formal' status. All of this takes time and the same transformational processes as evidenced by the cases studied in this chapter.

The cases also illustrated the 'ripeness' of situations. Although controversial, the concept does have implications as it asks whether enough has been done to transform a conflict. Without the will and the necessary transformation processes, conflicts might not be "ripe for resolution." The same can be said about sustaining processes (which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6). Political will can and should also come from other actors, as discussed in the previous chapter (concerning the roles of civil society and other actors in conflict transformation). This

chapter then discussed insider mediators and peacebuilders in terms of who they are, what they can do to transform a situation, and how they can contribute to the peace process. There are many insider mediators and peacebuilders in the region doing a variety of peace promotion and peace support activities, including building and strengthening the platforms necessary for peace. Building such platforms for peace is especially important and necessary. Activities cover constituency-building, all types of grassroots activities and civil society peacebuilding, including network-building, peace advocacy, peace monitoring, peace education, and interfaith dialogues, all of which are essential to ensure the successful ending of a conflict. To summarize, political will is crucial to ending a conflict and there is a time and place for every action and every actor. Such is why any effort to end a conflict requires two central keys as part of the approach – contingency and complementarity. As such, this chapter analysed the whole process from these two aspects and sought to find a proper balance within and between them.

This chapter also focused on the peace process itself and highlighted various frameworks and steps taken in the process. In addition, it noted that the involvement and role of third-party intervenors has been vital to many conflicts in the region as illustrated by the case studies above. However, many challenges remain outstanding, including:

- An obvious lack of political will, with many parties looking at the process to further certain agendas and not to end conflicts;
- The persistent presence of 'spoilers' and doubters;
- Unclear mandates for third party facilitators/mediators;
- A lack of negotiation capacity on the part of parties to the process;
- The process not being taken seriously and not being added to national agendas;
- Parties having different reasons for being in the process and not being on the 'same page' when they sit and negotiate with each other;
- Hurried and poorly designed agreements;
- A lack of coordination within parties;
- Biased and/or lack of impartiality on the part of third parties;
- A hardening of 'positions' on the part of parties including approaching the negotiating table without an intention to compromise;
- Parties regarding issues as 'non-negotiable'; and
- Parties, especially rebel movements' lack of capacity to be part of the process especially in terms of knowledge, funds, and legitimacy.

All these show how difficult it is to ensure a successful peace process. Peace processes also benefit from the involvement and support of those within and outside conflict areas. While insiders have already been mentioned, outsiders include the international community such as the International Contact Group (ICG) in the Mindanao process, countries and international agencies such as Japan, JICA, and the World Bank which supported development-related programs in conflict areas, as well as international support for peacekeeping and peace monitoring efforts such as the AMM in Aceh and the IMT in Mindanao. These efforts were also crucial to ensure the success of post-agreement implementation activities like disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration or the normalization process. Bringing situations back to normalcy is not an easy task as has been shown by the DDR in Aceh and normalization processes in Mindanao. Finally, continuing the process amid constant challenges is key. Thus, there is a constant need to innovate and address challenges immediately. Such is why the contingency-complementarity approach is important as it encourages analysing a situation from different angles and lenses. Because ending conflicts is a multi-party, multi-task, multi-issue, multi-level, and multi-phase activity. The next chapter will examine how peace can be sustained.

Discussion questions

1. Is there a particular way of ending conflict in Southeast Asia?
2. How do we connect conflict transformation with peacebuilding and peacemaking?
3. How do we ensure the success of a peace process?
4. Who are the main actors involved in a peace process?
5. What are the most important steps in a peace process?
6. Is there a difference in how inter-state and intra-state conflicts are addressed in Southeast Asia?
7. Who makes the best third party intervenors (facilitators/mediators)?
8. What are the main lessons to be learnt from the case studies in this chapter?
9. The following questions have been asked to parties and stakeholders of the Mindanao peace process. They are important for a successful peace process. How would you answer them?
    a. How to satisfy demands for, and resistance to, autonomy, self-determination and separation?
    b. How to accommodate the needs of the minorities, and the insecurities of the majorities, in deeply divided societies?
    c. How to identify, or cultivate, moments in which political rather than military initiatives might be fruitful?
    d. How to deal with spoilers, destabilizing actions, and violence deliberately targeted at derailing peace initiatives?
    e. How to deal with former combatants and their weapons?
    f. How to reconcile a society with its fraught past?
    g. How to realise a peace dividend in terms of jobs, housing, and sustainable development, etc?

Recommended reading

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Chapter 6

Sustaining Peace

Chapter 6: Sustaining Peace

Ichsan Malik [1]

6.1 Introduction

Many years ago, Johan Galtung (1996) reminded us that human relationships are often tainted by self-interest, domination, hostility, and oppression. He went on to say that love and empathy are no longer enough to permanently maintain harmonious relationships (Galtung, 1996). Instead, violence has increasingly become the most frequently used instrument when faced with crises. At the highest levels, such attitudes can lead to war within and between countries. As such, the study of violence has evolved over the years to enable a better understanding of this phenomena (as mentioned previously in Chapters 1 and 2). It would be useful at this point to revisit some of those points of discussion.

The study of violence continues to grow from time to time and from generation to generation. Initially, humans were only familiar with direct violence, such as murder and torture. However, over the years, the definition of violence has evolved beyond direct acts into structural violence, which refers to violence arising from an imbalance of strength, life opportunities, access, and control of resources. Alongside structural violence is the equally harmful cultural violence. Also referred to as symbolic violence, the latter originates from habits and beliefs that have been internalized in communities to justify or legitimize direct and structural violence. Similarly, ecological violence emerges as a result of extractive and exploitative development activities (Galtung, 1996) and includes the production of life-threatening hazardous waste, pollution, and excessive consumption.

In the last two decades, other more headline-grabbing forms of violence have become familiar based on ideologies and religious beliefs which often give birth to extreme violence. Also in this decade, alongside the information revolution, the spectre of virtual violence has grown. Making use of information technology and cyberspace to express violent intent, this form of violence can easily spread and affect all aspects of human life (Malik, 2017). Eliminating all forms of violence is vital to achieve peace, especially positive peace in society. As mentioned in Chapter 1, positive peace occurs where elements of negative peace (i.e. the elimination of direct violence) are combined with other efforts to eliminate all other forms of violence (including structural and cultural violence) leading to the creation of harmonious relations between parties. However, for peace to be sustainable, law and order is crucial combined with a sense of justice, as demonstrated by an institutionalized framework or system to manage and resolve conflict issues within society. Thus, positive peace with a capacity to sustain itself or sustainable positive peace is preferable. The previous chapter examined how conflicts can be resolved and included discussions on the kinds of efforts necessary to ensure peace after an agreement has been signed. DDR or 'normalization' processes are particularly essential to ensure conflicts do not relapse. This chapter intends to reach beyond that stage and argues that to sustain peace, focus on the past and future are necessary.

Sustainable peace can be achieved if preceded by a process of *reconciliation* that seeks to re-humanize opponents and repair damaged relations. While the process of reconciliation is ongoing, strategies (which may involve certain dilemmas) may also be chosen based on 'justice' in order to maintain the 'peace' (Malik, 2017). Following, the need for structurally equitable economic development, a new political order, and

[1] With contributions from Josephine Rosa Marieta Soeprapto, Marc Batac, and Ayesah Abubakar.

policies to restore a damaged ecological environment through re-balancing (peace and development) become paramount. Eventually, a more open, tolerant, equal, and constructive society will be constructed to eliminate cultural violence (gender and peace). These processes and the conditions leading to sustainable peace will be discussed in the sections below.

6.2 Reconciliation

As observed in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia, reconciliation as a concept is widely used in the context of political transitions from authoritarian regimes to democratic governments. This political change is also frequently referred to as a period of transitional justice where reconciliation is defined as a stage whereby former combatants have come to terms with a painful past caused by human rights violations committed by the previous regime.

South Africa is considered a country that has successfully achieved reconciliation. VD Merwe (1999) stated that four main actions were at the core of the reconciliation movement. The first involved "restoring humanity" to all groups, even the perpetrators (including those who had committed serious human rights violations), but especially the victims. Here, human rights and humanity must take priority. Second, reconciliation was seen as an attempt to reorganize a new "moral order." Thus, a "consensus" on the new values deemed useful for managing future life was necessary. Third, a change in attitude and belief had to be engendered to enable people to overcome fear, anger, and revenge, all emotions that can prolong a conflict. Finally, a reorganization of interaction patterns with the enemy group to move towards a mutually beneficial relationship was imperative. As such, conflicting groups had to be willing to take risks in order to accept the new contract and initiate trust.

To comprehensively understand the complexity and perspectives of reconciliation, the reconciliation spectrum must first be understood. Following, the issue of justice—a matter often giving rise to stumbling blocks and dilemmas in the reconciliation process—should be discussed and clarified. Next, there needs to be an appreciation of the psychological phenomenon of competitive victimhood which always surfaces in the reconciliation process. Finally, the actions necessary to achieve reconciliation will be considered.

6.2.1 Reconciliation spectrum

Literature reviews and empirical experiences facilitating reconciliation processes have revealed the broad spectrum of processes known as reconciliation. Over the years, experts have studied reconciliation from various perspectives along this spectrum, including behavioural change, the purpose of reconciliation, and actor involvement.

(a) Reconciliation as a process
According to Bar-Tal (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004), reconciliation is a long and continuous process involving psychological change which includes changing motivations, life goals, and beliefs, attitudes, and emotions. This psychological change process plays a central role and is a necessarily slow process because such changes cannot be forced.

Success, according to Long and Brecke (2003), depends on four factors:

(1) The existence of novelty, which is something new to solve complicated conflicts;

(2) The existence of voluntariness consisting of activities carried out in the spirit of volunteerism;
(3) The existence of vulnerability with an awareness that the reconciliation process is very vulnerable to exploitation; and
(4) The existence of irrevocability or non-contingency where agreements that have been produced can be verified but must be consistently maintained.

The stronger these four factors are, the more successful the reconciliation process will be. By contrast, Kraybill (1995) suggested a reconciliation cycle that drew from his experience in South Africa. There, he thought people had the wrong image of reconciliation – they seemed to see it merely as erasing the dark past instead of as a long and ongoing process. Thus, Kraybill suggested seven stages in the reconciliation cycle (if at the end, reconciliation has not been achieved, the cycle will repeat itself):

(1) The first stage is to build a new relationship. After a conflict, trust no longer exists. Each party must have the courage to take the risk of establishing new relationships. Interactions and information-sharing will help to build trust between the two parties.
(2) The second stage is the occurrence of new injuries. When the expectations of the two parties do not meet, or when one feels insulted, or when one party feels that the other has betrayed them, new psychological scars are formed.
(3) The third stage is withdrawal, which may take the form of physical or emotional withdrawal. This happens after a new injury occurs. Each party evaluates events and its feelings towards the other party. If there is no immediate and appropriate effort to address this or no apology is made, trust will again be lost and the newly built relationship could break.
(4) The fourth stage is reclaiming identity. The first element that is destroyed in a violent conflict is human identity. Identity is fundamental in reconciliation because conflict makes people feel and behave like "demons." Restoring identity includes raising self-awareness as a person and self-affirmation that he or she is a person who is wise and well-behaved.
(5) The fifth stage is an internal commitment to reconciliation. This is a turning point after the withdrawal and restoration of identity. Both parties are rationally aware of the importance of reconciliation.
(6) The sixth stage is the restoration of risk. After the suffering of the past and the emergence of new injuries, parties must have the courage to take the risk to improve relationships. Thus, risk must be restored because it indicates the building of basic capital to restore trust, which will then lead to reconciliation.
(7) The seventh stage is negotiation to meet present needs. Past death, trauma, and abuse must be discussed to find a way to meet present needs. While negotiations about human life seem almost impossible and even more impossible to compensate, it must still be done. Negotiations will only be successful if both parties feel free of oppression. Also, it can only be done in conditions where relationships between individuals/groups are relatively normal.

These seven stages of reconciliation are depicted in Figure 6.1 below:

Figure 6.1 Reconciliation cycle

Source: Kraybill, 1995

(b) Reconciliation as a goal

Lederach (1997) prefers to see reconciliation as a goal and outlines four outputs of reconciliation: (1) *truth*, that is to openly express past events; (2) *mercy*, which is forgiveness that is given to rebuild new relationships; (3) j*ustice* which includes the perpetrator giving restitution or compensation to the victim and social restructuring; and (4) *peace*, which is a realization of a common future, prosperity, and security for all parties.

Similarly, Kriesberg (2007), who has conducted many studies in South Africa, pinpointed four main dimensions of reconciliation, namely: (1) *truth*, where past pain or loss incurred in a group is recognized by one's opponent; (2) *justice*, where those who have been oppressed and who suffered cruelty demand compensation for their suffering; (3) *respect*, where after all the atrocities, both parties demand mutual respect, especially for those who have suffered the most; and (4) *security*, because a sense of security and safety is necessary, especially by those who have suffered in the past. Ideally, all four dimensions should be included in every reconciliation process. However, sometimes contradictions can occur between dimensions because parties may view them differently, especially the justice dimension.

Wessells and Bretherton (2000) considered that reconciliation as a goal varies depending on the context of the conflicting country. Their example, in the context of Australia, is described below:

> *[Reconciliation] entails uncovering and coming to terms with the past, sharing power and correcting injustices, reconstructing collective self-esteem and moving beyond internalized images of inferiority, restoring respect for cultures that the colonial powers had sought to eradicate, and building channels for cooperation and positive development.*

Therefore, it is obvious that although several basic components of reconciliation as a goal can be seen, such as the disclosure of past truths, justice, forgiveness, and a sense of security, each conflict will face different pressures. Some reconciliations may only emphasize forgiveness while others may focus on justice as the overarching goal.

(c) Reconciliation from the perspective of actor involvement
The role of elite political leadership is central to the reconciliation process as it is generally performed formally and is also supported by government policy. However, the process should also not neglect the role of civil society or community groups who tend to champion informal approaches to reconciliation. Based on the approach used, the involvement of actors can be seen from different perspectives – that of political leadership elites and formal processes to community group involvement (Baron, 2008). Hence, reconciliation approaches can be divided into top-down and bottom-up, or grass-roots, processes.

Top-down reconciliation involves political elites, is supported by state policies, and is a formal process. By contrast, bottom-up or grass-roots reconciliation requires the participation of the general public who were usually also victims of the conflict. This approach is more informal or culturally adapted and is therefore not directly supported by state policy.

Grassroots approaches basically adopt the entire spectrum of reconciliation discussed above, namely reconciliation may be seen as a psychological change process and a goal involving all actors in the conflict. Psychological changes include changes in motivation and relationships as well as in life goals, emotions, and beliefs. However, the most important psychological change in grassroots reconciliation concerns the relationship of the parties involved as expressed by Kraybill.

Grassroots reconciliation emphasizes fulfilment of the fundamental needs of all parties, mutual respect for security, cooperation, and the institutionalization of reconciliation. Meanwhile, from the perspective of actor engagement, the grass-roots approach also stresses the role of actors both at the grassroots level and mid-range groups who may have been both direct victims and conflict actors, as revealed by Sen (2009).

As regards the success of reconciliation, the potential level of dissatisfaction especially at the community level is surprising. This was observed by Van der Merwe (1999) in South Africa:

> *[The Truth and Reconciliation Commission's] approach to community reconciliation was essentially top-down. It saw its potential for maximum impacts as changing the relationships between broad categories of people, affecting national values systems, and altering national political dynamics. These changes, it was felt, would be filtered down to the community level. Through holding community (human rights violation) hearings, it was also felt that local communities could, to some extent, be engaged in the process. Local hearings were, however, dominated by the bigger agenda of the [Truth and Reconciliation Commission]. They were not designed with the needs of the various local stakeholders in mind.*

6.2.2 Reconciliation in action

Whilst successfully documenting reconciliation actions at work, Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004) identified at least 12 activities or actions for reconciliation within the framework of achieving sustainable peace. To keep it simple, the twelve actions can be categorized into 4 groups: (1) truth disclosure and justice actions; (2) peace education; (3) development for peace; and (4) cultural and artistic actions for peace.

The four activities in the first group of actions are apology, truth and reconciliation commissions, public trials, and reparation payments. Apology includes asking for forgiveness as a sense of responsibility for all past acts and asking the victims for forgiveness. One example can be seen when FW de Klerk, the former President of South Africa, openly asked for forgiveness in August 1996 for all the pain and suffering caused by the past policies of the South African National Party. The Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) were established to resolve past conflicts with the aim of disclosing the truth on past acts of violence and violations of human rights, in addition to being mechanisms to enforce justice. One of the most famous TRCs was the South Africa TRC of 1995.

The public trials of certain individuals prosecuted for violations of human rights and crimes against humanity were of particular importance. One such example was the trial of perpetrators of the Balkan conflict and genocide at the war crimes tribunal in The Hague. Finally, reparation payments **entails** the provision of compensation to victims as an acknowledgment of guilt and a sense of responsibility. One example can be seen in the compensation offered to victims in Czechoslovakia by the German government for the suffering they experienced during the German occupation from 1939-1945.

The second group of actions (peace education) covers activities such as education, writing a common history, mass media broadcasts, and publicized meetings between representatives of the groups involved. Education is an effective method for initiating reconciliation because such curricula prepare students to live in a peaceful situation. For example, in Northern Ireland, a culture of peace was developed through an educational process. Writing a common history is a useful activity only if parties strive together to compile a history of past violence. This will lead to peace. This activity was performed successfully by Germany and the Czech Republic but failed when Japan, Korea, and China tried to write the history of the Nanking massacre. Mass media can be an effective medium to encourage reconciliation, as well as to provide information about the importance of peace. This approach proved successful in Aceh but failed in Maluku, Indonesia. Finally, the use of publicized meetings between group representatives can be seen when key leaders to conflicts are portrayed shaking hands as a symbol of reconciliation. One such example took place when Benjamin Netanyahu and Yasser Arafat were filmed shaking hands.

In the third group of actions (development for peace), two activities are highlighted: the work of NGOs and joint projects. NGOs or non-government organizations are important because they play a vital role in reconciliation. In general, NGOs are closer to grass-roots groups and can act as facilitators and mediators. Examples of this activity include the *Baku Bae* movement in Maluku, Indonesia, and the work of the IID in the Philippines. Joint projects can take the form of cooperation between communities, elites, or even between countries. For example, in the process of reconciliation between France and Germany, a twin city project was launched, and from 1950-1962, partnerships between 125 cities in France and Germany were created. This was also followed by collaborations between universities in the two countries.

In the fourth group of actions (arts and culture for peace), tourism and cultural exchanges play a crucial role. In particular, tourism is essential for reconciliation because it builds social-psychological relationships between conflicted parties. Through tourism, groups can learn about the culture, history, and economics of their former rivals. Similarly, cultural exchanges in the form of book translations, artist visits, joint productions of movies and television programs, and painting exhibitions can be vital to forge new relationships. One successful example were the cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan.

6.2.3 Competitive victimhood in reconciliation

In addition to forgiveness and justice for victims that are personal in nature, another pertinent issue between victims or relationships between groups of victims was coined by Noor et al (2008). *Competitive victimhood* encompasses subjective mutual claims between two groups of victims asserting that one group has suffered more than another (out-group). Such claims also proclaim which group was treated unfairly by the others. Thus, competitive victimhood is considered an important predictor to achieve forgiveness between conflicting groups. Other predictors include common ingroup identity and empathy.

The study by Noor et al (2008) on the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Chile found that when one party felt less victimized, the level of out-group trust increased and raised the possibility of forgiveness between groups. On the other hand, if victimhood competition increases, the identification of in-groups also increases, leading to a more subjective evaluation of past violence making forgiveness between groups less achievable. This study found no significant relationship between empathy and victimhood competition or that empathy was associated with forgiveness between groups.

In conclusion, the study also found that no group should feel it has suffered the most and that all must be considered to have experienced similar levels of suffering because trust in outgroups and the role of empathy are vital. By contrast, Doorn (2008) argued that reconciliation should not be preceded by forgiveness because forgiveness only becomes truly possible when victims and perpetrators find a sense of self-worth and acknowledge the existence of other groups. Only in this way can the long process to build new relationships be achieved, thereby leading to reconciliation. In other words, victims should respect themselves and believe that everyone can change thereby enabling former perpetrators of violence to one day become partners.

Bartal (2004) suggests that the most important and fundamental psychological change required is a change in belief, especially the beliefs of conflicting societies (societal beliefs). Hence,

> *Reconciliation in the psychological framework refers to a societal-cultural process that encompasses the majority of society members, who form new beliefs about the former adversary, about their own society, and about the relationship between the two groups. It is not a formal process, because it requires a change of societal beliefs.*

Changes in societal belief will cause a change in ethos in the community, from one of conflict to an ethos of peace which, according to Bar-Tal, lies at the core of the reconciliation process. These include the presence of new goals in the community to live side-by-side, changes in stereotyping opponents so they can be seen as unique fellow human beings, objectivity about opposing groups, reducing feelings of victimhood, and critically viewing shared histories. Only then will new relationships be forged and peace reign.

For example, a study conducted by Oren and Bar-Tal (2006) showed a change in ethos of conflict in Israeli society, confirming that ethos is at the centre of people's beliefs and hence, their social identity. Thus, shared beliefs in a community creates a picture of the surrounding world and helps develop a sense of belonging and social cohesion. In addition, ethos changes as social identity changes because society is not static but will change as a result of new experiences. In Israel, Oren and Bar-Tal discovered that the peace process had changed the ethos of the community. As a result, Israeli society now has new symbols and new collective memories at the basis of its social identity.

Based on the above description, we can conclude that victims, both as individuals and groups, must first make peace with themselves. Ideally, victims should see all conflict incidents holistically and evaluate all conflict events objectively to increase respect for themselves and to respect the existence of other groups. They must also subscribe to a new belief that two conflicting parties will once again be able to live together in peace.

6.3 Justice and peace

Justice is a very crucial element of peace. Indeed, Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (2010) perceives justice to be the base or platform for peace. Thus, peace without justice cannot be peace and will likely collapse. Due to its importance, it is therefore necessary for justice and its related issues or dilemmas to be clearly defined.

To gain a comprehensive understanding of justice in the context of peace, the actors or parties involved must first be identified. There are three groups of actors: (1) the offender or perpetrator group (consisting of those who committed wrongdoings and crimes in the conflict/war); (2) the victim group (consisting of those who became victims and suffered during the conflict/war); and (3) the affected group (consisting of those who received both the effects and destructive impacts of the conflict/war).

By focusing our attention on certain actors, the violent relations which developed during conflicts, and the strengths and weaknesses of the actors involved, the two most important definitions of justice in the context of conflict and peace can be identified – *retributive justice* and *restorative justice* (Jeong, 2010; Rivera, 2009).

In *retributive justice*, the focus is primarily on the offenders or perpetrators. Therefore, their crimes and related penalties are given the most attention. The motivation for revenge and the desire to mete out the maximum punishment possible is justified in retributive justice. The slogan for criminal penalties thus applied is, “You hurt us so we will hurt you. A life for a life, an eye for an eye.” As such, law enforcement or conflict resolution is performed through human rights court mechanisms or the international court established by international institutions.

By contrast, *restorative justice* focuses more on the victims, with the main focus on repairing relationships between victims, offenders, and the community. This approach concerns broken and damaged relationships as a result of conflict situations. Restorative justice thus emphasizes “healing after being wounded” and is therefore a healing process. Restorative justice is ideal to discuss apology and forgiveness and contributes greatly towards reconciliation and conflict resolution.

Hamber (2009) proposed three types of justice be included in the reconciliation process. First, distributive justice, where decisions or considerations are given appropriately or proportionately to victims. In the reconciliation process, victims may receive truth and reparations, while perpetrators may receive amnesty. However, where perpetrators are much stronger socially, politically, and economically, a power disparity between victims and perpetrators may cause the former to feel a sense of injustice.

The second type of justice is procedural where procedures and processes are carried out honestly and openly. In this case, the “voice” of the victim will absolutely be heard and accommodated. Consistency and sensitivity are required in the process of procedural justice. Consequently, procedural justice is designed to improve the victim’s self-esteem.

Finally, interactional justice denotes decisions and considerations that reflect a respect for dignity and mutual respect. This justice links particularly to social relationships and respect for group identity.

As put forward by Martin Luther King Jr, peace and justice are intimately intertwined. Therefore, the various conditions of justice and also the actors involved in the process will offer a clear blueprint on how justice can be implemented to resolve conflicts and bring about peace with all of its consequences.

6.3.1 Justice dilemma[2]

The focus on victims and perpetrators of violence is always foremost in any study on conflict. In some political conflicts such as in South Africa, the division between victims and perpetrators is clear. But where the major source of conflict is a difference in religious identities, such as in Northern Ireland or Maluku, Indonesia, the division between victims and perpetrators becomes blurred.

Such is the characteristic of an *intractable identity conflict* as suggested by Coleman (2006). In this type of conflict, all levels of society are involved. Because everyone is a conflict actor, everyone can also become a victim. Moreover, victims may be perpetrators of the conflict too. As individual victims, a person may lose his/her family due to the conflict that he/she is involved in, but when he/she attacks the other party in retaliation, said victim may also become a perpetrator.

As a result, two conflicting issues arise: forgiveness and justice. As to the former, at some point, victims will need to overcome their bitterness because negative emotions conflict with the need to restructure the future. Meanwhile, the obligation to punish perpetrators (retributive justice) may conflict with the need for victims to recover (restorative justice). These two issues have not yet been successfully brought together in the reconciliation process.

However, Hamber (2007) also argues that overcoming bitterness related to conflict is only an illusion for victims, that it is actually unfair to force them to forgive and forget – in other words, as Hamber notes, such urging may engender fake or false reconciliation. Further, as Hamber puts it,

> *Victims of political violence often reject the concept of forgiveness because they equate it with pardoning, whereas others think forgiving might mean forgetting, something they are not prepared to do given their suffering.*

During an in-depth study of forgiveness in the context of religion, national interests, and asymmetric and momentum strengths, Auerbach (2004) observed a fundamental dilemma related to forgiveness and past memories, one which manifests in the question who is the 'victim' and who is the 'perpetrator.' The question can of course be argued powerfully by either side.

In terms of the dilemma or conflict between a victim's past memories and forgiveness in reconciliation, the concept of justice might seem an appropriate meeting point for conflict victims. Theoretically, justice is considered an expression of mutual respect from one group to another. Without justice, there is no respect, and without respect, there is no justice. Accordingly, justice is an expression of mutual respect for other groups, while violent conflict is a form of injustice that takes the form of loss of life, discrimination, expulsion, exclusion, and dehumanization. The process of reconciliation essentially re-humanizes humans.

[2] Parts of this section were contributed by Marc Batac, Program Coordinator for GPPAC-SEA and Deputy Director for the Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID).

The debates pitting peacemaking against justice and accountability have created tension between peacemakers and justice practitioners. Often, the debate centres around whether or not peace or justice should take precedence, and, if so, why? If one seeks full accountability and the criminal prosecution of aggressors, would old wounds be reopened and violence be re-ignited? On the other hand, if some form of immunity from prosecution is allowed via a politically negotiated settlement, wouldn't this lead to a culture of impunity resulting once again in an unsustainable peace?

However, the dichotomy between peace and justice is based on a narrow understanding of both concepts. First, the debate neglects to mention that peace means more than just a cessation of immediate and direct violence, but also encompasses structural forms of violence. Peace, when understood as an enduring and long-term goal, goes beyond the narrow definition of immediate cessation of direct violence, instead relying on justice and accountability to ensure sustainability. Where mass crimes, especially those enforced and perpetrated by state actors are not addressed, or where victim-survivors' calls for justice are ignored, or where the roots of a conflict are not understood, the danger of violence reoccurring remains high. At the same time, the retributive and legal aspects of justice, which focus on punishing offenders and improving and implementing laws, fail to take into account restorative and relational justice, which focus on the relationship between offenders and victims, and on the promotion or restoration of cooperative behaviour, agreement, negotiation, or dialogue among actors in society.

Second, the debate ignores the fact that every conflict is unique, and therefore, no one-size-fits-all approach can possibly be of use. And finally, following the context-specific nature of conflicts, such debates neglect the importance of personal experience – that what constitutes peace and justice emanates from one's own experiences. Therefore, the aspirations of the oppressed and victim-survivors should take precedence over the perception and standards of outsiders. For example, a conversation on justice should not begin with a Geneva-based international intergovernmental organization's idea of what is just and good for a particular society including what solutions should be imposed; rather, such conversations should be anchored on the existing capacities of communities to determine their own creative solutions.

For the past several years, we have seen a marked shift towards understanding the interrelation of peace and justice as mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive. This is due to a deeper and broader understanding of these two concepts in the fields of international justice and peacemaking. For example, a recent milestone marking the international community's realisation that peace and justice are complementary and interlinked, can be seen in Sustainable Development Goal 16 which refers to "*peaceful and inclusive societies*," "*access to justice for all*," and "*effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions*."

While societies may fall apart and states may fail to achieve the aspirations of local and grassroots-led peacebuilding organizations and advocates, the above notion has long been understood by those on the ground. Those experiencing violence and injustice have seen first-hand the difficulties of building just societies. They also understand that peace is unsustainable when oppressive relationships remain and justice is but a dream. This 'marriage' of the goals of peace and justice has been forged by the work of advocacy and peacebuilding organizations around the world such as the Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID), a 33-year old Philippines-based regional advocacy institution in Southeast Asia.

At the core of its work is a commitment to support people-to-people solidarity for local strategies not only to engender conflict transformation and human security, but also to support the protection and promotion of human rights and the self-

determination of minoritized communities across Southeast Asia and beyond. Beyond achieving ceasefires and peace pacts, IID believes we should tackle the much larger question of how to build more just societies. Justice is not merely dispensed through legislation or court rulings. Instead, it is experienced either positively or negatively through the quality of opportunities, behaviours, and relationships across different sections of society, and measured from the point of view of those in the margins of society.

We know that societies fall apart and states fail to achieve peace because, for example, certain relations and policies exclude some from decision-making and deny access to resources. The fundamental question centres on power – how it is built, shared, exercised, and to what ends it is wielded, whether to oppress and divide, or to engender dignity and trust across all sections of society. And for IID, the search for an answer begins by speaking to those most marginalized and helping them to build alternative pockets of power by encouraging solidarity, narratives, aspirations, ideas, solutions, and action. In so doing, it can be argued that this will not only transform conflict situations and promote peace-building, but also help to sustain peace.

6.4 Peace and development[3]

Peace and development are complementary, akin to two sides of the same coin. There can be no sustainable peace without development and development would definitely not be possible without some form of peace. As reconciliation progresses, efforts to rebuild all economic, political, security, and environmental structures should be implemented.

The significance of these two aspects is reflected in the Institute for Economics and Peace's Global Peace Index which declares the highest ranking countries in the world to be Iceland and New Zealand. These two nations enjoy a peaceful environment with minimal structural violence and welfare is distributed evenly throughout the population. Since the index was established in 2008, Iceland has always ranked at the top of the list. As such, the attainment of positive peace through, for example, better government policies, better business practices, and the importance of human rights has become a main concern of Icelanders. This is also reflected in policies that have eliminated structural and cultural violence in the country. Moreover, Iceland also has a policy of no involvement in the race to procure lethal weapons.

Likewise, New Zealand has benefitted from a reconciliation process between its indigenous Maori population and Western settlers. Accordingly, the government acknowledges the cultures of all communities in New Zealand. In addition, it cooperates openly with all parties, and boasts an harmonious balance between humans and the environment, thus avoiding ecological violence. The characteristics mentioned above can be seen as indicators for the realisation of development in post-conflict areas and as a road map to rebuild areas affected by conflict to bring about lasting peace.

6.4.1 The development perspective

Development can occur at *macro*, *meso*, and *micro* levels. The former regards society at its broadest level (interaction between nations) while the second involves groups or communities. Micro level development focuses on small groups or even individuals. Social, economic, and political development at all three levels should be taken into consideration when a society is ready to rebuild after a conflict. However, development can only be conducted in a peaceful environment. In Indonesia,

[3] This section was contributed by Josephine Rosa Marieta Soeprapto, Indonesia Defense University.

development at all three levels has occurred and serves to show how such processes can contribute to a sustainable peace.

Development at the macro level contributes to structural changes in society. In Indonesia, for example, structural changes can be found in the Aceh Peace Process in 2005 which resulted in the implementation of *Sharia* law, and also in Ambon through the incorporation of a peace curriculum in the local education system. It is argued that financial incentives, through development, should be part of other changes thereby fostering the reconciliation process in the community.

The case of Ambon demonstrates the importance of meso intervention. Social contacts and interaction between conflict groups are important for reconciliation and polarized groups should be able to meet in safe and conducive environments. As such, the Baku-Bae market (a place where Muslim and Christian women can trade for basic necessities) in Ambon was rebuilt.[4] Economic and social factors also contributed to the success of the program.

At the micro level, it is imperative to understand the role of individuals in instigating conflict or even in bringing peace and development to a community. This is aptly illustrated by the case of Ali Fauzi Manzi, the youngest brother of Amrozi and Ali Gufron, who gained notoriety for bombing several nightclubs in Bali in 2002. As an ex combatant, he trained in Afghanistan and spent three years in a Filipino prison for carrying out a terrorist attack. As such, he was radicalized and had embraced a culture of violence, yet somehow, he became de-radicalized by the humanistic approach of Indonesia's police authority and as a result, embraced a culture of peace. Through education, Ali Fauzi cemented his position by exposing new perspectives on convicted terrorists and combatants in Indonesia. To date, Ali Fauzi and his Foundation of Peace Circle has facilitated hundreds of ex-terrorists and ex-combatants to reintegrate themselves into society (Evi, 2020).

To rebuild areas damaged by conflict and to achieve the goal of sustainable peace, it can therefore be seen that an integrative approach to macro, meso, and micro level development is key. Peace without development will not last long and development cannot be achieved without peaceful conditions. The above three examples clearly illustrate the importance of development at all levels in society.

6.4.2 Roadmap

What should be built and achieved after conflict? Should attention be focused on improving the economic welfare of society? Or is the issue of political justice (which is often the main source of conflict) more important? Or should other marginal issues be tackled first such as the destruction of environmental aspects? Of course, actual decision-making will depend on who finally comes to power after the conflict. Thus, four crucial elements must be considered as part of post-conflict development frameworks – the economy, justice, the environment, and leadership.

To be prosperous again after continuous violent conflict is certainly the dream of every post-conflict society. This essentially requires ex-combatants to find employment again. For instance, farmers could return to the land and factory workers could return to factories. Such a move requires adjustment. However, markets that were damaged or even destroyed will eventually be busy again and long stagnant industries will produce again. At the same time, economic principles must be integrated with the peace-building process amid gradual change whilst taking care to adapt to the new context and situation. Such integration must therefore include the participation of conflict actors and victims.

[4] See the case study on Baku Bae in Chapter 5.

Justice is the most sensitive issue during peacebuilding and will be directly related to the new government and new political structures. Also in need of restructuring are the security sectors and educational institutions while respect for human rights must be encouraged. The restructuring of new political structures must be carried out carefully – many post-conflict societies became trapped in the dynamics of manipulative power politics, which in turn can trigger internal conflict. A democratic life that fully respects human rights is the hope of every post-conflict society, although sometimes the theory remains theoretical, because new rulers may quickly become new oppressors. The defence and security sectors must receive attention whilst avoiding discrimination and repression.

The natural environment is usually less of a concern during peacebuilding as revamping the economy usually takes precedence. Indeed, there is even a tendency for destructive development projects to be approved at this stage despite its adverse effects including pollution, excessive consumption, and dangerous waste from factories.

Leadership is vital to sustaining peace. South Africa's experience with Nelson Mandela proves that strong leadership does equate to long-lasting peace. Of course the process is by no means easy but a strong inspirational leader can sustain peace by, for example, inviting those trapped by painful past conflicts to help build their future. By contrast, leaders who are oriented to the past, usually fail to bring about peace.

The difficulties of achieving all these goals can be illustrated by the case of Aceh (see the background to Aceh's conflict in Chapter 4). As a province of Indonesia, Aceh has long been in conflict with the Indonesian government. The situation was made worse when a tsunami hit the region on 26 December 2004, killing almost 200,000 and destroying nearly 60% of its infrastructure. One of the root causes of the conflict in Aceh was poverty and under-development. Despite being rich in natural resources, Aceh's poverty rate was higher than other provinces in Indonesia. In 2002, the World Bank recorded its poverty rate at 29.8%, the highest for any province (The World Bank Office Jakarta, 2008).

On 15 August 2005, the conflict which had lasted for almost three decades ended with the signing of a peace agreement between the government and the Free Aceh Movement in Helsinki, Finland. The Helsinki MoU, as the agreement was termed, called for the following: decommissioning and demobilization of the armed forces on both sides; the reintegration of former combatants; political participation for GAM, including the right to establish local political parties; relocation of military forces out of Aceh; respect for human rights; amnesty for political prisoners; and a dispute settlement mechanism. Both parties have shown strong political will to honour the process. After the peace agreement, the poverty rate in Aceh declined, reaching 17% in 2014, while its human development index rose to 73.1 in 2013 from 69.1 in 2005 (The World Bank Office Jakarta, 2008).

Aceh serves as an example of how peace can be sustained through political will and by improving public welfare. The road map for the political, economic, and cultural development of Aceh was detailed in the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA) which expanded on the points made in the Helsinki agreement. On the political aspect, many Acehnese leaders including those from GAM were mainly focused on political development and struggled for regional leadership. Various local and national parties also tried to accommodate the former combatants. Local parties have mostly dominated politics and positions in Aceh since 2005, with former GAM members becoming governors and *Partai Aceh* (Aceh Party), which was created by GAM, controlling the provincial parliament. However, there were setbacks in moving forward. As a result of mismanagement and corruption by local officials, the economy of Aceh has not progressed as planned. Some even say that Aceh has become one

of the most corrupt provinces in Indonesia (Laksamana, 2005). This perception of Aceh worsened when even Irwandi Yusuf, the former GAM leader who became the Governor of Aceh, was charged with bribery by the court (Jakarta Post, 2019). Aceh has also been criticized for implementing *Sharia* law which is deemed harsh and discriminatory towards women (Human Rights Watch, 2010).

With reference to the level of development, Aceh also illustrates the importance of intervention at those levels. At the micro level, actors able to contribute to the process of rebuilding were identified. Former GAM combatants were re-integrated into the political and social systems through the work of the Body for Reintegration in Aceh (BRA,) and other agencies. At the meso level, communities used their social capital to resolve issues. For example, the local method of reconciliation known as "*Pesijeuk*" was used to resolve outstanding issues and reconcile conflicting parties in the community. Trusting in their local and informal leaders has served as social capital to bring about change to communities. At the macro level, the new LoGA was introduced and subsequently implemented as part of the roadmap towards the promotion of development and sustainable peace in Aceh. Despite a number of challenges, at least a roadmap to guide the process was adopted. Its success or failure depends entirely on the Acehnese people themselves.

6.4.3 The Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA)[5]

The Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) was created by the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (GPH-MILF) during peace negotiations in 2002. The establishment of the BDA was formalized by the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 – Implementing Rules and Regulation signed on 22 May 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. As part of a confidence-building measure between the parties, it allowed the MILF to establish its own development arm. The BDA's mandate is to plan and implement community-based projects in conflict areas. These projects were to be funded by government and donor organizations. However, the BDA was not birthed without difficulty – first, it is not a legal entity or a government, as such, it cannot accept funding directly nor can it be involved in legal transactions. As a result, the BDA planned and consulted with communities on the kind of development projects most needed in their areas, then worked with the government or donor-appointed NGOs to implement these projects in partnership with conflict-affected communities. Along the way, the BDA's modality increased trust between the MILF and conflict-affected communities as regards the peace process. In a way, humanitarian and development-oriented activities of the BDA became part of the peacebuilding process while peacemaking was ongoing. Also, the existence of BDA proved two arguments: that the MILF was not averse to development and that the government was not using development as a counter-insurgency strategy, both of which were public perceptions during that period.

In 2005, the World Bank, through the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) and the BDA accomplished the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA). This JNA presented the key causes of the conflict in Mindanao as its main contribution to the peace process – understanding how injustice, not poverty, was the root cause of the conflict. Moreover, in 2006, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) engaged with the BDA during the Consolidation for Peace (COP) meeting held in Penang, Malaysia. It was in this meeting that BDA suggested that JICA work with them through the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP). Thus, in 2008, JICA and BDA launched the Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction (J-BIRD) programme. Throughout BDA's partnership with donor agencies and the government, it has also developed and practiced its own social preparation program. This is known as the "Values Transformation Training" (VTT)

[5] This section was contributed by Ayesah Abubakar, Borneo Research Institute, Universiti Malaysia Sabah.

program. The VTT is taught to BDA communities as a philosophy and values system to be practiced in development planning and implementation.

The culminating contribution of the BDA was the drafting of a Bangsamoro Development Plan (BDP) launched in 2015. The BDP introduced a development framework that reinforced the approach of sustainable human development and peacebuilding as key to achieving durable peace in Bangsamoro. This was accepted as an important approach for development planning to address the effects of long years of armed violence and conflict in these communities. The strategy based on the approach of sustainable human development plans followed six thematic areas: (1) Economy and livelihood; (2) Social services – education, health, social protection, housing, water, and sanitation; (3) Infrastructure – support to the economy, social services, cultural development, the environment; (4) Culture and identity; (5) Environment and natural resources; and (6) Governance – politics, justice, peace, and security. In addition, the themes of gender, children, peace, and food security were included as cross-cutting themes in the development plan.

In March 2019, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) commenced as a new government. While the BARMM embarked on its first official government development planning exercise, nonetheless, it utilized the Bangsamoro Development Plan as a resource and guide in crafting a new plan for this region. Moreover, the VTT – as a contribution of the BDA, has become a more attractive social preparation method and choice for BARMM and all its partners in the implementation of development programs. On the other hand, the BDA, while not a part of BARMM, continues to work closely with its agencies, donor organizations, and conflict-affected communities during this post-agreement phase in the Bangsamoro peace process. This is an important contribution to the process of sustaining peace in Mindanao.

6.5 Gender and peace

Denial of the right to food, health, education, and social life for women and girls in areas of direct armed violent conflict is still a common phenomenon (Mazurana and McKay, 2001). Women and girls deserve respect and recognition of their basic rights. Accordingly, the global community and society in general must firmly reject abuse, direct violence, cultural violence, and structural violence that victimizes women.

In a violent conflict, women may not only be victims but can also become the perpetrators. Therefore, the optimum contribution of women to peace efforts is highly significant. The reality shows that violent conflict is never gender-neutral although women and children tend to suffer more than other groups in society. In principle, it must be agreed from the start by all parties that women should not be marginalized, and that their positions and roles must be recognized. As such, there should be equal room for men and women to be fully involved in the peace-building process.

Nevertheless, we must admit that not all parties are willing to accommodate the role of women in peacebuilding. In a patriarchal culture, where important decisions are made and carried out by men, there is undoubtedly a process of marginalization or even elimination of the roles of women. This is especially apparent in post-conflict situations where crises still exist. In this type of situation, those who can benefit from the crisis, usually men, will almost definitely take full advantage of the situation.

Sustainable peace demands the role of all interested parties through their full involvement. In order to facilitate the full participation of women, the first step is to gender mainstream peace-building by making sure that women are involved in

every single step of the peace-building process. The next step is to consolidate and support women's' networks to encourage greater involvement in the implementation of peace-building. Finally, advocacy for UN resolution 1325, which directly leads to sustainable peace, should be performed.

6.5.1 Gender mainstreaming

The perspective on women's involvement, role, and position in peace-building as well as the ideology behind women's involvement in peace-building is something that should be accepted to avoid repetition of the same mistakes. From the beginning, Mansour Fakih (2013) warned about the "problematic ideology" of "women in development (or WID)." Although WID is widely adopted by international UN agencies, many NGOs plunge women into a vicious circle of helplessness, whereas through "gender and development" (GAD), women are empowered and even able to become agents of change (Fakih, 2013).

The perspective of women in development assumes that the root cause of women's problems is the low quality of available resources which results in an inability to compete with men in society, including peace-building efforts. Accordingly, efforts must be made to eliminate discrimination hindering the education of women. This approach to efficiency and poverty alleviation has become mainstream yet efforts to educate women and eliminate discrimination have proven unsuccessful to eliminate injustice for women, only producing short-term and non-transformative changes.

Gender and development perspectives do not only focus on women but also include men. This approach does not blame the victims of injustice nor does it focus too much on women. At its core lies in a common understanding. The problem of women lies in the WID ideology adopted by both women and men which is influential in policy-making, eventually leading to gender bias or gender blindness. As a result of gender-biased policies and development, many development results impact women and men differently. GAD, on the other hand, makes full use of gender analysis which focuses attention on the structural injustice caused by gender beliefs that are rooted and hidden in, for example, community traditions, religious beliefs, and development planning policies. Injustice due to belief is manifested in various actions including the marginalization of women in development, the subordination of women, stereotyping the female gender, violence against gender, and excessive workloads for women.

Thus, gender analysis becomes a gender mainstreaming perspective for peace-building. The definition of gender mainstreaming, according to Schirch and Sewak (in Van Tongeren et al, 2005), concerns not simply the involvement of women in peace-building activities but also focuses on how governments, NGOs, security forces, and international organizations have always used a gender lens in every peace-building activity, whether planning, implementation, or evaluation as depicted below.

Figure 6.2 Three key steps to mainstream gender in peace-building



Source: Schirch and Sewak, 2005

Gender Analysis. An analysis must be carried out, starting from the planning process to the implementation and evaluation stages of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. In initial planning, significant differences between men and women are sometimes neglected. Gender analysis requires data on how war and violent conflict impact the two genders differently, including the division of labour between men and women. Women must be involved in peacekeeping activities, peace talks, mediation, and grassroots reconciliation from the start.

Gender Equality. The goal of gender equality must be valued by all peace actors. Gender equality refers to equal opportunities, resources, and respect between men and women. This does not mean men and women should be the same, but that they should live and work on equal terms. The peacebuilding program will contribute to gender equality when it becomes an integral goal of every aspect of the program and not one that simply includes some women in some development projects. Communities still unable to provide equal access, opportunities, and resources to women must use affirmative action to ensure the goal is reached.

Gender Representation. Peacebuilding activities must fully involve women and women's organizations at every stage of their activities. Women leaders and their organizations need access to all peacebuilding actors to present their analysis and ideas, as well as to channel their energy for peace-building activities. Women are very effective in building bridges between various organizations and ethnic groups, gathering information, and setting priorities and strategies especially to tackle issues of violence against women. Hence, we have to admit that solidarity among women's groups is indeed high.

6.5.2 Women's group networks

The destructiveness of violent conflict and the complexity of peace-building efforts requires the contribution of individuals and community groups both as the perpetrators and victims of conflicts. Women's group networks comprise one of the potential groups needed to achieve sustainable peace. According to Schirch and Sewak (2005), women's groups have proven themselves easier to cooperate with and easier to work with. At the same time, they care less for hierarchies, are more creative, and can work in stressful situations. This is based on their observations of several women's groups, including the Argentinean Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo, Liberian Women's Mass Action for Peace, and the Save Somali Women and Children group.

Another interesting finding from women's groups in Jammu and Kashmir (Gupta and Gopinath, in Van Tongeren et al (2005) concerns their ability to break the deadlock in peace-building processes. For example, the bloody conflict between Muslims,

Hindus, and Sikhs in Kashmir led to a wave of distrust, resentment, and trauma that almost eliminated any opportunity for peace. Despite this, at the refugee camp in Samanbal, women's groups met and shared their hopes, joys, and sorrows. Through dialogue, a mutual understanding that no "one truth" existed was able to arise along with the realisation that the peace-building process was about finding common truths.

Healing trauma caused by violent conflict is one of the most important activities of the peacebuilding process. Women's groups usually take the lead in this field. Psychosocial activities for women and children, peer group counselling, joint recreation activities, and choir and art activities are some of the main undertakings in trauma healing carried out by women's groups. Women's groups have also conducted research related to such trauma, and have held conferences and carried out advocacy activities with the aim of helping conflict victims to recover.

Other activities are related to community economic recovery. For example, the Caring Women's Movement in Maluku, Indonesia developed a joint market for conflicting Muslim and Christian groups. At that time, the community was segregated based on religion. The joint market allowed traders from two conflicting communities to reconcile after a religion-based violent conflict in Maluku. The market continued to grow as the dialogue intensified leading to growing trust and empathy between the two conflicting communities.

The examples above illustrate that the contribution of women's groups has been significant in sustaining peace activities; therefore, such groups need support to increase their role. Various future meetings to share best practices and lessons learned from different conflict situations at the national, regional, and global levels are still relevant and urgent. UN agencies, regional agencies, governments, and NGOs need to continue to support women's networks so they can coordinate and consolidate their strength to speak more loudly for peace-building efforts.

6.5.3 Advocacy for UN Resolution 1325

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) affirms the integration of women and women's groups into conflict prevention and peace-building programs. Although the United Nations has made efforts to expand the role of women in some fields and eliminate the stigma thereof, many parties still reject the role of women in the peace process. In general, there is undoubtedly still a lack of recognition of the importance of women's roles in peace. However, thanks to the hard work of such groups, especially the Coalition on Women and International Peace and Security that has become the main lobbying force, UNSCR 1325 was finally adopted on 30 October 2000.

There are four main pillars to UNSCR 1325: (1) women's participation, (2) protection, (3) prevention, and (4) relief and recovery. The intention of the first pillar is to increase women's participation in all aspects of decision-making at the national, regional, and international levels and includes mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Moreover, such participation should also embrace peace negotiations and peace operations, the latter of which could see women taking on the role of soldiers, police, and even as special representatives of the UN secretary-general. The second pillar of protection refers to the protection of women and children from sexual violence and gender-based violence, including in emergency situations such as refugee camps. The third pillar of prevention aims to improve the strategy of interventions to prevent violence against women, including prosecuting those who violate or who are responsible for the occurrence of such violence (which is in itself a violation of international law). Prevention also seeks to strengthen women's rights in national laws and supports those peace initiatives and conflict resolution processes carried out by women. Finally, relief and recovery aims

to advance measures to overcome international crises through a gender lens and includes designing refugee camps that take into account the needs of women and children. In other words, the purpose of this pillar is to ensure the comfort and safety of women and children in the midst of war or refugee camps.

It is expected that UNSCR 1325 will encourage male leaders and combatants to listen to and pay more attention to the opinions of a wider range of parties especially women. Men often ignore discussions on inequality and the impact of conflicts especially in relation to women. Peacebuilding programs should pay attention to how women and men can work together to enable optimum contributions to sustainable peace and security. UNSCR 1325 is a global commitment to ensure the systematic and sustainable involvement of women and children in peace-building and security efforts. A global spirit is needed to achieve the ideals of UNSCR 1325. As such, the UN Secretary-General has ensured that women now participate in all senior leadership levels within the UN body. In 2018, 72 countries, including Indonesia, formed National Action Plans to implement the values of UNSCR 1325.

6.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, several important concepts and conditions of sustaining peace were noted especially the realisation that sustainable peace depends on a complete reconciliation process. Efforts to re-humanize victims and perpetrators and the emergence of new values opposing violence seek to guarantee sustainable peace. However, the problem of competitive victimhood still lurks as demonstrated by the Maluku peace process (Malik, 2017). It should also be noted that there are still vulnerabilities in the relationship between justice and peace with human rights activists continuing to suspect that restorative justice merely serves to preserve impunity for offenders/perpetrators. As such, they argue that offenders should be prosecuted for the crimes they have committed.

It has also been seen that rebuilding societies destroyed by conflict is not an easy matter. Which should be rebuilt first: the economy, political systems and structures, or a culture of peace? While there has been a tendency for many conflict areas to build political systems first ahead of restructuring the economy, such strategies have failed to improve the welfare of post-conflict communities. In addition, this chapter emphasized the role of women in post-conflict development and in ensuring sustainable peace. As such, equal comprehensive involvement and participation in peace-planning and implementation, increased access between women and men, and improved representativeness of women or women's groups in peace activities should become fundamental principles in the future.

Finally, it should be noted that the role of civil society organizations, regional organizations, and international organizations is essential to promote sustainable peace-building activities and initiatives. Efforts by organizations such as the IID in promoting solidarity and dialogues for peace have contributed to reconciliation and peace in East Timor, Myanmar, and Mindanao and should continue to be supported. The same goes for the efforts of the BDA in Mindanao and ASEAN-IPR's support for WPS's agenda through the AWPR. Most importantly, the key component of all these efforts is collaboration, a keyword for ensuring sustainable peace.

Discussion questions

1. Why is the Southeast Asian region still vulnerable to socio political conflicts, even though reconciliation efforts have been made in various conflict areas?
2. How do we sustain peace after conflict resolution?
3. Why is community involvement and participation vital to the reconciliation process?
4. Why is justice sometimes seen as incompatible with peace? Which is more important in Southeast Asia?
5. How does the restorative justice approach contribute to long-term peace?
6. How has the women's movement contributed to sustainable peace in the region?
7. Are religious and ethnic differences still a source of conflict in Southeast Asia?
8. Why is development an important but difficult part of building sustainable peace?
9. What else can be done to ensure the sustainability of peace in the Southeast Asian region?

Recommended reading

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Chapter 7

Regional Framework for Peace

Chapter 7:
Regional Framework for Peace

Abubakar Eby Hara[1]

7.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses regional frameworks for peace and particularly relates to ASEAN'S approach to cooperation in resolving conflicts in the Southeast Asian region. ASEAN's approach has evolved from desiring a situation of "no war" to encompassing broader issues such as human security which emphasizes people-centred security rather than state security as was the case during the cold war. In addition to the internal demands of its members, this evolution occurred due to changes in external threats to ASEAN. The internal motivation relates to the fact that as middle power countries, ASEAN nations had to work together to overcome problems between and without themselves. In contrast to the European Union (EU) whose cooperation was primarily economic, the motivation for Southeast Asian states to cooperate was mainly political and security-related. These countries desired the creation of a peaceful region free from external intervention so they could concentrate on building national and regional resilience.

Pioneered by five countries in Southeast Asia, namely Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, ASEAN was first declared/announced in Bangkok on 8 August 1967. Its birth was overshadowed by tense and suspicious regional relations and an international world still controlled by the tug of war between the Soviet Union and the United States. Meanwhile in the region itself, tensions stemmed from distrust between countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, which had just ended the *Konfrontasi* (or the violent conflict emanating from Indonesia's response to the creation of the Federation of Malaysia). Likewise, Malaysia and the Philippines were still involved in a dispute over Sabah, a territory in the north of Borneo island, while Thailand was anxious about communist influences in Indochina.

Initially, cooperation was relatively slow. It was only in 1976 that ASEAN held its first summit and issued the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which guided future cooperation. At the summit, ASEAN issued a declaration reinforcing previous assumptions about the principle of cooperation. Most importantly was the principle of non-intervention and an end to the use of force in resolving conflicts. The main principles of TAC are as follows:

(a) *Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations;*
(b) *The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;*
(c) *Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;*
(d) *Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;*
(e) *Renunciation of the threat or use of force;*
(f) *Effective cooperation among themselves (ASEAN-AIPR, 1976).*

This summit and TAC aimed to respond to the increasing intensity of warring situations in Indochina, especially following the fall of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to communism. After Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia in 1978, the five ASEAN members actively used diplomacy to counter the intervention in various international forums. Up until the Comprehensive Cambodian Peace Agreements in 1991, most ASEAN activities concentrated on efforts to overcome the communist

[1] The author would like to thank Yukiko Nishikawa, Kamarulzaman Askandar, and Ayesah Abubakar for providing comments and suggestions to this chapter.

threat. Therefore, ASEAN's role initially concentrated on resolving disputes or reducing tensions among states. Although not entirely successful, this role has at least prevented open conflict and war between ASEAN countries. To a certain degree, ASEAN has therefore been seen as successful in fostering its identity and developing its *ASEAN Way* to resolve conflicts.

Its experiences in dealing with communist threats led ASEAN to develop cooperation and dialogue forums such as the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to annually discuss many regional political and economic issues. In these forums, ASEAN emphasizes cooperative norms to resolve conflicts between countries. In subsequent developments, ASEAN began to assert a stronger institutionalization of its organization by establishing the ASEAN Charter in November 2007, which was seen as a step forward. The Charter is significant as it formed a starting point for ASEAN to become a more institutionalized organization. ASEAN also launched its aspiration to become a more relevant institution for the people by establishing the ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) to demonstrate its concern for human rights issues in the region.

Over the years, this regional organization has increasingly become a part of ASEAN society and must now reorient its state-centric approach. It is required to play a role both in traditional security sectors and non-traditional human security sectors. ASEAN is also increasingly tasked to have a real contribution to society, including overcoming social problems such as migrant workers, human trafficking, smuggling, economic inequality, corruption, and food security occurring within its member countries (Intal, Ruddy, Suhud, Setyadi, and Silka Hapsari, 2016). In this last context, ASEAN has tried to work to overcome such issues by, for example, setting up three community pillars: (1) the Political-Security Community, (2) the Economic Community, and (3) the Socio-Cultural Community. However, its role is often limited by ASEAN's main principles of cooperation which stress sovereignty and non-intervention. Nonetheless, efforts to play a greater role in overcoming those problems within its member countries continues to be pursued mainly because of pressure, especially from various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Abdulrahim and Almuttaqi, 2017).

In this chapter, we will discuss ASEAN's perspective on peace and conflict management, and how this perspective has been affected by developments in the region. This chapter is divided into seven sections. First, the theoretical frameworks of peace in ASEAN will be introduced. Second, the development of the ASEAN framework for conflict management and peace promotion will be looked at. Third, the concept of positive and negative peace and its relevance to ASEAN will be examined. Fourth, we will explain ASEAN conflict management beyond the ASEAN way which gives emphasis to the roles of ASEAN formal sub-organizations (AICHR, AIPR, AHA Centre). Fifth, the roles of the individual state as a mediator and interlocutor in conflicts in the region will be further explained. Next, the roles of non-state actors in ASEAN and how ASEAN and community processes can work together will be discussed, followed finally by a conclusion.

7.2 Theoretical frameworks of peace in ASEAN

Theoretically, ASEAN's development can be seen from three main perspectives in the study of international relations, namely, realist, liberal, and constructivist, all of which can help us to understand ASEAN better. The development of ASEAN's external and internal environment and its complexity therein shows that one perspective may be more relevant to a certain period while other perspectives may be more appropriate to other eras. For example, a realist perspective can explain the development of ASEAN during the cold war more adequately than its counterparts.

Meanwhile, the liberal and constructivist perspectives are relevant to explain ASEAN cooperation towards regional integration, especially in the social, economic, and trade fields.

The three main perspectives all hold particular perceptions of peace. In realist calculations, peace is seen more as an atmosphere without war and the absence of serious military threats from one country to another. In liberalism, peace is seen more broadly because it relates to functional cooperation between states. This cooperation, especially in the fields of economy and trade, will create interdependence and can prevent possible conflicts between countries. From a constructivist perspective, peace is seen more as an attempt by actors to build identity and the norms of cooperation in various dialogical activities.

However, a peace concept is required that can encompass all three perspectives. One conceptual umbrella that can frame the development of peace in ASEAN is Johan Galtung's theory of positive and negative peace. In general, negative peace is interpreted to mean an atmosphere of no war and violence between countries. By contrast, positive peace is more about building various attitudes, institutions, and activities to support the peace process in a broader sense (Galtung, 1964). The three theoretical perspectives above can easily be interpreted in this light. Thus, realism is closer to negative peace while liberalism and constructivism are more akin to positive peace.

Before discussing transformation of the ASEAN peace perspective, this section will first look at the realist, liberal, and constructivist approaches in viewing ASEAN developments. The realist approach can explain the early development of ASEAN with an emphasis on preventing war or the spread of war in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the liberalist and constructivist approaches saw the possibility of more functional cooperation and support for the norms of peaceful relationships.

It must be noted that the preceding discussion on the theoretical aspect of international relations is very superficial due to limited space. More emphasis will be placed on how ASEAN responds to the challenges of the times by transforming itself. This transformation can also be seen from the understanding that initially, ASEAN was quite satisfied with building negative peace or an atmosphere of no war among its members, but the evolving context of the region also demanded evolution to address the changing nature and demands of the times. ASEAN then took initiatives to make a more positive contribution to peace and security by promoting cooperation concerning many broader social, economic, and societal issues. In the context of Galtung's peace theory, significant developments in ASEAN, which had previously fixated on negative peace, have now moved it towards realizing positive peace.

7.2.1 Realist perspective

From a realist perspective, no matter how relatively stable the situation is in the region, the possibility of military threats remain. Countries must continue to take into account their survival in an anarchic world (Lebow, 2016). This is, of course, an unforgettable part of the history of relations between ASEAN member countries, and there is no guarantee such tensions will not arise again. Suspicion of their neighbours, however, remains largely due to historical legacy and geopolitical position. From a historical perspective, the Indochina countries have experienced alternating wars and alliances. For example, it is not surprising that because of its location between Vietnam and Thailand, Cambodia and Laos have often been caught in the struggle for influence between these two countries. However, more recently, Cambodia has preferred to ally itself with China, which is temporarily providing more military guarantees and economic cooperation. Geographically, archipelagic countries such

as Singapore have also designed their security against the possibility of war with their predominantly Malay-majority neighbours.

The realist calculation was also applied when ASEAN faced communist threats from Indochina in the 1970s. As such, it mobilized diplomatic efforts to face Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia in 1979. At that time, the five ASEAN countries emphasized the principle of non-intervention and the peaceful settlement of the issue. Its diplomatic efforts were supported by Western countries, which were also concerned about Vietnam's expanding communist influence in Southeast Asia. These diplomatic efforts finally won support at the United Nations, and a peace agreement was achieved under which Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia and immediately held democratic elections (Mcgrew and Worden, 2017).

At the same time, although ASEAN does tend towards being anti-communist, officially, it has tried to not formally become part of the Western bloc. As such, it has maintained close relations with other countries in the Asia Pacific region and made it a point to discourage foreign interference. An example of this can be seen when it launched the ZOPFAN Declaration (Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality) on 27 November 1971 in Kuala Lumpur. The aim of this was to prevent external powers from using the region to test their influence. In the context of ZOPFAN, ASEAN members rejected the existence of all foreign military bases in the region for fear of inviting major power rivalry. Those foreign bases still existing, such as Subic Bay and Clark Field in the Philippines, would be considered temporary.

Initially, ZOPFAN was only signed by the five founding countries in 1971. Then, as part of realising ZOPFAN, all ten ASEAN countries agreed to the treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) on 15 December 1995. In SEANWFZ, ASEAN sought to carryout nuclear disarmament to promote security and peace in the world. For this purpose, ASEAN countries try to convince countries possessing nuclear weapons to commit to maintaining ASEAN as a nuclear weapons-free zone. With the exception of Russia, other major nuclear powers such as China, the United States, and France were not enthusiastic about supporting SEANWFZ for almost the same reasons. They were especially concerned about losing freedom of movement in the maritime zone of Southeast Asia which was also limited by the agreement (Acharya and Boutin, 1998).

ASEAN's development in the 1960s-1970s demonstrated regional geopolitical calculations and what these newly independent countries could do amid various military tensions in the region. Calculation of realism cannot be avoided in such situations. The motivation for survival in this context brought together the five main founding members of ASEAN to work closely against possible communist and external threats. This choice was based on rational calculations in view of the existing developments at that time. This also had a strong influence on their anti-intervention principle as well as their principle of sovereignty. This became an important foundation for cooperation in the region and became crucial for a constructivist approach to ASEAN norms and identity in the future.

7.2.2 Liberal perspective

The situation of nation-states, which are designed to have their own sovereignty, can inherently give birth to anarchy. However, from a liberalist perspective, in the case of Southeast Asia, these countries recognise the benefits of cooperation over possible anarchic situations. The presence of ASEAN itself is a major sign that, from a liberalist perspective, it is seen as an effort to realise common interests in politics, society, economy, and trade.

The liberalist approach can be useful in analysing ASEAN in various contexts (Dunne, 2016). The EU's experience can be seen as an ideal example. For example, David Mitrany's theory of functionalism and integration became a reference point in the mid-1970s to explain the levels of ASEAN cooperation (Mitrany, 1948). Although ASEAN developed differently from the EU due to differences in social and economic contexts, several collaborative efforts to form an ASEAN Economic Community reflect the EU's experience. ASEAN also tried to integrate economic cooperation by forming various free trade agreements between ASEAN members and their dialogue partner countries.

When the cold war ended in 1989, several observers doubted whether ASEAN would be able to continue its cooperation smoothly (Buszynski, 1992). They saw the communist threat in the north as the *raison d'etre* of ASEAN cooperation. However, that opinion was not entirely correct. ASEAN countries had actually increased their membership by including Indochina states and Myanmar. All countries agreed with the ASEAN TAC. Even communist countries such as Vietnam and Laos eliminated former foreign policy goals to officially support communist revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia to adjust with ASEAN's cooperation principles.

In addition, the end of the cold war brought on new challenges. If security had previously only been defined in the context of state security, it now extended to human security. Issues of concern included health, the safety of migrant workers, human trafficking, smuggling, climate change, and the haze due to forest fires. From a liberal viewpoint, these issues should be handled as part of more functional ASEAN cooperation. As such, ASEAN collaborates to overcome cross-border problems in various forums. In the economic field, cooperation is carried out following a multi-cooperation model, namely by making ASEAN free trade area agreements with partner countries. This demonstrates ASEAN's steps to expand economic cooperation towards economic integration.

Reflecting on the experience of the EU again, efforts have also been made to build a single market to encourage economic integration. Following Balassa's theoretical framework, there are five stages to economic integration, namely free trade areas, customs unions, common markets, economic unity, and total economic integration. Within this framework, ASEAN has only entered the first stage, namely "*the creation of a large market, even though it is being carried out in a hobbled manner*" (Balassa, 1994). Despite only achieving the first stage, at least ASEAN is seen as having succeeded in laying the foundation for a fairly viable single market and production base (Sing, 2018).

In the context of integration, ASEAN has set a target to achieve an ASEAN Community that includes three pillars: (1) the ASEAN Economic Community, (2) the ASEAN Security Community, and (3) the ASEAN Political and Social Community (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017). Apart from the targets that have not yet been met, this effort shows that ASEAN leaders are wary of criticism (Hill and Menon, 2010; Ravenhill, 2008) and as such may seek to be more relevant to the people. In an effort to establish the above communities, it has established several steps to be seen as a more institutionalized organization including launching the ASEAN Charter.

The analysis of liberalism above is in line with the positive peace approach. ASEAN builds more functional institutions to overcome various problems threatening peace. Apart from establishing the AICHR, ASEAN also created the AHA and the AIPR which have already shown their relevance to fostering peace and preventing conflicts. This can be seen as an important transformation in ASEAN's attitude towards peace as no longer limited to negative peace. These sub-organizations try to carry out various advocacy activities such as protecting women victims of human

trafficking, protecting children, overcoming poverty, and continuing the dialogue around migrant worker problems. Therefore, the violence that threatens peace is no longer seen as just direct violence but now also includes indirect sources of violence such as poverty, hunger, discrimination, and social inequality (Galtung, 1969).

7.2.3 Constructivist perspective

From a constructivist perspective, ASEAN's development is seen more from how it builds its identity and norms of cooperation (Acharya, 2014). When launching regional cooperation models set out in the TAC and ASEAN Charter, ASEAN takes steps to strengthen cooperation norms. This approach does not look at the causality of factors leading to changes within ASEAN but rather emphasizes the process of how ASEAN changes and adapts to new demands from its environment. In terms of laying down the norms and principles of this cooperation, several agreements set out in the ASEAN concord continue to demonstrate its commitment to building cooperation in the region not only between ASEAN countries but also in cooperation with countries around the Asia Pacific. Some of these agreements include the:

> *ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok, 1967), the Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (Kuala Lumpur, 1971), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) (Bali, 1976), the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali, 1976), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Bangkok, 1995), the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali, 2003), the ASEAN Charter (Singapore, 2007), the Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the Roadmap for the ASEAN Community (2009-2015), and the ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations (Bali Concord III, 2011) (Kemlu, 2011).*

In the context of a constructivist approach, the introduction of the three pillars of ASEAN Community even though still at an early stage, is significant as part of the social construction to form a new ASEAN identity. It is hoped that later, ASEAN countries will internalize the importance of constructing a common community which could become a driving force for cooperation. The ASEAN Community is an important step in the post-cold war era to form an organization that is more relevant to face human security challenges. This is in line with ASEAN's desire to realise the idea of the importance of people in ASEAN, known as the *ASEAN People-Centred concept*. During the cold war, ASEAN emphasized cooperation between countries to maintain their respective sovereignty. Attention to the ASEAN People-Centred concept is set forth in the ASEAN Charter which reads, "*WE THE PEOPLES of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) …*" This is important progress as this concept had not been stated in the Declaration on the Establishment of ASEAN in Bangkok in 1967 (Natalegawa, 2018).

In the course of this, constructivists have also seen that the development of cooperation norms in ASEAN is well underway. The norms of sovereignty and non-intervention are norms that have been successfully socialized and held by its members. The entry of the Indochina countries and Myanmar into ASEAN is seen as their willingness to adopt its cooperation norms. With the joining of these states, the goal of One Southeast Asia in ASEAN has been achieved.

Constructivists also argue that a kind of security community in ASEAN has been formed even though it is not strictly a collective security. In a collective security, there is a military pact between countries in the sense that if one member country is attacked by another that is not a member, all countries in the pact are obliged to defend it (Ganesan, 1995). The ASEAN Security Community is seen from a different perspective and is based on the principle of non-interference in other countries'

affairs and not using weapons to settle disputes (Acharya, 2014). This is a mutually agreed upon peace norm. So far, there has been no war in the region, no organized preparation for war or contingency plans for war, and no military competition leading to an arms race (Acharya, 2014).

In a constructivist context, ASEAN's development remains open and depends on how member countries themselves will carry out this organization. The change towards cooperation in protecting human rights, for example, stems from the universal idea of human rights, which was later internalized by several ASEAN countries. Although it was not entirely successful, ASEAN at least agreed to form an ASEAN Human Rights Commission called the AICHR. The AICHR stemmed mainly from the desire of several ASEAN countries recently undergoing reforms in their political systems such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. In addition, ASEAN members wanted to show compliance with international human rights norms when after the cold war, human rights became an important issue, receiving attention from major countries and unions such as the US and the EU. Constructive efforts such as these supported the development of positive peace in ASEAN. Of course, not all designs ran smoothly, and there was some resistance to the new ideas. But what is certain is that global ideals such as human rights, democracy, environmental protection, and the protection of women will continue to be spread by norm-entrepreneurs in ASEAN countries (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).

The signing of the AICHR is part of the evolution of ASEAN to overcome conflicts. If previously the emphasis was on resolving conflicts between countries, the establishment of AICHR shows that concerns faced by the community are now receiving more attention. Prior to this, the conflict resolution framework concerning state-security could be seen in agreements such as ZOPFAN in 1971, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 1976, and the Treaty on SEANWFZ in 1978. This was followed by an agreement to address various human rights issues starting from the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (2015), the ASEAN Charter, and the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) in 2011.

7.3 From negative to positive peace

Within the three approaches, peace and conflict have an important place in discussions. Only the way each sees peace is different. The realist perspective may be said to emphasize what is called negative peace. However, since its inception, peace in the sense of overcoming war and direct violence was an integral part of ASEAN's development (Askandar, 1994). Until the present, this is still relevant because the possibility of war between countries is still possible among ASEAN countries. There is also the possibility of attacks from other countries due to conflicts in, for example, the South China Sea.

Conflicts in ASEAN as described in Chapter 3 involve mostly intrastate, interstate, and violent extremism issues. However, there are also indirect threats of violence and insecurity such as poverty, human rights violations, environmental destruction, and crimes against women and children. During the cold war era, these issues were not yet a priority for ASEAN. In other words, ASEAN at that time, following Galtung's definition of peace, emphasized negative peace in the sense of preventing military conflicts from occurring between countries in Southeast Asia as well as the possibility of interference from major powers. After the end of the cold war, the demand for ASEAN member states to address social, human rights, and economic problems increased. This security threat addressed human security needs and was anticipated by ASEAN countries. In other words, developments show that ASEAN

must continue to sustain positive peace to prevent the emergence of potential violence in its communities.

To manage conflict, ASEAN uses the *ASEAN Way* (see the discussion on the ASEAN Way in Chapter 3) which relies on a common code of ethics in the international community, such as the principle of non-interference, territorial integrity, and peaceful conflict resolution. The principle of conflict management is socialized through experiences and intensive dialogues between ASEAN member countries. To maintain the integrity of their cooperation, ASEAN members have shown a willingness to carry out dialogues that are sometimes long and complicated to reach a consensus that satisfies all parties. In its development, the adoption of such a mechanism for ASEAN countries is a necessity in any policy-making.

The principles of the ASEAN Way were highly valued by all its members (Tan, 2017) and were used to prevent disputes from escalating by placing greater emphasis on good relations among its members through established dialogue mechanisms. The ASEAN Way is also aimed at preventing the internationalization of existing conflicts, which can invite foreign interference to the area. Foreign interference, in the minds of ASEAN leaders, especially Indonesia, could fill the region with conflict (Leifer, 1973), as occurred in the Middle East. They also subscribe to the idea of strengthening national resilience thus contributing to regional resilience and averting destabilizing conflicts between them.

Several authors, for example, mentioned that Southeast Asia before the formation of ASEAN was in crisis and conflict (Crozier, 1965; Mackie, 1974) as can be seen during the tension between Indonesia and Malaysia due to Sukarno's policies, known as *Konfrontasi*. Another example occurred between Malaysia and the Philippines during their conflict over Sabah. After the *Konfrontasi* ended in 1965, countries in the region began to realise the need for cooperation and restraint in relations with other countries. Learning from experience that revisionist politics in the region could lead to tension and conflict, Indonesia changed its political direction following a change in government from Sukarno to Suharto in 1966 and abandoned confrontational politics against neighbouring countries, relying instead on persuasion and dialogue to organize the Southeast Asian region (Weinstein, 1969). As a result, five Southeast Asian countries, namely Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines, agreed to form ASEAN in 1967.

After the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, it took quite some time to strengthen cooperation between its members mainly due to the threat emanating from the Indochina war following Vietnam's independence in 1946 which continued until 1979 when it invaded Cambodia. The Indochina War is often divided into the first Indochina war which was primarily a war of independence between Vietnam and France (1946-1954), and the second Indochina war which mainly focused on Vietnam's Unification War where the Vietcong, which was a communist power in South Vietnam supported by North Vietnam, fought against South Vietnam (1954-1973). This war ended with the unification of the two Vietnams and the withdrawal of US troops from the battlefield in the 1970s. These two wars also involved Laos and Cambodia, which border Vietnam. The third or last Indochina War occurred because of Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia (1978-1991). Vietnam intervened to overthrow the ruthless Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot's regime in Cambodia and established a pro-Vietnamese government named the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). This intervention triggered a backlash from ASEAN countries with ASEAN applying diplomatic pressure to force Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia and enter into negotiations. ASEAN efforts, which were also supported by Western countries, finally bore fruit when Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia in 1979. The end of the above conflicts then prompted an expansion of ASEAN membership in the 1990s.

Such a background contrasted with European Union cooperation which proceeded in an evolutive and functional manner in the economic field. Economic cooperation was not ASEAN's initial motivation because the economies of these countries were based on similar agricultural sectors which competed with each other. External factors and the need to resolve domestic security issues free from foreign interference were far more important at that time. This was followed by an expansion of communist influence in the region. ASEAN then agreed to support a peaceful and neutral area which was embodied in the ZOPFAN agreement of 1971 (Yamakage, 2017). As a new organization, the development of this cooperation was rather slow because each ASEAN member was still exploring cooperation and mutual understanding. Cooperation was strengthened due to mutual external threats, which then became a serious focus for these countries.

Although ideal on paper, ASEAN countries actually did not possess enough military power to enforce such ideals. Therefore, the decision was made to instead campaign for these principles in various forums. This principle became very relevant when ASEAN was faced with Vietnam's incursion into Cambodia in 1979 as the invasion was diametrically opposed to its principle of non-intervention and respect for the sovereignty of other countries as outlined in the TAC. As such, ASEAN rejected this intervention and rallied diplomatically to oppose the military interference. Various diplomatic meetings were held to resolve the conflict. In Jakarta, for example, a series of meetings called the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) were held to push Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia. The JIM was conducted three times, namely JIM I in July 1987, JIM II in February 1989, and JIM III in 1990 in Jakarta. JIM I brought together the two conflicting countries for the first time and resulted in a ceasefire during which Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia and the United Nations sent peacekeeping troops to Cambodia's border (Sudrajat et al, 2020). In JIM III, the resistance groups that had joined the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) except the Khmer Rouge agreed with the PRK to form a joint government, namely the Supreme National Council (SNC). The SNC acted as the representative of the Cambodian government abroad until a new government was formed as a result of elections supervised under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). These long negotiations ended peacefully with the Paris Peace Agreement on 23 October 1991 which was signed by 19 countries (Sudrajat et al, 2020).

Through such intensive dialogue forums between ASEAN members and the Indochinese countries not yet ASEAN member countries, the TAC principles underwent intensive socialization. For ASEAN countries, these became the principles and norms that guided states in the region to resolve conflicts. When Vietnam later withdrew from Cambodia and changed its foreign policy, which had previously contained support for communist movements in other countries, ASEAN considered Vietnam to have begun to understand the importance of TAC's principles. With a reform program known as *Du Moi*, Vietnam officially replaced its previous isolationist foreign policy and embraced a multilateral foreign policy to establish good relations with any country helping it to realize its interests (Chapman, 2017). This country was later accepted into the ASEAN fold in 1994. This step was followed by other Indochina countries, namely Laos and Cambodia. The persistence of ASEAN to implement the TAC in dealing with Vietnam is a lesson for all countries in the region, that ASEAN does not tolerate aggressive politics that are anti-status quo and which threaten other countries.

This process is one of the means by which the ASEAN Way has been shaped and illustrates the learning process among the elites of ASEAN countries. Every country in the region has experienced conflict and felt adverse consequences as a result. For example, as a consequence of *Konfrontasi*, Indonesia learnt that aggressive politics could invite the intervention of foreign powers. It also gained an unfortunate image in the international community due to Sukarno's leadership and territorial ambitions.

Accordingly, Suharto, who replaced Sukarno in 1966, changed the country's policies and tried to build understanding with neighbouring countries. This change in attitude changed Indonesia's neighbours' perceptions of it. Like Indonesia, other countries in the region also desire a stable and peaceful region.

The learning process to manage Southeast Asia in an orderly manner showed results when this region became relatively peaceful in terms of harmonious relations between countries. As a result, these countries developed a mutual understanding with no country posing a truly serious military threat to another. In Galtung's perspective, therefore, ASEAN was built in the spirit of positive peace. Positive also embraces peaceful problem-solving and discards the use of weapons. Consequently, ASEAN seeks to resolve conflicts in the region through ASEAN mechanisms. For example, it facilitated a dialogue to mediate the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia in 2011. Prior to this, Indonesia also sought a territorial conflict resolution with Malaysia regarding the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan to be resolved through the TAC mechanism. Article 14 of TAC contains a commitment to resolve conflicts through the ASEAN High Council (ASEAN Secretariat, 1976). However, Malaysia rejected the proposal, because it also had a territorial dispute with Singapore which eventually would be resolved through the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The two parties finally agreed to bring the case to the ICJ without going through ASEAN's High Council mechanism (Irewati, 2016). At the ICJ, 16 out of 17 judges sided with Malaysia and it was given ownership of the islands (Singh, 2019). Likewise, the conflict between Singapore and Malaysia regarding the islands of Batu Putih and Pedra Blanca was brought to the ICJ resulting in one island being given to Singapore (Pedra Blanca) and the other to Malaysia (Middle Rocks). Despite domestic protests, the governments of both countries committed to accept the results of the ICJ decision to finally resolve the territorial ownership disputes.

One of the most strenuous tests of the TAC principle of peaceful problem-solving was the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over ownership of the Temple of Preah Vihear and the small area surrounding the temple ruins (for more details on the Thai-Cambodia conflict, see Box 3.6 in Chapter 3). According to the ICG report, the ASEAN Way proved unable to anticipate outbreak of the conflict because the area's potential for conflict had been around for a long time (ICG, 2011). However, this view is not entirely correct. Cambodia worried about the Thai military's much stronger and more organized intermediary and wanted to solve the problem immediately so reported the case to the UN Security Council. However, the UN Security Council decided the problem could still be resolved by ASEAN itself, especially since Indonesia, which was chair of ASEAN at that time, had already instigated active shuttle diplomacy to enable the two countries to meet and talk (Farida, 2014). The problem was resolved through a complicated process of mediation by Indonesia. Even though the dispute was finally resolved through various meetings and dialogues in the context of ASEAN, the ASEAN Way mechanism had delayed solving the problem, thus, forcing the issue to boomerang (ICG, 2011). This also shows that acceptance of the norms of peaceful settlement in the TAC cannot be taken for granted but must continue a process of socialization and internalization within its respective countries.

During its development, ASEAN began to enter the spotlight after the end of the cold war because in addition to conflicts among states *not* being resolved, conflicts involving the interests of ASEAN people had also met the same fate. In other words, the ASEAN Way was deemed insufficient as a mechanism to overcome all potential conflicts in the region. As such, people in ASEAN countries began to demand a bigger role from the organization to solve their other problems such as human rights, migrant workers, the role of women, the smuggling of women and children, privacy, terrorism, and other trans-border problems (Hara, 2007).

To deal with this problem, several components in the ASEAN Way, such as the principles of non-intervention and consensus, have faced criticism from within. For

example, some have argued that ASEAN should carry out constructive and flexible engagement allowing interference from ASEAN in its member countries for urgent matters. Therefore, some suggest the principle of non-intervention should no longer be interpreted rigidly. ASEAN has tried to capture the desire of its people by way of its people-centred concept which seeks to involve ASEAN citizens in its activities. ASEAN has also tried to institutionalize cooperation by introducing a charter. As such, it has become more functional and has made agreements on free trade, protection of human rights, and humanitarian cooperation. All this means that the principle of non-intervention can no longer be understood so rigidly. However, the new cooperation mechanism is not yet perfectly formed although interaction between countries, experiences of cooperation, and the search for best practices will improve existing cooperation mechanisms. Likewise, several ASEAN sub-organizations such as the AICHR, the AHA, and the AIPR have carried out their respective functions despite certain limitations, both in terms of funding and the authority given to them.

However, the effectiveness of these new-established institutions has not been properly tested because ASEAN still struggles when faced with intrastate conflicts occurring in its member countries. For example, ASEAN has done little to help resolve the Rohingya issue in Myanmar. While the international community, including the United Nations, has condemned the human rights violations committed against the Rohingya people by the Myanmar government, ASEAN sub-organizations have made no direct effort to address the problem because of the principle of non-intervention. ASEAN can only carry out humanitarian efforts to help those victims displaced from their land. Similarly, ASEAN cannot do much to help democratic movements in Myanmar protesting against the military coup that overthrew Aung San Suu Kyi's legitimate government in February 2021.

However, ASEAN has made attempts to solve the problem of transnational crime. Transnational crimes are so called because they cross national borders. While preparation for a crime may be conducted in the home base of one country, the criminal activity itself may be carried out in many other countries. Such crimes also involve criminal groups which may be organized in more than one country. Among the transnational crimes threatening ASEAN are terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, arms smuggling, international economic crimes, and cyber-crimes (Sovannasam, 2011). Efforts to overcome this problem also require police cooperation, adjustment of regulations and laws, and cross-border legal assistance to enable collaborative action to be more effective. Transnational crimes may also impact issues of national sovereignty and integrity. For this reason, transnational crimes need to be discussed in the context of political and security cooperation as mandated by the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM). This problem is considered so serious, ASEAN created several working groups, including the Working Group on Counter Terrorism (WG on CT), the Working Group on Trafficking in Persons (WG on TIP), and the Working Group on Cybercrime (WG on CC). In addition, ASEAN has tried to tackle the illegal drug problem through the ASEAN Work Plan on Securing Communities Against Illicit Drugs 2016-2025. Moreover, ASEAN agreed upon the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT) and the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP). Aside from the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), ASEAN also introduced the ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting (AFMM), the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police Meeting (ASEANAPOL), and ASEAN Senior Officials on Drugs Matters (ASOD) to tackle transnational crime. Further, ASEAN also collaborates with other countries through these mechanisms.

Some conflicts in the region concern border and territorial issues such as maritime boundaries, ownership of islands, and territorial disputes. Conflicts over maritime boundaries are usually caused by the overlapping boundaries of the Exclusive Economic Zone, so mutually agreed boundaries are often required. In this case, archipelagic countries and those with maritime boundaries are the most affected.

These countries, especially Indonesia, have prioritized conducting negotiations to determine maritime boundaries.

While maritime boundaries between ASEAN members can be negotiated, this has proven not to be the case with territorial disputes involving China over the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. ASEAN members initially agreed to face China's claim together but became divided following particular manoeuvres conducted by China. For example, Cambodia tends to support China's claim on the islands in the South China Sea (Thul, 2015). In responding to an ICJ decision over areas in the West Philippines Sea, which rejected China's claim, ASEAN countries failed to reach a consensus due to Cambodia's objections. However, Cambodia has received economic and military assistance from China for some time. Thus, it was hardly surprising that it argued ASEAN could not make international legal decisions and therefore should not get involved (Thul, 2015).

The ASEAN mechanism for dealing with the South China Sea conflict faces a major test in this regard. Mechanisms like the ASEAN Way do not work as expected when faced with China's ambition to control the area. China has deliberately indicated that she is entitled to the areas within the "nine-dash line," which she considers traditional fishing territory. Meanwhile, ASEAN countries maintain that the nine-dash line violates their maritime boundaries. This has led to clashes between Indonesian warships and Chinese coast guard ships. Indonesia has also tried to evict Chinese fishing vessels from entering the maritime territory around its Natuna Islands. To strengthen its position, Indonesia even changed the name of the sea in the north of the islands from the South China Sea to the North Natuna Sea.

ASEAN countries rely on diplomacy to resolve conflicts. As middle power countries, diplomacy is an inevitable choice to avoid foreign interference. Therefore, to the extent possible, they avoid increases in military power that could turn the South China Sea into a battlefield. For example, ASEAN issued its Indo-Pacific Outlook which seeks to ease tensions between the United States and China. As such, ASEAN's position in facing these developments is relatively neutral and inclusive towards both China and America. ASEAN emphasizes efforts in accordance with its principles so stresses building consensus, norms, and diplomacy, and not exaggerated military approaches (Acharya, 2019). Consistent with this, it previously came up with a "Code of Conduct" to jointly address the South China Sea issue, but deciding such efforts were ineffective, the Philippines decided to bring its case to the ICJ (Buszynski, 2015).

The conflict in the South China Sea, therefore, is a major challenge to ASEAN's conflict resolution approach and mechanisms. These include the development of forums such as the ARF, the ASEAN PMC, and the ASEM to discuss various security issues not only in Southeast Asia but also in the Asia Pacific (now called the Indo-Pacific) which have proven quite effective in bringing together countries in the region to discuss important issues. The ARF, for example, enables countries in the region to regularly hold dialogues to discuss various timely issues. Although not expected to produce immediate outputs, this forum has become a place for countries to discuss problems and seek cooperation to ease tensions through multilateral dialogue, build mutual trust, and prevent conflict (Haacke, 2009). ARF participants include other countries besides all ASEAN members, such as the ten ASEAN Dialogue Partner countries (United States, Canada, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, New Zealand, and the European Union) as well as countries in the region such as Papua New Guinea, Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, Timor-Leste, and Bangladesh.

These forums may work for interstate conflicts among ASEAN member countries but are not necessarily effective for countries outside ASEAN as they are subject to different conditions and strategic cultures. For example, while the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China in resolving the South China Sea dispute was established,

and an original agreement in the DOC was signed in 2002, this agreement did not fulfil its mission of building trust and defusing greater tensions between the claiming nations. However, the DOC could serve as a starting point for negotiating a more formal agreement in a Code of Conduct (COC) (Li, 2014). One reason a COC may be difficult to implement is China's desire to resolve disputes in the South China Sea through direct bilateral forums with claimant countries, in contrast with ASEAN's desire for a comprehensive multilateral settlement. Disagreement has lately arisen among ASEAN countries themselves. As mentioned previously, Cambodia (a member of ASEAN) supports China's position and its desire for bilateral settlements with claimant countries. Meanwhile, the Philippines, feeling it had reached a deadlock, resolved to bring the dispute to the ICJ (Buszynski, 2015).

7.4 Beyond the ASEAN Way: Roles of ASEAN formal sub-organizations

The development of the situation both in ASEAN countries and their external environment requires ASEAN to demonstrate its relevance on an ongoing basis. Security threats are no longer only defined as matters of state security and harmonious relations between countries which were initially the main focus of this organization now also include human security, which covers a variety of complex issues such as poverty, violations of human rights, and various transboundary issues.

In the late 1980s, changes in some countries led to openness and democracy which also had implications for ASEAN. Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines all aimed for more democratic systems. Meanwhile, a growing political openness was seen in Malaysia. ASEAN was also becoming more people orientated, and the people wanted a more functional ASEAN. Such demands were reflected in increasingly active non-governmental organizations within ASEAN which then sought to address human security issues, including the protection of human rights and democracy. In addition, the international environment, while no longer posing a military threat, drew attention to various other threats to humanity and required ASEAN to play a more significant role.

ASEAN leaders are aware of these dynamic changes and have taken several important initiatives such as the ASEAN People Centred idea. This paradigmatic switch aims to show that ASEAN's current concern is its people (Sani and Hara, 2013). In this context, ASEAN launched three pillars of the ASEAN community in 2015, namely, the Political-Security Community, the Economic Community, and the Socio-Cultural Community. Even though the ASEAN Community is developing slowly, at least it now possesses a kind of framework to encompass various fields of cooperation that are more functional and relevant to its grassroots. This has changed ASEAN to a more institutionalized forum, not just an organization holding regular meetings among its elites.

The ASEAN Community initiative was followed by efforts to form several other ASEAN institutions related to mechanisms to improve its security. The following are four ASEAN sub-organizations that can be said to be points of departure from the ASEAN Way perspective. Such differences are points of departure because cooperation in these sub-organizations requires a level of intervention between countries to ensure effective cooperation. This does not mean ASEAN has completely abandoned the ASEAN Way, because in many aspects, it is still the dominant discourse among some elites in ASEAN countries.

7.4.1 The ASEAN Charter

For 40 years, ASEAN operated without a charter. Although able to run quite smoothly, as a regional organization, it was not yet perfect. Signed in 1976, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was considered insufficient for an institutionalized international organization. It was only when the Charter was later approved and signed in November 2007 by representatives of all ASEAN leaders, that ASEAN was deemed to be moving towards becoming a well-institutionalized organization.

The process of creating ASEAN's Charter was quite complicated. Moreover, the consensus process also proved time consuming. In 2005, at the 11th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN leaders formed the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) consisting of well-known figures from all ASEAN countries to draft what turned out to a visionary and advanced charter. Next, the EPG report was submitted to the ASEAN Summit in Cebu on 12 January 2007. ASEAN then formed a High-Level Task Force (HLTF) consisting of officials and ambassadors of ASEAN countries to prepare a charter for signing at the next summit in Singapore in 2008 (Koh, Manalo, and Woon, 2009).

The process of forming the Charter was very complex and caused tension between conservative and progressive ASEAN countries, especially in terms of its broad authority. As regards the proposed establishment of the ASEAN Human Rights Body, for example, the CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) initially objected to the need for such a body because of its ability to interfere in the human rights affairs of their countries. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand proved more progressive, proposing a human rights body with sufficient powers to protect human rights. Meanwhile, states such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei lingered somewhere in the middle of these two camps. Although ASEAN later did approve a human rights body, its status was very weak (Hara, 2018).

The Charter was also criticized for certain articles which sought to integrate the organization akin to the European Union. However, the articles still emphasized the principles of sovereignty and strong non-intervention. Criticisms aside, ASEAN's decision makers were quite satisfied with the Charter seeing it as an acceptable compromise. For HLTF member, Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi bin Abdul Razak, the Charter became a source of pride giving as it did all ASEAN activities a source of reference (Koh, Manalo, Woon, and Razak, 2009). With the Charter, ASEAN's efforts to support more effective cooperation will be stronger than ever before. The Charter, for example, was expected to establish a suitable and effective dispute resolution mechanism, and cement ASEAN as a rules-based environment where decisions are legally binding and adhered to (Koh, Manalo, Woon, and Gonzalez-Manalo, 2009). For a summary of the ASEAN Charter see Box 7.1 below.

Box 7.1 The ASEAN Charter

Background	Challenges	Solution
Since its formulation, ASEAN has been without a Charter as is usual for an international organization. It was only after nearly 40 years that its leaders discussed the need for a Charter. The Charter is a formulation of the treaty, principles, and norms of cooperation that have so far been used. The Charter was formalized in Singapore on 20 November 2007 by 10 heads of state of the governments of ASEAN's member countries.	The most important issue facing ASEAN is the need to demonstrate its relevance directly to the people. A tug of war exists concerning fulfilment of this demand with the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention that are still firmly held by some ASEAN members. The Charter has often been criticized for not having a keen vision for the integration of regional cooperation to address this problem. Whether the Charter helps lay the groundwork for a more functional collaborative process to take place poses an important question for the years ahead.	The ASEAN Charter needs to be tested as a mechanism for managing disputes. In the case of the Preah Viher dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, for example, the Charter was not used as a reference document. However, it at least provides a basis for solving functional cooperation problems. Some of the most significant contributions offered by the Charter are to: • Provide the association with a more institutionalized framework • Codify all ASEAN norms, rules, and values that will - Guide actions of member states - Provide for the establishment of appropriate and effective dispute mechanisms, and steer ASEAN towards a rule-based environment where decisions are legally binding and observed - Make ASEAN's institutions work more efficiently and effectively - Enhance the role and functions of the ASEAN chair, the Secretary-General, and the Secretariat - Promote ASEAN identity and create solidarity among its citizens - Form a base for the ASEAN Community

Source: Koh, Manalo, Woon, and Gonzalez-Manalo, 2009

7.4.2 ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)

Another main sub-organization is the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) which was formed on 23 October 2009. The process of forming this sub-organization was again complicated due to objections from several member states regarding the Commission's authority. Although its authority is limited, this institution still constitutes an important step forward for ASEAN, and comprises a place where leaders can begin to discuss human rights violations in member countries. As stipulated in its Terms of Reference, the AICHR's objectives are quite basic, namely, to promote and protect human rights and the fundamental freedoms of ASEAN's people. It also declared respect for international human rights standards. Such a declaration is an important starting point because it is an acknowledgment and appreciation of human dignity. However, the AICHR still contains notes on the implementation of human rights by taking into account national and regional specificities (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009).

After the formation of the AICHR, ASEAN succeeded in agreeing to an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) in 2012. The AHRD is a basis for discussing, identifying, and consulting human rights values and norms. Through the AHRD, the AICHR has a stronger foundation. The main activities of the AICHR are to mainstream human rights principles into the ASEAN community, particularly social and economic rights such as the rights to health, education, employment, HIV prevention, care, and support services in the community, as well as integrated sexual and reproductive health,

family planning, maternal-child health, and equal standing before law. The AICHR is also active in campaigning to tackle human trafficking. Several ASEAN agreements already exist in this regard, such as the ASEAN Convention against Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (ACTIP). Various workshops and seminars were also carried out to socialize the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the ASEAN community. Establishment of the AICHR, despite its functional limitations, is an important step to promoting human rights in this region. It is hoped that the next step will be the protection and enforcement of human rights (Hara, 2019).

ASEAN also has a Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC), which was formed in 2010 to promote and protect women and children's human and basic rights. ASEAN has also shown sensitivity to the issue of women's protection by holding the ASEAN Women's Program (AWP). The program includes collecting, analysing, documenting, and disseminating data and information on women. Since 2002, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Women (AMMW) has also been officially held, which aims to determine women's protection policies in ASEAN and to support the decisions of the ACWC and ACW reports. For a summary of AICHR, see Box 7.2 below.

Box 7.2 ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)

Background	Challenges	Solution
The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was inaugurated at the 15th ASEAN Summit on 23 October 2009 in Hua Hin, Thailand. ASEAN has long faced various problems of human rights violations but has long considered human rights issues as too 'taboo' for discussion at the organizational level. The decision to establish a human rights body was a sensitive and difficult issue for ASEAN countries because it involves the dignity and interference of other ASEAN countries. However, to demonstrate the relevance and sensitivity of this organization at the national and international levels, the AICHR was finally agreed upon.	The main problem with the AICHR is related to the authority given to its representatives to carry out activities to address human rights problems occurring in ASEAN member countries. The international community often focuses on human rights issues such as the Rohingya, the Pattani, and those occurring in Moro, Papua. Not to mention the increasing number of problems faced by activists including extra-judicial killings and even elimination by the state. Apart from these problems, the issues of political freedom and freedom of speech are also in the spotlight of many ASEAN member countries which have a variety of political systems.	The AICHR tries to address human rights problems with its limited capacity. Its attention is directed to social rights such as women, children, migrant workers, labourers, and the control of human trafficking including the problems related to it. Accordingly, the AICHR's limited power causes it to concentrate more on promotion, socialization, and capacity-building as regards the above problems. So far, the AICHR has not yet reached the stage of implementing, protecting, or enforcing human rights

Source: Hara, 2019

7.4.3 ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (ASEAN-IPR)

In November 2012, ASEAN also formed a sub-organization to discuss issues of conflict management, reconciliation, and peace in its member countries, namely the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (ASEAN-IPR). This was motivated by the possibility of military conflicts such as the border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia concerning the Preah Vihear temple in 2008. Such conflicts were certainly

shocking amid the realisation that ASEAN would decline to use military means to resolve conflicts between countries. In addition, reconciliation is important and cannot be separated from peace. While some ASEAN member countries are still involved in destabilizing internal conflicts, others have ended and are now in the process of reconciliation and post-conflict peacebuilding pointing to the need for a body to help provide support for these important activities. Such are the reasons for formation of the ASEAN-IPR.

The ASEAN-IPR was also intended as an institution to monitor and identify potential conflicts within ASEAN. One of its objectives is to realise the 2009 Political-Security Community Blueprint to seek strategies to indicate disputes and conflicts before they arise and endanger regional stability. To this end, the institute is engaged in research activities on peace, conflict management, and reconciliation. Accordingly, it organizes capacity-building activities for stakeholders, and has become a centre for networking among research institutions in the region. At the same time, this institution also aims to build a culture of peace in the region and beyond. As such, the ASEAN-IPR is expected to be able to provide recommendations for comprehensive solutions in the field of peace and reconciliation in the ASEAN region.

In addition, the ASEAN-IPR established the ASEAN Women for Peace Registry (AWPR), which aims to increase the involvement and contribution of women in the process of building and making peace in the region. The AWPR primarily seeks to realise ASEAN's goal of including a gender perspective in conflict prevention strategies. ASEAN previously issued its Joint Statement on Promoting Women, Peace and Security in ASEAN on 13 November 2017 during the 31st ASEAN Summit.[2]

Within the structure of the AIPR, the Governing Council is the highest decision-making body of ASEAN-IPR, consisting of representatives from each ASEAN member state, together with the Secretary General of ASEAN and the Executive Director (who serve as ex-officio members of the Council). The work of the Board includes the formulation of guidelines and procedures for the activities, funding, and budget of the institution. The Council is supported by an Advisory Board which is responsible for the Institute's research priorities. The Board consists of representatives from each ASEAN member state, consisting of prominent people in the field of peace and reconciliation, with the Executive Director of the ASEAN-IPR who also serves as an ex-officio member. Among current Advisory Board members are prominent academics who are actively researching and advocating for peace such as Prof Joseph Liow from Nanyang Technological University (NTU) of Singapore and Prof Kamarulzaman Askandar from Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM). For a brief summary of the ASEAN-IPR, see box 7.3 below.

[2] See the section on the AWPR in Chapter 6 of this book.

Box 7.3 ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (ASEAN-AIPR)

Background	Challenges	Solutions
The Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR) was launched by ASEAN on 8 May 2011 at the ASEAN Summit in Jakarta. Although ASEAN has a mechanism to resolve conflicts through dialogue forums, it does not yet have an institution that can seriously identify conflicts in the region. In fact, several problems in this area could become a time bomb if not handled from the start. Apart from that, existing conflicts such as demands from groups in Pattani, Moro, and in Papua, require constant attention and solutions to overcome or defuse them. The ASEAN-IPR was also created to support the pillar on political cooperation and to promote peace within ASEAN at higher levels. The APSC has ten action lines where the ASEAN-IPR is part of the implementing entity.	The ASEAN region has various existing and potential conflicts. These are not limited to territorial conflicts, insurgencies, separatist movements, violent extremism, and terrorism, but also include conflicts related to human security issues. Can ASEAN identify, anticipate, and find solutions to these conflicts? This is an important challenge for ASEAN.	The AIPR was created for the purpose of addressing these challenges through in-depth studies of peace, conflict management, and reconciliation. This institution also promotes activities listed in the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint and other activities agreed upon by ASEAN member states. For this purpose, the AIPR can collaborate with research and civil society organizations in the ASEAN region. This cooperation can include: research; capacity-building; creating a pool of experts; supporting ASEAN sectoral bodies; and disseminating information related to peace, conflict management, and reconciliation in the region.

Source: ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation

7.4.4 ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre)

Another institution that supports positive peace in ASEAN is the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management or the AHA Centre. The AHA Centre's main objective is to facilitate cooperation and coordination between ASEAN member countries and the United Nations and international organizations for disaster management and emergency response in the ASEAN region. Furthermore, the AHA Centre also partners with international organizations, the private sector, and civil society organizations, such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) Partnership Group.

The AHA Centre has three focuses, namely: hazard science and technology, especially for the ASEAN region; information and communication technology (a key factor of this centre); and disaster management. The AHA Centre collects data and information about disasters and distributes them to the relevant parties. In the meantime, seven other key areas are handled by the AHA Centre, including the centre for information and communication technology, disaster risk monitor, preparedness and response, and partnership building. In an effort to build relationships, several countries have become partners, such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the United States, and the European Union.

As an information centre for disaster events, the AHA Centre can distribute diverse and coordinated assistance so they do not accumulate in one place as before. In addition, it can remove barrier limits for parties wishing to send aid to disaster areas in ASEAN. Further, the AHA Centre's activities include efforts to help victims of both natural disasters and violence. For example, it was involved in efforts to help victims of Typhoon Haiyan (2013) in the Philippines. In addition, it has collaborated with

many countries and international organizations, coordinated to mobilize more resources, and coordinated with ASEAN leaders and partners worldwide.

Regarding the Rohingya conflict in Myanmar, however, ASEAN has been reluctant to get involved directly because of its principle of non-intervention. Despite this, because the scale of the conflict has tarnished ASEAN's image, several ASEAN countries have publicly expressed their disappointment with Myanmar's handling of the conflict. Some ASEAN countries have also individually tried to help by sending humanitarian aid to Rohingya refugees. Indonesia even approached Myanmar by sending Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi to meet with Myanmar leader, Aung San Syu-ki. Moreover, the AHA Centre helped out by sending humanitarian aid to conflict areas in the Rakhine state of Myanmar, where most Rohingyas are living. Thus, as an institution openly accepted by Myanmar, it was able to help Rohingya refugees when aid from many other countries was rejected. The AHA Centre even helped the repatriation process for Rohingya refugees returning to Rakhine state. For its part, ASEAN formed a special taskforce to implement the AHA Centre's Preliminary Needs Assessment Team (PNA) report. This task force is expected to accelerate the repatriation process of Rohingya refugees from Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh to Rakhine State. Myanmar Ambassador to ASEAN, U Min Lwin, said that his party welcomed efforts to form the task force by the General Secretary of ASEAN (Setnas ASEAN, 2019). For a summary of the AHA Centre's goals and activities, see Box 7.4 below.

Box 7.4 ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre)

Background	Challenges	Solutions and activities
The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre) on disaster management was signed in by ASEAN Foreign Ministers on 17 November 2011. The AHA Centre was formed with the aim of coordinating humanitarian assistance to ASEAN areas in need. This assistance can be for natural disasters or conflicts causing the displacement of people. Before formation of the AHA Centre, assistance like this was sporadic, not directed, and not coordinated. The AHA center accommodates the ASEAN Way which is sensitive to the culture and sovereignty of member countries in its various activities. Such an approach is used, for example, by the AHA Centre to assist the repatriation of Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar.	Natural disasters are common in various countries including Southeast Asia. In times of disaster, affected countries are often unable to solve these problems alone. For this purpose, the AHA cooperates with various countries and other international organizations. AHA centres also try to build adequate capacity and coordinate activities with other agencies.	The AHA Centre carries out collaborations with various organizations such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the United Nations, and the AADMER Partnership Group. It also collaborates with ASEAN dialogue partner countries. In the event of a large-scale disaster, such as Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013), the AHA Centre worked with the ASEAN Secretary General, who took on the role of ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator, to mobilize more resources and coordinate with ASEAN leaders and partners around the world. Likewise, AHA Centres are doing the same to help Rohingya refugees return to Rakhine province in Myanmar. Two high-level commitments reaffirm the role of the AHA Centre as ASEAN's main regional coordinating body in the field of disaster management and emergency response, namely: (1) the ASEAN Declaration on One ASEAN One Response: Responding to Disasters as One in the Region and Outside the Region, and (2) ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management

Source: ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance

7.5 Roles of individual states in conflict resolution

Insurgencies, revolutions, and self-determination type conflicts still persist in some ASEAN member countries. Due to the principle of non-intervention, the organization has not yet found a definite form to approach these conflicts.[3] Individual ASEAN members, however, can take the initiative to assist countries affected by these conflicts, especially if the countries affected request it.

One of the longest and most protracted conflicts in the region was the Mindanao conflict involving the government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Bangsamoro people represented by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).[4] The Bangsamoro nation once demanded independence from the GPH, but is now happy to accept the settlement of broad autonomy to their region. ASEAN member countries that helped the peace process are Indonesia and Malaysia. For the first time, these two countries, together with the OIC (the Organization of Islamic Conference – before it became the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), succeeded in pushing for the Tripoli agreement between the Philippine government and Bangsamoro, which was represented by the MNLF and led by Nur Misuwari. The Tripoli Agreement, which was signed on 23 December 1976, contained the formation of an autonomous government in the Southern Philippines. The Muslim autonomous regions would include Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, and Palawan.

Malaysia has been a facilitator in the peace process since 2001. This process began after a severe crisis brought on by an all-out-war instigated by the GPH under President Joseph Estrada (1998-2001) against the Bangsamoro. After Estrada was removed as president on charges of corruption and plunder, the new president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, invited Malaysia to facilitate the peace process between the GPH and the MILF. Malaysia also led the International Monitoring Team (IMT) formed in 2004 to oversee the ceasefire agreement between the two sides. Malaysia's role was significant in achieving the Framework Agreement for the Bangsamoro (FAB) in 2012 and the Comprehensive Agreement for the Bangsamoro (CAB) in 2014. The parties are presently in the process of implementing the agreements under the leadership of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) made up mostly of key leaders from the MILF and the Bangsamoro community.

In relation to the conflict in Southern Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia have also been very active in finding solutions to the problem as facilitators. A series of efforts to initiate negotiations have been initiated by former Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, in Langkawi and by Indonesian Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, in Bogor in 2008. In addition, efforts have also been made by countries outside ASEAN, and by several organizations in Geneva and in Finland. However, all previous attempts were not successful. Malaysia, on the other hand, was able to convene a brief dialogue session in Kuala Lumpur between representatives from the Thai government and the BRN (National Revolutionary Front) in February 2013 that resulted in the signing of a "general consensus document." This consensus was, of course, still far from resolving the conflict, but at least it constituted a good starting point. Malaysia continued to pursue this dialogue despite the lack of any clear positions or offers of solutions either from the Thai government or from the Patani movement side. As a member of ASEAN and also a representative of the OIC, it can therefore be seen that Malaysia sought to play a stronger role as a peacemaker and gain status as a mediator, not only as a broker (Mccargo, 2014).

[3] For examples and the causes of intrastate conflicts in Southeast Asia, see Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
[4] The Mindanao conflict and peace process are also covered by Chapters 4 and 5.

Indonesia was also involved in helping to resolve the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the land around the Preah Vihear temple, which was considered a no man's land.[5] Cambodia took the case to the ICJ which decided the ancient temple was a world heritage site in 1962. However, the land around the temple was considered by Thailand to be excluded from the decision who again brought up the matter in 2008. Political developments in Thailand then influenced the hardening of its demands for the region. The tension between the two countries peaked after a military incursion occurred causing dozens of casualties in 2011.

At first, Thailand did not want to involve ASEAN in resolving the conflict even though Cambodia had requested ASEAN intervention in 2008. Because tensions had not yet peaked, ASEAN under the leadership of Singapore in 2008, asked the two countries to resolve their own problems bilaterally. It was only following the armed clashes in 2011 that Cambodia reported the matter to the UN Security Council, which prompted ASEAN to involve itself in mediating the conflict.

To avoid further interference from the UN Security Council, Indonesia, the chair of ASEAN in 2011, played an active role in mediating the conflict. Indonesian Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, conducted "shuttle diplomacy" to bring together the Cambodian and Thai foreign ministers in Bangkok and New York in February 2011. Then at the May 2011 ASEAN Summit in Jakarta, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono succeeded in bringing together the prime ministers of Thailand and Cambodia to discuss this issue. Indonesia also proposed an observer to monitor the conflict areas around the temple and encouraged the two parties to activate the annual General Border Committee (GBC) meeting.

Following Cambodia's reports of border violations on 18 July 2011, the ICJ ordered Thailand and Cambodia to withdraw their troops from the contested border area. The ICJ also stated that a UN review team would be deployed to monitor the ceasefire (BBC News, 2011). Following this and changes in the Thai government, tensions between the two countries eased, and the annual General Border Committee (GBC) meeting was activated to discuss cooperation at the border, including in the economic and security sectors without addressing the issue of border disputes (Parameswaran, 2018).

7.6 Roles of non-state actors in ASEAN in promoting peace

The role of NGOs in helping to create conditions for peace in ASEAN has become increasingly important. NGOs participate both as partners who can assist ASEAN activities and as actors who criticize ASEAN activities. Several NGOs, that are members of the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (Forum-Asia), for example, conduct evaluations of AICHR activities (Hanara, Cornelis, Judhistari, Ginbar, and Majumdar, 2019). ASEAN also accommodates NGOs for formal affiliation. Moreover, NGOs are seen as helping to realise ASEAN cooperation in various fields, especially economics, societal, culture, and science (Aviel, 1999). NGOs can also be considered part of the epistemic community that formulate views on how ASEAN should carry out economic and political cooperation.

Some NGOs that are members of the Human Rights Working Group (HRWG), for example, were very active in encouraging the formation of the ASEAN Human Rights Body and trying to oversee the formation of its TOR in the 2000s. In addition, the ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) brings together think-tanks to provide input on security issues. Their views are channelled through

[5] For further details of this conflict, see Box 3.1 in Chapter 3.

the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) and are considered track-two diplomacy (to discuss security and political issues in the Asia Pacific region). Several think-tanks that were members of ASEAN-ISIS, also formed the Council for Security and Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) in June 1993, which gave a lot of input to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

NGO involvement in the formation of the AICHR shows one example of community involvement in ASEAN regardless of whether such input was viewed satisfactorily by the ASEAN elite. The AICHR was formed through the initiative of several important ASEAN figures who were members of the Eminent Persons Group. This Group sent its recommendations about ASEAN's Human Rights Body to the Working Group on the ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (WG-AHRM) representing NGOs, academics, and government officials of the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies Colloquium on Human Rights (AICOHR). They participated in persuading ASEAN leaders to form a strong human rights body. In addition, they also drafted the AICHR Charter and TOR. Although their efforts were not fully accommodated, parts of their proposal paved the way for the formation of the AICHR.

In addition to these NGOs, NGOs outside ASEAN affiliates publish reports and statements about AICHR works. For example, Forum-Asia, a group of several NGOs, has made progress reports on the AICHR, mentioning many of its failures. Such NGOs have always been involved in promoting human rights and criticizing ASEAN governments for human rights abuses. Among the members of this forum is Kontras, an Indonesian CSO, which opposes the AICHR. For example, former Kontras chairman, Haris Azhar, expressed his pessimism and disappointment in the AICHR, stating that it would take another thirty years for it to function properly. Instead of just lobbying ASEAN governments, Kontras along with other human rights groups, joined the Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) which fostered solidarity among NGOs to protest human rights abuses by ASEAN countries. As such, they chose to become an opposition force outside ASEAN government circles.

It is also worth noting the deep involvement of the people of ASEAN in the early 2000s in the discussion of new ASEAN agendas. Hope was expressed that this organization would be more functional. Accordingly, members of various NGOs and think tanks calling themselves the ASEAN People's Assembly (APA), held a meeting in Batam, Indonesia on 24-25 November 2000 in conjunction with the 4th ASEAN Summit in Singapore. Around 300 NGO representatives, grassroots leaders and activists, think-tanks, and businesses attended the Assembly. Leading regional NGOs such as Forum Asia and Focus on the Global South also attended the meeting. Several government officials, including Abdurrahman Wahid, Ali Alatas, Jose Almonte (the former Philippine national security adviser), and ASEAN Secretary General, Rodolfo Severino were also present at the first meeting.

This meeting reflected the needs of the ASEAN people for a new ASEAN and mentioned several agendas in which they believed ASEAN should play a role. Among these were various social, political, and economic issues including: the role of the community in setting the ASEAN agenda; the impact of globalization; women's power and empowerment; the role of the media; possible regional human rights mechanisms; the role of civil society; efforts to overcome poverty; environmental management boundaries and opportunities; events in Myanmar and East Timor; policies for education system reform; and ASEAN's role in regional community development.

In addition, the APA has established an ambitious APA Action Plan that addresses human security issues in the region via a kind of scorecard. The Action Plan identifies seven areas requiring greater attention, more in-depth scrutiny, and action by civil society groups (Aviel, 1999). The Action Plan has a very wide agenda including plans to: create a score card for the implementation of human rights programs; monitor

the advancement of gender equality; evaluate the advancement of democracy; introduce an ethical code for CSOs; increase cooperation to tackle HIV/AIDS; and to pioneer a human development report for Southeast Asia (SEAHDR).

The activities of the APA were highly appreciated and were widely seen as contributing to community-building in ASEAN. In particular, it serves as a gathering place for representatives from various sectors on Tracks 1, 2, and 3 in the region by creating a network of think-tanks, civil society supporters, and policymakers committed to driving ASEAN's transformation into a more people-cantered organization responsive to the voices, visions, and values of the various communities of Southeast Asia. The main motor of APA management has been its think-tank groups making up the ASEAN-ISIS network which have successfully held meetings before the ASEAN Summit from 2000 to 2009. However, some CSOs were not satisfied with the way the ASEAN-ISIS worked in setting up the agenda due to their different visions for the region. This led to the emergence of the ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC) and the ASEAN Peoples Forum (APF) which is a coalition of NGOs in the Solidarity for Asian People's Advocacy (SAPA) network. The ACSC/APF has continued to meet before the ASEAN Summit since its formation in 2005 (Gerard, 2013).

The developments above show that ASEAN is no longer simply an organization that manages inter-state conflicts. Now, it also tries to build positive peace by looking at the problems existing in the ASEAN community. Various social issues under the umbrella of human security have also become important and are now seen as major concerns for ASEAN cooperation. This includes efforts to build and highlight awareness about human rights and the protection of such rights in a broader context.

7.7 Conclusion

ASEAN has developed to anticipate changes and demands from its environment to achieve its goal of maintaining peace in the Southeast Asia region. This development departs from its original purpose to resolve and prevent conflict. Initially, ASEAN decided not to consider negative peace which seeks to preserve a no war situation. From an organization that was once very state and elite centric, ASEAN has since created agencies to bring it closer to the people. State security, which had been a focus since the beginning, is still important. This can be seen from several latent cases that have surfaced, or which continue to persist, such as the Thailand-Cambodia conflict and the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Thus, ASEAN has built a platform to manage disputes between member countries based on the principle of the ASEAN Way. Although the mechanisms and principles used have been constantly criticized, ASEAN continues to play an important role in promoting peace via preventive diplomacy through mechanisms such as the PMC, ASEM, and ARF.

To address the demands of changing times and to make ASEAN relevant to its citizens, ASEAN has also formed various bodies such as the AICHR, AHA and AIPR to help address issues such as human rights, refugees, humanitarian concerns, and peace and reconciliation. ASEAN also ratified the ACW on women as a commitment to be more relevant in the protection of women and children. Thus, there has been a transformation in ASEAN's attitude to resolving conflicts, from state centric to people centric, or what is known as a people-centred ASEAN. While this has evolved slowly, through the process, ASEAN's openness to handle human security issues has been an important step forward to support positive peace in the Southeast Asian region. In fact, this has become a model for ASEAN's organizational mechanisms.

Progress in ASEAN's peace making process cannot be measured mainly from legal, binding, or theoretical perspectives. ASEAN often does not begin with a difficult

to implement agreement instead choosing to work incrementally. This approach has yielded laudable results, as members are not pressured or pushed to accept decisions they do not wish to make. This chapter highlighted instances where such mechanisms have worked especially in addressing human rights, peace, and conflict issues. Over the years, many new bodies and institutions have been introduced to address issues raised by the people of ASEAN and to complement existing mechanisms for dispute resolution within the ASEAN framework. These bodies and institutions have also contributed a habit of resolving problems through negotiation, dialogue, and consensus. This development shows that ASEAN is increasingly reflective and engages civil society in anticipating and overcoming various transnational problems. In other words, the development towards positive peace is expected to be even stronger in the future.

Discussion questions

1. How is peace seen by ASEAN member states?
2. What were the main reasons for the formation of ASEAN?
3. Why was the period between 1967 to 1976 seen as "formative" for ASEAN?
4. What is so special about the ASEAN approach to conflict management?
5. What is the importance of the practice of "non-intervention" for ASEAN?
6. How has ASEAN's "preventive diplomacy" approach contributed to the management of conflicts in the region?
7. What are the functions of the sub-regional bodies in ASEAN? Are they effective?
8. What have been the main challenges in the development of ASEAN's conflict management approach?
9. What is the "ASEAN Way"? How effective has it been in addressing conflict issues in the region?
10. Why have internal mechanisms for dispute resolution like the provision to set up a "High Council" to resolve disputes never been implemented?

Recommended reading

1. Acharya, A, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, Routledge, 2001.
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Chapter 8

Transformative Peacebuilding – Towards a Culture of Peace in Southeast Asia

Chapter 8: Transformative Peacebuilding – Towards a Culture of Peace in Southeast Asia

Kamarulzaman Askandar

8.1 Introduction

This sourcebook began with the idea of presenting a discussion on peace and conflict transformation using case studies from the region. While there is already an abundance of literature in this field, it was felt that one combining existing approaches with regional examples could be useful for students in Southeast Asia especially when written by scholars and practitioners who have worked on such issues and understand the challenges. Therefore, the writers and contributors to this sourcebook are all *scholar-practitioners* – meaning people who write and teach about peace, but at the same time, practice and implement their knowledge on the ground. Some are from the "soil of the conflict" in the context of Lederach's peacebuilding framework. Others are also *insider mediators or peacebuilders* playing a role in transformative peacebuilding from within. Those not working from within (conflict areas) support such activities from the outside. But their role here is clear – not only to write about the textbook meanings of peace and conflict (management, resolution, transformation) through their understanding of the concepts and approaches, but also to encourage an expansion of knowledge in this field and the creation of more scholar-practitioners and insider mediator/peacebuilders in the region. Such is our vision – to contribute to peace and an overall culture of peace in the region. While the ways to do this are myriad, since the contributors are educators, they have chosen the path of peace education for this purpose. Ultimately, the goal is to promote *sustainable positive peace* as the desirable end product by way of a transformative peacebuilding approach and process. As such, this last chapter will make some final observations about the issues, processes, and lessons that have been learnt from the many years these scholar-practitioners have spent addressing and transforming conflicts, and implementing peace in the region.

8.2 Focus on peace studies

Why peace studies? Perhaps the more apt question is why not? This was one of the first questions posed by this sourcebook. Peace and conflict studies are a relatively new field in the region, mostly growing from programs concentrating on political, social, and human rights issues. It has also benefitted from (and contributed to) the push for peace education as a way of promoting a culture of peace.

Peace education as defined by UNICEF is:

> *the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behaviour change that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an interpersonal, intergroup, national, or international level (UNICEF, 2016).*

Peace education then is a holistic, multidisciplinary, and transformative process where one can learn to cultivate awareness, concern, and the behaviours leading

to peaceful relationships, conditions, and structures. Concurrently, it also transforms and seeks to alter people's mindsets, attitudes, and values, as well as the behaviours that originally either created or exacerbated the violent conflict. Moreover, peace education helps to break down the social conditions giving rise to structural and cultural violence. As such, it has a social and political purpose. Furthermore, it contributes to a culture of peace, and promotes tolerance, diversity, and empowerment. Finally, it encourages individual and social responsibility with the objective of creating more active agents of peaceful change.

Peace education is synonymous with peace studies. The same questions asked of peace education, for example, pertaining to its learning goals and objectives, were also asked when peace studies programs were designed and introduced in institutions of higher education. These include what students should know and what they should be made aware of. In particular, they need to understand the nature of conflict, how it begins, how unmet needs can lead to conflict, and what dynamics have the potential to perpetuate cycles of conflict. At an individual level, peace studies also contribute to personal development. To begin with, students are often asked to assess their personal style of conflict resolution before delving into the more difficult terrain of the emotions involved in such situations and how to process them. Further, how does one acquire or improve the necessary skills, capacities, and competencies to hasten a peaceful solution and how do one's dispositions, attitudes, and convictions help or hinder the process. Effective verbal and non-verbal communication skills, combined with negotiation, analytical, and problem-solving skills are all important contributors to enhancing one's capacity to handle conflict and form part of the core of the transformation and problem-solving nature of peace studies.

In Chapter 1 of this sourcebook, peace studies was summarized as a transformative process that enhances the knowledge, skills, and attitude necessary to contribute to a culture of peace. Notwithstanding, this discipline is still very much a work in progress and more effort is needed, specifically to integrate conflict resolution and transformation skills into both formal and informal education. As the art and science of teaching, pedagogy also plays a critical role in how the subject is taught and how the knowledge gleaned is eventually applied. Peace pedagogy is both formative and transformative. As such, the teaching of peace should be as creative as possible, focusing not only on imparting knowledge and expanding the minds of students but also seeking to affect their attitudes and worldview as potential responsible leaders of the future. The same applies to peace research (commonly described as "action research") which centres on the interplay between theory, experience (or implementation), and reflection, the latter of which must be a constant throughout the process. As a result of this holistic approach to learning, it is hoped peace studies will provide students with a platform and framework that will help to achieve sustainable positive peace in the region.

8.3 Understanding conflict

The process of transformative peacebuilding starts with an understanding of the nature of conflict. *What is conflict?* Chapters 1 and 2 pointed out that it can be understood not only by studying definitions and concepts, but by analysing its different perspectives, angles, contexts, and processes. The conflict mapping and analysis tools as a prelude to intervention (presented by Simon Mason from ETH Zurich) stress that such understanding stems from a perusal of four components – actors, content, context, and process. Actors describe the parties, both primary and secondary (and possibly third parties); content denotes the issues, needs, or goals underlying the conflict and which have become a focus of contention between

the parties; context is the environment surrounding a conflict or factors otherwise affecting it; and process encompasses the dynamics, history, and timeline of a conflict, including the escalation process and moments and processes for peace.

Another useful conflict mapping and analysis approach is inspired by Dugan's (1996) nested conflict model which looks at the interplay between issues (goals and incompatibilities), relationships (the nature and structure of relationships between parties), and sub-systems and systems (their context, process, and environment) that exist in conflict situations. Hence, conflict forms part of a system and should be understood as such (presented as the systemic analysis by Ropers and Abubakar in Chapter 4). How a conflict is viewed affects the way it is addressed meaning the tailoring of approaches is vital depending on, for example, the need for urgency and the capacity of the intervenor. Such factors combined with the time frame of the peacebuilding approach will determine what action needs attention at any given time. This was discussed in detail by Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this sourcebook. The approach as a whole points to the importance of *contingency* and *complementarity* in the conflict transformation framework – which is contingent upon the nature of the issues, the structure of the relationships, the context of the system and process; and the capacity of the intervenors who may be insiders or outsiders. All these factors must be complimentary and work together to address the situation.

Understanding conflict also means delving deeper into the situation by focusing on what was described in Chapters 1 and 2 as the components of the *conflict triangle* as discussed by Galtung and Mitchell among others. Also known as the *ABC of conflict*, this tool describes the interplay between the components of Attitude, Behaviour, and Contradiction. Each in itself can describe the events escalating or de-escalating a conflict, for example, the mindset, perception, and stereotypes affecting the attitude of conflict actors; the positive or negative behaviour that can lead to either conflict or peace; and the contradiction or issues giving rise to the different perceptions and behaviours of actors. Components also interact meaning to make an impact, all these factors must be addressed together. When and how depends on the context and the urgency of the situation. This is reflected in the *iceberg analogy*, which says that while some aspects of a conflict may be visible, others lie hidden beneath the surface. Thus, one might be able to see the behaviour of actors but their underlying attitude and mindsets, as well as the real root causes giving rise to the conflict may be hidden. This wider base or platform for conflicts cannot be ignored.

Chapters 1 and 2 also looked at the notion of violence. Violence is described as direct or indirect aggressive acts done by actors to others in the context of conflict for a specific purpose. However, the term includes the repercussions or impacts of these actions (or inactions) meaning violence must also be seen from the perspectives of structural and cultural violence – that it can be built into or reflected in the structure of society resulting in alienation, discrimination, and the suppression of needs and identities (structural); so much so, it can evolve to the extent it is seen as a normal and acceptable way of life (cultural).

In a region where peace has been somewhat elusive, the focus on peace studies is not only important but necessary. Southeast Asia has had its share of such experiences and a history of conflicts: from long periods of colonization by mostly Western countries; to being involved in and affected by global competitions for power during the cold war period; to the pains of nation building in the post-colonial period including dealing with ensuing demands for recognition, self-determination, democracy, and power-sharing; to shortcomings in addressing connected issues such as good governance, social and economic development, protection of human rights, justice, reconciliation issues, protection of the environment, and human security. Threats to security, both conventional or traditional, as well as non-conventional or non-traditional (including threats to human security) abound and require the attention of states (as well as peoples) in the region. While Southeast

Asian states have tried to address these issues in their own respective ways, they have met with only varying degrees of success.

Several chapters, especially Chapters 3 and 7, looked at the region's management of these threats. Attention on regional peace and security fluctuated depending on the needs of the time. For example, it escalated from the 1950s to the 1970s, not only because it was the height of the cold war period, but also because many countries were newly independent nation-states struggling to juggle international and regional issues with their own nation-building processes. These included the need to strengthen peace, security, and stability within their own nations. At the same time, they were charting new territories and experimenting with new ways of dealing with regional issues and essentially conducting international relations for the first time as new nations. The formation of ASEAN in 1967, and its subsequent development since then, attested to this desire to reject violence whilst trying to avoid involvement in superpower rivalries, as well as enabling space for individual states to address internal issues without having to face outside interference or intervention. The logic was that by creating peaceful, stable, secure, and resilient nations, the region would in effect become peaceful, stable, secure, and resilient. Such logic contributed to the underlying guiding principles of ASEAN and formed the basis of conflict management in the region as discussed in Chapters 3 and 7. It is thus that conflict management developed and evolved within Southeast Asia.

The evolution of this regional conflict management approach would eventually be described as reflecting the local decision-making style of *musyawarah* or consensus-seeking to reach *muafakat* or consensus. This so-called *ASEAN Way* can be further explained as the "3-R" approach of conflict management meaning the need to *restrain* oneself from making decisions that might have an adverse effect on relations between parties; the need to uphold this *responsibility* at all costs; and the need to maintain *respect* for other nations which includes restraining oneself (Askandar, 1996). Without such respect and unity, it is claimed, acts of restraint and responsibility are unlikely to occur. While it could be argued that the 3-R approach does form part of the basic tenet of international diplomacy, such principles have been highlighted by ASEAN member states as a foundation for inter-state relations and is the cornerstone of their conflict management approach.

At the same time, the context of the situation has also evolved. Developments in the Indochinese part of the region throughout the 1970s and 1980s have resulted in the institutionalization and socialization of the ASEAN Way of conflict management. This can be seen from the various documents introduced since then. The context again evolved with the end of the cold war in the early 1990s. A new world order bodes well for regionalism and an increased role for regional actors in managing regional conflicts seems well under way. However, the changing context also brought challenges like terrorism and violent extremism to the forefront, blurring domestic and international boundaries and presenting new and difficult challenges for the region. Accordingly, the need to reframe approaches to conflict became paramount as the threats faced by nations now include the "non-traditional." While national security is still important, increasingly issues of human security are becoming ever more urgent. To the peoples of the region, this is not new. Although supporting the nation-building process was seen as a necessary growing pain, much unhappiness has manifested over the way it conflicts internally with issues that have either persisted or carried over from the colonial period, in addition to those related to more general unfulfilled needs.

This top-down approach of peace and conflict management has been challenged by various non-state actors (both armed and non-armed) and affected communities in the region, especially those with historical grievances, as well as other more contemporary needs. This gave rise to more internal problems. All this resulted in the focus of the approach changing as the strategies and mechanisms to deal with

such conflicts expanded. This is when the more expansive conflict transformation strategies and approaches became more prominent and widely accepted. The result is that peacebuilding efforts now involve the transformation of actors, context, and issues, both personal and group related, as well as the processes of creating new institutions, strengthening relations, and building new platforms for long-term positive peace. A multitude of other actors from various tracks are also more actively involved. However, this presents an awkward dilemma for peace in the region as strategies to address and handle inter-state issues may be at odds with those processes handling intra-state conflicts. This then gave rise to criticisms of ASEAN, that it was an elite club looking out only for the interests of member states and not the peoples of the region. It is within this context that the book approaches the subject of addressing conflicts – that while there are many approaches to address conflict issues, the main strategy is slowly changing to a transformative peacebuilding approach especially when addressing intra-state conflicts in the region.

8.4 Conflict transformation and transformative peacebuilding

This sourcebook supports the idea of conflict transformation – that contemporary conflicts require more than just management of the issues and behaviours of conflict parties, or a reframing of positions to secure a compromised settlement. Instead, the focus leans more towards digging deeper into the root causes of an issue to find a win-win solution via conflict resolution. And as conflicts are also embedded in a structure of relationship patterns that go beyond the site of the conflict, therefore, conflict transformation is a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses, and structures that support continuation of the violent behaviour. From this point of view, conflict can even be thought of as constructive and a catalyst for change as it could become a starting point for the transformation process to begin.

As mentioned in Chapters 1, 4, and 5, conflict transformation is a long-term process that works for change – of the violent structure, of the relationships between affected parties, and of the mindsets and attitudes of those involved. Thus, conflict transformation requires the contribution of all sectors in the long-term process of building peace. Finally, even if actors outside the conflict areas/region can contribute and play a constructive role in addressing the conflict, this approach stresses that the onus and bulk of efforts must come from within – from the *soil of the conflict*. It is these people who should be in the driver's seat when it comes to moving and sustaining the process.

Depending on the angle from which the conflict is approached, different narratives have arisen in Southeast Asia. Such narratives also depend on other variables – context, actors, as well as the types and levels of conflict. The narrative of the conflict transformation approach has been chosen for this book because of its comprehensiveness and the "work-in-progress" nature of many conflict transformation processes in the region. This approach also works by focusing on the transformation aspects of the peacebuilding framework, giving it the term, *transformative peacebuilding* – an approach that seeks to transform various aspects of the conflict as part of its framework to build sustainable positive peace.

This term was also used by Simon Fisher and Lada Zimina (2009) to illustrate the transformation work of external peacebuilders seeking to make fundamental political and social change to address conflict situations, as opposed to "technical peacebuilding" which they describe as an "*incremental activity, which aims to make a practical difference in a specific domain, without necessarily changing the deeper context*." Fisher and Zimina look at transformative peacebuilding from the

perspectives of goals, strategies, values, and analysis of the process. While their main attention was on the actors of peacebuilding, especially individuals and organizations tasked with and involved in such activities (especially external actors), this book argues that such outlooks, activities, and responsibilities are also reflective of those working on conflict transformation and peacebuilding from within conflict areas in the region. Even more so given the transformative roles of local and regional actors and the soil-of-the-conflict approach taken by this book. Regional experiences have shown that despite the importance of the systemic context which takes into account the contribution of international actors, the core of transformative peacebuilding emanates from within the region, and especially the soil of the conflict. This is where it begins and ends.

The above analysis is summarized by Table 8.1 below using the experiences of transformative peacebuilding efforts within the region from the perspectives of local/regional peacebuilders, the state, and non-state actors involved in the conflict and transformative peacebuilding processes.

Table 8.1 Transformative peacebuilding in the context of experiences in Southeast Asia

GOALS	*Overall purpose*	*To end open conflict (achieve negative peace) as well as to transform underlying structures (relationships, institutions, and culture) as an integrated element in achieving sustainable positive peace. Attainment of sustainable positive peace with a local/regional flavour/content.*
	Agenda	*Set to achieve the overall purpose of the process. Agenda set by the vision and direction of the main actors, including governments, leaders of CSOs, and other NSGs; increasingly with contributions by affected communities.*
	Objectives	*Achieving national goals; achieving goals of NSGs; achieving human security goals for affected communities.*
	Priority	*Reduction of violence and transformation of structure of relations between main actors; transformation of context, issues, actors, and groups leading to the promotion of peace, prosperity, and security.*
STRATEGY	*Focus*	*Building elements of wider change into a specific piece of work, for example, the peace process. Putting transformation into long-term plans for peace; linking transformation to peacebuilding and peace mediation processes; transformation of the structures of relations; ensuring positive momentum of the process.*
	Evaluation	*Efficiency plus bigger picture impact. Periodic assessment of progress at different time-frames and at different levels.*
	Learning	*Taking failure as a starting point; inclusion of self-reflection and action learning. Coming up with new innovations and practices; responding positively to setbacks and challenges to improve the process.*
	Issues	*Expand, change, and transcend contested issues. Finding common concerns; transformation of values to interests; finding ways to transform 'non-negotiables' to 'negotiables.'*
	Theory of change	*Developed in relation to analysis and systems thinking. Done in consultation with constituents, stakeholders, and with the support of partners; periodic reflection with a focus on evaluation and learning.*
	Scope	*Multilevel, local-global, alliance across sectors. Identifying contributors; focus on insiders; work on the basis of the contingency and complementarity approach.*
	Time horizon	*Combining immediate, intermediate, and long-term concerns and focus. Linking these with the scope of the action.*

VALUES	*Accountability*	*To all identified partners/community, constituents, and stakeholders.*
	Whose peace?	*Ideally for all. Need to find the proper balance and the most acceptable formula for all parties and communities. Community can be at different levels – from regional to local; translated into activities at different tracks.*
	Self-image	*Peacemakers, peacebuilders, change-makers, or agents of change and transformation.*
ANALYSIS	*Context*	*Adds ongoing analysis and future scenario planning, all undertaken after consultation with the wider community. Periodic review of context at all levels.*
	Actors	*Identifying relevant actors. Ensuring good working relations between them. Inclusivity as a goal; ensure representativeness; transformation of critical actors – work for change of perspective, goals, hearts, will, inclusive sense of identity.*
	View of violence	*Understands that identity based on ethnicity, gender, and class dimensions are integral parts of violence. Violence happens when actors and affected groups become desperate and see no other available options. Need for other options and other possibilities. Need to transform energy into positive outcomes; active promotion of non-violent approaches.*
	View of conflict	*Inevitable, an opportunity for development and change; Reviewing cost-benefit dichotomy of actions – options and implications of actions.*

Source: Based on Fisher and Zimina's criteria for transformative approaches to peacebuilding by external peacebuilders (2009)

As presented in Table 8.1 above, the overall purpose of transformative peacebuilding is to achieve sustainable positive peace, an approach that believes conflict is inevitable and an opportunity for change. The transformation process to bring this about will involve the core actors working as *agents of change* with a clear focus and agenda. Specific strategies are utilized at all levels under the principles of contingency and complementarity. In the end, the transformation will have allowed contributions from all, if not most, actors, and will be for the benefit of all. Throughout the process, periodic assessments will be conducted and improvements to the process made accordingly. While this description of transformative peacebuilding is perhaps idealistic, its intention is to highlight the important steps undertaken within the context of conflict transformation and peacebuilding in the region.

The next section will look at the lessons learnt from peace mediation processes in the region. Some points about transformative peacebuilding raised here will also be highlighted and discussed.

8.5 Basic premise for peace: Lessons from regional peace processes (mostly from the experiences of Aceh, Mindanao, and Southern Thailand)

Much discussion in this sourcebook has centred around the notion that an absence of war does not equate to peace. The region experienced long periods without violence between groups at the intra-state level and even longer periods between states. This, however, did not mean there was peace. It only meant conflicts in the region had been well managed and had not escalated into violence. Therefore, this sourcebook also examined the process of managing and ending conflicts. While the process of ending conflicts can (and should) start from when a conflict surfaces, in reality initiatives only tend to be taken at later stages. Regional experiences have shown that such efforts tend to fall under what has been described as *transformative peacebuilding*. And while transformative peacebuilding is a long-term process, it is also useful to consider specific focuses or periods of activities within the process. One such focus refers to ending conflicts as discussed in Chapter 5 of this sourcebook.

Chapter 5 looked at how the peace mediation process was used to end conflicts in the region. A number of conflict situations were mentioned in Chapters 4 and 5 including Aceh (Indonesia), Mindanao (the Philippines), and Southern Thailand. The process of peace mediation was discussed in great detail including the roles played by all actors, third parties, and those from the other "tracks" in the process. Different facilitators, mediators, and third parties were given different mandates with varying results. Put together, many valuable lessons for transformative peacebuilding can be learnt from these efforts, some of which are summarized below.

(1) ***Sincerity and willingness of the parties/armed actors to resolve and engage peacefully.*** This is always the most crucial point at the beginning of any peace process. Without sincerity, there can be no political will to move forward. For example, involvement in the process may form part of a different agenda or parties may simply be acting out a charade to satisfy the demands of their constituents or other actors. If sincere, the process can be much more effective. Sincerity can be caused by many factors and be seen in many forms. In particular, it can arise from a process of actor and/or group transformation, as was the case in Mindanao and Aceh. Chair Salamat of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was essential to the MILF becoming involved in the peace process with the government of the Philippines (GPH). After leading the armed struggle for many years, he became convinced that the Bangsamoro issue could be resolved politically and thus, came to believe that the only way to achieve this was through dialogue with the GPH. Hence, when the GPH suggested a formal dialogue, he agreed and convinced the MILF to take up the offer. This transformation opened a path towards the GPH-MILF peace process in 1997.

    As regards Aceh, President Abdurrahman Wahid, or Gus Dur as he was popularly known, was also crucial to the peace process starting in 2000 with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) after years of violent repression by the Indonesian authorities. Gus Dur was sincere in starting the process and eager to find a solution to the decades-long armed conflict, including allowing the involvement of a Swiss based organization, the Henri Dunant Centre (HDC) (later to become the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue) as facilitator. Despite the failure of the HDC-facilitated process, this initiative contributed to the building of a platform for future peace processes with the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), which eventually took place a few years later in 2005.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the peace process in Southern Thailand, as there, the parties have struggled to move the process forward since it formally began in 2013. This has been partly due to a lack of sincerity and willingness to truly engage on both sides.

(2) ***Possibility of starting a peace process***. Sincerity and a willingness to start the process are vital contributors to a peace process. But other factors include the transformation of actors and groups as mentioned above, as well as the transformation of issues, context, and relationship structure. Another point mentioned in Chapter 5 was whether a situation is "ripe" for resolution. This point is controversial as it points to situations of prolonged conflict and a "hurting stalemate" which could take years of fighting and suffering on the ground. However, it does highlight a useful negotiating point by focusing on the cost-benefit dichotomy to persuade parties to join a peace process.

The CMI-facilitated Aceh process benefitted from the transformation of actors, context, and issues occurring between 2000 and 2005. Likewise, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami acted as a catalyst to move things forward. It also transformed the context of the situation. But it still needed a platform – this was created by back channel talks and informal negotiations between the two sides that occurred prior to the tsunami.

By contrast, the situation in Southern Thailand has increased in intensity since early 2004. This has been seen as an attempt by insurgent groups to accelerate the "ripening" of the situation and push it towards a formal dialogue where all non-state actors would be seen as legitimate parties deserving of a place at the negotiating table. At the same time, the Thai government also looked at the cost and benefits of pursuing military action versus starting a dialogue process with the movements in the South. All these point to the need to look at the possibility of starting a peace process as a way out of dire situations.

(3) ***National process***. The experience from the region shows that the roles of all tracks and actors are important to achieving sustainable positive peace. However, the main conflict/armed actors' involvement in the peacemaking process is crucial as they can lead the way in settling and resolving conflict issues. Track 2 and 3 involvement including experts, scholars, civil society, and grassroots organizations are essential to prepare and strengthen the platform in the transformative peacebuilding process. Together they work to complement the work of Track 1 actors. During times when the peace process slows or even stalls, these other tracks can keep the momentum going. Once an agreement has been signed, they can rally support among their constituents and other national actors for the socialization, institutionalization, and implementation of points in the agreement. Together, all actors from all tracks have a role to play in transforming the conflict and building sustainable positive peace. However, political elites must find ways to broaden the appeal of the peace process and peace accords. Only when everyone is on the same page can the process truly flourish.

(4) ***A peace process should be inclusive***. It should involve all the necessary actors including 'militant' groups. Although a straightforward point, it is sometimes difficult for governments to accept, invite, or even allow insurgent movements to sit at the negotiating table. Mostly, this is due to a reluctance to give legitimacy to such groups which they see as illegal, subversive, and a threat to the security of the nation. Because most states see insurgencies and armed struggles as security issues, they tend to handle these groups unilaterally with such strategies as declaring martial law and dispatching more troops and security forces, as well as by injecting funds into the area as a way of

countering economic issues and the problems being faced by the people. Only as a last resort do governments involve so-called rebels or militant groups in a dialogue. During peace negotiations, the primary function of leaders is to persuade their followers to endorse the process and their decisions. However, inclusivity in a formal peace process can also raise problems.

A particular problem relates to who should be included. This is especially difficult if more than one party is claiming to represent the people. Related to this is the issue of representativeness. How do we confirm whether this group truly represents the people on the ground? Such a case occurred in the Southern Thailand peace process. In 2013, a representative of the BRN was invited to the dialogue resulting in the General Consensus Agreement of 2013. The process then continued with a newly-formed loose coalition, MARA Patani, which was specifically created to be a party to the dialogue. MARA Patani, however, was criticized for not truly representing the aspirations of the Patani people, and for not being a main party to the current conflict on the ground. The process then evolved further to include the BRN in a separate track which the Thai government initiated after criticisms that the talks should include the BRN who *were* main actors on the ground.

Finally, inclusivity in some areas also refers to those outside the negotiating room who, nevertheless, are still affected by such decisions. For example, the Mindanao peace process was eventually derailed by the Supreme Court of the Philippines in 2008 for not consulting with constituents who would be affected by decisions made in the peace process. To overcome this, both sides, and especially the MILF, executed many consultation exercises on the ground. The agreements signed also went through a review process in the executive and legislative bodies of the government before going through a referendum process. In the end, it was deemed all important segments of society affected by the conflict had been consulted and involved in the process.

(5) ***The absence of violence is not a prerequisite***. Negotiations are. Successful peace negotiations must anticipate and manage the problem of continuing violence. While a ceasefire between groups is a key point in starting a peace process, this does not make ceasefires a prerequisite to such talks. All examples from the region show that negotiations were carried out while actors were continuing activities on the ground. While ceasefire discussions and other security issues should be done early in the process, they were never a pre-requisite to the dialogues. Bodies have at times even been created to prevent violent actions on the ground affecting the peace process. For example, the GPH and MILF created a body called the Ad Hoc Joint Action Groups (ADJAG) to monitor and control criminal elements in the conflict-affected areas of Mindanao so they would not adversely affect the peace process.

(6) ***A successful peace process is organic and cumulative***. Organic means the process has its roots on the ground, in the soil of the conflict. It also involves those rooted in conflict areas. While leaders of some groups may be living outside the area, they have connections to those living within conflict areas. It is vital that peace efforts include those groups. Infrastructures for peace including relationships are built from within as platforms for peace. This is why creating and supporting an internal process is vital. For example, efforts to enhance the capacities of local civil society groups to help in the peacebuilding process have been made in Mindanao, Aceh, Southern Thailand, and all other conflict areas in the region. Empowerment of these groups improves the quality of discussions, the efforts made, and commitment to the process. But to begin with, parties need to be invested in the process which ensures momentum. Finally, this kind of investment and commitment can also contribute to the

better implementation of any decisions made. It should also be noted that the process is cumulative meaning any efforts made at any stage and level contribute to the whole process.

Although sometimes slow at the beginning, if parties are serious, early efforts can be built upon to move the process forward. While success is always best, failed attempts can serve as important lessons and contribute greatly to the building and strengthening of future peace processes. For example, lessons from the failed HDC-facilitated process helped to ensure success under the CMI in the Aceh peace process. Likewise, lessons from the GPH-MNLF process also helped its GPH-MILF counterpart. The latter is a good example of the cumulative nature of peace processes. Each time there was a setback, the parties dealt with the challenges and came back stronger. In fact, it could even be argued that the process was improved by these setbacks. Moreover, new innovations were introduced such as the International Monitoring Team (IMT) which monitored security issues on the ground, the International Contact Group (ICG) which acted as observer and guarantor of the talks, as well as the many innovations of civil society actors from Tracks 2 and 3 to support and improve the process as described in Chapters 4 and 5.

(7) ***Peace processes are deals that require trade-offs***. It is well accepted that decisions and agreements in peace processes are the result of compromise between negotiating parties. As such, success will not be possible if parties are set in their positions and unwilling to compromise. The GAM, for example, was willing to set aside its demand for independence when autonomy under the guise of 'self-government' was offered. For its part, the Indonesian government agreed to the 'self-government' arrangement and allowed the GAM to transform into a 'local' political party, making the necessary changes in Indonesian law to enable this to happen. Something similar occurred in the GPH-MILF peace process. While independence for the Bangsamoro was never an issue, in return, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) was created to give the Bangsamoro people independence to rule themselves within an asymmetric relationship structure with the Philippine government.

(8) ***A peace process does not end with the peace accord***. One of the most challenging tasks to attaining sustainable positive peace is the implementation of the agreements to keep the momentum going. The post-agreement period is crucial because this is the time when most of the work is done. Different terms have been used in the region to describe the *normalization* process in Mindanao, as well as the more 'normal' terms of *disarmament*, *demobilization*, and *reintegration* (DDR) used in Aceh. Efforts must be made to bring life back to normalcy in conflict-affected areas. The initial focus is always on reducing the capacity for violence leading to initial post-agreements to disarm and demobilize armed actors. This can be followed by a systematic reduction of weapons and a review of security policies and issues through a process of security sector reform. At the same time, if a peace agreement is to stick, initiatives are needed to re-integrate members of the armed groups, including paramilitary elements, into society. Experiences from Aceh and Mindanao show the difficulty of this task as it should not only involve financial remuneration and compensation for former combatants, but also address their long term rehabilitation. In addition, such initiatives must be integrated with moves to address the needs of the victims of violence to provide relief for their suffering and to prevent it from being seen as a program to reward armed combatants. Thus, reconciliation efforts are essential to sustaining peace in the post-agreement period.

At the same time, it must be pointed out that while it is acknowledged that the need for peace involves a search for truth and justice, parties are understandably hesitant to push for peace through retributive means. Experiences from Cambodia, Aceh, and Mindanao show that peace and justice are not always compatible in the peace process. Instead, transitional justice that combines the need for truth with reconciliation between former enemies is the preferred approach. As a result, parties will be more likely to set aside the notion of justice in the push for peace. Moreover, peace is a development issue because affected communities must see dividends from the peace process. While a political solution is crucial, improvements in the social and especially economic situation of communities must also be observable to ensure peace is sustained.

(9) **Indigenous approaches to dispute resolution are often more appropriate than international 'best practice.'** While an interesting argument, such a statement raises a number of questions. One involves the nature of the indigenous approaches mentioned, and another asks whether international best practices even exist. As such, more studies need to be done on local wisdom and practices in conflict management, resolution, and transformation in the region. Because textbooks usually assume that conflicts are similar in nature, peace processes tend to use the same approach and frameworks, albeit depending on the nature, types, and issues of the conflict, as well as the actors involved. However, in some cases, indigenous approaches have been elicited and used to address conflict issues, as indeed they should be. One such case involved the *Baku Bae* approach of reconciliation in the Ambon conflict in Indonesia. Another emphasizes universality and common attributes as prescribed in the national ideologies of the *Pancasila* in Indonesia and the *Rukun Negara* in Malaysia. Still another example involved Cambodia's reconciliation process where the focus was put firmly on mercy and peace in the aftermath of a very difficult civil war and much human suffering. Therefore, the indigenous approach should be elicited and utilized in peacebuilding and peacemaking as much as possible.

At the regional level, it is noticeable that decision-making processes and the management of disputes has at least benefitted from some local practices such as *musyawarah* (consensus-seeking) and *muafakat* (consensus) contributing to the formation of an ASEAN Way of dispute resolution. This forms part of ASEAN's *preventive diplomacy approach*. Other potentially 'indigenous' approaches include highlighting the importance of values (including religious and local traditions) in bringing groups together; the involvement of affected communities and groups in the transformation and peacebuilding processes; and the (not so popular) peace and stability approach of conflict management adopted especially by states when faced with various demands to address pressing issues affecting communities. Again, more work needs to be done on these matters as one could argue that such approaches are universal and not specific to this region.

(10) **Transformative peacebuilding**. Finally, as mentioned throughout this book, the process of transformative peacebuilding is crucial to all aspects of achieving sustainable positive peace. It is also central to the peace process. Certain elements must be transformed before a formal peace process can even begin. Such a process would result in more transformations to ensure sustainability. It could be argued that in cases where the peace process has yet to achieve a positive result like in Southern Thailand, such elements as issues, context, structures, and to a certain extent, actors, have yet to be fully transformed. Examples from Aceh and especially Mindanao have shown how transformative peacebuilding can contribute to the peace process and to achieving peace in long-term conflict situations.

As mentioned previously, *contingency* and *complementarity* are vital components of transformative peacebuilding. This points to a need to be ready for any situation and for different actors to work together and complement each other in support of the process. This is also part of what is termed *strategic peacebuilding* – focusing on specific activities, actors, and institutions that can be useful in the peacebuilding and peace process. Transformative peacebuilding should focus on transforming these components so they can strategically affect the process for peace. As Lederach (1997) states:

> *… the process of building peace must rely on and operate within a framework and a time frame defined by sustainable transformation ... [A] sustainable transformative approach suggests that the key lies in the relationship of the involved parties, with all that the term encompasses at the psychological, spiritual, social, economic, political and military levels.*

This is particularly true of the work done in this region. He goes on to say that such efforts are intended to create an infrastructure for peacebuilding, which means that

> *we are not merely interested in 'ending' something that is not desired. We are oriented toward the building of relationships that in their totality form new patterns, processes, and structures (Lederach, 1997).*

This notion of building something new to ensure peace in the region is an important part of the transformative peacebuilding process.

In conclusion, the lessons learnt from regional peace processes as discussed here and in the previous chapters is summarized in the comprehensive peace process flowchart created by Norbert Ropers (2021) from the Peace Resource Collaborative (PRC) presented below. It shows that there are many aspects and phases to conducting a peace process, many of which are interconnected and involve a variety of actors. The complementarity of these actors is crucial to ensure success.

Diagram 8.1 The peace process flowchart



Source: Norbert Ropers, 2021

8.6 Conclusion

This chapter presents a summary of the lessons learnt in this book and argues that conflicts in the region should be approached through transformative peacebuilding. While there are differences between approaches to address inter- and intra-state conflicts, transformative aspects are still evident at various steps and levels of these methods. However, results can vary depending on other variables as explained especially in Chapter 5. In the end, the struggle is always about trying to achieve sustainable positive peace, creating a long-term infrastructure for peace, and promoting a culture of peace in the region. While positive examples from the implementation of this approach do exist, many challenges still need to be overcome. As mentioned previously, the best way to look at this framework is to see it as a work in progress.

As this sourcebook is being written, the world is facing new challenges brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. All countries in this region are being adversely affected by it. Apart from the obvious challenges of addressing the crisis by controlling the spread of the virus and managing the effects of the pandemic on the economy and other aspects of life, the pandemic has also brought forth differences and sharpened lines between identity, cultural, and economic groups in many countries around the region. This can be seen as an initial reaction to the crisis. Luckily, the way the pandemic is being handled has improved, even as the COVID-19 situation remains gravely serious. A situation such as this affecting everyone, needs the collaborative efforts of all to adequately address it. Another issue that has rocked the region is the military coup in Myanmar on 1 February 2021. The arrests of democratically elected leaders and the suspension of democracy have led to a serious crisis situation with hundreds of deaths on the streets of Myanmar. Daily demonstrations led by the civilian democratic movement have not yet persuaded the military regime to reverse its position. Although the coup has resulted in international condemnation, it seems to be having little effect on the regime. The situation presents a particular challenge for the ASEAN way of conflict management. So far it has not proven to be of much help as differences of opinion on how to approach the situation have rendered it incapable of producing any positive results.

Despite this rather bleak outlook on the regional situation, it is hoped that the other more positive examples presented in this book will serve to illustrate the various approaches and frameworks that make up the transformative peacebuilding way of addressing issues in Southeast Asia and that this will convince us that we are indeed moving in the right direction. As mentioned many times before, we do believe that these strategies are still a work in progress and that they can be improved upon to achieve sustainable positive peace and a culture of peace for the region.

Discussion questions

1. Why is peace still a “work-in-progress” in Southeast Asia?
2. What are the major challenges for achieving sustainable positive peace in the region?
3. How can we improve ASEAN’s conflict management framework?
4. What are the most important conflict-related issues affecting the region?
5. How true is the notion that conflict in Southeast Asia is both constructive and transformative?
6. What is the role of indigenous approaches and “local wisdom” in the management and transformation of conflicts?
7. What is the role of development in sustaining peace? How do we go about choosing which kind of development to focus on for peace to happen?
8. Can rebels and insurgents be convinced to disarm and join the peace process? If so, how do we go about doing it?

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